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ABSTRACT
Work-Family Reconciliation Policies Reexamined: Good or Bad for Gender and Class Inequality
in Employment across Twenty-Four High-Income Countries?
by
Sarah Kostecki
Advisor: Dr. Janet Gornick

In this dissertation, I am in conversation with the small but influential gendered tradeoffs
literature. First, multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise policy measures were developed
for two of the most widely studied work-family reconciliation policies—leave and ECEC. I
constructed a comprehensive set of leave and ECEC policy measures for 24 high-income
countries using secondary and country-specific sources. The goal was to determine which
countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are “well-developed” across multiple policy
dimensions. The new measures were then used in combination with the LIS microdata to
reevaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis—whether well-developed leave and ECEC support
women’s employment but adversely affect women’s work intensity, earnings, and occupational
attainment, by class. To extend the literature, the relationship between the two policies and class
inequality in employment between low- and highly educated women was also explored.
Overall, the results show the importance of moving toward multidimensional,
disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC policy measures for use in gendered tradeoffs
research. A newly constructed policy typology categorizes the development of leave and ECEC
across multiple dimensions better than standard welfare state categorizations. The varied
relationships among the measures of individual policy dimensions raise the question of what
types of relationships, if any, we should see among policy measures. The ongoing debate as to
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whether “well-developed” leave and ECEC worsen gender employment inequalities may be a
result of the many ways these policies have been measured and utilized across different studies.
Utilizing the new typology and policy measures to reevaluate the gendered tradeoffs
hypothesis adapting the two main methods in the literature (regimes and multilevel models), the
results suggest any empirical evidence to support the hypothesis is explained only by certain
design features of leave policy. Unintended, class gaps between low- and highly educated
women may also be exacerbated by certain design features of leave policy. Therefore, the results
provide some support for “class tradeoffs” among women and well as gendered tradeoffs.
However, evidence to support gendered tradeoffs and, new to the literature, class
tradeoffs is dependent on the method used to test relationships between the policy dimensions
and outcomes, the class definition used, and included country cases. Building on accumulated
evidence in the literature, there is no evidence to suggest that “good” ECEC adversely affects
women’s employment and attainment. If we want to continue to evaluate the links between these
two prominent work-family reconciliation policies and women’s employment, then the issue of
unintended consequences of these policies cannot be separated from the issue of intended
consequences of these policies.
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PART 1: STUDY BACKGROUND
Chapter 1: Overview of Study
Introduction
This dissertation is in conversation with the small but influential gendered tradeoffs
literature. In it, I address key methodological and empirical gaps to add to the main debates and
move the literature forward.
The gendered tradeoffs hypothesis suggests that generous work-family policies (inclusive
of work-family reconciliation policies that help parents, mainly mothers, reconcile tensions
between paid and unpaid work, including leave and early childhood education and care (ECEC))
are linked to worsened gender inequalities in employment. The argument is that, though
generous policies support women’s employment, they also lower the glass ceiling for women and
hinder women’s earnings, compared to men’s earnings. The literature suggests that gendered
tradeoffs, or unintended consequences, are not uniform for women across class (measured by
educational attainment, annual earnings, or occupational status). However, the debate is still
ongoing as to whether and to what extent generous work-family policies promote worsened
outcomes for women and whether these policies are more detrimental to labor market outcomes
for high-status women compared to low-status women.1
To add to the complexity of the link between work-family policies and labor market
outcomes for women, the policy indicators used in the literature are overly simplified. They
measure one or two dimensions of the generosity of these policies, such as the length of paid
leave and the percentage of children under the age of compulsory schooling in ECEC. 2

1
2

High-status and low-status to be defined later in the chapter.
Usually five or six years of age, though this age cutoff varies across countries.

1

Increasingly, scholars have pointed to the need for better policy measures of work-family
policies (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019; Hook and Li 2020; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013;
Mandel 2012). I address the call for better policy measurement and construction of policy
measures for two of the most widely studied policies in this body of research—leave and ECEC.
These policies help women combine paid with unpaid work and are categorized specifically as
“work-family reconciliation policies.”
Only once the issues of work-family policy measurement, problematic policy indicators,
and outdated country classifications are addressed can the debate move forward and the gendered
tradeoffs hypothesis be reevaluated. The question is whether “well-developed” leave and ECEC
policy dimensions in high-income countries are positively linked to women’s employment but
negatively linked to women’s labor market attainment. The term “well-developed” has been used
in past studies (see Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, for example) but is never adequately
defined. In this study, well-developed leave and ECEC policies are defined as those policies that
best support women’s employment across multiple policy dimensions, based on evidence from
the literature. It is a technical term that is distinctly related to the measurement of leave and
ECEC policies. Leave and ECEC policies are considered well-developed if they rank highly
across indicators that measure multiple policy dimensions.3
Throughout this dissertation, “leave” is used as an umbrella term that encompasses three
different types of leave policies: maternity leave (around the birth of a child, for mothers),
paternity leave (around the birth of a child, for fathers), and parental leave (longer leaves
available to parents once maternity and paternity leave end). 4 The terms “ECEC services,”
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To be explained in more detail later in the chapter.
Across some countries, such as Iceland, there is no differentiation between these three types of programs. An
evaluation of program types can be found in more detail in the appendix for Chapter 4.
4
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“ECEC,” or “ECEC arrangements” are used as umbrella terms that encompass different types of
care and pre-primary education services for children under compulsory schooling age. “Policy
indicator” and “policy measure” are used interchangeably and defined as the tools that are used
to measure dimensions of work-family reconciliation policies.
Distinct concepts of the relationship between welfare states, work-family policies, and
women’s outcomes are important to this study. A “welfare state paradox” is meant to signal that
generous or well-developed welfare states with large public service sectors—mainly the Social
Democratic welfare states (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden)—promote women’s
employment but hinder women’s chances for high earnings and desirable positions (Mandel and
Semyonov 2005, 2006). “Gendered tradeoffs” is also used to define the relationship between
work-family policies and adverse labor market outcomes for women. The term signals that welldeveloped work-family policies promote women’s employment but worsen gender employment
inequality across measures such as annual earnings or occupational attainment. This concept
largely ignores the country of origin of these policies. However, both concepts presuppose that
well-developed welfare states and/or work-family policies worsen gender employment
inequalities.
An associated question is about the link between work-family reconciliation policies and
class inequalities among women in employment. If well-developed policies are linked to
worsened gender employment inequalities, could they potentially be linked to improved class
employment inequalities among women? That well-developed work-family reconciliation
policies reduce class inequalities among women may be an “intended” consequence of these
policies. But is this intended consequence at the potential expense of worsened gender
employment inequality?

3

Worsened gender employment inequalities linked to well-developed work-family policies
can also be defined as “unintended consequences” of these policies. Also important to this study
is the debate over whether these policies promote inequalities for certain groups of women over
others (see Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019 and Hook and Li 2020 for more on these points).5
Finally, the terms “tradeoffs” and “paradox” may be stretched to encompass links between leave,
ECEC, and adverse labor market outcomes for different sample groups. Where each term is
applicable will be specifically stated across the chapters.
To carry out this research, two main data sources were utilized. First, detailed countrylevel policy data from a variety of primary and secondary sources from around the years 2010
and 2013 were compiled into two new policy databases. These data will be used for the
measurement and construction of new leave and ECEC policy measures. Household income
datasets from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database for 24 high-income countries from
around the years 2010 and 2013 will also be used for two analyses.6 The first is a descriptive
assessment of a set of women’s labor market outcomes (employment, part-time employment,
annual earnings (hereafter, “earnings”), managerial status, and lucrative managerial status). The
second analysis looks at the relationship between leave and ECEC policies, as measured in the
indicators, and the labor market outcomes, with the use of correlation analysis and multilevel
modeling.
In this introductory chapter, I introduce the research background—why the issue of
gendered tradeoffs matters, the theoretical puzzle, my argument, and my research goals. I end
with an outline of the dissertation moving forward.

5
6

For a comprehensive list of terminology terms used in this dissertation, please see Appendix 1.
The years of the country-level policy data were chosen to match the years of the LIS data.
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Why the Relationship Between Work-Family Policy and Gender Inequality in Employment
Matters
Across high-income countries, women’s paid employment has become the norm over the
past several decades, but gender inequality in employment across nearly all measures continues
to persist (UN Women 2015).
National governments and international organizations such as the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations (UN) recognize the necessity of work-family policies
to help women enter and maintain employment and reconcile paid work with unpaid care work.
At the country level, national governments provide work-family policies to assist families,
mainly mothers, with the care of children and time off around childbirth. For example, leave
policies provide new parents with time off, usually paid, around the birth of the child (this leave
is mainly allocated to mothers and is increasingly allocated to fathers), and ECEC policies are
supports provided for the care of children, such as publicly available childcare or subsidies to
parents to offset the cost of care.
That work-family policies vary in generosity across different country-level contexts is
well-known. For example, the United States provides very weak work-family supports for
women, such as 12-week unpaid leaves around the birth of a child through the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). These short, unpaid leaves uphold the cultural expectation that care work
should be provided by the family, specifically mothers. Conversely, Scandinavian countries
provide generous work-family policies, such as long, well-paid leaves and widely accessible and
affordable childcare. These policies are defined by gender egalitarian principles that are aimed at
women’s integration in employment.
A large body of literature that links work-family policies and women’s labor market
outcomes suggests that generous work-family policies, such as well-paid leaves allocated to

5

mothers or low-cost, widely available childcare for children under the age of compulsory
schooling, better support women’s employment and reduce gender gaps across measures such as
earnings and occupational attainment (Gornick and Meyers 2003; see Hegewisch and Gornick
2011 for a thorough literature review).
Conversely, another set of literature links generous work-family policies to worsened
labor market outcomes for women. Particular to this study, the small body of gendered tradeoffs
literature argues that generous work-family policies are may be linked to worsened labor market
outcomes for women compared to men (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Pettit and Hook
2009) and for mothers compared to non-mothers (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019). Generous
policies segregate women and mothers into female-typed occupations (low-status/low-skilled
roles, often low-paid and with less opportunity for professional advancement; in this body of
literature, the term often refers to occupations in the public care sector), lower the glass ceiling
for women, and overall stunt women’s pay and job prospects in comparison to men’s.
Over the past 15 years, the debate surrounding argument for a welfare state paradox or
gendered tradeoffs has been further refined by the suggestion of the uneven benefits of workfamily policies for differently situated women in employment. This argument draws from the
feminist idea of intersectionality—that women experience “complex inequalities” (McCall 2001)
“of race, class, gender, and other dimensions of inequality in society…. Intersectionality draws
attention to patterns of interactions between different aspects of power and inequalities within
categories of individuals too often seen as relatively homogenous” (Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund 2013, 2).
Adapting the concept of intersectionality for gendered tradeoffs research, the argument is
that diversity among employed women, especially among women with different skill sets and/or

6

levels of educational attainment, is not commonly highlighted in the research linking workfamily policies and gender employment inequalities. Across all high-income countries, women
with a tertiary education (a four-year college degree or higher) have high levels of employment
(Esping-Andersen 2009; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007) regardless of work-family policy
context. However, scholars debate whether the work-family policy context affects the
composition of employment for women without a college degree. In some countries, women
without a tertiary education are likely to be in employment over others (Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund 2013). These facts suggest that women have different levels of bargaining power and
opportunities across different policy contexts that are specifically linked to skill and educational
differences (Mandel 2012).
Theoretical Puzzle
That generous work-family policies may be linked to unintended consequences for
women’s employment and attainment, and that unintended consequences are not uniform for
women across different class groups, is the main puzzle in the literature that is the subject of
continued debate. There is little consensus in the literature on whether and to what extent
generous work-family policies hinder the employment and attainments of some groups of women
compared to others.
The puzzle is supported by two dominant groups of theories—supply-side theories about
women’s preferences for employment and demand-side theories of employer statistical
discrimination. The association, or causal link, between policy effects and gender employment
inequality is murky, however. Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 952) argue “women’s job
preferences cannot be detached from employers’ behavior and labor market opportunities.”

7

Supply-side theories link generous work-family policies to worsened employment
inequalities in hiring, advancement, and pay. Women that take up long leaves or part-time work
options may self-select into jobs with lower pay or occupational advancement—often in femaletyped occupations. The welfare state as employer argument suggests that large public sectors and
the provision of widely available, publicly subsidized childcare draws women into female-typed
occupations with little room for professional advancement. Preferences for work in female-typed
occupations may be linked to women’s perceptions of employer behavior. Skillsets and human
capital may also erode over time due to repeated leave-taking.
The theory of capabilities parallels the supply-side theories, above. The argument is that
an individual’s well-being is the result of agency and capabilities (Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1992) as
well as work-family policies. Individuals have different resources (for example, levels of
educational attainment) and freedoms to choose between different ways of living. Both agency
and capabilities interact with available work-family policies to help women make decisions
about employment (Hobson 2011; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013). Gender inequalities in
employment can result from these individual choices that are partly shaped by available workfamily policies.
On the demand side are theories about the relationship between work-family policies and
employer statistical discrimination. Women are perceived by employers as taking time out of
work for caregiving responsibilities or as likely to reduce their working hours more than men
(Hegewisch and Gornick 2011). Employers learn this behavior over time and penalize women in
terms of occupational advancement and pay.
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Bringing in a class dimension, the claim is that generous work-family policies are more
likely to worsen gender gaps in employment attainment between high-status7 women and men
compared to low-status men and women.8 In this study, “high-status” and “low-status” are
umbrella terms that encompass different possible class definitions. The first is the characteristic
of the worker. Worker characteristics are often defined by human capital or educational
attainment. These terms can also signal what type of job a person holds. Annual earnings or
hourly wages are used delineate high-paying jobs versus low-paying jobs (jobs with earnings
above or below the median, for example). Occupational attainment is another way to delineate
different job types. Managerial or non-managerial positions can be used to indicate skilled jobs
versus non-skilled jobs for example. Class identification through occupational groups is much
harder to quantify due to limited data availability on occupational groups, though it has been
attempted (see Mandel and Shalev 2009). When referring to past research, I will use the
language used by the author(s). Otherwise, I will use the umbrella terms “high-status” or “lowstatus.”
The argument is that, in generous welfare states, employer statistical discrimination is not
as relevant for low-status women because centralized wage-setting institutions offset any
negative effects of generous welfare state policies on the earnings and occupational attainment of
low-status women. Wage-setting institutions compress earnings for those at the bottom of the
income distribution. This compression of earnings reduces earnings gaps between low-status
men and low-status women (Mandel 2012).

7

Mainly defined by level of educational attainment, earnings/wages, and occupation.
I use status because it is in line with the longer concept of “socio-economic status.” Socio-economic status is an
umbrella term that describes class differences of individuals and groups. For ease of narration, throughout this
dissertation I use the shorter term, status.
8
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Conversely, highly skilled women are not protected under strong wage-setting
institutions in countries with generous work-family policies. Employers statistically discriminate
against women in terms of pay and occupational advancement in the absence of these
protections. Employers are also less willing to invest in the skills of highly skilled women if it is
assumed they will interrupt their careers for childrearing or opt to work a reduced hourly
schedule to combine paid and unpaid work (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
2012).910
Argument, Replication, and Advancement of Gendered Tradeoffs Research
Two main advancements have been made in the literature to date. The first advancement
is the growing evidence for the use of discrete work-family policy measures. A key issue in the
literature is whether work-family policies are provided as a package—with this policy package
similarly influencing women’s labor market outcomes—or whether work-family policies have
different links to women’s labor market outcomes. Those that argue work-family policies are
packaged and similarly influence women’s employment construct policy indices that are
inclusive of several measures of individual policies such as weeks of paid leave, the enrollment
rates of children in ECEC, and the size of the public sector. However, those that argue work-
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Advantaged women also enjoy fewer protections under centralized wage-setting institutions than disadvantaged
women in countries with generous welfare states. Mandel (2012, 245) argues protections of centralized wage
institutions are not in the interests of highly skilled women anyway “because their effect is to lower the wage
ceiling, they can potentially reach, while raising the cost of outsourcing domestic services”.
10
These assessments are also in line with gendered critiques of the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature. For
example, Estevez-Abe (2005, 2006) finds sex segregation is lower in the weakly developed welfare states of marketoriented economies of the US and Canada. She argues that labor markets are less gender-segregated, both
horizontally and vertically, due to weaker employment protections and weak family policies that are less likely to
interrupt women’s careers. Conversely, strong employment protections of coordinated market economies (in
countries like Norway and Sweden) promote occupational sex segregation. Family policies that allow women to
interrupt their careers more often make matters even worse, because “in this context policies that shield mothers
from work obligations further erode their attractiveness as employees” (Mandel 2011, 161).
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family policies have differential effects for women’s labor market outcomes use discrete policy
indicators.
Accumulated empirical evidence in the literature shows that two of the policies widely
studied in gendered tradeoffs research—leave and ECEC—have different relationships with
women’s employment and labor market attainment. Aggregating measures of multiple workfamily policy measures into policy indices masks the differential effects these policies have for
women’s labor market outcomes.
Though still debated, the empirical evidence for leave suggests that long leaves 11 may
worsen gender earnings gaps and gaps in occupational attainments (Mandel 2012; Mandel and
Semyonov 2005, 2006; Pettit and Hook 2009). Conversely, the empirical evidence for the
relationship between ECEC and gender employment inequalities suggests that generous ECEC
(measured predominantly by enrollment rates of children in care) reduces gender employment
gaps (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017) or at the very least has no discernable relationship with
gender inequality in employment (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019). In other words, “good”
ECEC is not linked to “bad” or unintended consequences for women in employment. Whether
generous or not, ECEC always supports women’s employment or is not associated with negative
effects for women’s employment and attainment. What matters is the quality of women’s
employment associated with different ECEC arrangements across countries and how different
ECEC arrangements shape women’s preferences for employment. Where ECEC is more
accessible and affordable, women hold higher-quality and higher-paying jobs. Employers are
more likely to hire women where state support for the care of children is high. The opposite is

11

Whether paid or unpaid, though long leaves are often low-paid and/or unpaid.
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true in countries where ECEC is less generous—e.g., not as widely available, or unaffordable
(Gornick and Meyers 2003).
The second advancement made in the literature is that work-family policies “do not lead
to paradoxes for all women” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 22). This growing empirical
evidence suggests that the relationship between work-family policies and women’s labor market
outcomes is not uniform across all class groups and should include a class dimension. Whether
and to what extent work-family policies linked to gendered tradeoffs in employment differ for
women by class is the focus of much continued debate.
These two advances in the literature form my main point of departure for the setup of this
study. To be in conversation with this small but influential group of literature, I argue for the
need to address the call for better data and measures on two key work-family policies—leave and
ECEC (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019; Hook and Li 2020; Mandel 2012; Sirén et al. 2020). This
is because current policy measures used throughout much of the research are narrow in scope
and do not take into consideration how well-developed leave and ECEC policies are across
multiple policy dimensions. We need to be able to better identify whether leave and ECEC
policies, and more specifically, the particular dimensions of these policies, generate employment
(in)equalities in the first place. The disaggregation done so far is inadequate.
Current measures of leave and ECEC are narrow in scope, over-simplified, and
constructed based on one or two dimensions of policy generosity—e.g., how many weeks of paid
leave are granted, or the enrollment of children under the age of compulsory schooling. Other
important dimensions of these policies are barely considered across the literature. For example,
leave may be generous in length or payment to mothers, but limited across the literature are
discussions of leave generosity for fathers and how fathers’ leave is linked to women’s
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employment. The payment rate of leave and eligibility requirements are important dimensions of
leave policy—payment and eligibility dictates who has access to leave in the first place. For
ECEC, out-of-pocket costs and whether care is a legal right to children matters for the quality of
women’s jobs. Are additional dimensions of leave and ECEC linked to consequences for women
in employment similar to what has already been found in the literature?
I propose for new leave policy indicators to be constructed that measure three dimensions
of leave policy: generosity (dimension 1)—how much leave is granted to both mothers and
fathers; gender equality (dimension 2)—fathers’ reserved share of all leave provided to mothers
and fathers; finally, the universality of leave (dimension 3)—the breadth of receipt. I suggest the
need for ECEC policy indicators that measure two dimensions: generosity (dimension 1) and
universality (dimension 2). A more complete set of ECEC generosity indicators will be
constructed that measure the percentage of children under compulsory schooling age in publicly
provided care and the cost of care to single and coupled parents. A measure of the universality of
leave that measures children’s right to leave at the national level, and the age and hours of
entitlement—will also be constructed.
Second, and relatedly, operational issues need to be addressed. Outdated, and in some
instances problematic, indicators need to be replaced or updated. Operational issues include
problematic indicators, such as full-time equivalent (FTE) leave, where the length of leave and
the wage replacement rate of leave are multiplied together to obtain the number of fully paid
weeks of leave. This measure can distort the true generosity of leave across countries. 12
Third, most policy data used to construct policy measures in the literature are from the
late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Policies can also change over time. I argue country-level policy data
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This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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used to construct policy measures used in this body of research are outdated and may not
adequately reflect more current relationships between work-family policies and women’s
employment. Updated country-level policy data from more recent years, around the years 2010
and 2013 in this study, will be used for the construction of new policy measures to study updated
relationships between policies and women’s labor market outcomes.
Third is the issue of domain. Most previous studies limited themselves to the usual 15–20
high-income countries and the use of out-of-date or inappropriate categories to sort countries—
predominantly Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) “Three Worlds” typology. These choices are no
longer justified, so other countries should be included along with new categories. The
incorporation of more high-income countries from Eastern Europe, 13 countries not traditionally
used in gendered tradeoffs research, coupled with a new set of policy measures will show
whether the usual suspects (e.g., the Social Democratic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
and Norway)14 provide leave and ECEC policies that are the most well-developed compared to
other countries in the study. A new country-level work-family reconciliation policy typology will
be generated from the newly constructed policy leave and ECEC measures. This typology will
advance the literature by showing that other countries beyond the Social Democratic countries
provide leave and ECEC policies that can be characterized as well-developed across multiple
dimensions of these policies.
The new set of multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC policy
indicators and the new work-family reconciliation policy country typology will then be used to
reevaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and, new to the literature, the relationship between
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Select Eastern European countries have been incorporated into gendered tradeoffs research, including the Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, and Hungary, I include more countries from this region.
14
Sweden, also classified as a Social Democratic country, is not included in this study because updated household
income data are not available in the LIS Database.
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the two policies and women’s class inequality (hereafter called the “women’s class inequality
hypothesis”). The replication and extension of analyses will be carried out by adapting and
utilizing the two predominant methodological approaches from the literature (regimes/family
policy contexts and multilevel modelling). Adapting and utilizing these two main methodological
approaches will allow me to compare my results, using the new policy measures and typology, to
past research findings.
Descriptive analyses of labor market outcomes will first be reevaluated. The newly
constructed work-family reconciliation policy typology will be used to evaluate employment
patterns for working-aged men and women across the new leave and ECEC policy groupings.
Correlation analyses between a set five labor market outcomes and gender and class gaps for two
sample groups (working-aged men and women and working-aged low- and highly educated
women) and the newly constructed policy measures will also be carried out.
Finally, a reevaluation of policy effects for women’s labor market outcomes will be
revisited using multilevel modeling. Select cross-sectional analyses from Brady, Blome, and
Kmec (2019) will be extended utilizing the new policy measures. I employ the use of multilevel
models to empirically evaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and the women’s class
inequality hypothesis. This analysis will help me to draw conclusions about the relationship
between leave and ECEC, as measured in the newly constructed work-family reconciliation
policy measures, and two labor market outcomes (employment and annual earnings) for the same
two sample groups. For the sample of men and women, a class approach is incorporated by
carrying out the analyses for men and women by three levels of educational attainment.15
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Different class definitions are used across the analyses in Chapter 8.
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Including an evaluation of the link between these policies and class inequality among
women extends the gendered tradeoffs literature. Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013, 30) argue,
“We believe the earner-carer policies developed in the Nordic countries hold the promise of
working to promote gender egalitarianism and class equality simultaneously.” Like Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund (2013), feminists argue that policies such as well-developed leave and
ECEC may be linked to reduced labor market inequalities among employed women (Gornick
and Meyers 2003). Adapting these ideas to this research, a missing piece of the tradeoffs puzzle
is whether well-developed work-family reconciliation policies reduce inequalities among
employed women across different class groups. If well-developed work-family reconciliation
policies are intended to reduce class divisions among working women, does the evidence support
this? If gender employment inequalities are exacerbated by well-developed leave and ECEC,
does this mean that well-developed leave and ECEC improve class inequalities among women,
potentially at the expense of worsened gender employment inequalities?
Research Goals and Outline
Research Goals
I have several interrelated goals with this dissertation research. The first goal is to
emphasize problems with current work-family policy indicators used in this body of literature
and to develop and introduce a more complete set of multidimensional, disaggregated, and
precise leave and ECEC policy indicators. This more complete set of measures will better
address which countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed in design.
These measures will be used to generate a new work-family reconciliation policy typology that
better categorizes which countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed
across different policy dimensions.
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A second, related goal is the construction of two new country-level policy databases for
leave and ECEC, with updated policy information for all 24 countries included in the study. Both
the policy indicators and the database will be made available to scholars for future research.
The third goal is to use the newly constructed indicators to replicate and extend analyses
across the literature. I argue a more complete set of leave and ECEC policy measures will be able
to better uncover relationships between leave and ECEC, as measured in the indicators, and labor
market outcomes for women across high-income countries.
Overall, this dissertation is intended to be a hybrid study that merges the two main
methods utilized in gendered tradeoffs research to date—welfare state regimes/family policy
contexts and multilevel modeling. Each country’s leave and ECEC policy context matters for the
measurement of these policies and the operationalization of policy data into discrete policy
measures. Likewise, any evidence of policy effects for gender and class employment
(in)equalities are dependent on leave and ECEC family policy context and policy measurement.
Chapter Outline
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the gendered tradeoffs literature and key debates in order to set
up my motivation for the study. The limitations in the literature, particularly as they pertain to
leave and ECEC policy measurement and indicator construction, and my theoretical argument
are both explained in Chapter 3.
This rest of this dissertation is setup in two parts. In Part 2 (Chapters 4–7), leave and
ECEC policy measurement and indicator construction will be detailed and critiqued. The focus
will be to conceptually unpack what it means for policies to be well-developed based on the
measurement of these policies. In Part 3 (Chapters 8 and 9), the newly constructed leave and
ECEC policy measures and a new work-family reconciliation policy typology will be used to
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replicate and extend gendered tradeoffs research across descriptive analyses, correlation
analyses, and with the use of multilevel modeling. As an extension to the literature, the link
between the policies and class inequalities among women in employment will also be assessed.
In Chapter 4, data and measurement for leave and ECEC indicator construction and the
research methods for Part 2 are introduced. Chapters 5 and 6 present empirical findings of two
descriptive analyses. In the first descriptive analysis across both chapters, I evaluate and compare
new leave and ECEC policy indicators to standard measures used in the literature. In the second
descriptive analysis across both chapters, I evaluate correlations among policy indicators. With
the correlations, I intend to show the complexity of policy measurement—how simple measures
of leave and ECEC policy generosity may or may not represent the scope of these policies more
generally across other dimensions based on relationships among the measures. Further, I will
show that which countries support well-developed leave and ECEC depends on how policies are
measured. These results will help me move toward a more complete, precise, and
multidimensional set of policy measures that can be used to evaluate links with women’s
employment outcomes.
Chapter 7 will present a new typology of work-family reconciliation policies. The
typology will better categorize leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed across multiple
policy dimensions into five policy groups (the most well-developed policy group to the least
well-developed policy group). The typology and the policy indicators used to construct the
typology will be used for the descriptive and statistical analyses in Part 3.
In Chapter 8 (Part 3), gendered tradeoffs research will be replicated and extended. I will
present findings from two descriptive analyses. First, I will compare patterns of five labor market
outcomes (employment, part-time employment, earnings, managerial status, and lucrative
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managerial status) for samples of working-aged men and women, utilizing three different class
definitions (educational attainment, earnings, and occupational attainment). I will also evaluate
class gaps among low- and highly educated women across measures of employment, part-time
employment, and annual earnings. Descriptive results will be organized using the new policy
typology from Chapter 7. In a second analysis, I will explain correlations between the labor
market outcomes and 11 of the newly constructed leave and ECEC measures. I will show the
extent to which different dimensions of leave and ECEC are correlated with the five labor market
outcomes. I will begin to draw conclusions about the link between well-developed leave and
ECEC policy dimensions and gender and class employment inequalities.
In Chapter 9, I will show results for two sets of hierarchical multilevel models for a
sample of men and women across three educational groups and a sample of low- and highly
educated women. I will determine the link between eight leave and ECEC policy dimensions, as
measured in the new indicators, and gaps in employment and earnings across the two sample
groups, keeping the models and the two labor market outcomes constant.
Finally, in Chapter 10, I will discuss the practical contributions of my research as it
pertains to the measurement of leave and ECEC policy and the relationship between these
policies and women’s labor market outcomes. I will also discuss the theoretical contributions and
policy implications of my research findings. I conclude with the limitations and future research
directions.
Overall Research Findings
Overall, the results in Part 2 show the importance of moving toward multidimensional,
disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC policy measures for use in gendered tradeoffs
research. Three main findings are apparent from Part 2. First, standard measures of leave and
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ECEC policies—especially leave policies—may be problematic or may not precisely measure
leave and childcare. For example, standard measures of leave policy generosity such as FTE
leave (the weeks of leave multiplied by the wage replacement rate) and weeks of paid leave (at
any wage replacement rate) equate well-paid leaves with poorly paid leaves.
The second finding is the identification of six possible relationships among the policy
variables using correlation analyses. The varied relationships among the measures of individual
policy dimensions raise the question of what types of relationships, if any, we should see among
policy measures. Should measures be highly correlated and adhere to the expectations of ideal
regime types (see Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2005; Mandel 2012), or should we see no
correlations among the measures (see Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019)? I definitively show that
leave and ECEC policy indicators are narrow in scope, or at the very least are limited in the
capacity to represent the scope of leave and ECEC policy more broadly. I argue the ongoing
debate as to whether “well-developed” leave and ECEC worsens employment inequalities may
be a result of the many ways these policies have been measured and utilized across different
studies—it is clear scholars are not measuring these policies the same way across countries, so
the persistence of the gendered tradeoffs debate should come as no surprise.
Finally, the policy measures and rankings of these measures do not provide evidence for
standard regime classifications. While the data supports that the Social Democratic regime is
(nearly) robust, perhaps because leave and ECEC policies are constructed based on gender
egalitarian values, a newly constructed work-family reconciliation policy typology categorizes
the development of leave and ECEC across multiple dimensions better than standard welfare
state categorizations. The typology identifies leave and ECEC policy variation both within and
across the policy groupings and within the 24 individual countries. The rankings of nine policy
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measures and points granted or subtracted for incentives and disincentives for fathers’ use of
leave that are used to construct the typology can be compared to evaluate how “well-developed”
these policies are across multiple policy dimensions.
Utilizing the new typology and policy measures to reevaluate the gendered tradeoffs
hypothesis and, new to the literature, the women’s class inequality hypothesis, adapting the two
main methods in the literature (regimes and multilevel models), the results in Part 3 suggest any
evidence to support or refute these hypotheses is explained only by certain design features of
leave policy—mainly features of leave policy universality and the generosity of leave policy for
mothers and fathers. From a set of multilevel models, leave universality seems to reduce
employment gaps between men and women across three levels of educational attainment.
However, both well-paid and unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers worsen gender earnings gaps
between low-and medium-educated men and women (well-paid leaves only worsen gaps
between highly educated men and women). Unintended, the results also show that leave periods
allocated to mothers actually worsen class employment gaps among women, regardless of
whether leaves are unpaid, poorly paid, or well-paid. Therefore, the results provide some support
for “class tradeoffs” among women, as well as gendered tradeoffs. However, any evidence to
support (or refute) gendered tradeoffs or, new to the literature, class tradeoffs, is also dependent
on the method used to test relationships between the policy dimensions and outcomes, the class
definition used, and included country cases.
Building on accumulated evidence in the literature, there is no evidence to suggest that
“good” ECEC dimensions, as measured by the enrollment of children in publicly provided care,
adversely affects women’s employment and attainment. “Good” ECEC seems to have nonsignificant or positive effects on women’s employment. Conversely, “bad” ECEC, such as high
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out-of-pocket costs to couples who work and have two children in care, are correlated with
women’s reduced employment intensity and worsened occupational gaps between men and
women.
Overall, I argue that if we want to continue to evaluate the links between these two
prominent work-family reconciliation policies and women’s employment, then the issue of
unintended consequences of these policies cannot be separated from the issue of intended
consequences of these policies. This study highlights the importance of assessing the effects of
multiple leave and ECEC policy design features for women’s employment and uncovers further
complexities to the study of the link between these policies and gender and class employment
inequalities.
Gender Equality and “Both Parents” Assumptions
And finally, note the following two assumptions to be aware of throughout the reading of
this dissertation. First, an underlying assumption in this dissertation is that gender equality
between men and women (as groups), defined as equal time in paid work and unpaid work, is a
shared goal of those who address issues of gender inequality in employment. I do not assume
that all individual couples would split their time and perform 50 percent of paid and unpaid work
if granted leave periods that are similar in length and payment. Nor do I argue that leave policies
that are gender egalitarian or equally accessible by mothers and fathers will solve the problem of
gender inequality in employment. Rather, I am arguing that legislation that at least allows for a
more symmetrical division of labor among couples, on average, can better promote gender
equality in employment. Employers may be less likely to discriminate against women if both
men and women have equal access to work-family reconciliation policies, especially leave
policies.
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Moreover, any use of the term “both parents” across analyses is not meant to signal any
specific family type or household type, but rather to signal an explanation of indicator results for
both mothers and fathers. Further, by evaluating the generosity of leave for fathers and gender
equality in leave legislation, I do not make any assumptions about family type or whether fathers
will take up leave where it is reserved for their use or well-paid. Many children only have one
parent, and many have same-sex parents. Leave and ECEC may not provide different family
types with the same benefits in terms of utilization or take-up (see Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado
2018 for more on this issue). These issues are not addressed in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
A popular field of study in social science research is centered on the relationship between
work-family policies and women’s labor market outcomes. A small but influential group of
studies in this genre addresses whether and to what extent generous work-family policies worsen
gender employment inequalities across high-income countries (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019;
Mandel 2011, 2012; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006;
Pettit and Hook 2009).16 The counterintuitive claim is that, though generous work-family
policies promote women’s inclusion in the labor force, they also promote unintended
consequences or gendered tradeoffs for women once in employment. These policies can worsen
women’s prospects to be employed in higher-paying jobs/occupations and may lower the glass
ceiling for women. In turn, gender gaps between men and women can be exacerbated across
measures such as annual earnings, working-hours, and occupational attainment. The addition of a
class component questions whether gender inequalities differ for women of different class
groups—e.g., high-status women compared to high-status men.
This counterintuitive claim motivates my research. I argue the study of the relationship
between the unintended consequences of generous welfare state policies and gender employment
inequality suffers from theoretical and empirical flaws. In this dissertation, I address three
fundamental issues in gendered tradeoffs research. The first is outdated and poorly constructed
work-family policy measures. The second is whether work-family policies differently affect

The terms “leave policies” and “ECEC policies” are used as umbrella terms throughout this dissertation when the
literature is broadly discussed. The terms will be used because Mandel and Semyonov’s original studies (2005,
2006) included measurements of both work-family reconciliation policies and the welfare state as employer (see
literature review, below). Other studies use different measurements—Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) include
work-family policies only. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) utilize measurements of work-family reconciliation
policies. I emphasize the differences in policy measurement throughout the review.
16
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gender employment inequalities for women in different class groups. Third, as an extension to
this research, I address the relationship between work-family policies and class inequalities
among women. This dissertation will be in conversation with the main influential pieces in the
gendered tradeoffs literature. In this chapter, I will set up my argument by reviewing both the
main issues and debates. Note that a very recent review (Hook and Li 2020) provides an
excellent overview of gendered tradeoffs research and will be referred to heavily in the chapter.
Throughout the literature review, “welfare state policies” and “work-family policies” will
be used interchangeably. Other terms specific to the literature review and following chapters can
be found in the Glossary.
Gendered Tradeoffs: Methods
The majority of the research in this genre is mainly comparative and inclusive of around
20 or more high-income or post-industrialized countries.17 “Two primary methodological
approaches are used in the literature. In the first, researchers compare exemplars of welfare state
regimes and assess whether differences across countries are congruent with expectations
generated from a comparison of family policy contexts” (Hook and Li 2020, 250). Studies using
welfare state regimes are rooted in the three worlds welfare state typology established by EspingAndersen (1990) and “his later conceptualizations of de-familialization or feminist critiques

Conceptually, the use of “high-income” often relates to the classification of countries into one of four income
groups based on levels of economic development—high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income, and
low-income (World Bank 2019).17 Similarly, “industrialized” refers to advanced economic development that
characterizes countries across Europe, North America, and some parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (scholars
have moved into classifying these countries as post-industrial countries because of a gradual transition of jobs in the
industry to the service sector). These countries have largely been studied together in comparative research because
they went through the process of industrialization and welfare state development around the same time in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The process of industrialization promoted the rise of wage labor and social
and gender arrangements that are still present in these countries today (Gornick and Meyers 2009, 7). Countries
included in these studies therefore have a legacy of developed welfare states and democratic governments and
institutions. In earlier gendered tradeoffs research, country cases were also constrained by available microdata in the
LIS Database, available only for select high-income countries.
17
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thereof” (Hook and Li 2020, 250). Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state regime typology
suggests that the political and institutional contexts of groups of high-income countries are
similar. Welfare states regimes (hereafter, “regimes”) vary in the state support provided to help
women reconcile paid and unpaid work. Patterns of gender employment inequalities should
therefore be apparent across the different regime types.18
Traditionally, generous work-family policies characteristic of the Social Democratic
regime (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), such as accessible and affordable day care
and generous leaves for women, coupled with labor market institutions such as strong centralized
wage bargaining institutions, should promote women’s employment. Paradoxically, generous
policies characteristic of this regime promote worsened gender employment inequalities because
generous work-family policies attract low-skilled women into employment. The addition of lowskilled women to the labor force depresses the earnings and occupational attainments of all
women.
That the more traditional work-family policies or weak work-family policies
characteristic of the other two regime types may not promote adverse outcomes for women in
employment is the other side of the paradox. The Conservative-Corporatist regime (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), and the Liberal regime
(Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)) are the main
comparison countries/regimes that promote different employment situations for women through
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From Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 950). Variations in gender earnings gaps are systematically associated with
structural characteristics of national labor markets and especially with the extent to which the labor market is
regulated. In general, the earnings gap between men and women tends to be more pronounced in the liberal market
economies of Liberal countries than in the Corporatist economies of Continental Europe and Scandinavia.
Corporatist economies are characterized by more generous social policies, more developed family policies, and
more comprehensive coverage of collective agreements. Taken together, these welfare state characteristics should
reduce economic inequalities between men and women, but they don’t. Family policies actually increase wage gaps
in Scandinavian countries.
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family policies. The Conservative-Corporatist regime promotes generous welfare states and labor
market policies, much like countries in the Social Democratic regime. However, this group of
countries is culturally more religious and promotes work-family policies, such as home care
policies, that support women to stay at home and care for children (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund
2013) and labor market policies and generous part-time work options (widely available and/or
high-quality—e.g., accompanied by benefits such as healthcare or social security) that are meant
to uphold traditional family models (male full-time earner and female homemaker or part-time
employed female).
Countries classified in the Liberal regime tend to promote the weakest labor market
policies that support low rates of unionization and low wages (Pettit and Hook 2009, 10). These
countries also support heavily privatized or market solutions of the care of children that make it
more difficult for women to enter and maintain employment (Mandel 2011; Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund 2013). The argument is that because weak work-family policies make it difficult for
women to enter and maintain employment, especially low-income women, countries in this
regime promote low employment rates of women but more parity of pay and occupational
attainment between men and women.
A few studies of this genre attempt to build on Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology
and incorporate select countries from Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic, for example). Mandel (2012) incorporates a separate “Eastern European” regime type
into her study for a total of four regime types. Mandel (2012) suggests that work-family policies
of Eastern European countries are most similar to those found in the Conservative-Corporatist
regime. Therefore, employment patterns of women in this regime type are similar to those of the
Conservative-Corporatist regime.
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“In the second approach, researchers combine individual-level data with contextual-level
family policy data in multilevel models. Most studies use hierarchical models with individuals
nested within countries” (Hook and Li 2020, 251). In this approach, family policies such as leave
and ECEC that are linked with women’s employment are quantified in policy measures. The
measures quantify the generosity of family policy across countries. Measures can be discrete or
aggregated into policy indices.
Across the literature, discrete family policy measures or indices that combine individual
measures are constructed from policy information across countries, such as the number of fully
paid weeks of leave, or measures of utilization of these policies, such as the enrollment rates of
children in ECEC.
The literature overwhelmingly uses the LIS microdata to empirically evaluate the link
between work-family policy and labor market outcomes at the individual level (Brady, Blome,
and Kmec 2019; Hook 2015; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel 2011, 2012; Mandel
and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Pettit and Hook 2009). The LIS Database is a cross-national database
that includes high-quality harmonized individual-level microdata from national household
income surveys in high-income, and increasingly, middle-income countries.
Family Policy Measurement and Class Differences, Evidence across the Literature?
Family Policy Measurement and Gendered Tradeoffs
Two issues relevant to this research are how to measure work-family policies and the link
between work-family policies and women’s employment. Specifically, are work-family policies
differentially linked to labor market outcomes for differently situated women?
In the two papers widely regarded as the first in gendered tradeoffs research, “Mandel
and Semyonov (2005, 2006) argue that, although family policies bring women into the labor
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market, they create a paradox wherein they have adverse consequences for women's occupational
integration and earnings. Family policies incorporate lower-skilled women who would otherwise
not be in the labor market into employment, which increases the gender gap in wages and
occupational sex segregation among those in the labor market, including those who would be in
the labor market irrespective of family policies” (Hook and Li 2020, 252).
The association between policy effects and gender employment inequality is murky—
“women’s job preferences cannot be detached from employers’ behavior and labor market
opportunities” (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 952). Supply-side arguments for the relationship
between generous work-family policies and women’s employment preferences link work-family
policies to worsened employment inequalities in hiring, advancement, and pay. Women who are
likely to take up generous (long) leaves or part-time/reduced-hour work options may self-select
into jobs with lower pay or occupational advancement because they prefer to work with other
women whose behavior resembles their own (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011). Women’s decisions
to self-select into jobs with lower pay or occupational advancement may also be based on
women’s perception of employer behavior.
Relatedly, occupational crowding can also occur where women self-select into femaletyped occupations. The welfare state as employer argument posits that generous welfare states
with large public sectors provide convenient or flexible job options for women in paid care work
(in ECEC facilities, for example). These convenient or flexible job options for women in paid
care work are characterized as female-typed occupations (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). These
jobs limit women’s occupational attainment and earnings compared to men.
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That women take up long leaves, sometimes repeatedly, can also erode their skillsets and
human capital over time. Skills erosion will also very likely influence the demand for women’s
labor as well as their relative pay or occupational attainment.
On the demand-side, the general argument is that employers statistically discriminate
against women in hiring, advancement, and pay because policies such as leave and part-time
work options19 protect women’s employment but loosen women’s ties to the labor market for a
period of time. These interruptions can occur once or several times over a woman’s working life.
Women are perceived as willing to interrupt their careers for caregiving responsibilities
(Hegewisch and Gornick 2011)—especially in generous welfare states where leaves are long and
because women, more often than men, take up leave and other part-time/reduced-hour work
options to which they are entitled. Employers prefer stable and highly productive male
employees that are less likely to interrupt their careers for caregiving responsibilities.
Work-family policy measurements included in each study are largely designed to capture
the scope of family policies and other features of welfare states (such as public social service
employment) across countries (see Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 955, for example). One of the
major methodological debates is whether to include measures of work-family policies in an
aggregated index or to study the relationship between work-family policies and gender
employment inequalities using discrete policy measures.
One major debate is whether there are gendered consequences of all work-family policies
or just select family policies. Scholars that assess whether gendered tradeoffs in employment are

19

Part-time employment allows women, especially mothers, to combine paid work with unpaid care work. It is a
major form of employment for women in industrial societies. Part-time work can serve as a mechanism to
incorporate mothers into paid work (the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, Australia). Part-time work may be associated
with lower job quality—e.g., low wages and with or without benefits such as paid time off, social benefits, and job
security (Borchorst 1994, Sundstrom 1997, Anxo and Flood 1998. Part-time work can act, indirectly, as a barrier to
better occupations and worsen the gender wage gap between men and women since men are not as likely to work
part-time (Mandel and Semyonov 2006, 1914).
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the result of generous work-family policy packages aggregate work-family policy measures into
indices or family policy dimensions that represent different work-family arrangements (Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006). Other scholars argue that not
all work-family policies are associated with inegalitarian outcomes. These studies evaluate
relationships between discrete family policy measures and gender employment inequality. The
main argument is that “different work-family policies are likely to have ‘divergent’ impacts on
women’s and mothers’ employment” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 5)—e.g., different policies
have differential effects on gender employment inequalities. Select work-family policies may
support equality in employment between men and women while others may exacerbate
inequalities.
In the foundational gendered tradeoffs research, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006)
argue that high-income countries each provide distinct family policy packages and that the more
generous the family policy package, the more likely gender inequalities in employment will
occur. Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) construct a welfare state intervention index (WSII)
to test this claim by aggregating three welfare state measures together using factor analysis.
The WSII is inclusive of the number of fully paid weeks of maternity leave, the
percentage of children under the age of compulsory schooling in public childcare (usually
between 0–6 years of age, though this age cutoff varies across countries), and the share of the
workforce in the public sector (a measure of the welfare state as an employer). The WSII is used
to test whether welfare states worsen gender gaps across wages and occupational attainment. 20
Table 2.1 displays the measures and data in Mandel and Semyonov’s WSII (2005, 2006).

Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 955) state “Maternity leave policies indicates the benefits and protections the state
offers to working mothers. Publicly funded childcare facilities and the size of the public welfare sector capture the
prevalence of social services provided by the state that facilitate the employment of mothers and generate the
demand for female labor.”
20
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Countries are ranked by the index of welfare policy (Column 1). The table shows that on the
index, the Social Democratic countries place at the top. The Liberal countries generally place at
the bottom of the index while Conservative-Corporatist and select Eastern European countries
(along with Spain) place in the middle. 21
Mandel and Semyonov (2005) conclude that generous work-family policy, as measured
in the WSII, is associated with larger gender pay gaps between men and women. The findings in
Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) second study largely support the findings from the first study—
generous work-family policies, as measured in the WSII, push women into female-typed
occupations, worsen women’s odds of obtaining managerial positions, and worsen the gender
managerial gap between men and women.
However, additional analyses across these studies also explore the relationship between
the three welfare state provisions separately from one another and gender employment
inequalities across measures of labor force participation, wages, and occupational attainment.
When the three provisions are tested separately, Mandel and Semyonov (2005) find that only
long maternity leaves worsen gender wage gaps between men and women. Long maternity
leaves and the size of the public sector increase the odds that women will be employed in
female-typed occupations. However, large public sectors and the higher enrollment of children
under compulsory schooling age in ECEC have no statistically significant effect on the gender
wage gap. Generous ECEC also has no statistically significant effect on women’s labor force
participation or occupational status. These results suggest that long maternity leaves are driving
the effects in the WSII models (Hook and Li 2020, 253).

To borrow from Scruggs and Allan (2008, 643), “The evidence for regimes was (apparently) confirmed with
social data.” The values across the three measures provide evidence that the countries in the Social Democratic
regime provide the most generous or most well-developed welfare states.
21
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In contrast to Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), Pettit and Hook (2009) suggest that
not all work-family policies are associated with gender employment inequalities. They propose
an inclusion-equality tradeoffs hypothesis—that some policies include or exclude women from
the labor force and “discourage or promote equality among those in the labor force” (Hook and
Li 2020, 253). The four work-family policy measures in their study are part-time work
(measured as the percentage of employed women that work part-time, less than 35 hours per
week; inclusion and inequality); publicly subsidized childcare (the percentage of very young
children aged 0–6 in publicly-funded day care facilities; inclusion and equality); unionization
(the percentage of the workforce that is unionized; exclusion and equality); and leave (measured
as all weeks of leave granted to mothers, whether paid or unpaid, across most analyses; exclusion
and inequality).
Pettit and Hook (2009) find that generous part-time employment and long weeks of
maternity leave are positively associated with women’s labor force participation (inclusion in the
labor market). However, long leaves and a higher prevalence of part-time work is negatively
associated with women’s earnings and occupational attainment (inequality in the labor market).
These findings are largely in line with the demand-side arguments of employer statistical
discrimination. Pettit and Hook (2009) ultimately conclude generous leave and part-time work
options increase earnings and occupational inequalities between men and women because these
provisions contribute to skills decline. In countries with generous leaves, women’s skills decline
due to long absences from work to take care of children. Additionally, part-time work contributes
to skills decline by diminishing women’s workplace experience in comparison to men, who are
more likely to have full-time jobs (Pettit and Hook 2009, 36).
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In a more recent study, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) retest Mandel and Semyonov’s
(2005) original claim that generous welfare states trigger tradeoffs for women and mothers in
employment in high-income countries. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) explore the relationship
between the weeks of paid leave for women (regardless of the wage replacement rate) and the
percentage of children 0–3 years of age in publicly subsidized childcare—and seven labor
market outcomes.
“They analyze LIS data both cross-sectionally (21 countries in the mid-2000s) as well as
with a country panel using fixed effects (12 countries, two time periods, mid-1980s/1990s and
mid-2000s)” (Hook and Li 2020, 253). Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) conducted one of the
first studies to incorporate a broad set of labor market outcomes into one study and test the
effects of policies between mothers and non-mothers and women and men at one point in time
and across several time points. They evaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis across 42
models. Some of the coefficients support the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis while others refute it.
Most, however, are not statistically significant. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) ultimately
conclude both paid leave and publicly subsidized childcare have no negative effect on the
employment outcomes of mothers and women, and “work-family reconciliation policies do not
trigger trade-offs and paradoxes in terms of gender equality with adverse labor market
consequences for women” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 1).22 23

22

Analyzing the employer side in Japan, Mun and Jung found that employers who offer generous parental leaves
prior to the implementation of new government mandates for parental leave “actually hired and promoted more
women after the legal changes” (Mun and Jung 2018, 508).
23
Note, however, there is a growing body of research that assesses how work-family policies influence cross
national variation in motherhood wage and earnings penalties. Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann (2012, 163) find that
“parental leaves and childcare are associated with higher earnings for mothers when support for maternal
employment is high.” Abendroth, Huffman, and Treas (2014, 1009) find “the motherhood occupational status
penalty is lower in European countries where expenditures on public childcare is higher.”
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The above results in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) are in contrast to the literature to
date. Beyond the use of a more comprehensive set of labor market outcomes, contrasting results
in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) could be due to differences in leave measurement (e.g., using
discrete indicators vs. an index). However, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) also do not consider
that family policies may differentially affect the employment and attainment for women across
different class groups and contexts (Hook and Li 2020, 253).
Adding a Class Dimension to the Study of Gendered Tradeoffs
Another subset of literature suggests the relationship between work-family policies and
gender employment inequalities differs for women across different class groups.
Class is defined in three different ways across the literature—by educational attainment,
wages/earnings, and occupational attainment (see Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
2011, 2012; Mandel and Shalev 2009; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Pettit and Hook 2009;
Shalev 2008). Educational attainment measures the characteristics of the worker through skills
attainment or levels of human capital. This measure of class is the most often utilized measure of
class because it is easily quantifiable in microdata (Mandel 2012; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund
2013; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Pettit and Hook 2009) and because educational attainment
“circumvents the difficulties inherent in assigning non-employed women their partner’s social
class” (Hook and Li 2020, 255). However, some studies define class by the type of job a person
holds. Annual earnings (above or below the median, for example), hourly wages, or earnings
quintiles are used to delineate different class groups by differentiating between men and women
with high-paying or low-paying positions (see also Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
2012; Mandel and Shalev 2009). Occupational groups can also be used to define class by the
type of a job a person holds. Persons can be separated into those who hold a managerial or non-
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managerial position, for example. Identifying class through occupational groups is challenging
for comparative studies due to data limitations. However, conceptualizing class by occupational
groups has been attempted across a few studies (see Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
and Shalev 2009; Shalev 2008).
To explain the measurement of class by education and earnings, Mandel (2012, 246)
argues that “both education and earnings capture skill differences, which is a key factor for
dis/advantage in the labor market. Education is an indicator of skill, while earnings are in large
part a reflection of skill.” Wright (2005) argues further that “These aggregations are consistent
with a broadly shared theoretical construct of classes as socially bound categories that
encapsulate systematic differences in material life chances”.
In studies that utilize occupational attainment as a measure of class, two occupational
groups are compared—managers at the top and menial services workers at the bottom—
described as “the post-industrial working class, encompassing unskilled and semiskilled work in
sales, care work, cleanup, food, and entertainment. The choice of the two is to represent different
patterns of women’s labor market integration as well as different poles of the contemporary class
structure. The first is home ground for the glass ceiling, while the second encompasses the lower
reaches of the feminized service sector” (Shalev 2008, 433).
To summarize across these studies, “high-status men and women” are characterized as
men and women with high levels of education (a university degree or higher) and/or high annual
earnings (above the median or in a high-earnings quintile), or high levels of occupational
attainment (e.g., managerial status). In contrast, “low-status men and women” are men and
women with low levels of educational attainment (less than a university degree) and/or low
annual earnings (such as annual earnings below the median or earnings in lower earnings
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quintiles), and those in unskilled positions. When referring to past research, I will use the
language used by the author(s). Otherwise, the umbrella terms “high-status” or “low-status” will
be used to indicate class.
Demand-side arguments suggest employer statistical discrimination in generous welfare
states is conditioned by class differences among women (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013;
Mandel 2011, 2012). The claim is that generous work-family policies are more likely to worsen
gender gaps between highly skilled women and men compared to low-skilled men and women.
The argument is that, in generous welfare states, employer statistical discrimination is not as
relevant for low-skilled/educated women compared to low-skilled/educated men because
centralized wage bargaining institutions offset any negative effects of generous welfare state
policies on women’s earnings and occupational attainment. Wage-setting institutions compress
earnings for those at the bottom. This compression of earnings means that earnings gaps between
low-skilled men and women are reduced (Mandel 2012).
Conversely, highly skilled women are not protected under strong wage-setting
institutions in countries with generous leave and ECEC policies. Employers statistically
discriminate against women in terms of pay and occupational advancement in the absence of
these protections. Employers are less willing to invest in the skills of highly skilled women when
it is assumed highly skilled women will interrupt their careers for child-rearing or opt to work a
reduced hourly schedule to combine paid and unpaid work (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013;
Mandel 2012).24

24

Mandel argues protections of centralized wage institutions are not in the interests of highly skilled women anyway
“because their effect is to lower the wage ceiling they can potentially reach, while raising the cost of outsourcing
domestic services” (Mandel 2012, 245).

37

Some findings empirically back up the above theories while others do not. In their study,
Pettit and Hook (2009) find wage inequality is worse between highly educated men and women
(those with a tertiary degree or higher) where part-time work is widely available and where
leaves are long.
Utilizing the family policy measures from the WSII, Mandel and Shalev (2009) find
generous welfare state policies in Social Democratic countries bring women into the workplace
but hinder women’s chances to obtain higher-class occupational positions and higher wages.
They draw this conclusion by testing the effects of leave, ECEC, and the size of the public sector
on gender wage gaps across different occupational groups (managerial and menial services
workers). They argue (much like the conclusions from Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006) that
leave, ECEC, and high shares of the employed in the public sector represent a bundle of
policies—“the more developed these policies, the lower women’s occupational and earnings
attainments” (Mandel and Shalev 2009, 1878).
Mandel (2011) conducts a factor analysis of seven work-family policies (both workfamily reconciliation policies and those that support women to stay at home and care for children
(home care policies)) and a factor analysis of seven gender inequality indicators that are relevant
to highly skilled women and seven that are relevant to low-skilled women. Mandel (2011) finds a
negative correlation between the gender inequality indicators and the family policy factor for
advantaged women and a positive correlation between the gender inequality indicators and the
family policy factor for disadvantaged women. 25 Similar to the argument of Mandel and Shalev
(2009), Mandel (2011) argues that generous leave and ECEC policies in the Social Democratic
countries worsens occupational gaps between highly skilled men and women.

Note for advantaged women, two of the indicators—women’s representation in ministerial or parliamentary
positions—are not standard labor market outcomes.
25
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Mandel (2012) evaluates the relationship between work-family reconciliation policies
and gender wage gaps for a sample that separates men and women into those with low education
and low earnings (a high school degree or less and earnings below the median) and those with
high education and high earnings (high education and earnings above the median).
For a first set of models, Mandel (2012) constructs four binary welfare state regime
variables—the Social Democratic, Conservative-Corporatist, Liberal, and Eastern European (the
Social Democratic regime is the omitted category in the models). These binary country-level
welfare state variables are the main country-level independent variables. She finds gender wage
gaps between advantaged men and women are highest in the Social Democratic regime. The
predicted gender wage gaps (in percentiles) between highly educated and high-earning men and
women are largest in the Social Democratic regime compared to the predicted wage gaps
between highly educated and high-earning men and women in the three additional regime types.
These findings largely support the claim that generous welfare states worsen gender earnings
inequality.
A second set of 24 multilevel models pools together men and women across four class
groups—low earnings, high earnings, low education, and high education. Six models are shown
for each class group. The main independent variable in Model 1 is the WSII, Model 2 is the
World Bank’s Rigidity of Employment Index (comprised of a difficulty of hiring index, a
difficulty of firing index and a rigidity of firing index). Models 3–6 include three measures of the
WSII separately and then all three combined in the final model.
Mandel (2012) finds the WSII is associated with reduced gender wage gaps between men
and women with low earnings, but is also associated with worsened gender wage gaps between
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men and women with high earnings—consistent with the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis or
evidence of a welfare state paradox.
However, when moving to the models that incorporate the three measures of the WSII
separately, the results are less clear. Long maternity leave and the size of the public sector
worsen gender wage gaps between high-earning men and women and highly educated men and
women. These effects persist when controlling for ECEC (Mandel 2012, 251, see Model 6H).
However, long maternity leaves also worsen gender wage gaps between low-educated men and
women. This effect also persists when controlling for other components of policy (Mandel 2012,
252, see Model 6L). The results for low-educated men and women contradicts the gendered
tradeoffs hypothesis.
Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) evaluate evidence for gendered tradeoffs by
examining family policy dimensions for 15 high-income countries. Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund
(2013) cluster together work-family policies by three dimensions of work-family policies, each
of which supports a different earning and caring model. 26 The dual-carer dimension “refers to
policies that stimulate fathers to take a more active part in caring for their minor children”
(Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, 10). This dimension includes measures of two policies—the
weeks of paid leave that can be used by the mother, father, or both (e.g., sharable leave) and the
weeks of paid leave reserved for fathers. The dual-earner dimension refers to “the extent to
which public policies enable a transfer of childcare from the family to the public sector enabling
mothers to maintain a major and continuous occupation commitment” (Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund 2013, 10). This dimension includes an unweighted average of three policy indicators—
public day care for the youngest children (0–2 years of age), full-time public day care services

26

This method of grouping policies together in an index parallels the method of index construction in Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006).
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for children over three, and earnings-related parental insurance (a multiplicative variable
reflective of the percentage of replacement of previous earnings and duration of the benefit).
“They combine the dual-earner and dual-carer indicators because they are highly correlated into
an earner-carer dimension” (Hook and Li 2020, 257).
The “traditional-family dimension” refers to the extent to which policies support women
to stay home and care for children (author’s own definition). This dimension is based on a
weighted average of four policy indicators—child allowances for minor children paid in cash or
via the tax system (expressed as a percentage of a single worker’s net wages at the level of
industrial workers in the country, weight of 1.0), part-time public day care services for somewhat
older children (from three years up to school age), relating numbers of places or children in care
to children in the relevant age group (weight of 1.0), home care allowance to a parent for care of
children below school age (weight of 0.5), and marriage subsidies via tax benefits to a head-ofhousehold having an economically inactive spouse (weight of 0.5).27 Finally, a residual set of
countries that do not fall into any of the three policy dimensions are characterized as marketoriented countries, since they do not provide either robust home care or work-family
reconciliation policies.
The classification of work-family policies into work-family policy “constellations”
mirror Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology—e.g., the work-family policies typical
of Social Democratic countries place into the earner-carer dimension, work-family policies
typical of Conservative-Corporatist countries place into the traditional dimension, and workfamily policies typical of Liberal countries place into the market-oriented dimension.

27

All indicator information is found on pages 9–10 in Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013).
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Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) draw two main conclusions about the work-family
policies of the earner-carer countries. First, because these countries provide well-developed
work-family reconciliation policies, more low-educated women will be drawn into the labor
market. When this happens, the wages and occupational attainments of all women compared to
all men in the aggregate will be depressed, since low-educated women typically self-select into
lower-wage occupations and work fewer hours (see Mandel 2011 for a similar argument).
Second, Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) find that the provision of leave policies that
support fathers’ care of children do not negatively affect gender wage gaps or occupational gaps
between highly educated men and women. These findings suggest there is no discernable
evidence that employers statistically discriminate against highly educated women in employment
compared to highly educated men in earner-carer countries. Overall, they argue that work-family
policies typical of the earner-carer countries “benefit mothers without creating disadvantages for
mothers with a tertiary education” (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, 30). 28
Finally, adding to the debate, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) find that long maternity
leaves may negatively influence the employment and earnings of highly skilled women
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Additional contextual evidence for possible differences in labor market outcomes can be found in gendered
critiques of the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature and the literature that examines “tradeoffs by social class
and income inequality” across countries with different work-family arrangements (Hook and Li 2020, 259). On the
first point, Estevez-Abe (2005, 2006) finds sex segregation is lower in the weakly developed welfare states of
market-oriented economies of the US and Canada. She argues that labor markets are less gender segregated both
horizontally and vertically due to weaker employment protections and weak family policies that are less likely to
interrupt women’s careers. Conversely, strong employment protections of coordinated market economies (in
countries like Norway and Sweden) promote occupational sex segregation. Family policies that allow women to
interrupt their careers more often make matters even worse, because “in this context policies that shield mothers
from work obligations further erode their attractiveness as employees” (Mandel 2011, 161). On the second point,
Hook (2015) “develops expectations about differences by social class under different regimes of familialization”
(Hook and Li 2020, 259; see Saraceno and Keck 2008 for familialization arrangements). She evaluates differences
in the generosity of welfare state spending and their effect on family employment patterns. She finds that workfamily arrangements in countries with low levels of defamilialization and high levels of income inequality
exacerbate inequality because highly educated mothers are more likely to be coupled with highly educated fathers
and both work full-time. While the opposite is true of for low-educated mothers—they are partnered to low-income
men and exemplify the male breadwinner model or one-and-a-half earner model. Low-income mothers largely stay
at home to take care of children where other childcare arrangements are either unavailable or too expensive.
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compared to highly skilled men. However, they also find no negative effects of ECEC on gender
employment inequalities. In fact, like other studies in this genre (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund
2013; Mandel 2012; Pettit and Hook 2009) they find that ECEC has no discernable negative
effect for women’s employment or attainment.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results above continue to fuel two of the main debates in the literature—how to
measure work-family policy and whether and to what extent work-family policies are associated
with gender employment inequalities for all women or across different class groups.
Across the literature, there is at least some consensus about the relationship between
select work-family policies and women’s labor market outcomes. Empirically, there is no
evidence across the literature to suggest that generous ECEC worsens women’s employment
attainment. Women’s employment and time at work is supported by generous ECEC. The highly
educated are not disadvantaged by generous ECEC (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
2012). These findings suggest that though family policies come in packages, generous ECEC is
not associated with negative, unintended consequences for women in employment.
Theoretically, more recent gendered tradeoffs literature also argues that generous ECEC
does not promote employer statistical discrimination (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013;
Mandel 2012). Whether generous or not, ECEC supports women’s time at work and continuous
employment. Therefore, ECEC does not factor into employers’ decision-making about hiring,
advancement, or pay.29 The harm of ECEC is centered around the availability, affordability, and
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Instances where employers may discriminate against the hiring or advancement of female employees not explored
in gendered tradeoffs research. One such instance is employer mandates. These mandates require employers to
provide childcare based on a quota of employees or number of female employees, for example. These facilities
therefore provide childcare spots to young children, similar to other types of public or private care institutions.
However, the onus of care provision is placed on the employer. A potential unintended consequence of these
mandates is that employers discriminate against hiring women so they do not have to provide childcare (Women,
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cost of care. On the supply side, women’s choices about entering employment and the quality of
that employment are constrained by ECEC options. Where ECEC is generous—that is, widely
available, of good quality, and affordable—women have better quality and better-paying jobs.
Where ECEC is not generous—not widely available, of bad quality, and unaffordable—women
overall tend to hold lower-quality, lower-paying jobs (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011) or may opt
out of employment all together. 30 Low-availability/high-cost ECEC is especially problematic for
low-skilled mothers who may be unable to afford private alternatives. Countries with weak
support for ECEC institutions may not be detrimental to highly skilled employed women because
they are better able to take advantage of available tax benefits for care or opt out of public
childcare because they are able to afford more expensive private alternatives (Mandel 2012).
That generous ECEC is not associated with unintended consequences for women in
employment suggests that moving forward, discrete measures of work-family policies should be
used to evaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis versus aggregating separate measures of
different work-family policies into indices. Though work-family policies are packaged, the
association between work-family policies and women’s labor market outcomes may differ across
different work-family policies.
Beyond the consensus that ECEC is not associated with gendered tradeoffs for women in
employment, no consensus exists across the literature as to whether other work-family policies—
particularly leave policies—fuel gendered tradeoffs. The wide variety of methodologies, policy

Business and the Law, Why Childcare? 2019). Another possible case of demand-side employer statistical
discrimination against women is a situation where employers may also choose to hire a woman that has guaranteed
or stated childcare over another woman. These may be individual cases and anecdotal without a clear path forward
in cross-national research. Employer mandates are in place in a number of middle- and low-income countries; they
are rare in high-income countries.
30
The point of comparison I make here and in the rest of this dissertation is between “good” and “bad” public
childcare and pre-primary education options for families. I do not make a comparison between public childcare and
pre-primary education options for families, whether “good” or “bad” and no publicly supported care.
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measures, and labor market outcomes included in any one study drive this debate. The issue of
class, measured mainly by educational attainment, further complicates this issue. Some studies
argue gendered tradeoffs are more prevalent for the highly educated (Mandel 2011, 2012;
Mandel and Shalev 2009), while other studies find no evidence that generous leave or other
policies disadvantage the highly educated (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013).
However, Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) best address why class is an important
component to the literature. The pool of employed women varies across countries. Variations in
employment rates across countries are directly related to policies that support women to enter
employment or stay at home and care for children. Different leave and ECEC policies are
attractive for differently situated women. Countries with generous leave and ECEC policies (e.g.,
the Social Democratic countries) will draw more disadvantaged women into the labor market.
When this happens, the wages and occupational attainments of all women compared to all men
are automatically depressed since disadvantaged women typically self-select into lower-wage
occupations and/or work fewer hours, on average, than men. This fact alone suggests that
gendered tradeoffs between men and women in the aggregate may be exaggerated and that any
study of the unintended consequences of leave and ECEC policies for gender employment
inequalities should include a class dimension (for more detailed information on the
conceptualization of class across the literature, see Appendix 2.1).
Additional limitations/issues with the literature will be discussed in Chapter 3 to aid in
the setup of my theoretical argument and research agenda.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Argument and Literature Limitations
Theoretical Argument
In the previous chapter, I established the two primary ways scholars have advanced the
gendered tradeoffs research agenda. The first is through the suggested use of discrete workfamily policy measures. Accumulated empirical evidence in the literature shows that two of the
policies widely used in gendered tradeoffs research—leave and ECEC—have different
relationships to women’s employment and labor market attainment. Aggregating measures of
multiple work-family policies into policy indices masks the differential effects these policies
have for women’s labor market outcomes. The second advancement made in the literature is that
work-family policies “do not lead to paradoxes for all women” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019,
22). This argument and mounting empirical evidence suggest that the relationship between workfamily policies and women’s labor market outcomes should include a class dimension. Whether
and to what extent work-family policies are linked to gendered tradeoffs in employment and how
tradeoffs possibly differ for women, by class, is the focus of much continued debate.
These two advances in the literature are my main points of departure for the setup of this
study. I suggest three additional advances that build on the literature. The first is to address the
call for better data and measures on key work-family policies (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019;
Hook and Li 2020; Mandel 2012; Sirén et al. 2020). The two key work-family policies of interest
throughout this dissertation research are leave and ECEC because they are the two most widely
incorporated and studied work-family policies across the literature. As stated in the introduction,
leave and ECEC are categorized as “work-family reconciliation policies”—they help women
reconcile tensions between unpaid work and employment and are therefore argued to be linked to
women’s labor market outcomes and gender employment (in)equalities. The term “work-family

46

reconciliation policies” will be used in this dissertation moving forward when specifically
referencing leave and ECEC.
Second, Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013, 30) argue, “we believe the earner-carer
policies developed in the Nordic countries hold the promise of working to promote gender
egalitarianism and class equality simultaneously.” Feminists argue similarly that policies such as
well-developed leave and ECEC may be linked to reduced class inequalities among employed
women (see Gornick and Meyers 2003, for example). Adapting these ideas to this research, I will
also address the link between well-developed work-family reconciliation policies and class
inequalities among women. If well-developed work-family reconciliation policies are intended to
reduce class divisions among working women, does the evidence support this? What are the
relationships between gender inequalities in employment (between men and women) and class
inequalities in employment (among women)?
The third advancement is revisiting the issue of work-family reconciliation policy effects
on women’s employment. I will perform a descriptive assessment of five labor market outcomes
for the two sample groups, by three different measures of class, using a newly constructed workfamily reconciliation policy typology to organize and explain the results. I will also address
whether well-developed (and not-well-developed) dimensions of leave and ECEC are linked to
worsened gender inequalities and reduced class inequalities in employment through the use of
correlation analyses. Finally, select cross-sectional multilevel modelling analyses from Brady,
Blome, and Kmec (2019) are adapted and extended. I employ the use of multilevel models to
empirically evaluate the relationship between leave and ECEC, as measured in the newly
constructed work-family policy measures, and employment and annual earnings for samples of
working-aged low- and highly educated women and working-aged men and women. A class

47

approach will be incorporated by measuring the policy effects for samples of women and men by
three levels of educational attainment.
This dissertation is intended to be a hybrid study that merges the two main methods
utilized in gendered tradeoffs research to date. Each country’s leave and ECEC policy context
matters for the measurement of these policies and the operationalization of policy data into
discrete policy measures. Likewise, any evidence of policy effects for gender employment
(in)equalities is dependent on leave and ECEC policy context and policy measurement. A major
goal of this dissertation is to emphasize problems with current work-family reconciliation policy
indicators used in this body of literature and to develop a more complete set of multidimensional,
disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC measures. The use of the new leave and ECEC
measures is twofold. The first is to use the policy measures to generate a new work-family
reconciliation policy typology that better categorizes which countries provide leave and ECEC
policies that are well-developed across different policy dimensions. The second is to use the
policy measures to replicate and extend gendered tradeoffs research.
The rest of this chapter addresses additional theories of relationships between leave,
ECEC, and women’s employment. These theories support the construction of additional
measures of leave and ECEC policy in the next chapter. The second and third advancements to
the literature will be addressed later on, in Part 3 of this dissertation.
Advancement 1: Better Leave and ECEC Data and Policy Measures
The first advancement from the literature addresses the call for better data and measures
on two key work-family reconciliation policies—leave and ECEC. A lot of work remains to
identify whether leave and ECEC policies—and more specifically, the particular dimensions of
these policies—generate employment (in)equalities in the first place. The disaggregation done so
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far is inadequate. Second, operational issues—outdated and, in some instances, problematic
indicators—need to be replaced or updated. Most policy data used to construct policy measures
in the literature are from the late-1990s to the mid-2000s. Because policies change over time,
these studies are outdated and may not adequality reflect more current relationships between
work-family policies and women’s employment.
Domain is also a question. Most previous studies limited themselves to
the usual high-income countries and the use of out-of-date or inappropriate categories to sort
countries. These choices are no longer justified, so other countries should be included, along
with new categories.
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the literature supports that generous leave may be linked to
worsened gender employment inequalities. Conversely, no empirical evidence exists that
generous ECEC is linked to worsened gender employment inequalities. For leave, nearly all
indicators used in the literature include some combination of the length of leave and payment.
ECEC generosity is measured primarily by the enrollment rates of children under compulsory
schooling age in care.31
Along with an increasing number of scholars, I argue these standard policy indicators of
leave and ECEC generosity that measure “how much” is granted are narrow in scope. Standard
indicators of leave incorporate different combinations of two dimensions of leave policy—the
length of leave and the wage-replacement rate of leave. These indicators mainly include leave
periods for use by the mother only. The four standard indicators of leave used in the literature are
the weeks of fully-paid leave, the total weeks of leave (paid or unpaid), weeks of paid leave

31

For a more detailed discussion of leave and ECEC measurement, see later on in this chapter and Appendix 2.1
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(regardless of the wage-replacement rate), and the average payment rate over the paid leave
period.
However, other dimensions of leave matter for women's employment. Eligibility
requirements—e.g., how easy it is to access leave—and specific wage-replacement rates—e.g.,
whether leave is well-paid or not—also matter for women’s employment. How easy it is for
women to access leave and how well leave is paid mean that leaves may be accessible to some
women over others. Further, how leave is allocated to fathers whether leave for fathers is linked
to women’s employment, is also lacking across the literature (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019;
Hook and Li 2020; Mandel 2012). Whether leave policy promotes gender equality (or not)
through equal take-up is also barely considered in this research, providing an incomplete portrait
of the breadth of leave policy across countries.
The theoretical and empirical evidence for the relationship between ECEC and gender
employment inequalities suggests that generous ECEC (as measured by enrollment rates) is good
for gender equality in employment. In other words, good ECEC is not linked to bad or
unintended consequences for women in employment. And in fact, whether generous or not—
ECEC always supports women’s employment. What matters is the quality of women’s
employment associated with different ECEC arrangements across countries and how different
ECEC arrangements shape women’s preferences for employment in the first place. Where ECEC
is more accessible and affordable, women hold higher-quality and higher-paying jobs.
Employers are more likely to hire women where state support for the care of children is high.
The opposite is true in countries where ECEC is less generous—i.e., not as widely available, or
unaffordable. New measures should address possible barriers to ECEC access, such as the cost of
care and children’s entitlement to ECEC.

50

The call for new measures also suggests that simple measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity commonly used in the literature may not be representative of the scope of these
policies—or how well-developed these policies are more generally across other policy
dimensions.
A simple assessment of the widely-used leave and ECEC policy generosity measures and
correlations between policy measures across two studies visually represent the limitations of the
standard leave and ECEC generosity policy indicators in the literature. To illustrate these
limitations, I compare the three indicators used to construct Mandel and Semyonov’s (2005,
2006) WSII to the leave and ECEC policy indicators from Brad, Blome, and Kmec (2019). I
compare the measures from these studies because Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) state their
study is a replication of Mandel and Semyonov’s original gendered tradeoffs research.
Both studies state the country-level work-family policy data utilized to construct the
policy measures is derived from several secondary sources.32 I assume the year of the countrylevel policy data is around or precedes the year of the LIS data used in the studies. Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006) utilize LIS data from the mid-to-late-1990s. Brady, Blome, and Kmec
(2019) utilize LIS data from between the years 2000 and 2007. Similar country cases are used in
both studies. However, one of the limitations of this comparison is the assumed different years of
the country-level policy data (i.e., the country-level policy data used to construct the indicators in
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) is slightly more recent than the country-level policy data used
to construct the indicators in Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006)). Policies, of course, are everchanging and can be modified over time, or completely new policies can be implemented. Still, it

32

Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) cites the secondary sources from which the data are derived on page 26. An
online supplement to Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) detailing the secondary sources for country-level data
used in the WSII measures is no longer available.
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is useful to evaluate and compare policy measures across studies to think more seriously about
possible relationships among different measures and the implications of these relationships. This
is important especially because scholars of this genre argue the policy measures used in any one
study capture the “scope of family policies” (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 955) or “…arguably
capture the most meaningful differences between countries” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 9).
If these measures capture the scope of family policies or represent meaningful differences
between countries, then clear relationships among the different measures should be apparent.
This simple comparison also sets up some of the motivation for Part 2 of this study.
First, Table 3.1 shows the studies use different measures of leave and ECEC. Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006) construct a measure of leave that is inclusive of the weeks of fully-paid
maternity leave.33 A measure of ECEC is constructed using enrollment rates of children 0–6
years of age in publicly subsidized care. To compare, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) construct
a leave measure that is inclusive of the weeks of fully paid maternity leave plus parental leave.34
The ECEC indicator measures the enrollment of children in publicly subsidized care from 0–3
years of age only. The leave policy measure in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) differs from
Mandel and Semyonov’s measure (2005, 2006) because it includes all weeks of leave regardless
of the payment rate while Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) multiply the wage-replacement
rate by the number of weeks of maternity leave. Further, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) also
consider much longer parental leave periods in addition to periods of maternity leave. For ECEC,
substantiative differences in the enrollment of children at different ages in ECEC are highlighted

33

Fully-paid maternity leave in this study is defined as the full-time equivalent leave (abbreviated to FTE leave).
FTE leave is calculated as the weeks of leave multiplied by the wage-replacement rate of leave.
34
As defined in Chapter 1, parental leaves are longer leaves taken once maternity leave and paternity leave end.

52

in the literature. Such differences can be attributed to the length of leaves or the cost and
availability of ECEC, for example. 35
All policy measures from across the two studies are ranked in descending order—with
the most generous policies, as measured in the indicators, at the top of each column. As shown in
the table, the difference in rankings of the measures across the different studies directly relates to
the different measurements of these policies and included country cases. Across the three
disaggregated measures of the WSII from Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), policies from
Social Democratic countries rank highly across measures of the generosity of fully-paid weeks of
maternity leave and the share of the employed in the public sector, with more variation in rank
across the measure of ECEC enrollment. Norway and Finland rank quite low in comparison to
other countries.36 However, in general, the rankings of the measures in descending order show
that included country cases generally group together to support the validity of Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) welfare state regime typology. In other words, evidence of regimes was confirmed with
the data used in three policy measures used to construct the WSII. Social Democratic countries
support the most generous policies, Liberal countries support the least generous policies, with
Conservative-Corporatist and select Eastern European countries ranked in the middle or bottom.
Conversely, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) do not adhere to a regime typology to motivate the
construction of their policy measures. Rankings of the leave and ECEC policy measures show no
discernable country groupings that adhere to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime typology.
Table 3.2 shows correlations between the policy measures within and across the studies.
First, focusing on the correlations of the policy measures within each study, the three policy

35

For more on this point see Appendix 2.1.
Refer back to Table 2.1 to see that using factor analysis, the four countries in the Social Democratic regime place
at the top of the WSII.
36
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measures included in Mandel and Semyonov’s WSII (2005) are all positively correlated with one
another (as also indicated in Table 2.1 from the previous chapter). The two policy measures used
in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) are not correlated with each other (r=.04). Across the studies,
leave and ECEC measures are moderately correlated with one another (for leave r=.46 and P <
0.05; for ECEC r=.55 and P < 0.05). These positive and significant correlations hold despite the
differences in the years of the country-level policy data and the differences in the measurement
of these policies. 37
However, looking at correlations between measures of different policy types across the
two studies, the leave measure from Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) is not correlated with either
the ECEC or public welfare sector measures from Mandel and Semyonov’s WSII (r=.13
(ECEC); r=-.15 (public sector employment)). Enrollment rates of children 0–3 years age from
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) are nearly but not significantly correlated with weeks of fullypaid maternity leave in Mandel and Semyonov (2005) (r=.35).38
These relationships among the policy measures suggest a few limitations of the policy
measures used in gendered tradeoffs research. First, these correlations suggest that simple
changes to the way leave or ECEC is measured means that measures of work-family policies
within any one study can be correlated to one another or not. The fact that the two measures in
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) are not correlated at all directly refutes Mandel and
Semyonov’s argument that work-family policies are “packaged” and in line with expectations
borne from the welfare state regime literature. The non-relationship between the leave and ECEC
policy measures in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) suggests that the generosity of work-family
policies is more complex and varies across countries—i.e., a country can provide generosity of

37
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Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019), do not address the country context of leave and ECEC policies in their study.
The cross-study correlations are between the same set of countries across both studies.
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paid weeks of leave to mothers but also ECEC arrangements that are not as generous as leave
(based on enrollment rates of children in care).
Second, the disparate relationships directly relate back as to whether these measures
represent the scope of family policy and differences across included country cases. The three
different relationships between the policy measures of these studies suggest that the capacity for
one measure of leave or ECEC policy generosity to more broadly represent these policies is
overly ambitious. Overall, the results suggest that included country cases, decisions about policy
measurement, and which policy and policy dimensions to measure should be considered more
seriously in gendered tradeoffs research. Any evidence of policy effects for class or gender
employment (in)equalities is dependent on these decisions.
Leave, ECEC, and Gender Inequality in Employment
In order to determine which countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are welldeveloped across multiple policy dimensions, I consider additional theoretical arguments that
have been ignored or under-utilized in gendered tradeoffs research. If the expectation is that
generous leaves, as measured by some combination of the length of leave and the wagereplacement rate, worsen gender employment inequalities, what about other dimensions of
leave? Are leave policies that are the most generous also those that are the most genderegalitarian and universal? If so, do these dimensions of leave also worsen gender employment
inequalities? And what about ECEC—how do we measure good and bad ECEC to determine the
relationships between ECEC and gender inequality in employment? What are the theories that
can be utilized to construct possible new measures to address these questions?
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Generosity and Gender Equality in Leave Legislation
First, leave benefits may be generous in design to mothers, but because leave policies
exclude fathers from the same benefits, generous leave to mothers can reinforce traditional
divisions of labor and employer statistical discrimination against women. A large body of
literature finds empirical evidence to support these arguments (see Gornick and Meyers 2003,
2009; ILO 1999; Heymann, Earle, and Hayeset 2007; Oun and Pardo Trujillo 2005; and Smith
and Williams 2007).39 Only two studies from gendered tradeoffs research consider the
relationships between periods of leave reserved for fathers use and women’s employment,
despite the clear implications of this omission (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, and Olivetti
and Petrongolo 2017).
If long leaves for mothers promote employer statistical discrimination, then leave for
fathers may level the playing field because employers anticipate that mothers won’t be the sole
leave-takers. In order for fathers to take up leave, the literature suggests leaves must be well-paid
(wages are replaced at two-thirds of usual earnings or more, for example), with equal weeks of
leave extended to both mothers and fathers (Castro-Garcia and Pazos-Moran 2016). Leave
periods must also be moderate in duration (between six months and a year as evaluated in the
literature)40 and a quota must also be reserved specifically for fathers’ use (Keck and Saraceno
2013; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010).
Recent evidence from Social Democratic countries shows men’s take-up of leave
increases with a “use it or lose it” incentive (see Duvander and Johansson 2012; and Haas and
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I am not making any assumptions about family type. However, note that studies that work-family reconciliation
policies may be more beneficial to two-parent families compared to single-parent families (Nieuwenhuis and
Maldonado 2018).
40
Though any consensus on an optimal midpoint is difficult to determine (see summary of Dearing’s 2016 argument
below).
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Rostgaard 2011). Conversely, leave that is too long, has a low wage replacement, or can be
transferred to the mother is much less likely to be taken up by fathers (Castro-Garcia and PazosMoran 2016; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Hook 2010) and reinforces traditional gendered
divisions of labor.41 Moreover, periods of shared leave will almost always be taken by the
mother, another factor that drives employer statistical discrimination.
Well-paid leave is also crucial for take-up on the part of low status women. The argument
is that women with low incomes will not be able to access available unpaid or low-paid leave
benefits simply because they cannot afford to do so. Low-income women may simply exit the
labor force in the absence of a leave policy that is not generous enough in terms of
payment (Gornick and Meyers 2009; Keck and Saraceno 2013; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017;
Plantenga and Remery 2009) or work part-time in order to combine work with childrearing.
Inflection Points: Optimal Leave Length
Another puzzle to emerge concerns identifying where the inflection point lies, regarding
the optimal length of leave. In other words, after what period of time does leave turn from being
advantageous to potentially being harmful, with respect to class and gender inequalities? 42

41

Note additional studies that analyze the effect of social policies on the household division of labor find that
generous or well-paid leave alone cannot explain fathers’ uptick in time spent on unpaid household work. Instead,
leave for fathers needs to be assessed in combination with other work-family reconciliation policies. For example,
Hook (2010) finds that across 19 high-income countries, in countries where men take leave and publicly subsidized
childcare is widely available and used by working parents, men do more housework than in countries where these
policies are not available. Fuwa and Cohen (2007, 512) argue countries that do not discriminate against women in
the workplace in the law and that have longer parental leave policies have a more egalitarian division of unpaid
household labor. Smith and Williams (2007, 188) find a “positive association between the father-friendliness of
national legislation and paternal time.” Similarly in her review of the literature, Noonan states, “It may be the case
that availability of both a generous daddy leave policy and subsidized childcare, together, provide an added impetus
for fathers to take on more care work and for mothers to return to work full-time after childbirth” (Noonan 2013,
132).
42
The infant health literature suggests that a six-month period of leave is best for infant and maternal health (Galtry
& Callister 2005). This literature also argues that in order for leave to promote gender equality in employment,
fathers also need access to similar leave times as mothers.

57

In the literature, the debate is whether leaves that are either “too long” promote employer
statistical discrimination and worsens gendered inequalities in employment between mothers and
non-mothers and men and women (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019; Blau and Khan 2013; Hook
2010; Nieuwenhuis, Need, and Van der Kolk 2017; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Keck and
Saraceno 2013; Pettit and Hook 2005). Conversely, leaves that are “too short” (not generous
enough, as measured by the length of leave) may put mothers at risk of dropping out of the labor
force either permanently or for a period of time to care for children. Absences from the labor
market can reduce capital accumulation, job skills, and can further perpetuate employer
statistical discrimination. More appropriate may be the consideration of what periods of leave are
optimal. Dearing (2016) for example, suggests a U-shaped ideal leave model that places 14
months in duration (7 months for the mother and 7 months for the father) as optimal for gender
equality in the division of labor, though no country has yet to meet this criterion. 43
Empirical evidence both supports and refutes these arguments. Nieuwenhuis, Need, and
Van der Kolk (2017) find that childcare leaves around 50 weeks or less are positively associated
with employment rates of mothers compared to non-mothers and that this effect is non-linear.
However, in contrast to Nieuwenhuis, Need, and Van der Kolk (2017), Keck and Saraceno
(2013, 315) find no evidence that long leaves (longer than 9 months (around 36 weeks))
negatively affect the employment rates of mothers versus non-mothers. Specifically, this ninemonth cutoff did not disincentivize low-educated mothers to leave the labor market. In countries
with very long leaves, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, long leaves of 2 years are actually
associated with longer working hours of mothers once children are older. Keck and Saraceno
(2013) also find that leaves that are “too short” (less than 9 months) puts all employed mothers at

Again, however, Dearing (2016, 5) emphasizes that “empirical evidence of the actual number of months alone that
would denote a ‘moderate duration’ of leave is rather mixed and it is difficult to draw a conclusion.”
43
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risk of dropping out of the labor market compared to non-mothers. However, Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2017) argue longer parental leaves (around one year or more) are associated with
worsened employment for women of all skill levels and worsened gender earnings gaps for
college-educated women.44
Universality (Accessibility) of Leave
Other dimensions of leave not considered in gendered tradeoffs research are universal
leave policy dimensions. By universality I mean the breadth of the population covered by leave
policies and ease of access, inclusive of the coverage rate of leave, eligibility requirements to
take up leave, and financing mechanisms. It may be the case that a leave policy is generous in
terms of payment rate or length. However, who is covered and who has access to benefits are just
as important for gender and class inequalities. Employees are less likely to take up leave if it is
financed by employers for fear of discrimination. Leave funded through social security
contributions can reduce employer statistical discrimination because “employers would not be
expected to replace wages during leave” (Gornick and Meyers 2009, 22–23). Coverage rates are
important to examine the breadth of the working population covered under such schemes.
Eligibility is also important because policies are less likely to have any effect on gender equality
in employment—good or bad—unless mothers and fathers have access to leave in the first place
(see Gornick and Meyers 2009 and Smith and Williams 2007 for more on these points).45
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Some scholars use months while others use weeks for leave measures. In Keck and Saraceno (2013), the indicator
explained in the text is a binary measure that evaluates the length of both post-birth maternity leave and parental
leaves. They create two groups—those countries with leaves that are 9 months or longer in duration and those with
leaves periods that are less than 9 months in duration. The 9-month cutoff is chosen based on recommendations from
UNICEF that leaves should be between six and 12 months in length. From Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017), the
inflection point is calculated by taking the derivatives of the maximum weeks of job-protected leave and jobprotected leave squared and dividing the results by 100. In their study, the weeks of job-protected leave range from 0
weeks in the United States to 166 in Spain.
45
Smith and Williams (2007, 180) incorporate an indicator of eligibility requirements into a father friendliness scale
that includes the months of employment needed to become eligible for leave. They find that in countries with less
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ECEC and Women’s Employment Preferences
The below supply-side arguments of the relationship between ECEC and women’s
preferences in employment have not yet been considered or are under-utilized in gendered
tradeoffs research. I focus on three interrelated arguments of ECEC policy relevant to this study.
The first argument is related to the provision of care and women’s employment. The
provision of care—whether care is publicly or privately managed (Mandel 2012)—directly
relates to the availability and cost of care.46 Yerkes and Javornik (2018, 5) argue that “public and
market provision mechanisms have different consequences for parents’ capabilities.” Publicly
provided care is more widely available and affordable and should be considered to determine the
breadth of public ECEC availability (Yerkes and Javornik 2018). Public care provision indicates
that the state takes an active role in caregiving and has a vested interest in making care widely
available to parents. Alternatively, private care provision through the marketplace means the
state takes less of a role in care provision (Gornick and Meyers 2009). Where private care is
more dominant has implications for which parents have access to care (Mandel 2012).
Second, are additional arguments about the cost constraints of ECEC as it relates to
women’s preferences for employment and the mechanism of provision. The cost and opening
hours of childcare affect both mothers’ preferences and their budget constraints. In cases where
childcare is privatized, costs of childcare are more expensive, and “the price of childcare is
perceived as a tax on the mother’s wage (Connelly 1992; Keck and Saraceno 2013, 302;
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992). Mothers with young children may opt out of the

restrictive eligibility requirements (and high scores of other dimensions across the scale) that fathers spend more
paternal time with their children.
46
This argument differs slightly from care that is publicly financed. Most studies in gendered tradeoffs research
focus on whether care is financed by public dollars. Both public and private childcare facilities may receive public
dollars. Provision, however, focuses on the management of care. See also Appendix 2.1 for more detail.
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labor market if they believe the cost of childcare isn’t worth the penalty to their earnings. In the
case of coupled households, traditional gender roles may be reinforced.
Related to out-of-pocket costs for care and opening hours, are matters of entitlement to
care. Countries with limited privatized care often place more restrictions on which families are
able to access limited care in the first place (Mandel 2012).47 Scholars argue that demand for
ECEC services is always higher than the supply of those services—this is the case even in
countries like Iceland with high enrollment rates of children in ECEC but no legal entitlement to
ECEC at the national level (Iceland Directorate of Education 2018; Moss 2015). Because
demand for childcare services is always higher than the supply of those services, a child’s legal
entitlement to ECEC at the national level is key to parents’ use of ECEC across class.48
Legal entitlement to care also ensures the responsibility of care is placed on the state to
ensure every child has access to care and promotes a societal expectation that care and family
time is a right of all children and families regardless of socioeconomic status (Saraceno 2011,
92–93). National-based entitlement to ECEC from an early age, ideally from birth, allows
families to choose the care arrangement that is the most optimal for their needs. Full-time ECEC
also allows families to choose how long their children are in care. Gornick and Meyers (2009,
25) note that “some parents may choose to use alternative care in the child’s first year” or parents
may choose to stay at home to care for children. 49
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Mandel (2012) addresses this issue but does not test it.
National legislation in Iceland does dictate, however, that “it is the responsibility of the municipalities to offer
children preschool education but with no age limit being specified” (Eurydice 2019).
49
Additional arguments about the positive or negative consequences for women’s employment are centered on
childcare hours and vacations that must conform to the demands of full-time employment (Mandel 2012). However,
limited cross-national comparable data makes this dimension difficult to study. Descriptive information on hours of
availability for ECEC services can be found in Appendix 4.2.
48
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Effective Coverage rate and the Coordination of Leave and ECEC for Mothers’ Employment
Preferences—More Important than Separate Measures of Leave and ECEC Policy Generosity?
Scholars suggest (Plantenga and Remery 2015) less of a concern is the separate study of
the length of leave, how much well-paid leave is granted to mothers and fathers, and enrollment
rates of children under compulsory schooling age in ECEC, but rather the generosity of distinct
provisions of both policy types and how they work together. The measurement of the generosity
of well-paid leave periods and enrollment rates in public care, called the effective coverage rate,
across countries is therefore a good comparison to policy measures of leave and ECEC
generosity separately (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Plantenga and Remery 2015). 50
The effective coverage rate can also provide a better understanding of how leave and
ECEC policies are coordinated across countries. A higher effective coverage rate is indicative of
better coordination between both policies —e.g., a higher effective coverage rate of children
under compulsory schooling age means that both leave and ECEC do not leave parents with
large gaps in care. More coordination of care is important to help mothers maintain continuous
labor force attachment (see Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy
2016; Javornik 2014; Plantenga and Remery 2015; Yerkes and Javornik 2018).
Policy Measurement: Operational Issues, Problematic Indicators, and Limitations
In the above section, I established supply and demand-side arguments of leave and ECEC
that are under-considered in gendered tradeoffs research. To reassess the standard measures in
the literature and to construct new measures to test these arguments, data and measurement
limitations of leave and ECEC must also be taken into consideration.

This measurement differs from Mandel and Semyonov’s WSII in that I’m measuring a specific definition of the
generosity of leave and ECEC and don’t assume this one measure represents the generosity of these policies as a
whole or represents the full scope of these policies.
50
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Standard Leave Policy Generosity Indicators
As stated earlier, measures of leave policy in the literature include combinations of two
dimensions of leave policy generosity—the length of leave and the payment rate. There are many
different ways to measure the generosity of leave. Scholars often don’t consider more than one
measurement in their study or which measures of leave policy generosity may be problematic. A
problematic leave policy indicator may not do much to advance knowledge of the unintended
effects of leave policy for gender employment inequalities. For example, Keck and Saraceno
(2013) critique the use of a measure of FTE leave. This measure “equates short-well paid leaves
with long, poorly paid leaves. From an organizational point of view and also from the point of
view of job protection, the two alternatives are, in fact, quite different” (Keck and Saraceno
2013, 305).
To elaborate on this point, if country x promotes a leave policy that offers 20 weeks of
paid leave at 100 percent of usual earnings (20 x 1 = 20 weeks of fully paid leave). This leave
period is “equated” with country y’s policy that offers 40 weeks of paid leave at 50 percent of
usual earnings (40 x .5 = 20 weeks of paid leave). In both scenarios, these leaves are both
considered “generous” even though the payment rate of leave in country x is generous and the
payment rate in country y is weak. Surprisingly, this is one of the only major critiques of leave
policy indicator construction in the literature. Keck and Saraceno’s (2013) insight highlights that
problematic policy indicators can distort readers’ understanding of which countries promote
leave policies that can be considered “generous” or “weak” in design. 51
Conceptually, scholars have also not systematically defined what types of leave are
included in measures of leave policy generosity. This is problematic because the periods of leave
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Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013), Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), and Mandel (2012) all utilize a
measure of FTE leave in their research.
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included in measurements across studies may differ and may render different conclusions about
the relationship between leave policies and employment inequalities. In this study, I differentiate
between three different periods of leave—maternity and paternity leave taken around the birth of
a child and longer “parental leaves” that can be taken once maternity leave and paternity leave
end. One of the main measurement considerations is to clearly define which periods of leave are
included in measures of leave policy generosity and how the delineation of different periods of
leave policy across specific countries may deviate from my own definitions.
Other measurement issues focus on whether to combine together periods of unpaid leaves
with periods of paid leave and how to measure periods of “well-paid” leave. Scholars argue that
combining weeks of paid and unpaid leave together (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Pettit and
Hook 2009) mask the differential effects both paid and unpaid leave can have on women’s
employment (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019). Low-skilled women and men may be less likely
to take up low-paid or unpaid leave because they cannot afford to do so (Brady, Blome, and
Kmec 2019, 5). For measures of leave with an optimal “midpoint,” there is also no consensus as
to whether periods of only paid leave or periods of both paid and unpaid leave should be
included.52 To date, no scholar has incorporated a leave policy measure into gendered tradeoffs
research that separates weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave from periods of well-paid leave.
Also, no consensus exists as to what constitutes leave that is “well-paid” to construct
measures of leave policy generosity. A wage-replacement rate of 60 percent of usual earnings
has been considered the lowest threshold across some studies (Keck and Saraceno 2013). Other
studies suggest two-thirds of earnings is justified as a low cutoff threshold where leave becomes
inaccessible to low-wage mothers and fathers and when fathers, in general, will not take up leave

52

Additionally, for a comprehensive descriptive evaluation of leave policies across the 24 countries in the study,
plus select Latin American countries, see Appendix Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
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(Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; see also Dearing 2016 for the same cutoff point). Note
similarly, the Family Policy Council of Europe member (2009, 36) suggest a 70 percent lowcutoff threshold below which leave becomes inaccessible to low-wage mothers and fathers.
However, other scholars have argued much higher wage-replacement rates may be more
indicative of generous leave. The argument is that fathers are only likely to take up leave that is
paid at 100 percent of lost earnings (Castro-Garcia and Pazos-Moran 2016). Javornik (2014)
argues an 85 percent wage-replacement rate is a cutoff point that is close is to the ideal, while
Gornick and Meyers (2003) place the cutoff at 80 percent of usual earnings.
Leave Universality
Leave universality measures have largely been absent from gendered tradeoffs research
because quantifying categorical information used to evaluate and measure leave policy
universality is problematic. Legislation across countries must be compared to determine which
countries provide the least or most optimal policies based on recommendations from the
literature and international organizations. Leave policy measures are then “scored” using a scale
that indicates which policies are better in line with which policies are more universal, or
accessible. Lack of comparable employed groups also makes the assessment of coverage
difficult. In many cases, specific groups of workers are exempt from coverage in leave programs,
including the self-employed, home workers, and informal workers (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt
2010, 208).
ECEC Data and Measurement Limitations: Standard and New Indicators
Highlighted earlier in the chapter, scholars mainly use measurements of enrollment rates
of children in publicly subsidized childcare as a proxy for the availability of ECEC. Measures of
enrollment, or the utilization of ECEC, are used because across many countries ECEC legislation
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does not set standardized rules for ECEC provision. Access, availability, and cost of care are
many times organized at the state/regional, municipal/city, or individual provider level. It is
argued that local jurisdictions may have a better understanding of local need for ECEC services,
with countries providing broad level curriculum requirements that states, municipalities, or
providers must follow.
However, the use of ECEC enrollment rates as the main measure of ECEC policy
generosity is potentially problematic. Enrollment rates may not be good indicators of the scope
of public care, because these measures may not be indicative of the cost or accessibility of care,
especially in countries with widely available private alternatives to care (such as in the US).
Data limitations for the measurement of enrollment rates also persist. First, children may
be double-counted in enrollment rates based on differences in age cutoffs for childcare and preprimary education across countries. The percentage of children enrolled in childcare services or
pre-primary education may therefore be overestimated or underestimated based on how children
are grouped in the data—e.g., children three years of age may attend both childcare and preprimary education and be counted in two separate sets of data that measure enrollment in these
ECEC institutions. As an improvement to this issue, the International Standardization of
Education Classification (ISCED) definition for ISCED 0 is now broken down into two
categories—01 (childcare services) and 02 (pre-primary education). The OECD Education at a
Glance annual publications also provides enrollment rates (in formal care arrangements) under
these categories (OECD 2017).
Increasingly, the only enrollment data available to researchers are rates for children in
formal care arrangements. These rates do not distinguish between care in public or private
facilities and whether these facilities are publicly or privately funded. Formal care enrollment
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rates mask the government’s true capacity for ECEC provision. Therefore, government
intervention to alleviate childcare issues is increasingly more difficult to evaluate. In addition,
while most countries follow the definition for ECEC (ISCED 0), differences may still persist
across regions and within countries around how enrollment rates are measured.
Issues also persist with measurements of expenditure data such as total public
expenditure on pre-primary education in percentage of GDP and childcare costs (as an additional
measure of ECEC availability). First, some countries do not include spending on ECEC at the
local level while other countries include local-level spending. “Such spending (local-level
spending) is comprehensively recorded in Social Democratic (Social Democratic) countries, but
in some other (often federal) countries it may not be fully captured by the OECD social
expenditure data” (OECD 2016). Second, divisions between social care and educational services
may not always be clear in the data (Randall 2000). Some countries may seem less generous with
spending for childcare services for very young children but put more resources into preschool
services for slightly older children (children three years of age or older), for example. Measures
of out-of-pocket costs to parents, take childcare subsidies and tax credits into account that can
lower the out-of-pocket fees to parents but are still measures of the utilization of care, and not
legislation per se. Conceptually, then, the measurement of the utilization of ECEC and the
measurement of leave policy legislation differ. We are not truly capturing national legislation
with measures of ECEC utilization (for a more detailed discussion of the scope and limitations of
ECEC measurement see Sirén et al., 2020).
New Country Cases and Rethinking Country Categorizations
Finally, there is also the question of domain. Most previous studies limited themselves to
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the usual high-income countries and the use of out-of-date or inappropriate categories to sort
countries. These choices are no longer justified, so other countries should be included along with
new categories that signal which countries promote leave and ECEC that are well-developed
across multiple policy dimensions.
Across a portion of the gendered tradeoffs literature, Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds”
(1990, 1999) welfare state regime typology is the dominant categorization typology used to
explain cross-national differences in both work-family policies and institutional arrangements.
However, findings from the leave and ECEC policy architecture literature suggests traditional
welfare state regime typologies may not adequately represent the development of these two
specific work-family reconciliation policies. When operationalizing more dimensions of leave
and ECEC than traditionally used in comparative research, researchers find considerable
heterogeneity of work-family policy development within countries across established welfare
state clusters.53
Drawing from the feminist welfare state literature, I suggest the development of a new
classification scheme that takes gender into account (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Orloff
2009; and Sainsbury 1994)54 and more accurately represents the development of leave and ECEC
policies across different policy dimensions. Similarly, Esping-Andersen (1999) makes a critique
of his own work by arguing that the three welfare state regimes do not disentangle the
relationships between welfare state policies and gender inequality in employment per se. These
arguments suggest room for new a typology of work-family reconciliation policy.

Similarly, Scruggs and Allan (2006, 2008) replicate Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds” analysis. They construct
decommodification and benefit generosity indices utilizing updated data for three welfare state programs
(unemployment, sickness, and pensions). The indices and correlations between the three different programs show a
mis-categorization of several countries and less support for distinct regime types.
54
Further, feminist welfare state scholars suggest leave and ECEC may differentially affect women’s employment
across countries classified in the same regime type.
53
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First, some studies from the literature on leave and ECEC policy architecture suggest
heterogeneity in the generosity of leave and ECEC policies within the countries classified in the
Social Democratic regime—especially when paid leave for fathers is taken into account.
Javornik and Kurowska (2017) find that the leave and ECEC policies of Iceland and Sweden are
more generous than leave and ECEC policies in Finland and Denmark. When including measures
of the weeks of paid leave for fathers, Finland and Denmark promote a much lower share of
reserved, well-paid leave to fathers when compared to Sweden and Iceland. Javornik and
Kurowska argue (2017, 630) that “the legal opportunity for fathers to use leave is not likely to be
converted into a real opportunity (i.e., child’s real opportunities to be with both parents) because
fathers and mothers are not treated equally (with relatively short quotas of nine and two weeks,
respectively) and/or financially unviable sharable leave.” Dearing (2016) draws similar
conclusions as Javornik and Kurowska (2017) that not all Social Democratic countries offer
optimal amounts of well-paid leave for fathers. Specifically, Finland and Denmark offer fathers a
very low share of reserved well-paid leave (at two-thirds of earnings or more) out of the total
share of well-paid leave available to both mothers and fathers.
Second some studies consider that countries outside of the Social Democratic regime
provide leave policies that are just as generous as those classified in the Social Democratic
regime. Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010) score the portion of a couples’ leave reserved for
fathers, incentives for the take-up of available leave, and the wage replacement of fathers’ usual
wages during leave to measure generosity and gender equality in leave legislation in highincome countries. They found that Greece—in addition to the Social Democratic countries of
Finland, Norway, and Sweden—provide leave policies that are both generous and gender-
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egalitarian in design (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010, 196).55 Castro-Garcia and Pazos-Moran
(2016, 51) find that Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden score highest on their Parental Leave
Equality Index (PLEI) and note that France, Spain, and Belgium all have the potential to reach
gender equality in paid leave.
Other studies in this genre show that Eastern European countries may provide leave and
ECEC policies that are just as well-developed as those in the Social Democratic welfare state
regime. These studies justify the inclusion of more high-income countries from this region into
gendered tradeoffs research. In her assessment of eight Eastern European countries, Javornik
(2014, 240) constructed an index with 11 components of leave and ECEC to evaluate which
countries promote state de-familialism (gender equality in paid and unpaid work). She finds that
Lithuania and Slovenia best promote women’s continuous employment and “active fatherhood”
(Javornik 2014, 253), similar to Social Democratic countries, through leave and ECEC policies.
For ECEC arrangements, Yerkes and Javornik (2018, 1) find that Iceland and Sweden,
along with Slovenia, provide the most well-developed ECEC arrangements that can best promote
reduced gender and class inequalities in employment based on a descriptive analysis of “five key
aspects of childcare provision (accessibility, availability, affordability, quality, and flexibility).”
Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) find that the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden may all help
parents equally combine work and care, but that no country’s policies support a universal
caregiver model.
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However, this does not mean that well-developed leave policies in these countries will be associated with gender
equality in employment. Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010) argue that the effectiveness of Greece’s legislation is
diminished by the limitations of coverage due to high levels of informality and self-employment. Workers in
informal work situations or that are self-employed are likely to be excluded from leave coverage
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Conclusions
In this chapter, I laid out my main argument and the limitations in the literature that will
be addressed in this study. My argument is focused around two of the most widely studied workfamily policies across the literature—leave and ECEC. A research agenda was formulated that
first brings the measurement and construction of leave and ECEC policy indicators front and
center. Only after a rigorous assessment of leave and ECEC policy measurement construction
can the relationships between these policies and class and gender inequality in employment be
properly evaluated. I will bring together how leave and ECEC are linked to both class
inequalities among women and gendered tradeoffs between men and women in employment. Are
the two related—e.g., do large class differences in gender inequality imply reduced inequalities
among women. How are the two conceptually related?
In this chapter, I drew attention to additional theories under-considered in this genre of
literature that motivates my research. First, the relationship between ECEC, women’s
employment preferences, and unintended consequences should be considered. The provision of
ECEC services (whether public or private), the out-of-pocket cost of care, and children’s
entitlement to leave all factor into women’s preferences for employment. What are possible
relationships between these ECEC dimensions and class inequalities among women in
employment?
I also addressed additional theories on leave. The question of leave generosity for
fathers—how much is reserved for fathers’ use and incentives and/or disincentives for take-up—
has only been addressed by a few studies. In the literature, it is suggested that fathers should be
allocated 50 percent of reserved leave to help to reduce employer statistical discrimination since
employers know that mothers will not be the only parent to take up leave. Is this true, or does
generosity of leave allocated to fathers also promote gendered tradeoffs between men and
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women in employment? The payment rate of leave, and whether leave is well-paid (e.g., replaces
wages of at least 67 percent of usual earnings or more) has also not been considered in the
literature. Poorly paid leaves are inaccessible to low-income parents. Fathers are also unlikely to
take up leave that is not well-paid. The wage-replacement rate of leave therefore has implications
for both class inequalities and gendered tradeoffs. Theories about optimal leave length and the
universality of leave are also linked to arguments of women’s employment preferences and
employer statistical discrimination.
Issues of the measurement of leave and ECEC and data limitations were also highlighted
and will be taken into account across my study. ECEC is mainly measured using enrollment rates
(the utilization of ECEC). Many countries do not promote standardized ECEC provisions
included in national-level legislation which limits measurement to a few country-level indicators,
most notably enrollment rates of children in ECEC. However, enrollment rate data are not
without their limitations. Children can be double-counted in two different types of care
(childcare services and pre-primary education). Enrollment in formal care arrangements masks
public provision for care because these rates are inclusive of children in all types of care
arrangements (both publicly and privately managed). Public expenditure on pre-primary
education may not include expenditure on ECEC at the local level so data may not be completely
comparable. Parental fees may better represent the cost burden to parents but can be measured in
many different ways and for different family types.
For leave policy, there are measurement issues that address whether to include weeks of
paid and unpaid leave together in one indicator, how to define thresholds for well-paid leave, and
if the length or the payment is a better indicator of “generosity.” Another puzzle to emerge
concerns identifying where the inflection point lies, regarding the optimal length of leave—when
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does it turn from being advantageous to being harmful, with respect to class and gender
inequalities? The literature has also largely ignored the use of problematic indicators such as
FTE leave that may distort readers’ understandings of which countries provide generous leaves
in the first place. How to adequately measure categorical information of coverage, eligibility, and
financing has largely been absent from the literature.
Finally, my disaggregation of the WSII and a discussion of the literature on leave policy
architecture showed that current typologies and country classifications may be outdated. Much of
the literature utilizes Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state typology to explain policy variation
and gender employment inequalities. The use of this typology also limits the number of
individual country cases included in gendered tradeoffs research. Additional literature on leave
and ECEC policy architecture suggests that when more dimensions of leave and ECEC are
analyzed across a broader scope of countries, that standard country classifications may not hold
(e.g., there is a rift as to whether all Social Democratic countries promote well-developed leave
and ECEC policies, for example). Others suggest that additional high-income countries from
Eastern Europe (Slovenia) and Southern Europe (Greece, Spain) may also support welldeveloped work-family reconciliation policies.
Part 2 and Part 3: Outline
The rest of this dissertation is set up in two parts (Part 2 and Part 3). Part 2 (Chapters 4–
7) is dedicated to leave and ECEC policy indicator construction and measurement. The main
goal of the chapters in Part 2 is to address the call for better policy indicators to be used in
gendered tradeoffs research. In order to do this, I replicate standard leave and ECEC indicators
from past research and construct new leave and ECEC measures using policy data from the
newly constructed leave and ECEC policy databases. These two sets of indicators—standard
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leave and ECEC indicators from the literature along with newly constructed leave and ECEC
policy measures (defined in Chapter 4)—will be compared to one another (across Chapters 5 and
6). The purpose of the comparison is threefold. First, I determine which country cases included
in the study provide leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed across different policy
dimensions, as measured in the policy indicators—the goal is to determine if countries in the
Social Democratic regime truly promote leave and ECEC policies that are the most welldeveloped. Second, based on the indicator results and analyses across Chapters 5 and 6, I
construct a new work-family reconciliation policy typology (Chapter 7) that regroups countries
together based on how well-developed leave and ECEC policies are across measures of multiple
policy dimensions. Third, using Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses, I evaluate
relationships between the policy measures. The goal is to determine the relationships among the
measures. One of the main arguments for the use of one or two policy indicators in any study is
that the indicators represent the “scope of family policy.” If this is the case, when measuring
multiple dimensions of leave policies, we should see clear relationships across the measures.
However, the comparison of the policy measures in Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) in this chapter suggests this argument is overly ambitious.
Further, a set of these policy measures will be used in Part 3 to test relationships between the
measures and gender and class employment inequalities.
The main goal in Part 3 is to discover whether the patterns of the unintended effects of
leave and ECEC policies for women’s employment across different class groups still hold when
new a new work-family reconciliation policy typology and new measurements of leave and
ECEC policy dimensions from Part 2 are considered.
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PART 2: LEAVE AND ECEC POLICIES: MEASUREMENT AND NEW TYPOLOGY
Chapter 4: Part 2 Setup
Introduction
This chapter sets up the analysis of leave and ECEC policy measures. I replicate standard
work-family reconciliation policy indicators from past research and construct new leave and
ECEC measures using policy data from the newly constructed leave and ECEC policy databases
(see Appendix Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Three dimensions of leave policy (generosity, gender
equality, and universality) and two dimensions of ECEC arrangements (generosity and
universality) are measured in discrete policy indicators. The construction of policy measures is
complex with distinct methodological and data considerations/limitations to take into account.
Overall, I argue that the way leave and ECEC policies are measured matters to draw conclusions
about which countries provide work-family reconciliation policies that are well-developed.
Further, the measurement of work-family policies is central to the issue of gendered tradeoffs—
the way policies are measured matters for the study of the relationship between work-family
policies and gender (in)equality in employment.
Country Cases and Analysis Setup
Country Cases
Leave and ECEC policy indicators are constructed based on policies from 24 highincome countries. The 24 country cases are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway (Social
Democratic countries); Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland (Conservative-Corporatist countries); Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK, and the US
(Liberal countries); Greece, Italy, and Spain (Southern European countries); the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Eastern European countries). Five
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of these country cases are newer additions to gendered tradeoffs research—Estonia, Greece,
Iceland, Poland, and Slovenia. I include these additional country cases because all five are postindustrialized, high-income countries that provide similar leave and ECEC policies as the
country cases most consistently used across this body of research. These additional country cases
also better represent a more complete set of regime types (see below).
Analysis Setup Across Two Sections of Results in Chapters 5 and 6
The analyses of all policy indicator estimates (and the rankings of the indicator estimates)
will be divided into two sections. In the first results section, individual countries nested in
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime types (and extended by others—see Arts and Gelissen
2002, for example) is the unit of analysis. I assume that countries included in each regime type
share similar institutional and political arrangements (as detailed in Part 1, see also Mandel 2011,
2012; Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Mandel and Shalev 2009). The expectation is that the
leave and ECEC policy data will confirm evidence of distinct welfare state regime types. 56 For
example, the data for leave and ECEC should confirm that the Social Democratic countries
provide leave and ECEC policies that are the most well-developed in design, as measured in
discrete policy indicators. This is because the Social Democratic welfare state regime is
characterized as the most well-developed compared to other regime types. Therefore, individual
leave and ECEC policies should be the most well-developed across multiple dimensions
compared to the leave and ECEC policies in countries categorized in other regime types. The

However, remember that Scruggs and Allan (2006, 2008) replicate Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds” analysis
and find less support for distinct regime types, using data from three welfare state programs – unemployment,
sickness, and pensions. Their findings, along with the findings from the leave and ECEC policy architecture
literature, suggest that I will also find a regrouping or reshuffling of countries away from standard regime types
when evaluating the development of leave and ECEC.
56
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goal is to determine if regime types are robust when measuring more dimensions of leave and
ECEC. Table 4.1 shows how the 24 countries are grouped by regime type. 57
In this first section of results, the estimates and rankings of the estimates across each
individual policy indicator are analyzed. The rankings are included to determine which leave and
ECEC policies are well-developed across different policy dimensions. The directionality of the
rankings is calculated directly from the indicator values (for a detailed explanation of indicator
construction and the ranking method, please see Appendix 4.3). For example, a high rank across
a measure of well-paid leave periods for mothers is indicative of a more generous policy for that
particular leave policy dimension.
In a second results section in Chapters 5 and 6, relationships between each individual
policy indicator are evaluated using either Pearson or Spearman correlations, where
appropriate.58 Section 2 addresses whether different measurements of leave and ECEC policy are
correlated or not. As shown in Chapter 3, both can be true across individual studies (e.g., in
Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), the three indicators in their WSII are highly and positively
correlated, in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019), leave and ECEC policy indicators have no
discernable correlation to each other).
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Regime types are labeled based on standards in the literature. There is much scholarship that classifies and
categorizes countries into typologies based on shared social and political characteristics and histories—including
similarities in welfare state structures and policies (see Arts and Gelissen 2002 for a comprehensive review and
Chapter 2 for more on this subject). Regime type labels can also differ across studies. The Southern European
regime can also be labeled as the Latin Rim Model or Mediterranean model. Generally, the Eastern European regime
or Post-Socialist regime type is characterized by a shared post-Socialist history and welfare state policies that
emphasize women’s care of young children (see Javornik 2014, for example). Welfare state regime types are
therefore generally based on geographic approximation as well.
58
Pearson correlations will be performed between continuous indicators. Spearman correlations will be performed
between indicators where at least one indicator is not continuous. For example, the leave universality index is an
ordinal or ranked scale. Several dimensions of leave policy are scored based on which policy situations are optimal
for working parents. However, we specifically do not know the spacing between the quantified categories.
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This exercise has three main goals. First, the correlations among policy indicators of the
same policy type will be used to determine if one measure is indicative of the scope of that
policy more generally—e.g., is one measure of leave policy generosity, such as the weeks of
well-paid leave, correlated with leave policy generosity across different measures, and do
measures of leave policy generosity also represent leave that is gender-egalitarian or universal
(e.g., accessible by mothers and fathers) in design? Second, the correlations between policy
indicators will be important to determine which to use in Part 3 in the measurement of policy
effects on gender and class (in)equality in employment. Overall, the goal is to highlight the
complexity of the measurement of leave and ECEC policies and how measurements directly
relate to understandings of which countries provide work-family reconciliation policies that are
well-developed.
Research Questions Chapters 5 and 6
The overarching research question addressed across the chapters: How can we construct
measures of leave and ECEC policy that are multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise?
Chapter 5 Research Questions:
RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of standard and newly constructed measures of
leave and ECEC policy generosity tell us about how to construct policy measures that are
disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity alter
previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes promote leave and ECEC
policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
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RQ3: What do correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity tell us
more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy generosity measure to more
broadly represent the scope of either policy?
Chapter 6 Research Questions:
RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of newly constructed measures of leave and
ECEC policy gender equality and universality tell us about how to construct policy measures
that are disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC gender equality and
universality alter previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes
promote leave and ECEC policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
RQ3: What do correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy across the three
policy dimensions tell us more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy
measure of any policy dimension to more broadly represent the scope of either policy?
Chapter 7—New Typology
The new policy measures explained across Chapters 5 and 6 will also be used to construct
a new work-family reconciliation typology in Chapter 7. To construct this new country typology,
a series of leave and ECEC policy indicators that best represent well-developed leave and ECEC
across different policy dimensions will be chosen. 59 60 Countries will be regrouped by the
number of high ranks across the different policy dimensions. More “high ranks” across different

59

A different selection of measures may lead to different country classifications. For example, weeks of moderately
well-paid leave using a 6-month cutoff means that Slovenia, Denmark, and Finland all rank near the bottom of the
indicator because weeks of well-paid leave for mothers is “too long.” However, given that the research on leave
length is its debate and because one year has been found to be a moderate cutoff point in other research (see Olivetti
and Petrongolo 2017), I do not include it here.
60
Also note that I don’t suggest these policy measures be studied together; rather, I intend to highlight different
patterns of generosity, gender equality, and universality of these policies across new country groupings.
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policy dimensions suggest work-family reconciliation policies are well-developed. This typology
is intended to take gender into account—e.g., those policies that support both mothers’ and
fathers’ care of children.61 The number of country groups in this new typology will be
determined by the analysis of the rankings across the policy measures in Chapter 7.
Leave and ECEC: Concepts and Measurement
The leave and ECEC policy measures constructed and evaluated in Part 2 are either
commonly used in gendered tradeoffs research or are newly developed based on additional
theoretical and measurement considerations highlighted in Chapter 3. Again, all original countrylevel policy data used to construct the policy measures can be found in Appendices 4.1 and 4.2.
As detailed in the literature review, all work-family policy indicators used in gendered
tradeoffs research are continuous indicators either evaluated as discrete, separate indicators or
combined into an index. In addition to continuous measures, with the new measures for leave
policy gender equality and universality and ECEC universality, I construct new indicators that
measure qualitative differences in leave and ECEC policy across countries based on whether
these policies support gender equality or are more widely accessible to working parents.62
Well-developed work-family reconciliation policies: Defined as leave and ECEC
policies that best support women’s employment, based on evidence from the literature.
Empirically evaluated as high rankings across measures of multiple policy dimensions of these
policies.63

61

Though note that policies in Social Democratic countries are built on gender-egalitarian values. While EspingAndersen (1990) famously “does not take gender into account,” I still expect these countries to rank highly when
constructing the new typology.
62
This method is drawn from Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019). They utilize a wage coordination measure as a
control-level variable that measures the qualitative differences in labor market institutions and corporatism by
scoring countries on a scale from 1 (fragmented wage bargaining) to 5 (centralized bargaining).
63
Here policies are separated from country because policies can change over time. However, individual countries at
any point in time can support well-developed policies as can specific groups of countries.
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Leave Policy Measures: Categories and Concepts
Categories of Leave Policy Included in Leave Policy Measurements
The umbrella term “leave” encompasses these three types of leave unless otherwise
specified.64 These three different categories of leave are specified because of the conceptual
ambiguity of included leave periods in measurements across the literature:
1) Maternity Leave: Mothers’ leave that can be taken around the birth or adoption of a
child.
2) Paternity Leave: Fathers’ leave that can be taken around the birth or adoption of a child.
3) Parental Leave: Leave that can be taken by either the mother or father once maternity or
paternity leave ends.65
Three Dimensions of Leave Policy Considered for the Construction of Leave Policy Indicators
1) Generosity: How much leave is granted to each recipient. All leave generosity indicators
take into account different combinations of leave length and the payment of leave. The
generosity of leave is calculated for leave periods allocated to both mothers and fathers.
All reserved and sharable leave is allocated to mothers. Only nontransferable leave
periods are allocated to fathers.
2) Gender equality: The extent to which leave policies are equally accessible by working
mothers and fathers and are most likely to lead to symmetrical use by both parents. Three
categories are defined: fathers’ reserved, nontransferable share of leave; incentives; and
disincentives.

64

Leave categories may differ across countries—see Appendix 4.1 for more detailed country-level information.
As stated earlier, programs are defined differently across countries. To learn more about country-level programs
see the notes accompanying table A4.1.
65
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a. Fathers’ reserved, nontransferable share of leave: Fathers’ reserved,
nontransferable leave period as a percentage of total leave (total leave is
comprised of three possible types of leave—fathers’ reserved, nontransferable
leave period; mothers’ reserved, nontransferable leave period; and shared leave
periods).
b. Incentives: Three incentives for fathers to take up leave: when fathers are
incentivized to take up a period of shared leave, leave that can be transferred from
the mother to the father, or periods of leave that can be taken together. 66
c. Disincentives: Leave policy dimensions that disincentivizes fathers’ take-up.
Two disincentives are considered—a parental leave scheme that is a shared
entitlement, but the entirety of leave can only be taken by one parent; a parental
leave scheme that is a shared entitlement, but in order for both parents to take a
portion of the leave period, this intent must be stated in a formal agreement.
3) Leave universality: Who is eligible to receive a paid leave benefit/breadth of the
population covered. Three separate dimensions of leave policy universality are defined:
a. Coverage rates: Using the ILO definition, coverage rates are defined as the
“Coverage in law of maternity leave: This indicator measures the share of
employed women (regardless of their status in employment, category of work, or
the level of formality), who are legally covered by statutory maternity leave. The
numerator is the result of the number of women employed, whose sector,

Daddy days and use-it-or-lose-it incentives (e.g., periods of fathers’ reserved leave that cannot be transferred or
used by the mother) are already included in the nontransferable leave periods allocated to fathers. This is the case for
12 weeks of parental leave allocated to fathers in Norway. However, Finland incentivizes fathers to take up the last
two weeks of parental leave in order to receive an additional 24 bonus days. These bonus days are not included in
the total weeks of nontransferable leave allocated to fathers. Nor are the two weeks of parental leave since they can
also be taken by the mother.
66
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occupation, or other personal characteristics are explicitly included in the scope of
the labor code (legally covered) minus the number of women workers legally
covered who do not meet the qualifying conditions to access the right to maternity
leave (legally unqualified). The denominator is the number of women in
employment, without discrimination as to age, nationality, marital status, or
residence. This indicator reflects the entitlement to maternity leave, regardless of
its length or payment.” (ILO 2014, 148).67
b. Financing schemes: How paid leave schemes are financed; through a social
insurance scheme or employer contributions, for example.
c. Eligibility requirements: Requirements that a person must meet to access leave
benefits—such as work history or contributions to a leave scheme.
Leave Policy Measures68
Generosity Indicators (one set of policy measures for both mothers and fathers)
Nine leave generosity policy indicators total are constructed (nine each for leave periods
allocated to both mothers and fathers). A broad set of leave generosity measures are compared
because these are the most widely utilized measures of leave in the literature. A goal of the
construction of these measures is to show the different possible ways leave policy generosity can
be measured using different combinations of the length of leave and the payment rate of leave.

67

The ILO (see the Working Conditions Laws Database) and the United States Social Security Administration (see
the Social Security Programs Throughout the World publications) and other sources provide information on covered
groups under leave programs. However, with no specific rules about how groups are categorized or about how
information is compiled and shared, I opt to not use this information in my comparisons. High-quality, comparative
coverage rates do not exist for paternity leave or parental leave
68
Detailed methodological information for the construction of each measure as well as data considerations and
limitations can be found in Appendix 4.4.
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The nine leave policy generosity indicators to be compared in the next chapter are those
commonly used in gendered tradeoffs research (Indicators 1–4) and those that are newer to the
literature and are measured based on additional theoretical arguments of leave policy generosity
(Indicators 5–9). Therefore, for Indicators 1–4, standard measurement methods from the
literature are replicated.
To address the call for better indicators that take into account wage replacement cutoffs,
for Indicators 5–9, two different wage cutoffs are taken into account. Indicator 5 includes all
weeks of leave that are either unpaid or low-paid (using a cutoff of less than 67 percent of usual
earnings). Indicator 6 measures weeks of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings or more.
Indicators 5 and 6 are mutually exclusive—and take into account periods of leave with different
payment rates that add up to a 100 percent total share of the total leave periods allocated to both
mothers and fathers across each country. Indicators 7 and 8 measure well-paid weeks of leave at
a 6-month and 12-month optimal midpoint. Indicator 9 measures well-paid leave periods for
mothers and fathers at a higher wage-replacement rate of 85 percent of usual earnings or more.
The exercise with these new leave generosity measures alternatives is an inductive one, to see
which leave cutoffs are useful and what patterns are shown across the different indicator options.
Table 4.2 shows which dimension(s) of leave policy generosity—length, payment, or
both—is emphasized across each of the individual nine measures:
Standard Leave Generosity Policy Indicators 69
1) Indicator 1: Total weeks of leave (paid + unpaid)
2) Indicator 2: Weeks of FTE leave (wage-replacement rate x the weeks of paid leave)
3) Indicator 3: Average wage replacement (usual earnings) over the total paid leave
period
69

Again, the standard leave policy generosity indicators take into account leave lengths and/or payments of rates of
leave for all leave—reserved/nontransferable and sharable leave allocated to mothers. However, standard measures
of leave policy generosity are constructed for fathers’ nontransferable leave periods to construct a more complete
portrait of leave policy generosity for fathers.
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4) Indicator 4: Weeks of paid leave (at any wage-replacement rate)
New Leave Generosity Policy Indicators
5) Indicator 5: Total weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave (less than 67 percent of usual
earnings)
6) Indicator 6: Weeks of well-paid leave at two-thirds of usual earnings or more (67
percent of usual earnings or higher)70
7) Indicator 7: Weeks of well-paid leave at two-thirds of usual earnings or more with a
moderate leave cutoff period of one year
8) Indicator 8: Weeks of well-paid leave at two-thirds of usual earnings or more with a
moderate leave cutoff period of six months
9) Indicator 9: Weeks of well-paid leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings
Gender Equality Measures
The leave gender equality measures address the extent to which leave periods are
allocated equally between mothers and fathers as well as incentives and disincentives for fathers
to take up leave. A measure of the share of nontransferable, paid leave for fathers has been
utilized in one study (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Indicators 3 and 4 consider shares of wellpaid, nontransferable leave periods allocated to fathers. Like the leave generosity indicators, the
construction of multiple gender equality measures is to consider which are the most useful for
use in gendered tradeoffs research.
1) Indicator 1: Share of nontransferable leave for fathers (paid or unpaid)
2) Indicator 2: Share of nontransferable, paid leave for fathers
3) Indicator 3: Share of well-paid, nontransferable leave for fathers (67 percent of usual
earnings or more)
4) Indicator 4: Share of well-paid, nontransferable leave for fathers (85 percent of usual
earnings or more)

70

Indicators 5 and 6 take two specific payment cutoffs into account for leave periods for both mothers and fathers.
Indicator 5 includes all weeks of leave that is either unpaid or poorly paid. In this case the measure includes all
weeks of leave that are paid at less than 67 percent of usual earnings. Indicator 6 includes all weeks of leave that are
paid at 67 percent of usual earnings or higher. Therefore, the data used to construct the two indicators is nonoverlapping and mutually exclusive. Added together, the weeks of leave sum 100% of total leave allocated to
mothers (reserved and shareable) and 100% of total leave allocated to fathers (reserved and nontransferable). The
sum of the total weeks of leave across these two indicators for each individual country match the value for each
country in Indicator 1, which measures all weeks of paid and unpaid leave.
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5) Incentive points (up to 3 points total): Incentives for fathers to take shared leave; a
portion of maternity leave or other leave periods can be transferred to the father;
periods of leave can be taken together.
6) Disincentive points (up to 2 points total): Only one parent is eligible to take up
leave; only one parent is able to take up leave, and in order to split it with the other
parent an agreement has to be written up.
Incentives and disincentives (5 and 6) are not continuous indicators. These are additional
categorical dimensions of leave policy gender equality. Points are granted or subtracted if
countries further incentivize or disincentivize fathers to take up different periods of leave. These
measures are discussed in Chapter 6 and utilized for the construction of the new country
typology in Chapter 7.71
Universality Measures
The leave universality measures are completely new measures not seen in the literature
before and measure the ease of accessibility or access to leave.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Indicator 1: Coverage rates for maternity leave
Indicator 2: The financing of reserved leave for mothers
Indicator 3: The financing of reserved leave for fathers
Indicator 4: Eligibility requirements for mothers’ leave
Indicator 5: Eligibility requirements for fathers’ leave
Leave universality scale: This scale combines all 5 separate indicators above into
one scale; the scale and ranks of countries means the scale and ranks can be compared
to the other stand-alone policy measures72

71

See Appendix 4.3 that details indicator construction.
Scale is essentially an ordinal variable. Higher scores on the scale indicate more leave universality across different
dimensions though we do not know the spacing between the variables (Williams 2019). The scale is modeled after
the wage bargaining scale used as a country-level control variable in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019). The same
method is employed for the ECEC universality scale (see below).
72
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ECEC Policy Measures: Categories and Concepts
Two Dimensions of ECEC Policy Considered
1) Generosity: How much ECEC is available; the availability and affordability of care.

The two types of ECEC considered are:73
a. Childcare services: Services available to very young children, typically
between zero and up through two years of age. 74
b. Pre-primary education: Early education arrangements that are available to
children typically between three years of age and the compulsory schooling
age (preschool, for example).
2) Universality: The breadth of receipt; children’s entitlement to ECEC, and the hours
of entitlement.
ECEC Measures
ECEC Generosity Measures
Indicators 1–3 are standard indicators used in the literature. Newer to the literature are
measures 4–8, weighted enrollment of children in formal care (by the dominant mechanism of
provision (Indicators 4 and 5), out-of-pocket costs for care for single parents and couples
(Indicators 6 and 7), and a measure of the coordination of care—e.g., the share of children
covered under well-paid leave (at 67 percent or more of usual earnings) or public childcare

73

For more detailed information, please see Appendix 4.3 that details indicator construction and ranking of each
policy indicator.
74
In this study, enrollment in childcare services (by the child’s age) is defined as those from zero up through two
years of age (immediately prior to the child’s third birthday). Note that in past studies scholars note there may be a
slight overlap between children enrolled in childcare services and pre-primary education. E.g., they may be counted
in both. See the notes section in Appendix 4.2 to learn about data limitations for any countries for which there may
be overlap.
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arrangements for children under compulsory schooling age across each individual country. Also
new to the literature is a measure of ECEC universality.
Standard ECEC Generosity Measures
1) Indicator 1: Enrollment rates of children in formal care (0–2 years of age)
2) Indicator 2: Enrollment rates of children in formal care (3 years of age–compulsory
schooling age)
3) Indicator 3: Total public expenditure on pre-primary education in percentage of
GDP per capita
New ECEC Generosity Measures
4) Indicator 4: Weighted enrollment rates of children in formal care (0–2 years of age)
5) Indicator 5: Weighted enrollment rates of children in formal care (3 years of age–
compulsory schooling age)
6) Indicator 6: Out-of-pocket costs for a lone parent family (out-of-pocket childcare
costs as a percentage of net family income (100 percent of the average wage, parent
employed full-time)
7) Indicator 7: Out-of-pocket costs for a dual-parent family (out-of-pocket childcare
costs as a percentage of net family income (dual-earners, both parents employed fulltime at 100 percent of the average wage) 75
ECEC Universality Indicators
1) Indicator 1: Child’s age of legal entitlement, scored (lower ages of entitlement =
higher scores, ordinal variable)
2) Indicator 2: Guaranteed hours of care attached to legal entitlement (more than 20
hours per week (full-time), 20 hours or less per week (part-time), ordinal variable)
3) ECEC universality scale: A combination of both Indicators 1 and 2; the scale and
ranks of countries can be compared to the additional stand-alone policy measures.
The method to construct this scale is the same for the leave universality scale.
4) Indicator 3: Binary variable that signals whether there is entitlement to ECEC or not
Dimensions of ECEC universality are quantified based on the age the child is eligible to
receive care. Each country is granted a score as to whether legal entitlements exist and whether

75

For single and dual-parent families—these data assume no other adults in the household. Note that childcare costs
are used to signal both good and bad ECEC across different chapters. Good out-of-pocket costs are those that are
low (ascending rank) while bad ECEC are costs that are high (descending rank).
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entitlement to care is more than 20 hours per week (full-time) or 20 hours per week or less (parttime).76
Methods: Indicator Measurement Construction and Rankings
See Appendix 4.4 that details indicator construction and the ranking methodology.
Database Construction and Country-Level Policy Information
Another contribution of this dissertation is the construction of two original country-level
policy databases with updated, detailed leave and ECEC policy information. Two new original
policy databases were constructed (again, see Appendix Table 4.1 and Appendix Table 4.2)
that contain the country-level policy data for leave and ECEC. In a recent review of the
literature, a major issue highlighted is that most country-level policy data are old—from the
1990s to the early-2000s (Hook and Li 2020). These country-level policy data in the databases
are significantly newer than what has been used in past gendered tradeoffs research, from around
the years 2009 and 2012 and used to construct all policy measures.77
Country-level policy data for leave and ECEC were derived from a variety of countryspecific sources as well as secondary sources and databases.78 As much as possible, these data
were previously standardized. All data were evaluated based on my knowledge of ECEC
arrangements across middle- and high-income countries and a close review of past research.79

76

For the scoring method see Appendix 4.4.
The years of country-level policy data were chosen to match the years of the microlevel data used in part three.
Across older studies of gendered tradeoffs, country-level policy data and microdata to measure employment
outcomes come from the mid-2000s or earlier (for an exception see Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Since policy is
not static and is ever-changing, the use of updated country-level policy data (along with the inclusion of countrylevel policy information from a larger number of countries) can provide new insights into gendered tradeoffs
research.
78
In the future, I plan to make these data available for public access, with full documentation.
79
Country-level policy data for seven Latin American countries—Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, and Uruguay was also collected. The intent was to include these countries in all analyses but were
ultimately excluded from all analyses due to time constraints. The goal is to utilize these policy data in future
research.
77
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For leave, country-level policy data were derived from The International Review of
Leave Policies and Related Research (various years), the LIS documentation
(www.lisdatacenter.org), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Family Policy Database, the Social Security Programs Throughout the World Database, and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Working Conditions Laws Database.
For ECEC, country-level policy data were derived from The International Review of
Leave Policies and Related Research (various years), the OECD, the European Commission,
EACEA National Policies Platform, Eurydice, Sistema de Informacion de Tendencias Educativas
en America Latina (SITEAL), Blofield and Franzoni (2014 and 2015), UNESCO United
Institutes of Statistics (UIS), the World Bank publication Cashing in on Education, Women,
Childcare, and Prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean (2016), and country-specific
sources.
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Chapter 5: Reevaluating Leave and ECEC Policy Generosity Measurement Across
Twenty-Four High-Income Countries
Introduction
In this chapter, all leave and ECEC policy generosity indicators are evaluated. The goal is
to compare standard indicators of leave and ECEC policy generosity from the literature to the
new indicators of leave and ECEC policy generosity. I do this to begin to draw conclusions about
which countries provide well-developed leave and ECEC policies and to determine which
indicators to utilize in Part 3.
How to Read the Tables in Chapters 5 and 6
The policy measure tables in Chapters 5 and 6 display all results in the same manner. The
24 countries are organized by the welfare state regime that adheres to Table 4.1 from the prior
chapter. Each column shows the estimates for one policy measure or the rankings of estimates
for that individual policy measure. Rankings (ascending or descending) take into account the
specific definition of each leave and ECEC policy dimension in Chapter 4.
The tables can be read horizontally—to compare the estimates and rankings of all 24
countries across one policy measure, or vertically—to compare the estimates and rankings for
one county or groups of countries across multiple policy measures. The top five ranked country
estimates and rankings across each measure are highlighted in green. The lowest five ranked
countries across each policy measure are highlighted in red. Duplicate ranks are considered one
rank.
Where ellipses are present in any column, this means an estimate exists but is missing for
that particular country. This is the case for expenditure on pre-primary education in Canada and
Greece, for example. A value of 0 across the leave generosity or gender equality tables signals
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the policy does not meet the criteria for that particular indicator, or the value doesn’t exist. For
example, in Table 6.1 (leave policy gender equality indicators), a 0 signals that fathers receive no
nontransferable, reserved leave. Therefore, an estimate for that particular country is not granted.
In some cases, the data do not meet the criteria for either parent. These delineations are in the
notes sections under the tables.
All analyses in Results Sections 1 and 2 refer to Table 5.1 (Leave policy generosity for
mothers), Table 5.2 (Leave policy generosity for fathers), and Table 5.3 (ECEC generosity). The
specific policy measures across each table that are being analyzed will be indicated across each
results section. In Results Section 1, patterns of leave and ECEC generosity, as measured across
indicators replicated and used in past research, are analyzed.80 In Results Section 2, patterns of
leave and ECEC policy generosity as measured in the newly constructed measures based on
theoretical considerations from Chapter 3 are analyzed.
Recall that the leave policy generosity indicators measure “how much” leave is granted.
Leave can be generous in terms of length, in terms of payment, or both dimensions (see Table
4.2). All leave generosity indicators measure some combination of length and payment to
measure generosity. Conversely, the ECEC generosity indicators measure different dimensions
of ECEC generosity. Generosity is measured by enrollment (availability), expenditure on preprimary education, and out-of-pocket costs for childcare services for single parents and couples
(to be evaluated in Results Section 2). Countries with higher enrollment rates of children, higher
expenditure on pre-primary education, and lower out-of-pocket costs for care, compared to other
countries, support ECEC arrangements that are more generous.

Standard policy measures for fathers’ nontransferable leave are also included in the discussion. Indicators of
fathers’ nontransferable leave are not normally included in past research. However, I include them here to uncover
more about patterns of leave policy generosity for both mothers and fathers across all countries.
80
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Results
Results Section 1: Leave and ECEC Generosity Across Regimes
The following research questions are addressed in this section:
RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of standard and newly constructed measures of
leave and ECEC policy generosity tell us about how to construct policy measures that are
disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity alter
previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes promote leave and ECEC
policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
Patterns of Generosity: Leave and ECEC Generosity Indicators Replicated from Past Research
This initial analysis compares the widely utilized leave and ECEC generosity indicators
from past gendered tradeoffs research. In this section, standard leave and ECEC policy
generosity indicators from the literature are evaluated. I will show measurement problems with
the standard leave and ECEC policy generosity indicators and explain why standard indicators
may not be adequate proxies for either leave or ECEC policy generosity more generally. In the
following section, the newly constructed leave and ECEC policy generosity measures will be
evaluated. I argue these newly constructed measures more precisely measure leave and ECEC
policy generosity.
The following indicators from the tables are evaluated in this section—Indicators 1–4
from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (Total weeks of paid + unpaid leave, Indicator 1; Weeks of FTE leave,
Indicator 2; Average wage replacement over the total paid leave period, Indicator 3; Total weeks
of paid leave, Indicator 4) and Indicators 1–3 from Table 5.3 (Enrollment in formal care
arrangements, children 0–2 years of age, Indicator 1; Enrollment in formal care arrangements,
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children 3 years to compulsory schooling age, Indicator 2; Total public expenditure on preprimary education in percentage of GDP per capita, Indicator 3.
Overall, results from the estimates and rankings of the estimates across the widely
utilized measures of leave and ECEC generosity across the three tables, show fairly clear
patterns in terms of which regimes provide generous leave and ECEC across the seven different
measures when compared to other groups. Reading the indicator results across the three tables
horizontally, it appears that countries in the Social Democratic regime rank highest across
standard measures of leave and ECEC generosity (denoted by green highlighting), suggesting
that these countries provide the most generous leave and ECEC policies, based on these
measurements.
Also as expected, countries in the Liberal regime generally provide the least generous
leave policies and ECEC arrangements. Across nearly all standard measures of leave policy
generosity, countries in the Liberal regime rank at or near the bottom (as denoted by the red
highlighting). Three of the countries in the Liberal regime provide no reserved, nontransferable
leave at all to fathers (Australia, Canada, and Switzerland). The exception is enrollment rates of
children in formal care arrangements. Enrollment rates of children are middling in these
countries, especially compared to countries in the Eastern European regime. These findings
largely support past research that indicates these two regimes provide leave and ECEC
arrangements that are the most or least generous as identified by the standard measures of leave
and ECEC policy generosity from the literature.
Patterns of generosity across the leave and ECEC measures are less clear across the
additional three regime types (Conservative-Corporatist, Southern European, and Eastern
European). Across each of the three regimes, countries rank at the top, in the middle, or at the
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bottom, across different indicators. There also appears to be a split in the generosity of leave and
ECEC across individual countries within these regimes. To take the Eastern European regime as
an example, the Slovak Republic does not provide reserved, nontransferable leave to fathers, like
Australia, Canada, and Switzerland from the Liberal regime. The Slovak Republic also ranks
lowest across the ECEC enrollment measures (Indicators 1 and 2, Table 5.3). Slovenia ranks in
the middle or highly across all measures of leave for mothers (Table 5.1) and ECEC
arrangements (Table 5.3)—when compared to the rankings of other countries in the regime.
However, all countries from this regime—including Hungary and Slovenia—rank poorly across
at least one or more standard leave policy generosity indicators for fathers (Table 5.2).
These early findings across the replicated standard leave and ECEC generosity measures
suggest that whether countries provide generous leave and ECEC may largely depend on how
generosity is defined and measured. The relationship between the generosity of leave and ECEC
across the same regime type is less clear—e.g., do countries support both generous leaves and
ECEC arrangements? The results are mixed, especially in the Conservative-Corporatist,
Southern, and Eastern European regime types.
Leave and ECEC Indicator Results Across Standard Measures of Leave and ECEC
When viewing the estimates and the rankings vertically across each standard individual
leave and ECEC policy generosity indicator, additional conclusions can be drawn. In the Social
Democratic regime, Iceland and Norway rank at the bottom across measures of all leave for
mothers (Indicator 1), indicating these two countries do not provide leave periods that are as
generous as countries across the four additional regimes in terms of length. However, Iceland
and Norway rank middling or high across all additional leave indicators.
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Denmark and Finland provide fathers with few weeks of nontransferable leave (3 weeks
in Denmark and 2 weeks in Finland, respectively, Indicator 1, Table 5.2) compared to weeks of
nontransferable leave to fathers in Iceland and Norway (13 weeks and 12 weeks, respectively)
and compared to the weeks of leave allocated to mothers (50 weeks in Denmark, and 44 weeks in
Finland, respectively, Indicator 1, Table 5.1). Perhaps unsurprising, all four countries in the
Social Democratic regime rank at the top of measures of spending on pre-primary education
(Indicator 3, Table 5.3). However, the rankings across the ECEC enrollment indicators
(Indicators 1 and 2, Table 5.3) show that Finland has lower enrollment in public care
arrangements than their Social Democratic counterparts. The results across the three tables are in
line with past literature on leave policy architecture that suggests Denmark and Finland do not
provide leave that is as generous as other countries in this regime; Finland also does not provide
ECEC that is as generous as the countries in this regime.
Moreover, indicator estimates and rankings for individual countries in the ConservativeCorporatist, Southern European, and Eastern European regimes may best exemplify problems of
the measurement of leave policy generosity across the gendered tradeoffs literature highlighted
in Chapter 3. From the Conservative-Corporatist regime, Germany will be used as an example
(though in general, these same patterns are shown for individual countries across the two
additional regimes).81 82 In Table 5.1, leave policy for mothers in Germany is shown to be
generous, as indicated by the rank of Germany’s leave policy at the top of Indicators 1, 2, and 4.
Germany provides mothers with very long periods of leave (rank of 2, Indicator 1). Because
Germany provides mothers with very long periods of leave that is paid, Germany also ranks at
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However, Indicator 9 across countries in the Southern European and Eastern European regimes show that these
countries promote very well-paid periods of leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings for both mothers and
fathers.
82
The same pattern is shown across leave generosity indicators in Italy and Luxembourg to a lesser extent.
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the top of the measure of FTE leave (rank of 3, Indicator 2) and total weeks of paid leave (rank
of 2, Indicator 4). These three measures lead to the conclusion that leave policy in Germany is
just as generous as leave policies in countries that belong to the Social Democratic regime.
However, the average wage-replacement rate over the total paid leave period in Germany is low,
at around 57 percent of usual earnings (Indicator 3). Germany’s rank across Indicator 3 is
therefore low (rank of 17 out of 24 countries).
Germany’s ranking on Indicator 2 (weeks of FTE leave) supports that measures of FTE
leave equate long, low-paid leaves with short, well-paid leaves. This is because the average
payment to mothers over the total paid leave period is low, at 57 percent of usual earnings, as
shown in Indicator 3. The additional top-ranked countries across Indicator 3 (Hungary, Slovenia,
Denmark, and Norway) all provide leave periods that are well-paid (more than 67 percent of
usual earnings). Further, Germany’s high ranking on Indicator 4 (total weeks of paid leave)
suggests that like a measure of FTE leave, a measure of weeks of paid leave at any wagereplacement rate similarly equates countries that provide long, low-paid leaves with short, wellpaid leaves.
Interestingly, even though periods of leave allocated for the father’s use are less generous
than periods for mothers, similar conclusions can be drawn about problematic indicators of leave
policy generosity for fathers across the same three regimes. Here, the same example of Germany
will be used (though the same results hold and are more prevalent for Italy and Luxembourg).
Germany ranks sixth across Indicators 2 and 4 (FTE leave and total weeks of paid leave).
However, Germany provides very low-paid average wage replacements over the total paid leave
period as shown in Indicator 3 (46 percent of usual earnings). Like for mothers, the measurement
of FTE leave and total weeks of paid leave equate countries with long, low-paid leaves to those
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with short, well-paid leaves (across Indicator 4 for example, Iceland ranks third and Norway
ranks fifth. Iceland replaces wages at 80 percent of usual earnings over the total paid leave
period while Norway replaces 100 percent, as shown in Indicator 3).
The results suggest that though leave policy generosity for fathers is not as generous as it
is for mothers across any country, the design of leave for both mothers and fathers is similar
across countries. Overall, these results suggest that when assessing widely utilized leave and
ECEC generosity measures from the literature, generally, one measure of leave policy generosity
for mothers (the standard in the literature) may more broadly represent the scope of leave policy
generosity for fathers.
Across the additional three regimes (the Conservative-Corporatist, Southern European,
and Eastern European), clear divides of the generosity of leave and ECEC policies exist within
regimes, based on these measures. Leave and ECEC policy in Hungary and Slovenia is generous,
while leave and ECEC policy across the additional countries in that regime is less generous, as
indicated by the rankings of the measure estimates.
Finally, the results show that standard measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity
may be problematic because they overstate the generosity of the wage-replacement rate of leave
across countries with long periods of leave that are low-paid as exemplified by the rankings of
the estimates for Germany across Indicators 1–4 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Problematic indicators
may distort the readers’ understanding of which countries provide leave and ECEC policies that
are generous in terms of both length and payment. This issue is considered in the next section.
Measuring Leave and ECEC Generosity—New Indicators
The analyses in this section refer to leave generosity Indicators 5–9 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2
(Total weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave, Indicator 5; Total weeks of well-paid leave at 67
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percent or more of usual earnings, Indicator 6; Moderate lengths of well-paid leave (67% of
usual earnings) using a one-year cutoff point, Indicator 7; Moderate lengths of well-paid leave
(67 percent of usual earnings) using a six-month cutoff point, Indicator 8; and Total weeks of
well-paid leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings). The newly constructed leave policy
generosity indicators across both tables take wage replacement cutoffs into account; periods of
low-paid and unpaid leaves (Indicator 5) and well-paid leave periods (Indicators 6–9) for both
mothers and fathers. From Table 5.3, also new to the literature, ECEC generosity Indicators 4
and 5 (weighted enrollment rates of children in formal care arrangements by the dominant
mechanism of provision for children of both age groups)83, Indicators 6 and 7 (out-of-pocket
costs for single parents and couples) and the coordination of care index (Indicator 8) are
assessed.
Overall, the new measures of leave policy generosity show that ranking patterns are not
as straightforward across regimes as they were from the previous section with the exception of
countries in the Liberal regime. Results still show that consistently, leave policy generosity is the
weakest across this regime for both mothers and fathers, regardless of how it is measured.
Enrollment rates of young children 0–2 years of age in care weighted by the dominant
mechanism of provision show that countries are re-ranked slightly downward when compared to
Indicator 1 due to the weight for enrollment penalizing the countries for privatized care. Out-ofpocket costs for both single parents and couples are also very high. Countries in the Liberal
regime rank last or very low across both measures of out-of-pocket costs (see Table 5.3).
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Private care for children 0–2 years of age is the dominant mechanism of provision in 10 countries (Austria, Czech
Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, and Ireland).
Unsurprisingly, these countries rank low across Indicator 4, Table 5.3 for this reason.
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Comparing the estimates and rankings vertically across individual indicators, countries in
the Social Democratic regime are the only countries to offer no weeks of poorly paid or unpaid
leave to mothers or fathers (with the exception of 2 unpaid weeks allocated to fathers in
Norway).84 However, Denmark and Finland offer long, well-paid leave periods to mothers that
can be considered too long in length and well-paid leave periods that are too short in length for
fathers (Indicators 6 and 8, Tables 5.1 and 5.2), depending on the inflection point used for the
measurement. Denmark, Finland, and Iceland also rank at the bottom of a measure of weeks of
well-paid leave at 85 percent of earnings or more (Indicator 9) for leave periods for both mothers
and fathers. This is because these countries do not offer well-paid leave at this earnings
threshold.85 Across the two measures of out-of-pocket costs (Indicator 6 and 7), out-of-pocket
costs in Finland especially for single parents are high (22 percent, Indicator 6, Table 5.3). The
results across countries in the Social Democratic regime indicate that when including new
measures of periods of well-paid leave and out-of-pocket costs of ECEC into analyses, countries
that have traditionally been shown to support generous leave and ECEC policies, as measured in
standard policy indicators, do not support generous leave and ECEC policies as well as
previously thought when new measures are considered.
Like the prior results, patterns of leave and ECEC policy generosity across the
Conservative-Corporatist, Southern European, and Eastern European regimes are less clear
across the new measures. In the Conservative-Corporatist regime, country estimates and rankings
across measures of well-paid leave (Indicators 6–9, Table 5.1 and 5.2) show that leave is not as
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For the ranking of Indicator 5, I assume the length of leave is more important than whether it is paid or well-paid,
much like Indicator 1.
85
I do not discuss individual country results for the Liberal group because the above section indicates that low ranks
are generally present across most measures of leave policy generosity for both mothers and fathers compared to
other country groupings.
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generous as the standard indicators evaluated in the prior section suggest. Germany ranks low (as
do nearly all additional countries in the Conservative-Corporatist regime), at 17 out of 24
countries across a measure of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings (Indicator 6, Table
5.1).
The rankings across measures of out-of-pocket costs to care across the ConservativeCorporatist, Southern European, and Eastern European regimes suggest a potential division in
generosity across these two policies—that ECEC may be more generous in scope to parents than
leave policies. Overall, the results across Section 2 suggest that a singular measure of leave or
ECEC generosity may not be representative of the scope of either leave or ECEC policy
generosity. This assumption will be further evaluated in Results Section 2.
Finally, the estimates and rankings across the coordination of care index (Index 1, Table
5.3), show what results across the individual indicators suggest. Generally, the Social
Democratic countries, but not only the Social Democratic countries, provide the most
coordination of care for children under compulsory schooling age under either well-paid leave or
enrollment in ECEC. The results for Hungary and Slovenia (Eastern European regime) show that
the coordination of care is just as generous as in the Social Democratic countries. Countries in
the Liberal regime along with the Slovak Republic (Eastern European regime) rank last, while all
countries in the Conservative-Corporatist regime rank in the middle of the index.
Results Section 2: Correlations—Leave and ECEC Policy Generosity
In this section RQ3 is addressed: What do correlations between measures of leave and
ECEC policy generosity tell us more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy
generosity measure to more broadly represent the scope of either policy?
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Correlation tables are presented that support the main points discussed in Results Section
1. The leave and ECEC policy indicators in this chapter are all continuous measures and
therefore linear relationships are expected. Because the measures are continuous, Pearson
correlations are used to assess relationships between the leave and ECEC policy indicators in the
tables below.86
Table 5.4 displays correlations between the standard leave and ECEC indicators. Table
5.5 displays correlation results between the new leave generosity and ECEC indicators that
measure periods of unpaid/low-paid and well-paid weeks leave for mothers and fathers, out-ofpocket costs of care, and the coordination of care index (Results Section 2). This table also
includes correlation results between a standard measure of FTE leave and new measures of leave
and ECEC policy generosity. The question is whether a measure of FTE leave, which was shown
to be problematic, is correlated with newly constructed leave measures. Both tables are divided
into sections by categories of leave and ECEC policies. Non-significant correlations across the
three tables are highlighted in yellow. Where applicable, patterns of results are discussed across
the three tables. Examples of correlations across the tables that supplement the discussion below
are highlighted in red in each table.
Discussion of Tables 5.4 and 5.5
First, in Table 5.4, several of the standard measures of leave policy generosity for
mothers are positively correlated with the same measures of leave policy generosity for fathers
while others are not. A measure of the weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave for fathers is
positively correlated with all paid weeks for mothers (r=.37 and P < 0.10). The average wage
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The measures of leave for both mothers and fathers using an optimal midpoint cutoff of either six months or one
year is not considered in the correlations or utilized in this dissertation moving forward. The goal is to address this
issue in more detail in future research.
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over the paid leave period for fathers is also positively correlated with all paid leave for mothers
(r=.56 and P < 0.01). However, FTE leave for fathers is positively but not significantly correlated
with FTE leave for mothers (r=.32). In Results Section 1, I showed that measures of both FTE
leave and paid weeks at any wage-replacement rate are problematic because these measures
equate long, low-paid leaves with short, well-paid leaves and that the design of leave allocated to
mothers and fathers was similar. Therefore, it was expected that both measures of FTE leave for
mothers and fathers would be correlated with one another. 87 The correlation results suggest that
the design of leave periods for mothers and fathers are similar across countries—however, there
is no statistically significant relationship between measures of FTE leave for mothers and fathers.
A standard measure of FTE leave for mothers therefore fails to capture the scope of leave policy
generosity for both mothers and fathers for this sample of high-income countries. The same
outcome is shown for all weeks, regardless of the wage replacement (r=.33).
The same varied results for correlations with statistical significance are shown between
different leave policy indicators that measure leave periods allocated to mothers and fathers. For
example, FTE leave for mothers is not correlated with all weeks of paid and unpaid leave for
mothers (r=.16). FTE leave for fathers is also not correlated with all weeks of paid and unpaid
leave for fathers (r=-.01). These results show that across the literature, standard leave policy
measures for mothers measure different aspects or dimensions of leave policy generosity. If
measures of leave policy generosity (in all cases for periods of leave for mothers) are not
correlated across different studies, this may point to differing results of the relationship between
generous work-family reconciliation policies and gender inequalities in employment.

87

These results are consistent with the analyses of the leave policy measures from Mandel and Semyonov (2005,
2006) and Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019).
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The same relationships between the newly constructed leave and ECEC generosity
indicators are also shown in Table 5.5. The example of the two newly constructed leave policy
indicators that measure periods of leave by two wage replacement cutoffs (unpaid + poorly paid
leave below 67 percent of usual earnings and 67 percent of earnings or higher) that add up to 100
percent of total leave for both mothers and fathers are highlighted. Weeks of well-paid leave at
67 percent of usual earnings for mothers (Indicator 2) is not correlated with weeks of well-paid
leave at 67 percent of usual earnings for fathers (Indicator 6) (r=.24). However, measures of the
weeks of unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave for mothers and fathers are positively and
significantly correlated (r=.39 and P < 0.10). For mothers, measures of the weeks of unpaid +
poorly paid weeks of well-paid leave (Indicators 1 and 2) are negatively and weakly correlated
(r=-.35 and P < 0.10). This negative relationship holds for fathers between the two measures but
is far from reaching statistical significance. fathers (r=-.10).
These results indicate that when moving to measures that take specific wage replacement
cutoffs into account, varied relationships between the measures persist. There are four possible
relationships/outcomes. For measures of the same leave policy generosity for both mothers and
fathers, the measure of leave may be significantly correlated (weeks of unpaid + poorly paid
leave, Indicators 1 and 5) or may not be significantly correlated (weeks of well-paid leave at 67
percent of usual earnings or higher, Indicators 2 and 6).88 For measures of leave policy for either
mothers or fathers, more than one measure for either parent can be correlated (Indicators 1 and 2
for mothers), or not (Indicators 5 and 6 for fathers).
These results also suggest that countries that provide longer periods of well-paid leave for
both mothers and fathers also provide fewer weeks of unpaid + poorly periods of leave to
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Though note that the measures are nearly correlated at P < 0.10.
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mothers through leave policies. Overall, the many possible measurements of leave policy
generosity solidify that one measure used in any one study may not be representative of other
dimensions of leave policy generosity or represent the scope of leave policy generosity more
generally.
In addition, unexpected is that indicators of FTE leave are highly and positively
correlated with measures of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings or more. This
relationship holds for both mothers and fathers (r=.90 and P < 0.01, mothers, Indicators 2 and 4;
r=.75 and P < 0.01, fathers, Indicators 6 and 8). However, measures of FTE leave for both
mothers and fathers are not correlated with periods of unpaid + poorly paid leave periods. The
correlation between the measure of unpaid + poorly paid leave (Indicator 1) and FTE leaves for
mothers (Indicator 4) is r=-.20. The correlation between the measure of unpaid + poorly paid
leaves (Indicator 5) and FTE leave for fathers (Indicator 8) is r=-.07. These results suggest that
leave policy generosity measures that separate weeks of low-paid + unpaid leave and periods of
well-paid leave may better exemplify the generosity of leave—both in terms of length and wage
replacement but cannot act as a proxy for one another in all cases. The fact that FTE leave is not
correlated with weeks of low-paid or unpaid leave periods in all cases also suggests the
importance of separating the two leave periods. Specifically for the gendered tradeoffs literature,
this may be important because it is theorized that the wage-replacement rate may differentially
affect women’s employment opportunities and gender inequality in employment.
Across Tables 5.4 and 5.5, there are also no clear relationships between the standard
ECEC indicators. In Table 5.4, enrollment rates for children 0–2 years of age and 3 years to
compulsory schooling age (Indicators 9 and 10) are positively but not significantly correlated
(r=.32). Expenditure on pre-primary education (Indicator 11) is also positively but not
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significantly correlated with enrollment rates of children 0–2 years of age (r=.33). However,
expenditure on pre-primary education is, unsurprisingly, positively and significantly correlated
with enrollment rates of children 3 years of age to compulsory schooling age (r=.65 and P <
0.01). The results suggest that higher enrollment rates of children in care are indicative of more
spending on pre-primary education, but not in every instance. Therefore, even standard ECEC
indicators may not be indicative of the scope of ECEC generosity, the relationship is largely
dependent on what dimension of ECEC is being measured.
In Table 5.5, a strong relationship between weighted enrollment rates of children 0–2 and
3 years to compulsory schooling age is apparent between the newly constructed weighted
measures (r=-.54 and P < 0.01), contrary to the correlations between the unweighted measures in
Table 5.4. Out-of-pocket costs for single parents are highly and positively correlated with out-ofpocket costs for couples (r=.65 and P< 0.01). Lower out-of-pocket costs for single parents are
indicative of lower out-of-pocket costs for couples. However, out-of-pocket costs for single
parents and couples are not correlated with weighted enrollment rates of children 0–2 years of
age (though the relationships between the two out-of-pocket cost measures with the enrollment
rate measure is negative, suggesting that higher enrollment rates mean lower out-of-pocket costs
of children in public care arrangements.
And finally, what about correlations between leave and ECEC policy measures? In Table
5.4, enrollment rates of children 0–2 years of age in ECEC are not correlated with several
measures of leave including a measure of paid weeks for mothers (r=-.07). However, other
stories are told with the measures. There is a negative and significant correlation between
enrollment rates for children 0–2 years and all leave for mothers (paid + unpaid, Indicators 1 and
9), signaling that longer leave periods, regardless of the wage replacement of that leave, is
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associated with fewer children enrolled in care. In Table 5.5, out-of-pocket costs for both single
parents and couples are negatively and weakly/moderately correlated with paid leave periods at
67 percent or more of usual earnings for mothers (r=-.37 and P < 0.10 for single-parent out-ofpocket costs and r=-.44 and P < 0.05 for coupled parent out-of-pocket costs). As expected,
correlations are negative but not significant between out-of-pocket costs for single and coupled
parents and the additional leave measures (with the exception of out-of-pocket costs for couples
that is moderately and negatively correlated with FTE leave). Again, results show that singular
indicators of either leave or ECEC policy generosity may act as a proxy for each other, but not in
every instance. This suggests the need to test more specific theories of the link between policies
and gender and class employment inequalities that are more accurately represented by policy
indicator proxies.
The coordination of care index is correlated with all other leave and ECEC policy
measures in the expected directions (with the exception of the unpaid + poorly paid weeks for
fathers). Correlations range from negatively and weakly significant with a measure of the weeks
of unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers (r=-.36 and P < 0.10, Indicator 1), to positively and
very strongly correlated with a measure of enrollment rates of children 3 years to compulsory
schooling age (r=.85 and P < 0.01). These correlations are expected as the index combines
measures of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings or more and enrollment rates of
children to determine the percentage of children below primary school age covered under wellpaid leave schemes and public childcare arrangements. These correlations suggest the index may
be an appropriate proxy for some of the stand-alone leave and ECEC policy measures.
These results back up the discussion of the estimates and rankings from the first results
section. The same measure of leave policy generosity for mothers is highly correlated with the
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same measure of leave policy generosity for fathers in several cases. Therefore, we can be sure
that more generous leave for mothers is indicative of more generous leave for fathers and that
one measure of leave generosity for mothers can act as a proxy of leave policy generosity for
fathers. This same result is shown in the correlations between different measures of ECEC
generosity across the two tables. Higher enrollments in ECEC for children of different ages are
correlated—e.g., higher enrollments of children 0–2 years of age in ECEC is correlated with
higher enrollments of children 3 years to compulsory schooling age. Lower out-of-pocket costs
for ECEC for single parents are correlated with lower-out-of-pocket costs for couples.
However, additional results are more complicated. One measure of leave policy
generosity for mothers may not be correlated with another measure of leave policy generosity for
periods of leave for mothers. This same relationship holds for fathers. Non-statistically
significant correlations are also shown between generosity measures of different leave and ECEC
measures. Less clear relationships are also apparent between generosity measures of different
policy measures—e.g., out-of-pocket costs for both family types and the generosity of well-paid
leave at 67 percent or more of usual earnings for fathers. These non-statistically significant
correlations suggest that welfare state generosity more generally is not uniform across different
leave and ECEC policies or across different dimensions of these policies. These results suggest
the measurement of leave and ECEC policy generosity is complex and relationships may largely
be driven by how generosity is measured and the chosen indicators across any individual study.
Based on these results, I conclude that scholars need to take more caution in explaining
what policy dimensions are being measured in leave and ECEC policy measures and why these
particular dimensions are important to any one study. One measure of leave or ECEC policy
generosity may not necessarily represent the scope of leave or ECEC policies more generally.
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Rather, leave and policy indicators only measure a specific policy dimension of generosity.
Therefore, what is being evaluated in gendered tradeoffs research is the relationship between
gender inequalities and different dimensions of these policies.
Discussion and Conclusions
Addressing the call for better policy indicators, this chapter is one of the first to provide a
comprehensive overview of the measurement of leave and ECEC policy generosity in gendered
tradeoffs research. In this chapter, I compared replicated standard measures of leave and ECEC
policy generosity widely used in the gendered tradeoffs literature to newly constructed leave and
ECEC policy measures not common in the literature. These new leave policy indicators measure
leave periods at different wage replacement cutoffs, inflection points, and include measures of
leave periods specifically reserved for fathers’ use. New ECEC policy generosity indicators
measure the enrollment rates of children by the dominant mechanism of provision and out-ofpocket ECEC costs for parents. All policy measures compared in this study were constructed
using updated, country-level policy data for 24 high-income countries from around the years
2010 and 2013.
Three main goals were laid out in the chapter. The first was to identify problematic
indicators and move toward more precise, multidimensional measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity. The second goal was to address if our understandings of which individual countries
and regimes provide generous policies is accurate, based on new policy measurements. The third
goal was to look at relationships between the indicators to determine patterns of relationships and
whether one measure can more broadly represent the scope of leave and ECEC policy generosity
more generally.
To return to the research questions:
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RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of standard and newly constructed measures of
leave and ECEC policy generosity tell us about how to construct policy measures that are
disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity alter
previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes promote leave and ECEC
policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
To address RQ1, the chapter first highlights problematic measurement issues with
standard indicators of leave and ECEC policy generosity. Problematic indicators may
misrepresent leave policy generosity. Using the example of Germany, leave periods for both
mothers and fathers rank highly across standard leave measures of FTE leave and weeks of all
paid leave. However, the wage-replacement rate over the total paid leave period shows the wage
replacement is quite low for both mothers and fathers (57 percent for mothers and 46 percent for
fathers). These countries are equated or ranked highly, along with other countries that provide
well-paid leave periods to both mothers and fathers.
The newly constructed policy measures showed how more precise, multidimensional
leave and ECEC generosity indicators both support findings and arguments from past research
and move the literature forward.
1) Based on the new leave and ECEC measurements, countries in the Social Democratic
regime generally provide the most generous leave and ECEC policies. This is
especially true for leave policy. Regardless of how leave policy generosity is
measured, Social Democratic countries rank highly across measures of leave for both
mothers and fathers.
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2) The countries in the Liberal regime provide the least generous leave and ECEC
policies. Regardless of how leave and ECEC policies are measured, countries in the
Liberal regime rank at the bottom of all measures.
3) New to the literature, the newly constructed leave and ECEC policy measurements in
this study support less-clear patterns of leave and ECEC generosity as shown across
the three additional regime types. Divisions within these regimes were shown as far
as which countries provide generous leave and ECEC policies and which do not,
based on different measurements. The results also showed that some individual
countries within these regimes ranked highly on standard indicators of leave and
ECEC generosity and lower on the newly constructed measures.
a. For example, from the Eastern European regime, Slovenia and Hungary rank
highly across measures of leave policy generosity for mothers and ECEC
generosity—more characteristic of leave and ECEC policy generosity of
countries in the Social Democratic regime. The Slovak Republic provides
leave and ECEC policies that are more typical of those found in the Liberal
regime.
b. From the Conservative-Corporatist regime, Germany ranks highly across
standard indicators of leave policy generosity. However, Germany ranks very
low or middling across newer measures of leave policy generosity that
separate weeks of low-paid and unpaid leave from weeks of well-paid leave at
67 percent of earnings or more.
Overall, there is merit to the past assessments that countries in the Social Democratic and
Liberal regimes provide the most and least generous leave and ECEC policies, respectively.
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However, results across other regimes are mixed and show that policy generosity of countries in
other regimes may mirror the generosity of policies in the Social Democratic regime or the weak
policies of the Liberal regime. These results are consistent with the literature on leave and ECEC
policy architecture. More generally, scholars need to be careful when assuming that leave and
ECEC policy differences can be explained by the welfare state regime literature.
RQ3: What do correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity tell us
more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy generosity measure to more
broadly represent the scope of either policy?
Building on the results from the Section 1, the correlations among the measures in
Section 2 showed the complexity of measuring leave and ECEC policy generosity and that
several relationships between the policy measures are possible. This study identified six possible
relationships among the policy generosity measures:
1) Statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across the same dimension of these policies for mothers and fathers—e.g.,
a measure of low-paid and unpaid leave for mothers is positively and significantly
correlated with a measure of low-paid and unpaid leave for fathers.
2) Statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across different measures of these policies—e.g., the weeks of FTE leave
for mothers is positively and significantly correlated with the weeks of well-paid
leave for mothers at 67 percent of usual earnings or more.
3) Statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across different policy types—e.g., weighted enrollment of children 0–2
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years of age in public care is negatively and significantly correlated with the weeks of
low-paid and unpaid leave allocated to mothers.
4) Non-statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across the same dimension of these policies for mothers and fathers—e.g.,
a measure of well-paid leave for mothers is positively but not significantly correlated
with a measure of well-paid leave for fathers.
5) Non-statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across different measures of these policies—e.g., the weeks of unpaid +
poorly paid weeks of leave allocated to fathers is negatively but not significantly
correlated with the weeks of well-paid leave allocated to fathers.
6) Non-statistically significant correlations among measures of leave and ECEC policy
generosity across different policy types—e.g., there is no relationship between the
weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers and out-of-pocket costs for care for
single parents.
The above conclusions suggest the measurement of leave and ECEC is problematic
because the generosity of these policies is not being studied the same way across the comparative
literature. The way leave and ECEC policies are measured, and the policy measurements
included across any singular study, may result in different relationships among policy measures.
These relationships among the measures also suggest that disparate results for the relationships
between leave, ECEC, and gender employment inequalities may persist in the literature due to
the many different ways these policies can be measured. Scholars need to take caution when
stating that their policy generosity measures represent the scope of policy more generally or
support the regime literature.
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A foreshadowing of the conclusions in this chapter was first indicated by the correlations
among the indicators from Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Brady, Blome, and Kmec
(2019) in Chapter 3. All three of the generosity indicators used in the WSII in Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006) are moderately and positively correlated. Using factor analysis, the
WSII shows that the Social Democratic countries indeed support the most generous welfare state
policies because all four countries in the Social Democratic included in the study place at the top
of the WSII. However, the leave and ECEC indicators utilized in Brady, Blome, and Kmec
(2019) are not correlated. Across both studies, the leave policy and ECEC generosity measures
were both moderately and positively correlated with each other.
Both studies draw different conclusions about the persistence of gendered tradeoffs.
Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) find that the WSII worsens gender gaps in earnings and
occupational attainment. However, the results are driven mainly by maternity leave and public
sector employment. In contrast, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) find no consistent evidence that
maternity leaves (or ECEC) worsen earnings and occupational gaps between mothers and nonmothers and men and women. The findings in this chapter suggest that differences in the
measurement of work-family policies may, in part, be driving these results. 89
Overall, however, the results above also suggest there are additional measurement
possibilities that should be taken into consideration that may help scholars more precisely
measure leave and ECEC policy generosity. Narrower measures that take into account specific
policy dimensions can move the gendered tradeoffs literature forward because scholars can
address more specific questions about relationships between policies and employment outcomes
for women. For example, do periods of unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers and well-paid
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From chapter 3 other possibilities in different findings across the studies are the included country cases and the
year of the country-level policy data used to construct the measures.
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leave for mothers have the same relationship with women’s labor market outcomes? These
questions will be more seriously addressed in Part 3 of this dissertation.
In the next chapter, additional measures of leave and ECEC policy dimensions not
considered in past research are evaluated—gender equality and universality of leave and the
universality of ECEC legislation.
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Chapter 6: Additional Leave and ECEC Policy Dimensions: the Measurement of Leave
Gender Equality and Universality and ECEC Universality Across Twenty-Four HighIncome Countries
Introduction
All results in this chapter refer to two tables for leave—Table 6.1 (gender equality) and
Table 6.2 (universality) and one for ECEC—Table 6.3 (ECEC universality).
Results
Results Section 1: Leave and ECEC Gender Equality and Universality
In this section, the following research questions are addressed:
RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of newly constructed measures of leave and
ECEC policy gender equality and universality tell us about how to construct policy measures
that are disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC gender equality and
universality alter previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes
promote leave and ECEC policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
Leave Gender Equality
The results in this section refer to Table 6.1. Scholars suggest that equal shares of
nontransferable leave has to be allocated to fathers in order for a leave policy to be considered
gender-egalitarian (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Dearing 2016). Fathers are also less likely
to take up leave that is not well-paid (at least 67 percent of earnings) or when he has less
incentive to do so. A leave policy may be generous in design but may not support gender
equality.
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The measures are designed to show which countries approach equal shares of
nontransferable leave to fathers in leave legislation. The percentages were calculated from the
leave generosity measures from the prior chapter. From left to right in Table 6.1, the indicators
move from broad to more specific definitions: Indicator 1 (share of all paid and unpaid leave),
Indicator 2 (share of all paid leave) 90, Indicator 3 (share of unpaid + poorly leave), Indicator 4
(share of all paid leave at 67 percent or more of usual earnings), and Indicator 5 (share of all paid
leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings). The last two columns display which countries
provide incentives or disincentives for fathers’ take-up. The results discussed below will also be
linked to the generosity measure estimates and findings from Chapter 5.
First, identifying broad trends across regimes, in general, the share of nontransferable
reserved leave for fathers declines across all regimes when reading the results from left to right.
The measure of the percentage of well-paid leave at 85 percent of earnings or more shows that
only 9 of the 24 countries in the study provide any leave to fathers at all at this earnings cutoff. A
few exceptions are Italy (Southern European regime) and Hungary (Eastern European regime).
Both countries provide a 100 percent share of leave to fathers. This is because no nontransferable
or sharable leave at 85 percent of usual earnings or more is granted to mothers.
In addition, because the estimate of the father’s share of nontransferable leave generally
declines as more narrow definitions of gender equality in leave legislation are taken into account,
lower shares of leave allocated to fathers are rewarded with higher ranks. For example, in
France, fathers are allocated 11 percent of nontransferable leave, as shown across Indicators 2, 4,
and 5. This share is ranked in the middle across Indicator 2 (rank of 8) and highly across
Indicators 4 and 5 (rank of 4 and 5, respectively).
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Indicator 2, total paid leave for fathers as a percent of total paid leave available to both parents was also utilized in
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
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Assessing patterns across regimes, the Liberal regime generally provides the weakest
gender equality of leave legislation based on the measures presented in the table—and as alluded
to from the leave generosity measures in Chapter 5. Two countries provide no nontransferable
leave at all to fathers (Australia and Switzerland). The US ranks second on Indicator 1 because
the US provides equal shares of nontransferable leave (the UK and Ireland rank in the middle on
Indicator 1). However, leave for both mothers and fathers is unpaid so the US ranks last across
the additional gender equality measures. In fact, by the time we move to Indicator 4 (the share of
well-paid weeks of leave paid at 67 percent of earnings allocated to fathers), none of the three
countries with reserved, nontransferable leave to fathers in the Liberal regime provide well-paid
leave to either parent.
Across the four additional regimes, there appears to be a split in which countries’ leave
policies support gender equality as measured across different indicators of leave gender equality.
Across the Social Democratic countries, Iceland and Norway provide leave policies that are more
gender-egalitarian in design than Denmark and Finland. These two countries allocate 33 percent
and 26 percent of the total share of leave to fathers. Both countries rank highly across Indicators
2 and 3. Norway places at the top on Indicator 4. 91 Remember from the leave generosity
measures, Iceland allocates 13 weeks of paid leave to fathers at 80 percent of usual earnings.
Norway allocates 12 weeks of paid leave to fathers at 100 percent of usual earnings. All
countries in the Social Democratic regime provide some percentage of well-paid leave to fathers,
but Norway and Iceland’s policies better promote egalitarian leave-taking—which is important
for fathers’ use of leave.
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A rank of a 3 for Norway is perhaps surprising. Norway provides the most weeks of well-paid leave to fathers as a
share of total leave. The two top-ranked countries (Italy and Hungary) rank first and second because they provide
very few weeks of well-paid leave to fathers while none is allocated to mothers at a wage-replacement rate of 85
percent of earnings or more.
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Across the three additional regimes (Conservative-Corporatist, Southern European, and
Eastern European), in general, the shares of well-paid leave paid at 67 percent of usual earnings
or 85 percent of usual earnings allocated to fathers are very low compared to the other regimes.
If fathers are only likely to use weeks of well-paid leave, the estimates across Indicators 4 and 5
show that fathers are offered a very low share and therefore most countries do not support gender
equality in leave-taking across leave legislation.
Exceptions to the rule exist across all regimes. France pulls away from the rest of the
countries in the Conservative-Corporatist regime. In the Southern European regime—Spain also
provides a 12 percent share of all nontransferable, reserved leave to fathers. In the Eastern
European regime, Poland and Slovenia also rank highly across measures of shares of
nontransferable leave (Indicators 2, 4, and 5). Nontransferable shares to fathers in these countries
that are paid (Indicator 2) or well-paid (Indicators 3 and 4) rival nontransferable shares to fathers
in Denmark and Finland (Social Democratic regime), especially in Slovenia that provide fathers
with only a 4 percent share of reserved, nontransferable, well-paid leave at 67 percent or more of
usual earnings.
Moving to incentives, the provision of incentives is spread out across countries within all
regimes. Interestingly, three of the six countries that provide incentives for fathers to take up
leave do not allocate any well-paid, nontransferable, reserved leave to fathers at 67 percent of
earnings or higher (Austria, the UK, and the Czech Republic).92 The other three countries that
incentivize fathers to take up leave are Finland (Social Democratic regime), Spain (Southern
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In Austria, parents are able to take a period of time off together. In the Czech Republic parents can take some time
off together and some maternity leave may be transferred from the mother to the father. In the UK, mothers can
transfer a portion of their maternity leave to the fathers.
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European regime), and Poland (Eastern European regime). 93 These latter three countries provide
at least a small percentage of well-paid, nontransferable leave to fathers and further incentivize
take-up.
Moving to disincentives, three of the countries do not provide nontransferable leave at all
to fathers, Australia and Canada (Liberal regime), and the Slovak Republic (Eastern European
regime), further disincentivizing fathers from any take-up of shared leave periods. 94 Slovenia, a
country that generally provides more generous and more gender-egalitarian leave policies
compared to other Eastern European countries, is penalized one point because periods of shared
parental leave can only be taken up by one parent. If parents want to share the shared parental
leave portion, this intent has to be stated in writing.
These results further establish that countries in the Social Democratic regime and the
Liberal regime generally support the most and least well-developed policies across measures of
gender equality, regardless of how it is measured. However, the results also establish a division
between Denmark and Finland compared to Iceland and Norway. Countries in the three
additional regimes (Conservative-Corporatist, Southern European, and Eastern European)
provide low shares of well-paid leave to fathers at 67 percent or 85 percent of earnings. These
results are perhaps unsurprising based on the leave generosity measures from Chapter 5. Across
these three regimes, most countries provide leave that is generous to mothers—both in terms of
length and payment—but which is not gender-egalitarian. These results further show the
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In Poland, parents can take time off together and a period of maternity leave may be transferred from the mother
to the father. The United Kingdom, Finland, and Spain all offer one incentive each. In the UK and Spain, mothers
can transfer a portion of their maternity leave to fathers. In Finland, there is an incentive for fathers to take up the
last two weeks of parental leave to receive additional bonus weeks of leave.
94
In Canada, only one parent is eligible to take up parental leave unless parents decide to share it in writing (same in
Slovenia). Australia and the Slovak Republic receive negative two points since only one parent is eligible to take up
parental leave with no opportunity for the other parent to take up leave.
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variation in how well-developed policies across these three regimes are based on new measures
of leave generosity and gender equality.
Results Section 2: Universality of Leave and ECEC
Leave Universality
The analyses below focus on the overall scores and ranks of countries on the leave
universality scale (hereafter, “universality scale”) in Table 6.2. I focus on the score and rank of
each country on the scale because there is not large variability across the five individual
indicators. In general, a higher score across the individual indicators or the combined score is
indicative of countries that better support universal leave-taking through their leave policies. The
lowest possible score a country can receive when the values for each indicator are added up is a 0
(this is indicative of “no policy”). The highest possible score is an 18 (see Column 6 in Table
6.2). Rankings on the scale range from 1 (highly universal) to 24 (low universality) (see Column
7 in Table 6.2).
The overall scores and the descending rank for the universality scale show that countries
across every regime provide leave policies that can be considered universal in terms of coverage,
financing, and eligibility requirements, with the exception of the several countries in the Liberal
regime, the Slovak Republic (Eastern European regime), and the Netherlands and Switzerland
(Conservative-Corporatist regime). The fact that countries in the Liberal regime, Switzerland and
the Slovak Republic provide the least universal leave policies is consistent with findings across
Chapters 4 and 5. These countries not only provide the least generous leave policies, but they
also provide the least universal policies. Part of the reason for low scores in the countries on the
universality scale is the absence of nontransferable reserved leave provided to fathers in four
countries—Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the Slovak Republic. Scores of 0s are granted for
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leave financing and eligibility requirements for fathers across the individual indicators. However,
across individual measures, selected scores suggest that leave policies targeted toward mothers
are generally accessible. For example, in Switzerland, eligibility requirements for maternity
leave are scored as a 3—indicating that leave is generally accessible to mothers.95 The
Netherlands ranks low across the universality scale as well as other measures of leave and also
ECEC.
In the prior results sections for leave generosity and gender equality measures, it was
shown that Finland’s policies are not as generous or gender-egalitarian as Iceland or Norway
based on the estimates and country ranks across different policy indicators. However, Finland
ranks first across measures of leave policy universality.
The findings across the three additional regimes (Conservative-Corporatist, Southern
European, and Eastern European), show that most countries provide leave policies that are
universal in design. However, additional estimate and ranking results from Chapter 5 and from
Section 1 of this chapter show that many countries in these three regimes do not provide leave
policies that are generous or that support gender equality in leave-taking (see the example of
Germany from Chapter 5). Further, variation exists within these three regimes as far as which
countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed in design as measured in the
indicators. The results across Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that using one indicator of leave policy
generosity for mothers across any one study may not be indicative of the true scope of these
policies across additional policy dimensions.
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Mothers must have a least 9 months of contributions and a work history of at least 5 months of the 9 months prior
to childbirth.
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ECEC Universality
Some clear patterns of ECEC universality are apparent again, with exceptions—three of
the four countries in the Social Democratic regime (Denmark, Finland, and Norway) 96 and
Slovenia provide legal entitlement to care for children at a young age and at more than 20 hours
per week (and receive the highest score of 7). Countries from across four of the five regimes
(with the exception of countries in the Southern European regime) offer no national-level
entitlement to ECEC and receive a score of 0: Iceland (Social Democratic) Italy (Southern
European), Australia, Canada, and the US (Liberal), and the Czech Republic, Poland, and the
Slovak Republic (Eastern European).
Generally, findings of entitlement to ECEC suggest that countries with more universal
entitlements have policies that are well-developed across other dimensions of policies. Clear
patterns have emerged and suggest that countries in the Social Democratic regime, but not only
the countries in the Social Democratic regime, provide leave and ECEC policies that are welldeveloped across different dimensions of these policies. The countries in the Liberal regime, but
not only the Liberal regime, provide leave and ECEC policies that are the least developed across
different dimensions. Results Section 2 takes a closer look at correlations of measurements
across the three welfare state measures.
Results Section 2: Correlations
RQ3: What do correlations between measures of leave and ECEC policy across the three
policy dimensions tell us more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy
measure of any policy dimension to more broadly represent the scope of either policy?
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As stated earlier, while Iceland does not ensure entitlement to care in national-level legislation (Moss 2015),
legislation does dictate, however, that “it is the responsibility of the municipalities to offer children preschool
education but with no age limit being specified” (Eurydice 2019).
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Leave Gender Equality and Universality Correlations
First, correlations among the gender equality and universality indicators are discussed.
Two different types of correlations are shown (Table 6.4 and Table 6.5) in the tables, Pearson
and Spearman correlations. As stated in the prior chapter, Pearson correlations are appropriate to
determine relationships between continuous leave and ECEC measures. Spearman correlation is
the more appropriate method to determine relationships between two variables in which one
variable is not continuous, usually ordinal. Therefore, Spearman correlation is the appropriate
method to evaluate relationships between ECEC scales and the continuous leave and ECEC
measures.97
Table 6.4 shows correlations between the leave gender equality and universality
indicators. All correlations for Table 6.4 are discussed in this section. Among the gender equality
Indicators (1–5), the results generally show that those countries with any leave granted to fathers
(Indicator 1) is positively correlated both with shares of all leave and all leave that is unpaid +
poorly paid (Indicators 2 and 3). Fathers’ share of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings
is also highly and positively correlated with weeks of all paid leave (r=.57 and P < 0.01), which
is perhaps unsurprising given the low number of nontransferable paid weeks of leave granted to
fathers in the first place. Weeks of well-paid leave that replace wages at 67 percent of earnings
and 85 percent of earnings are not correlated—indicating that gender equality in leave legislation
is not uniform at different earnings cutoffs.
Moving to the leave universality indicators (6–11) a few results stand out. Remember that
scores across Indicators 6–10 added up comprise the universality scale (11), so positive and
statistically significant correlations between the individual indicators and the scale are expected.
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For more information about the differences between Pearson and spearman correlation see Statistics Solutions and
Stata Manual 13 (cited in the bibliography).
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Measures of the financing scheme for mothers and fathers are not correlated—though the
correlation is in the expected direction (r=.27). This suggests that financing of leave for fathers is
more restrictive than it is for mothers. However, the correlation between the eligibility of leave
for mothers and fathers is high (r=.71 and P < 0.01). These results suggest that the more
accessible leave is to mothers, the more accessible it is for fathers as well.
Assessing correlations among the different leave and ECEC measures, the universality
scale is positively and significantly correlated with the share of well-paid leave allocated to
fathers at 67 percent of usual earnings or more (r=.57 and P < 0.01); this suggests that countries
with a higher share of leave for fathers at 67 percent of earnings provide leave policies that are
generally more accessible to both parents. However, looking at correlations between eligibility
requirements to take up leave and shares of well-paid leave for fathers at 67 percent (Indicator 4
and Indicators 9 and 10), the relationships between these measures are positive, as expected,
however, the relationships are not statistically significant (r=.14 and r=.23). Therefore, individual
measures of leave universality are not correlated with measures of leave gender equality in all
cases.
And finally, the ECEC universality scale is weakly but positively correlated with the
universality scale (r=.35 and P < 0.10). However, the ECEC universality scale is also not
significantly correlated with four of the five individual leave universality measures (with the
exception of the financing of leave for fathers), though the relationships are in the expected
direction. The ECEC universality scale is also not significantly correlated with the share of wellpaid leave to fathers at either 67 percent or 85 percent of usual earnings (though again, the results
are in the expected direction). The results from Table 6.4 further suggest that one measure of
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leave policy universality or gender equality may or may not be able to act as proxy for how welldeveloped leave policies are across different dimensions.
Toward New Multidimensional, Precise Measures of Leave and ECEC: Relationships
In Chapter 5, it was established that correlations among measures of leave and ECEC
policy generosity are complex. Six different types of correlations among the measures are
possible. These results suggested that measures of leave and ECEC policy generosity may be
narrow in scope and may not represent other dimensions of generosity—both for the same policy
or across different policies.98
In this section, I determine the relationships among a set of the newly constructed
measures of leave and ECEC across the different policy dimensions. Tables 6.5 shows results for
correlations between 13 leave and ECEC policy measures from across the two chapters. In order
from top to bottom and left to right across the two correlation tables, the seven leave policy
measures included are the newly constructed generosity measures of weeks of unpaid + poorly
paid leave and weeks of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings for periods of leave
granted to both mothers and fathers (1–4). Also included are measures of gender equality of
weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave (5), gender equality of paid leave at 67 percent of usual
earnings (6), and the universality scale (7). The five measures of ECEC generosity included are
weighted enrollment rates of children in care across the two age groups (8 and 9), out-of-pocket
costs for care for both single parents and couples (10 and 11), and the ECEC universality scale
(12). The coordination of care index (13) is also included that measures the percentage of
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The question also is whether we should see correlations between the measures in the first place. The three
measures that comprise the WSII (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006) are positively and significantly correlated.
Conversely, the leave and ECEC measures in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) are not correlated.
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children under compulsory schooling age covered under well-paid leave and public childcare
arrangements.
The correlations between the leave indicators in Table 6.5 (the first seven indicators in
the table) show somewhat more clear relationships between new measures of three different
dimensions of leave policy (generosity, gender equality, and universality). We already know
from Table 5.5 that the weeks of well-paid leave for mothers at 67 percent of earnings is not
significantly correlated with the weeks of well-paid leave for fathers at 67 percent of earnings.
The results in Table 6.5 show the weeks of well-paid leave periods for mothers at 67
percent or more of usual earnings is not significantly correlated with equality in paid leave at 67
percent of earnings (r=.16) either. These results suggest that countries with the most weeks of
well-paid leave allocated to mothers cannot be used as a proxy of the generosity of well-paid
leave for fathers or gender equality in paid leave to fathers. However, the universality scale is
positively and highly correlated with leave paid at 67 percent of usual earnings for both mothers
and fathers (r=.55 and P < 0.01 across both correlations). These results show that the generosity
of well-paid leave for either mothers or fathers is indicative of the universality of leave policies
more generally.
As indicated in Chapter 5, Table 5.5, several measures of ECEC and leave policy
generosity are correlated, including ECEC enrollment rates of children 0–2 years of age and
many of the leave generosity measures. I also established that out-of-pocket costs for single
parents and couples are not correlated with enrollment rates of young children 0–2 years of age
enrolled in ECEC.
In Table 6.5, I show that weighted ECEC enrollment rates (8 and 9) are moderately and
positively correlated with measures of leave policy gender equality and universality. However,
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correlations between out-of-pocket costs for both single parents and couples and measures of
leave policy are more varied. Out of-pocket-costs for single parents and couples and gender
equality of leave at 67 percent of usual earnings are not correlated, though the result is in the
expected direction (r=-.23 and r=-.30)—e.g., higher shares of leave allocated to fathers at 67
percent of earnings is associated with lower out-of-pocket costs to parents. Out-of-pocket costs
for care are negatively and moderately correlated with well-paid leave periods for mothers at 67
percent of earnings (r=-.38 and P < 0.10 for single-parent out-of-pocket costs; r=-45 and P < 0.05
for coupled parent out-of-pocket costs), but again, are not correlated with well-paid weeks of
leave for fathers at 67 percent of usual earnings (r=-.16 and r=-.26, respectively), though the
relationship is in the expected direction.
ECEC measures and the coordination of care index are negatively correlated with unpaid
+ poorly paid weeks of leave allocated to mothers. However, correlations are not significant
between unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave allocated to mothers and enrollment of children 3
years to compulsory schooling age, out-of-pocket costs of care for couples and single parents,
and the ECEC universality scale. These results suggest that countries with long weeks of unpaid
+ poorly paid leave provide more well-developed ECEC, but only across specific ECEC
dimensions. The relationships between select ECEC measures and the coordination of care index
and unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave allocated to fathers differ from the relationships
between these measures and unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave to mothers. Longer weeks of
unpaid + poorly paid leave is positively and significantly correlated with weighted enrollment
rates of children 3 years to compulsory schooling age, the ECEC universality scale, and the
coordination of care index. This suggests that countries without generous leaves to fathers in
terms of payment provide more generous and universal ECEC policies.
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Discussion and Conclusions—Well-Developed Leave and ECEC Policies
Discussion
To return to the first two research questions:
RQ1: What do the estimates and rankings of newly constructed measures of leave and
ECEC policy gender equality and universality tell us about how to construct policy measures
that are disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise?
RQ2: How do newly constructed measures of leave and ECEC gender equality and
universality alter previous understandings about which individual countries and regimes
promote leave and ECEC policies that can be characterized as the most well-developed?
The results from this chapter suggests that disaggregated, multidimensional, and precise
measures of leave and ECEC can help us uncover which countries support well-developed
policies across different policy dimensions. The use of only one or two measures of these
policies across any one study may accurately represent the extent to which leave or ECEC
policies are developed across specific countries—including the countries in the Social
Democratic regime. In fact, the results show the robustness of select welfare state regimes to
classify and categorize countries based on the development of these two policies—specifically
the Social Democratic and Liberal regimes. However, for countries from other regimes, the risk
is a misrepresentation of the extent to which they provide leave and ECEC policies that are welldeveloped (or not) across narrow, simplified policy measures.
Based on the measurement of more dimensions of leave and ECEC policies than
considered in past research, the results for the gender equality and universality leave and ECEC
measures reconfirm many of the overall findings from Chapter 5. The findings also help me
conclude which countries and regimes provide leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed.
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Across the measures of different dimensions of these policies, countries in the Social Democratic
regime provide the most well-developed leave and ECEC policies. The exception is Finland.
While Finland has very universal leave policies, childcare costs are higher than their Social
Democratic counterparts. Reserved leave for fathers is also not as generous as the periods found
in Norway and Iceland.
However, it’s not only the Social Democratic countries that provide the most welldeveloped leave policies; the results also suggest that France (Conservative-Corporatist), Spain
(Southern European), and Slovenia (Eastern European) also provide leave and ECEC policies
that are well-developed based on a broader set of policy measures.
Based on the measurements and rankings of the policy indicators from across Chapters 5
and 6, the Liberal countries provide the least developed leave and ECEC policies, as do countries
from across other regimes—the Slovak Republic (Eastern European) and Switzerland
(Continental European). However, no country ranks highly across every policy measure assessed
in Chapters 5 and 6—including those from the Social Democratic countries.
RQ3: What do correlations between measures of leave and ECEC policy across the three
policy dimensions tell us more generally about the possibility of one leave or ECEC policy
measure of any policy dimension to more broadly represent the scope of either policy?
Like the results from correlation tables in Chapter 5, the correlation tables in Chapter 6
show the same complicated relationships between the policy measures. The non-statistically
significant correlations between many leave and ECEC gender equality and universality
measures from Table 6.4 suggest that one measure of leave or ECEC gender equality or
universality may not accurately represent the scope of these policies across additional policy
dimensions.
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Table 6.5 presents a set of newly constructed leave and ECEC policy measures across the
three dimensions of these policies (leave policy generosity, gender equality, and universality and
ECEC policy generosity and universality) that are suggested for future use in gendered tradeoffs
research. Perhaps clearer relationships are shown between this set of policy measures. However,
there are exceptions to this rule. The correlations show that one measure may not be a proxy for
the scope of these policies across different dimensions. However, a broader set of policy
measures allows for a more thoughtful approach to choosing policy measures and addressing
their limitations for gendered tradeoffs research.
Final Conclusions for Chapters 5 and 6
Finally, to return to the overarching research question: How can we construct measures of
leave and ECEC policy that are multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise?
In Chapters 5 and 6, a comprehensive set of leave and ECEC policy measures were
evaluated. Updated leave and ECEC policy data from around 2010 and 2013 for 24 high-income
countries was used to construct the measures, many of these policy measures new to the
literature. The goal was to address the complicated nature of policy measurement specifically in
as it applied to gendered tradeoffs research. After a comprehensive assessment across the policy
measure estimates, rankings, and correlations, the results confirmed some of what we know
about well-developed leave and ECEC across individual countries and welfare state regimes.
However, the relationships among different dimensions of these policies are complex. It is clear
that one or two measures of these policies used in any particular study may not be indicative of
the true scope of these policies across different dimensions. These results are important because
the debate in gendered tradeoffs research is about whether and to what extent leave and ECEC
policies worsen gender gaps between men and women in employment. I suggest that one major
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reason for the continuation of this debate is the use of policy measures that are not standardized
across these studies.
The results also suggest that moving toward new indicators of leave and ECEC policy
that are disaggregated and precise may provide a better understanding of relationships between
different policy dimensions, or different components of these two policies. These new measures
can be used to test more specific theories of these policies and their relationship with gender
inequalities in employment.
However, policy measures that more precisely measure more dimensions of these policies
also complicate the gendered tradeoffs story. The measurement of these policies across multiple
dimensions of policy is complex and requires much knowledge about leave and ECEC policies
across high-income countries. It is clear throughout the literature that policy indicators and
measurement are not standardized, which suggests scholars have different understandings and
interpretations of these policies. The measures presented in the chapters are also by no means
exhaustive. Additional measures could also be added to what I have presented in the chapter
based on the use of different measurement techniques. And of course, the leave and ECEC policy
landscape across countries is ever-changing. Policy measures become quickly outdated over
time.
The larger question is which dimensions of leave and ECEC if any, are driving
unintended gender inequalities between men and women and class inequalities between low- and
highly educated women in employment across high-income countries? This question will be
explored in Part 3.
In the final chapter of Part 2, a new typology of work-family reconciliation policies is
constructed to pull together many of the findings from Chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 7: Well-Developed Leave and ECEC Policies: A New Work-Family Reconciliation
Policy Country Typology
Introduction
In this final chapter of Part 2, a new typology of work-family reconciliation policies is
constructed based on the rankings of 11 new leave and ECEC measures. This chapter is similar
to Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013), which groups countries with alike work-family policy
characteristics into constellations of family policies. In Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013), a
country’s family policies are grouped similarly to the way countries are grouped in the traditional
welfare state regimes. However, I will show a reshuffling of countries in this new typology.
When assessing more dimensions of leave and ECEC policies that are characterized as welldeveloped, the welfare state regime typology does not adequately explain leave and ECEC policy
variation.
Method
For the construction of the new typology, the ascending or descending rankings of nine
leave and ECEC policy measures across different policy dimensions and incentives and
disincentives for fathers to take up leave of the leave are added up to generate a total ranked
score. The rankings are used because they convert each policy measure to a system that is
completely comparable across different indicators. This typology is constructed based on the
rankings of multiple dimensions of both policies; to be a country classified as having welldeveloped leave and ECEC policies, the policy rankings must be high across most, if not all nine
policy measures.
The 11 leave and ECEC policy dimensions used to construct the new typology are shown
in Table 7.1.
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With this method, the lower the ranked score across the measures of 11 leave and ECEC
policy dimensions, the more well-developed the policies overall. Both ascending and descending
ranks are used to signal that the higher the rank—the more generous, gender-egalitarian, or
universal the leave or ECEC policy across any singular measure of a particular policy dimension.
Descending rank scores are used for seven of the nine ranked policy measures. For example,
Hungary provides women with 105 weeks of well-paid leave to mothers. Weeks of well-paid
leave in Hungary therefore receives a rank of a 1 across this policy measure. Ascending ranks are
used for out-of-pocket costs of care for both single and coupled parents. Out-of-pocket costs in
Italy for both single parents and couples as percent of net family income is zero, signaling that
parents do not face out-of-pocket costs for care in Italy. Therefore, out-of-pocket costs in Italy
receives a rank of a 1 across these two policy measures.
Finally, points granted for incentives are subtracted from the total ranked score, while
disincentives are added to the total ranked score. This, again, is because a lower-ranked score is
indicative of leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed across measures of different
policy dimensions. Incentives will lower the scores even further while disincentives will raise the
score.
This typology provides a detailed, more refined understanding of the true scope leave and
ECEC policies across high-income countries. The typology also shows which countries truly
provide policies that are well-developed compared to studies that utilize only one or two
measures of leave and ECEC. The table is useful to compare measures of different policy
dimensions to each other.
1) Countries with well-developed leave and ECEC policies are those with total ranked
scores that add up to 57 points or less.
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2) Countries with moderately-well-developed leave and ECEC policies are those with
total ranked scores between 68–80 points.
3) Countries with moderately developed leave and ECEC policies are those with total
ranked scores between 86 and up to 98 points.
4) Countries with moderately low developed leave and ECEC policies are those with
total ranked scores at 131 points or higher.
5) Finally, countries with the least developed leave and ECEC policies are the four
countries with no reserved, nontransferable leave for fathers (Australia, Canada,
Switzerland, and the Slovak Republic).
The total ranked score cutoffs for each new country grouping are based on natural cutoffs
from the resulting total ranked scores. Five groups of countries are clear by the overall ranked
scores with a more or less even distribution of countries across the five groups. Generally, the
top grouping includes countries with leave and ECEC policies that rank highly across all
measures. The second and third group generally consists of countries whose policies rank higher
on measures of ECEC policy and lower across measures of leave policy. The bottom two groups
include countries with leave and ECEC policies that rank low across measures of both leave and
ECEC policy.
Remember that the correlation between the total weeks of well-paid leave for fathers at
67 percent of usual earnings or higher is nearly perfectly correlated with fathers’ share of wellpaid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings or higher (leave policy gender equality). As a
sensitivity analysis, in Table 7.2, the total ranked score with both leave dimensions are shown,
along with a total ranked score that excludes fathers’ share of well-paid at 67 percent of usual
earnings or higher. The exclusion of the rank of fathers’ share of well-paid leave from the overall
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ranked score does not dramatically change the outcome of the results. The cutoffs for the five
groups change slightly but are still clearly delineated (see the last column of Table 7.2). For
countries with well-developed leave policies, Slovenia could potentially be placed into either the
well-developed or moderately well-developed group, depending on whether or not the share of
well-paid leave allocated to fathers is included. Therefore, both leave policy dimensions are
included in the construction of the typology.
Results
Total overall scores range from 44 (Iceland)–175 (the Slovak Republic). Clear divides are
shown across the five groups by the overall ranked scores in Table 7.2. This point is best
emphasized in the gap between the moderate and moderately low country groups. The gap in the
score between the Netherlands (first country to place in the moderately low developed group)
and Austria (last country to place in the moderately developed group) is a full 33 points (the
Netherlands = 131 points, Austria = 98 points).
At first glance, patterns of well-developed leave and ECEC are shown by the ranks and
the highlighting of the ranks. Most top ranks and green highlighting are found in the top three
country groups. Low ranks in the bottom two country groups are emphasized by the red
highlighting of ranks across multiple measures. Countries with no nontransferable reserved leave
allocated to fathers are classified in the least developed group. In the least developed group,
countries that do not allocate nontransferable leave to fathers also rank very low across most
other measures of leave and ECEC. These results provide further evidence that standard welfare
state regime typologies may not adequately explain important similarities in leave and ECEC
policy design across individual countries placed in different welfare state regimes.
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In Chapters 5 and 6, rankings across the individual policy measures showed clear divides
within welfare state regimes as to which countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are
more well-developed, as measured in the indicators. The results in the new country typology in
Table 7.1 show a reshuffling of countries across all of the original welfare state regimes into the
new typology of work-family reconciliation policies. These results suggest that standard welfare
state regimes fall apart when more dimensions of leave and ECEC are operationalized and
measured.
However, the new typology nearly supports the integrity and robustness of the Social
Democratic regime. Three of the four countries in the Social Democratic regime place in the
well-developed group and have the top three overall ranking scores (Iceland, Norway, and
Demark) along with countries from two of the four traditional regimes—Spain (Southern
European) and France (Conservative-Corporatist). Famously, Esping-Andersen (1990) does not
take gender into account in the construction of the “Three Worlds” welfare state regime
typology. However, the near integrity and robustness of this original welfare state regime is
perhaps due, in part, because institutions in the Social Democratic countries are built on genderegalitarian principles.
Finland is the only Social Democratic country that places in the moderately-welldeveloped group along with Slovenia, Italy, Hungary, and Estonia. In this moderately-welldeveloped group, most countries rank highly across most indicators, though Italy, Hungary, and
Estonia rank low across measures of weeks of well-paid leave for fathers and the share of wellpaid leave for fathers. Finland ranks low across measures of enrollment and cost of care both in
contrast to other countries in this grouping and compared to their Social Democratic
counterparts.
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Discussion
Overall, the typology shows that measures of multiple dimensions of leave and ECEC
policy generosity, gender equality, and universality best exemplify the differences between those
high-income countries that provide well-developed leave and ECEC policies and those that do
not. All countries that place in the well-developed group provide leave and ECEC policies that
rank high or middling across measures of the weeks of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual
earnings or more and the share of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings or more that are
allocated to fathers. Countries in the well-developed grouping also rank highly across additional
measures of leave and ECEC policy.
In the least developed group, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and the Slovak Republic do
not offer nontransferable leave to fathers (regardless of the payment rate) in the year of the data.
Therefore, policy dimensions are ranked very low across these two measures and also across
nearly all additional measures. All countries’ policies in the least developed group, with the
exception of Switzerland, also disincentivize fathers from taking shared leave. Further, the
rankings signal that enrollment rates in public care are low and out-of-pocket costs for childcare
are high compared to countries in the other groupings. A low ranking across one leave or ECEC
measure in this group is indicative of a low ranking across others. This is especially true for
leave policies. Countries with no nontransferable leave for fathers automatically translates into a
low ranking for leave universality because two of the five dimensions that are measured in the
scale are equal to 0.
In general, this typology shows that one measure of leave and ECEC may not represent
the scope of leave policies across high-income countries and that we need to be careful to better
understand what policy dimension is being measured and how a particular measurement is
utilized across gendered tradeoffs research. The results of this typology are in line with and
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extend past research. For example, Javornik (2014) and Yerkes and Javornik (2018) find that
Eastern European countries provide leave and ECEC policies that are just as well-developed as
the Social Democratic countries. I also suggest that while welfare state regimes are useful for
understanding differences in institutions across countries, that a closer look at just two workfamily reconciliation policies suggests much variation in work-family policy within traditional
welfare states. This fact should be taken into consideration when addressing the link between
welfare states and unintended labor market outcomes for women and work-family policies and
unintended labor market outcomes for women.
Conclusions
In Part 2 of the dissertation, I showed:
1) Leave and ECEC policy measurement is complex. However, moving toward
multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise measures of leave and ECEC policies
provide a more accurate assessment of which individual countries support welldeveloped (or not-well-developed) leave and ECEC policies.
2) A more complete portrait of leave and ECEC policies across different dimensions
shows that traditional country groupings fall away. Bringing in indicators of leave
policy generosity that measure fathers’ nontransferable leave periods and the share of
total leave allocated to fathers especially shows clear divides in which individual
countries provide policies that are well-developed in design. The Social Democratic
countries, but not only the Social Democratic countries provide policies that can be
considered well-developed.
3) I established that standard policy measures are narrow in scope. One or two measures
of leave and ECEC policies may not adequately represent the scope of these policies
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more generally in all cases. This relationship holds among policy measurements of
the same provision and relationships among measurements of different provisions.
4) Newer measures of leave policy generosity that separate weeks of well-paid leaves
from weeks of unpaid + low-paid leaves may better represent the scope of leave
policies more generally.
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PART 3: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LEAVE, ECEC, AND WOMEN’S LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES
Chapter 8: Leave and ECEC: Good or Bad for Gender and Class Inequality in
Employment?
Overview
In Part 2, it was established that the measurement of work-family reconciliation policy
complicates gendered tradeoffs research. Bringing the construction of work-family reconciliation
policy measures front and center, I definitively showed that standard leave and ECEC policy
measures used in the literature that are based on one or two dimensions of these policies may not
represent the scope of leave and ECEC across countries. Additionally, which countries provide
well-developed leave and ECEC cannot be explained by standard welfare state regime
typologies. Which countries provide well-developed leave and ECEC (or not) is largely based on
what policy dimensions are measured and how they are measured. These results complicate the
issue of gendered tradeoffs because they suggest that the way policies are measured, and which
dimensions are measured, may potentially alter understandings of the relationship between leave,
ECEC, and gender and class employment inequalities.
This chapter is descriptive and exploratory. Past influential research in the gendered
tradeoffs genre (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel
2012; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017) is replicated and extended to better evaluate the evidence for
both gender and class inequalities. In the first part of this chapter, five labor market outcomes of
interest across the 24 individual countries and across the five work-family reconciliation policy
groupings generated in Chapter 7 are reported. The goal is to determine patterns of gender and
class inequalities in employment, by the five policy groupings and by class. In the second part of
the chapter, the relationship between 12 continuous measures of leave and ECEC policy
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dimensions and the labor market outcomes are reported using correlation analysis. The goal is to
evaluate the relationships among a more complete set of newly constructed multidimensional,
disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC policy measures and labor market outcomes to
determine new links between dimensions of the two policies and gender and class inequalities.
The terms “employment outcomes,” “women’s outcomes,” and “labor market outcomes”
are used interchangeably throughout this chapter and encompass both measures of employment
(e.g., employment and part-time employment) and employment attainment (annual earnings
(hereafter, “earnings”), managerial status, and lucrative managerial status). These terms are used
interchangeably because no standard terminology in the literature exists. More specific terms—
gender employment gaps, or gender gaps in annual earnings (hereafter, “earnings gaps”) will be
used, where applicable.
Throughout this chapter are two sample groups of interest: working-aged men and
women and working-aged women with low and high levels of educational attainment. 99 The
terms gender employment inequalities and class employment inequalities are used to signal
negative or worsened gaps between men and women (gender employment inequalities) or among
women (class employment inequalities) across the labor market outcomes in question.
Employment inequality is used as an umbrella to signal both types of inequality. Evidence of a
relationship between well-developed policies and worsened employment inequality or evidence
of a relationship between a singular policy dimension and worsened employment inequality is
characterized as a tradeoff.
Because class is central to the tradeoffs puzzle, all results are shown by using the three
predominant measures of class—educational attainment, earnings, and occupational attainment.

99

Education classifications are explained in the data and measurement section, below.
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Five labor market outcomes are of interest in this chapter:100 employment, part-time
employment, earnings, managerial status, and lucrative managerial status (managers with
earnings in the 70th percentile or higher).
Similar to Brad, Blome, and Kmec (2019, 13), I argue that no one analysis or model can
definitively resolve the relationship between work-family reconciliation policies and women’s
labor market outcomes. The focus then is to draw conclusions based on “cumulative evidence”
across the analyses in this chapter and multilevel models presented in the next chapter. Like
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) evaluating a broad range of labor outcomes, and across multiple
analyses, will help me better determine if there is strong empirical evidence for tradeoffs in
employment.
Methods
Data
Country-level policy data (for correlations between policies and labor market outcomes):
To evaluate correlations between leave and ECEC policy dimensions and the labor market
outcomes, measures of individual leave and ECEC policy are divided into two groups—welldeveloped and not-well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions:
Well-developed policy dimensions: Well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings
(hereafter well-paid leave) for mothers, well-paid leave for fathers, equality in well-paid leave,
weighted enrollment of children 0–2 years of age in ECEC (hereafter, “enrollment of children 0–
2 years”), and weighted enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling age in ECEC

100

These labor market outcomes are the dependent variables for the multilevel models in Chapter 9.
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(hereafter, “enrollment of children 3 years old to compulsory schooling age in ECEC”), and the
coordination of care.
Not-well-developed policy dimensions: Unpaid + poorly paid leave periods (mothers),
unpaid + poorly paid leave periods (fathers), equality in unpaid + poorly paid leave periods, outof-pocket costs for single parents, and out-of-pocket costs for couples.
Microdata and country sample: Microdata are derived from waves 9 and 10 of the LIS
database, around the years 2010 and 2013, respectively. The LIS Database is a cross-national
database that includes high-quality, harmonized individual-level microdata from national
household income surveys in high-income, and increasingly, middle-income countries. These
microdata are widely used in comparative socio-economic research. The gendered tradeoffs
literature predominately utilizes the LIS microdata (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Pettit
and Hook 2009; Mandel 2011, 2012; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Hook 2015; Brady,
Blome, and Kmec 2019).
The same 24 high-income countries from the previous section are included in all
analyses, when possible. The 24 countries with reference year are Australia (2010), Austria
(2013), Canada (2010), Czech Republic (2013), Denmark (2013), Estonia (2013), Finland
(2013), France (2010), Germany (2013), Greece (2013), Hungary (2012), Iceland (2010), Ireland
(2010), Italy (2014), Luxembourg (2013), the Netherlands (2013), Norway (2013), Poland
(2013), Slovak Republic (2010) Slovenia (2012), Spain (2013), Switzerland (2013), United
Kingdom (2013), and the United States (2013). The majority of prior gendered tradeoffs
literature is from the mid 2000s or earlier. This study will be the first to use more recent
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microdata (and policy measures). The year of the microdata are recent enough to avoid
confounding with the Great Recession of 2008/2009. 101
Measurement
Sample: Individuals aged 25–54; this age group is standard in the literature because it
excludes students and early retirees.
Definitions of class: Three definitions of class are used across the analyses—educational
attainment, annual earnings, and occupational status. Educational attainment measures
characteristics of the worker through skills attainment, earnings and occupational attainment are
a reflection of skill. 102
Educational attainment is based on the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED) classifications. The LIS microdata educ variable is harmonized using the ISCED
classifications. Low educational attainment is defined as having less than a high school
education. Medium education is defined as having a high school degree or higher, some college
with a degree below a bachelor’s degree (an associate’s degree in the United States). High
educational attainment is defined as having the equivalent of a four-year bachelor’s degree or
higher.103 Educational attainment is used as the measure of class for analyses of employment,
part-time employment, and earnings gaps.
Annual earnings is used for analyses of earnings gaps. The working-aged sample is
divided into four groups based on two separate definitions of class. For the first definition the
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Conversely, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019, 8) utilizes policy data from the mid-2000s and argues this helps to
avoid confounding with the Great Recession.
102
For a more detailed discussion of measuring and defining class, see Chapter 2.
103
Note that this analysis does slightly differ from Mandel’s in that low education in her study is inclusive of those
with a secondary degree (e.g., high school in the United States) while low education in my study includes those with
less than a high school degree. However, despite these differences in the education categories, I will show my results
are consistent with her earlier findings.
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two groups are the high-socioeconomic group and the low-socio-economic group. The highsocio-economic group is defined as men and women with annual earnings above the median and
a four-year college degree or higher. The low-socioeconomic group is defined as men and
women with annual earnings below the median and with less than a high school degree. The
second definition are men and women with earnings above median earnings only and men and
women with earnings below median earnings only.
For the purposes of this study, occupational attainment used to identify which women are
managers and which women are lucrative managers—managers with earnings at the 70th
percentile or higher.
Labor Market Outcome Definitions
Employment: The percentage of women that are employed as a share of all women
employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force.
Part-time employment: The share of employed women that are employed 30 hours per
week or less.
Annual earnings: Annual earnings are converted to country-year specific percentiles. 104
This approach eliminates the need to adjust for national currencies, with or without price
adjustments. It is measured as the relative rank of earnings for employed men and women ages
25–54 within each country’s earnings distribution (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 9). “This
measure also avoids conflating welfare state policies with the effect of wage setting
institutions…Each respondent’s wage is measured by his or her or her position in the national

From the LIS Database: “Total income from labour of all household members, including cash payments and
value of goods and services received from dependent employment, profit/losses and value of goods from selfemployment, as well as the value of own consumption.”
104
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earnings distribution irrespective of cross-national differences in the length of the wage ladder”
(Mandel 2012, 246).105
Before annual earnings are converted to country specific percentiles, negative earnings
are bottom coded by converting them to 0. At the top of the distribution, annual earnings are topcoded at 10 times above the median to take care of outliers at the top. 106
Manager: The percentage of employed men and women that are identified as having a
managerial status in the LIS microdata occb1 variable.
Lucrative manager: Being a manager with annual earnings at the 70th percentile or
higher.
Research Questions and Expectations
Research Questions
In the first part of this chapter, labor market outcomes across the 24 individual countries
and across the five work-family reconciliation policy groupings generated in Chapter 7 are
assessed. The goal is to determine patterns of gender and class inequalities in employment, by
the five policy groupings and by class.

Per Mandel (2012, 245–246), and discussed elsewhere in this study, this method is employed to “avoid conflating
the effect of welfare state policies with the effect of wage-setting institutions. Each respondent’s wage is measured
by his or her position in their national earnings distribution, irrespective of cross-national differences in the length of
the wage ladder. On the assumption that the effect is conditioned by class, what this standardization prevents is the
risk that the centralized wage determination in well-developed welfare states will cause an exaggerated effect of
welfare state policies for less advantaged groups and obscure their unfavorable implications for more advantaged
groups.”
Further, the LIS database reports three possible current incomes—gross, mixed, and net (see the grossnet variable).
The LIS data for France 2010 and Poland 2013 report mixed income—total individual annual earnings does not
account for full taxes and contributions. The LIS data for Hungary 2012 and Slovenia 2012 reports net income—
total annual earnings does not capture taxes and contributions. The additional 20 datasets report gross income (taxes
and contributions are fully captured, collect, or imputed). The way these data are reported will also have an effect on
earnings gaps between men and women and among women. Earnings gaps will be higher across countries that report
gross annual earnings than across countries that report mixed or net annual earnings because taxes and contributions
are not captured in these datasets.
106
This method is recommended by the self-teaching materials provided by the LIS Cross-national data center in
Luxembourg.
105
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This section is in conversation with the welfare state paradox literature. The expectation
in the welfare state paradox literature is that women’s employment is highest in the Social
Democratic regime, compared to the employment of women in other regimes. However, gender
gaps in earnings and occupational attainment are worse in the Social Democratic regime
especially between high-status men and women. The reason for worsened gender employment
inequalities is largely due to well-developed work-family policies.
The new work-family reconciliation policy typology from Chapter 7 shows that standard
welfare state regimes fall away when measuring more dimensions of leave and ECEC policies. I
adapt the welfare state paradox and tradeoffs hypotheses to the work-family reconciliation policy
typology. I expect women’s employment will be highest and part-time employment rates will be
the lowest in the well-developed work-family reconciliation policy grouping. I also expect that
employment gaps between men and women will be the lowest in the well-developed policy
grouping. By class, gender employment gaps between highly educated men and women should
be the lowest in the well-developed policy grouping compared to gender employment gaps
between highly educated men and women gaps in the four other policy groups.
However, if the tradeoffs hypothesis holds, well-developed work-family reconciliation
policies should undermine women’s earnings compared to men’s earnings. Earnings gaps
between men and women should be highest in the well-developed policy group. Further,
earnings gaps between men and women in the high-socio-economic group and with earnings
above the median should be larger than the earnings gaps between men and women in the lowsocio-economic group and with earnings below the median. Particularly, the gender earnings
gaps between men and women in the two “high-status” groups should be highest in the welldeveloped work-family reconciliation policy grouping compared to the gender earnings gaps
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between men and women in the two “high-status” groups across the four additional policy
groups.
Additionally, managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps between men and women
should be highest in the well-developed policy group compared the managerial and lucrative
gender managerial gaps between men and women across the four additional policy groupings.
The percentage of women in managerial and lucrative managerial positions should also be the
lowest in the well-developed policy grouping given that glass ceilings should be prevalent in
countries with well-developed policies.
Because well-developed work-family reconciliation policies should reduce class
inequalities among employed women, the secondary expectation is that employment, part-time
employment, and earnings gaps between women with low and high levels of educational
attainment should also be the lowest in the well-developed policy grouping. Of course, we know
that other institutions also influence women’s labor market outcomes, such as wage-setting
institutions, however, again, the interest is to establish patterns between the development of leave
and ECEC policies, and labor market outcomes, holding other institutional variations constant.
Expectations for Correlations Between Labor Market Outcomes and the Leave and ECEC Policy
Dimensions
In the second results section, the relationship between singular measures of leave and
ECEC policy dimensions and the labor market outcomes are reported using correlation analysis.
With a more complete set of measures of leave and ECEC policy dimensions, the expectation is
for different relationships between the leave and ECEC policy dimensions and labor market
outcomes.
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The 12 measures of leave and ECEC can be broken down into two groups—those that
measure well-developed leave and ECEC dimensions and those that measure not-well-developed
leave and ECEC dimensions. In Chapter 3, I identified many theories about the expected
relationships between different dimensions of leave and ECEC policy dimensions and labor
market outcomes. Four sets of expectations are generated based on the two groups of policy
measures. This analysis is intended to add more nuance to the relationship between leave and
ECEC policies and gender and class (inequalities) in the labor market.
1) Well-developed leave includes measures of three leave policy dimensions: well-paid
leave periods for both mothers and fathers and equality in well-paid leave at 67
percent of usual earnings. Six correlations are expected:
a. First, well-developed leave dimensions will be positively correlated with
women’s employment, across the educational groups.
b. Well-developed leave dimensions will be negative correlated with gender
employment gaps between men and women across the educational groups.
c. Well-developed leave dimensions will be negatively correlated with women’s
part-time employment, by class.
d. For class inequalities among women, well-developed leave dimensions should
be negatively correlated with class gaps in employment, part-time
employment, and annual earnings, between low- and highly educated women
(i.e.,—well-developed leave dimensions should be correlated with reduced
class gaps among women with different education levels).
e. If the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis holds, well-developed leave dimensions
will be positively correlated with gender earnings gaps between high-status
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men and women (i.e., —well-developed leave dimensions should be
correlated with worsened gaps between men and women). There should be no
correlation or a negative correlation between well-developed leave dimensions
and gender earnings gaps between low-status men and women.
f. Well-developed leave dimensions should also be negatively correlated with
the share of women in managerial or lucrative managerial positions and
positively associated with gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial
gaps (i.e., —well-developed leave dimensions should be correlated with
worsened gaps between men and women).
2) Well-developed ECEC encompasses three policy measures: weighted enrollments of
children in ECEC across the two age groups and the coordination of care.
a. The expectation is for the well-developed ECEC dimensions to be positively
correlated with women’s employment rates.
b. Well-developed ECEC will be negatively correlated with employment gaps
between men and women, across class.
c. Well-developed ECEC will be negatively correlated with part-time
employment rates among women, across class.
d. Well-developed ECEC will be negatively correlated with employment and
part-time employment gaps between women with low and high education.
These expected correlations are the same as for well-developed leave
dimensions.
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e. However, based on growing empirical evidence in the literature, there should
be no correlations between well-developed ECEC and any of the additional
employment outcomes.
3) The coordination of care is the final dimension. Broadly, the more coordinated the
end of well-paid leave periods are with coverage of children under publicly provided
ECEC, should be positive for women’s employment. The coordination of care should
be positively correlated with women’s employment rates, by class. It should be
negatively correlated with gender employment gaps, employment gaps among
women, part-time employment rates, gender earnings and class earnings gaps.
Finally, the coordination of care should be positively correlated with the share of
women in managerial and lucrative managerial positions and should be negatively
correlated with gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps (it should be
correlated with reduced gaps).
4) Not-well-developed leave encompasses three measures: unpaid + poorly paid leave
periods for mothers and fathers and equality in unpaid + poorly paid leave for
mothers and fathers. I characterize leave that is unpaid or poorly paid as not-welldeveloped because leave may be generous in length or the share allocated to fathers,
but not in payment. My argument is that when leave periods are poorly paid, these
periods should also have adverse relationships with labor market outcomes and
worsen gender and class inequalities. However, the relationships between these
particular leave policy dimensions and gender and class employment inequalities are
not necessarily a tradeoff because unpaid and low-paid leave periods are not
considered “well-developed.”
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a. Not-well-developed leave should be negatively correlated with women’s
employment rates and positively correlated with employment gaps between
men and women, overall and by class.
b. Not-well-developed leave should be positively correlated with employment
gaps between low- and highly educated women.
c. Not-well-developed leave should be positively correlated with earnings gaps
between men and women and earnings gaps among women (i.e.,—not-welldeveloped leave should worsen earnings gaps). These gaps should be highest
between high-status men and women.
d. Not-well-developed leave should be negatively correlated with the percentage
of women in managerial and lucrative gender managerial positions and
positively correlated with gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial
gaps (i.e.,—not-well-developed leave should be correlated with lower
percentages of women in managerial and lucrative gender managerial
positions and should worsen gender managerial and lucrative gender
managerial gaps).
5) Not-well-developed ECEC encompasses two measures: The out-of-pocket costs for
childcare for both single and coupled households. High childcare costs should impact
women’s employment intensity and job quality.
a. High out-of-pocket childcare costs for single parents and couples will be
positively correlated with women’s part-time employment, especially among
the low-educated groups.
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b. High out-of-pocket childcare costs for single parents and couples will be
positively correlated with the part-time employment gap between low- and
highly educated women (i.e.,—it will worsen part-time employment gaps).
c. High out-of-pocket costs will be negatively correlated with the share of
employed women in managerial and lucrative managerial positions and will
be positively associated with gender managerial and lucrative managerial gaps
between men and women (i.e.,—it will worsen gender managerial and
lucrative gender managerial gaps between men and women).
Section 1: Labor Market Outcome Descriptives
This first set of results is largely descriptive and explores patterns of employment
outcomes. Averages are displayed for the 24 individual countries, overall, and for each of the
five work-family reconciliation policy groups. Across all tables, descriptive results are organized
by the five policy groupings generated in Chapter 7 with overall averages at the bottom of each
table.
Employment Rates
Table 8.1 displays results for women’s employment, employment gaps between men and
women, by educational attainment, and employment gaps between low- and high-educated
women. On average, the employment rate of women across the 24 countries is 73 percent.
Employment, as expected, increases as the level of educational attainment increases.
Employment gaps between men and women, by educational attainment, also declines as
education increases—the average employment gap between men and women with low
educational attainment is 16.9 percentage points and falls to 7.9 percentage points between men
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and women with high educational attainment. The average employment gap between low- and
highly educated women (final column) is high at 31.2 percentage points.
Moving to averages across each of the five work-family reconciliation policy groupings,
the results show distinct patterns in female employment rates and employment gaps between
men and women, by educational attainment. Reading the table from left to right, employment
rates for women increases as education increases. Employment gaps between men and women
generally decreases as educational attainment increases.
Comparing the employment rates and employment gaps among the highly educated
across the five policy groupings, employment rates are highest among women with high levels of
education attainment in the top two work-family reconciliation policy groupings compared to the
bottom three groupings (84.8 percent for the well-developed policy grouping and 87.2 percent
for the moderately well-developed grouping). Employment rates among highly educated women
in the well-developed group are 4.3 percentage points higher than the employment rates for
highly educated women in the least developed group, signaling that countries with welldeveloped leave and ECEC policies have more favorable employment rates for highly educated
women.
Moving to employment gaps between highly educated men and women across the five
policy groups (final column), employment gaps in the top two policy groupings are similar at 4.7
and 5.3 percentage points, respectively. Employment gaps between highly educated men and
women in the bottom two policy groupings are nearly double that of the top two policy
groupings—and 10.5 percentage points in the least developed groupings and 9.1 percentage
points in the moderately low developed grouping.
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Surprisingly, the employment gaps between low- and highly educated women in the least
developed and well-developed policy group are nearly identical at 27.0 and 27.5 percentage
points, respectively. However, though class employment gaps are similar, the employment rates
of both low- and highly educated women are generally higher in the well-developed regime
compared to the least developed regime. For example, both Norway (well-developed grouping)
and Canada (least developed grouping) have the same level of class inequality among women at
23.5 and 23.3 percentage points, respectively. However, the employment rate among the loweducated in Norway is 13 percentage points higher than the employment rate among the loweducated in Canada (65.9 percent compared to 52.9 percent). The employment rate among the
highly educated in Norway is 13.3 percentage points higher than among the highly educated in
Canada (89.4 percent compared to 76.1 percent). Therefore, low class inequality among
employed women can be either “good” or “bad,” depending on the employment rates. There are
several explanations for possible low class employment inequality among women that need to be
explained in the context of additional results.
Overall, the results suggest top two policy groups promote higher female employment
rates, across class, and lower gender employment gaps between men and women, when
compared to the bottom two groupings. However, class inequalities among women need to be
compared with caution and in combination with employment rates.
Part-Time Employment
Patterns of results are less clear when moving to part-time work. Part-time work is both a
measure of labor market activity and work intensity. Across the six Eastern European countries
included in the study (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and
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Slovenia), the share of women in part-time work is low overall and by the three levels of
educational attainment compared to the other countries in the study (Table 8.2).
The low shares of women in part-time work across Eastern Europe can be attributed to
both supply and demand-side factors. Recent literature suggests that low part-time employment
rates among prime-aged women in Eastern Europe is due to employment protective legislation
that discourages part-time work. Increases in the share of women in part-time work across these
countries is often involuntary—women prefer to work full-time and have the opportunity to do
so as a result of long maternity leaves and generous ECEC. An increase in the demand for parttime work is also a result of the business cycle—i.e., part-time work rises in a sluggish economy
and then declines again when economic conditions improve (Fialová 2017).
Because of the great differences in the percentages of employed women in part-time
work in Eastern European countries compared to other countries, two sets of part-time
employment averages are shown. The first set of results includes Eastern European countries in
the averages, by work-family reconciliation policy grouping. The second set of averages exclude
Eastern European countries.
Overall, slightly more than one-fourth of all employed women (27.5 percent) are
employed part-time (see Table 8.2). Excluding Eastern European countries, the share of women
in part-time employment increases to one-third of all employed women (33.9 percent).107
Generally, reading the table from left to right, the pattern is that the share of women in part-time
work decline as education level increases. This is true across the overall part-time work averages
and the part-time work averages across each of the five policy groupings. Generally, part-time
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These results are well in-line with past research—see Mandel and Semyonov (2006), for example.
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employment shares among women are high across all countries (with the exception of the
Eastern European countries), and regardless of the development of leave and ECEC policies.
Comparing the part-time employment rates among highly educated women across the
five policy groupings, average shares of part-time employment among the highly educated is
very similar, and especially across the four policy groupings for which part-time work data is
available for all groups (the exception is the well-developed grouping. Part-time work
information is not available for Norway, Denmark, or France across educational groups). The
patterns persist with or without the inclusion of Eastern European countries. Overall, there is
little evidence to suggest part-time employment rates among highly educated women are lower
in countries with more well-developed leave and ECEC policies.
The part-time employment gap between low- and highly educated women (final column)
also needs to be explained in the context of part-time employment rates among low- and highly
educated women. The part-time employment gap is the lowest in the moderately well-developed
group, at 7.3 percentage points (average with Eastern European countries) and 4.3 percentage
points (average without Eastern European countries). This is in part because the share of women
part-time work is more similar across the educational groups in this policy grouping, though
shares greatly differ. For example, in Italy, the part-time employment rate among low-educated
women is 44.1 percent compared to 41.9 percent among highly educated women. The part-time
employment rates in Finland are half of Italy’s rates at 20.8 percent among the low-educated and
14.4 percent among the high-educated. Therefore, class inequalities among women in part-time
work can appear low, but actual part-time employment rates themselves can vary quite a lot.
Because class inequality among women is a function of the part-time employment rate, can we
say that low-class inequality is good, even if part-time employment rates are high? The
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interpretation of results is dependent on which countries are included in analyses and the
employment statistic(s) in question. 108
Gender Earnings Gaps
To evaluate earnings gaps across different class groups, Mandel’s (2012) descriptive
analysis is replicated and extended. In Table 8.3, the low-socio-economic group is inclusive of
employed men and women with low educational attainment and earnings below the median. The
high-socio-economic group are those individuals with high educational attainment and earnings
above the median. In the fourth and fifth columns, a new, secondary class definition is
introduced. Individuals are separated into two groups—those with earnings above and below the
median only, regardless of educational attainment. The expectation is that earnings gaps will be
larger between men and women in the high-socioeconomic group (compared to the lowsocioeconomic group) or those with earnings above the median (compared to those with earnings
below the median), regardless of work-family reconciliation policy group. Secondary to this
expectation is that earnings gaps will be the largest between men and women in the highsocioeconomic group/above the median in the well-developed policy group compared to the
earnings gaps between men and women in high-socioeconomic group/earnings above the median
across the four additional policy groups. However, the overall evidence for these expectations is
inconclusive. One factor is that results change based on the class definition used.
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Another issue not explored in this dissertation are differences in working time that can be delineated as long and
short part-time work time work, along with legal reductions in working time. According to Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund. (2013, 27) “long part-time work allows mothers to have a relatively continuous work-like connection
which enhances women’s agency, although it means that male and female partners still have different life patterns,
with implications for their relative capabilities.”
109
Note that gender earnings gaps are sensitive to the number of hours worked. The strength of using the medians as
a cutoff to distinguish between the low- and high-socio-economic groups is that the median annual earnings for two
groups do not change even though I am not controlling for the number of hours worked.
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First, remember Slovenia and Hungary are net income data sets. Poland and France are
mixed income datasets. Because not all taxes and contributions are taken into account, earnings
gaps across these countries are lower than if gross earnings were available (gross earnings
includes taxes and contributions). However, average earnings gap patterns across the five workfamily reconciliation policy groupings and the overall average hold if these countries are
excluded. Also to consider is that “gender wage gaps are naturally much smaller within groups
than countrywide, since by definition each group only includes part of the earnings distribution”
(Mandel 2012, 247).
Moving to the results, first, the overall earnings gaps between the average man’s and
woman’s earnings is 19.9 percentiles. Across the five work-family reconciliation policy groups,
the overall earnings gaps are similar and range from 16.0 percentiles in the moderately welldeveloped group to 22.9 percentiles in the least-developed group.
Looking at the results across the first class definition (Columns 2 and 3, low- and highsocio-economic group), the overall earnings gap between the average man’s and woman’s
earnings is 9.2 percentiles in the low-socio-economic group compared to 10 percentiles in the
high-socio-economic group (see bottom row in the table). However, moving to the definition of
earnings only (see Columns 3 and 4), the earnings gap between the average man’s and woman’s
earnings is 6.7 percentiles for those below the median and 6.1 percentiles for those above the
median. The first class definition confirms that earnings gaps are larger for men and women that
are both highly educated and have earnings above the median. However, the secondary class
definition reports that earnings gaps are slightly larger overall for the low-status group; those
with earnings below the median. The results also suggest that more specific definitions of class
show larger earnings gaps in percentiles—i.e., a class definition that incorporates both education
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and earnings will report larger earnings gaps than a class definition that only takes into account
one of these specifications.
To complicate matters, the pattern does not hold across the five policy groupings or
overall. For the first class definition, the average earnings gaps are larger for the high-socioeconomic group compared to the low-socio-economic group but only for the well-developed and
moderately well-developed policy groups. For example, the average earnings gap between men
and women in the low-socio-economic group is 7.0 percentiles and 10.7 percentiles between men
and women in the high-socio-economic group. The earnings gaps are reversed only for the welldeveloped policy group when moving to the class definition that utilizes earnings cutoffs only. In
the well-developed group, the earnings gap between the average man’s and woman’s earnings
for those with earnings below the median is 8.8 percentiles. The earnings gap between the
average man’s and woman’s earnings for those with earnings above the median is 7.1
percentiles.110
Further, looking at average earnings gaps across individual countries that are included in
the well-developed group (Denmark, Norway, Iceland, France, and Spain), earnings gaps are
typically higher between men and women in the high-socio-economic group compared to the
earnings gaps between men and women in low-socio-economic group. However, these gaps are
no higher or lower when compared to other individual countries. 111 In Denmark, for example, the
gap between the average man’s and average woman’s earnings is 4.4 percentiles in the low-
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Three of the four countries classified in the Social Democratic regime are also categorized in the well-developed
policy group. The results for earnings gaps in this study using the first class definition support the findings and
argument in Mandel (2012). Countries with well-developed welfare states or in this case, well-developed leave and
ECEC policies across multiple dimensions, are characterized by higher earnings gaps, on average, between highly
educated and high earning men and women compared to low-educated and low earning men and women. However,
the reversed pattern when moving to a class definition of earnings only refutes the results and argument from
Mandel (2012).
111
These results are in-line with Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013).
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socio-economic group and 12.6 percentiles in the high-socio-economic group. To compare,
earnings gaps are similar in the Slovak Republic—classified in the least developed regime. 112
The earnings gap is 3.3 percentiles in the low-socio-economic group and 12.5 percentiles in the
high-socio-economic group. The pattern is the same when moving to the earnings definition
only—in Demark, the earnings gap is 2.0 percentiles between men and women with earnings
below the median and 8.4 percentiles between men and women with earnings above the median.
In the Slovak Republic, the earnings gap is 4.3 percentiles between men and women with
earnings below the median and 8.8 percentiles between men and women with earnings above the
median.
However, patterns of earnings gaps across individual countries are also reversed across
several individual country cases when comparing results across the two class definitions. Taking
Iceland as an example, the average man’s earnings in the low-socio-economic group is 11.9
percentiles higher than the average woman’s earnings. The average man’s earnings in the highsocioeconomic group is 15.3 percentiles higher than the average woman’s earnings. However,
when moving to the definition of earnings only—the earnings gap is 25.1 percentiles between the
average man’s and woman’s earnings men and women with earnings below the median. The gap
is smaller between the average man’s and average woman’s earnings in the group above the
median at 11.6 percentiles—a large shift, just by changing the class definition.
These results suggest two findings. First, that gender earnings inequality may not be
worse in countries with well-developed leave and ECEC compared to countries whose policies
are not as well-developed. Secondly, any conclusions about gender earnings inequality and
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Both Denmark and the Slovak Republic are gross income datasets and are therefore comparable.
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whether worsened earnings gaps are shown between men and women with higher levels of
educational attainment and/or high earnings is largely dependent on the class definition used.
Finally, moving to earnings gaps between low- and highly educated women, the average
earnings gap between women is 36.7 percentiles. Earnings gaps between women are lowest in
the well-developed policy group at 29.2 percentiles. This means the average earnings of loweducated women is 29.2 percentiles lower than the average earnings of high-educated women.
These results tentatively suggest that countries with well-developed work-family reconciliation
policies do a better job at reducing earnings inequalities among women, without depressing the
earnings of highly educated and/or high-earning women compared to the earnings of highly
educated and/or high-earning men.
Finally, correlations of the earnings gaps in Table 8.4 also provide mixed evidence for
the significance of class differences for understanding cross-national variations in gender
inequality (Mandel 2012, 248). 113 Mandel suggests that in most countries the level of gender
wage inequality in one group is unrelated to its level in another. The results in Table 8.4 show
that levels of earnings inequality between men and women in the low-socio-economic group and
the high-socio-economic group are only slightly and positively correlated (r=.22), confirming
Mandel’s (2012) previous findings. However, the correlation of earnings gaps for the definition
that takes into account earnings only (the alternate class definition incorporated into this study),
improves and is statistically significant (r=.38 and p<.10). Therefore, while class is an important
dimension to the issue of gendered tradeoffs, the definition of class also matters. A better
comparison of different class definitions and gendered tradeoffs warrants further study.
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Not shown, a similar pattern is shown across employment rates.

163

Glass Ceilings: Managers and Lucrative Managers
Table 8.5 reports results for the percentage of women managers, percent of female
lucrative managers, and gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps. The
categorization of managerial positions across individual countries can vary by definition. Some
countries are more relaxed with categorizations of managerial positions than others (Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund 2013). A more relaxed definition of which positions are considered
managerial means that more employees are classified as managers. Therefore, a managerial title
may not necessarily indicate authority or status (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 9; Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Overall, 5.4 percent of employed
women are classified as managers. The percentage of employed women that are lucrative
managers falls to an average of 2.6 percent of employed women. Average gender managerial
gaps and lucrative gender managerial gaps are very similar—around 3.2 percent and 2.8 percent,
respectively. These patterns hold across the five policy groupings—more employed women are
classified as managers than lucrative managers. Gender managerial gaps are slightly larger than
lucrative gender managerial gaps across four of the five policy groupings, the exception is the
well-developed grouping where lucrative gender managerial gaps are slightly larger than gender
managerial gaps (2.6 percentage points compared to 3.0 percentage points). On average, both
gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps are largest in the moderately low and
least developed policy groupings 4.4 and 3.5 percentage points in the moderately low group and
3.5 and 3.2 percentage points in the least developed policy group. These results refute the
expectation well-developed work-family reconciliation policies are linked to worsened gender
managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps.
Across individual countries, the largest percentage of female managers are found in the
United States (13.1 percent, moderately low developed policy group), Iceland (10.3 percent,
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well-developed policy group), and Estonia (9.9 percent, moderately well-developed group) (see
Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013 for similar results). This means the categorizations of
managerial positions are more relaxed across countries with different leave and ECEC
landscapes.
When moving to the percentage of female lucrative managers, percentages are more
similar across countries with the spread of 0.9 percent of female lucrative managers in Greece
and Hungary to 5.3 percent in Estonia and France. In the United States, the percentage of female
lucrative managers falls to 5.2 percent. In Iceland, the percentage of female lucrative managers
falls to 4.3 percent—which is still higher than the percentage of female lucrative managers in
other individual countries. These results suggest that high rates of female labor market
attainment are also independent of the development of leave and ECEC policies.
However, across the three-country cases, managerial and lucrative gender managerial
gaps are especially high (with the exception of managerial gaps in Iceland which are 2.0
percentage points) when compared to the gaps across other countries—3.8 percentage points
(lucrative gender managerial gap) in Iceland; 6.7 percentage points (gender managerial gap) and
5.0 percentage points (lucrative gender managerial gap) in Estonia; and 3.6 percentage points
(gender managerial gap) 4.8 percentage points (lucrative gender managerial gap) in the United
States. These results suggest that countries with high rates of employed women in managerial or
lucrative managerial positions also have high percentages of men in these same positions. Taken
together, the results suggest that women face similar barriers reaching managerial or highly paid
managerial occupations across high-income countries, regardless of the development of workfamily reconciliation policies.
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In this descriptive analysis, the three possible ways to measure class (educational
attainment, earnings, and occupational status) were explored to determine patterns of gender and
class inequalities across the 24 countries and across the five policy groupings. Different ways to
measure class showed the results are less clear for the link between well-developed work-family
reconciliation policies and gender and class inequalities. This descriptive analysis suggests there
is just as much evidence to support that countries with well-developed policies promote good
employment outcomes among employed women as there is to refute it. Results here show why
the relationship between work-family reconciliation policies is complex and still debated.
Results Section 2: Correlations Between Work-Family Reconciliation Policies and Employment
Outcomes
Moving to individual policy effects, relationships between leave and ECEC, as measured
in the indicators, and women’s employment outcomes is discussed in Section 2. The results
tables display relationships between all outcomes from the prior section and 11 of the continuous
policy measures constructed in Part 2. Remember that I expect different relationships between
the policy dimensions and the labor market outcomes. Because of the expectations for different
relationships between the policy dimensions and labor market outcomes, four sets of
expectations were generated for four sets of policy dimensions (well-developed leave and ECEC
policy dimensions and not-well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions). The goal is to
explore the relationships between “good” and “bad” dimensions of leave and ECEC and the five
labor market outcomes. Across all tables, correlations are divided into two groups—in the first
group are the correlations among the well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions and
labor market outcomes. The second group is the correlations among the not-well-developed
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leave and ECEC policy dimensions and labor market outcomes. The write-up of the results is
broken into two sections that follow the correlation groupings.114
Well-Developed Leave and ECEC Policy Dimensions
Three leave and three ECEC policy dimensions, as measured in the indicators, are
characterized as well-developed policy dimensions. For two measures—well-paid leave for
mothers at 67 percent of usual earnings and well-paid leave for fathers at 67 percent of usual
earnings, two sets of correlations are shown in the tables. The first set of correlations among the
well-paid leave measure for mothers and fathers and the outcomes includes all possible country
cases. For weeks of well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings for mothers, Hungary is
excluded in the second set of correlations because prior work for this chapter showed the weeks
of well-paid leave in Hungary to be an extreme value.115 Hungary offers 105 weeks of well-paid
leave, while the second most generous country, Slovenia, offers half that amount at 52 weeks.
For well-paid leave for fathers, Iceland and Norway are excluded in the second set of
correlations because the weeks of well-paid leave in these countries are also extreme values
compared to the length of well-paid leave for fathers in other countries. Iceland and Norway
provide 13 and 12 weeks of well-paid nontransferable reserved leave to fathers, respectively.
These periods of leave are nearly 10 and 9 weeks longer than the next most generous well-paid
leave periods for fathers in Finland at 3 weeks. As will be shown in the correlations, the policy
values for these countries drive relationships between well-paid leave and select outcomes. On
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The relationship between select outcomes and gaps and the universality scale (ordinal scale) is considered in the
multilevel models in the next chapter. Also remember from Part 2 that well-paid leave for fathers at 67 percent of
earnings and the share of well-paid leave allocated to fathers is nearly perfectly correlated (r=.97). Therefore,
correlations between the employment outcomes and gaps and these two policy measures are very similar.
Conclusions drawn about correlations apply to both measures.
115
Extreme values are “are the minimum and maximum values in that set.” In this case, the values are too far out of
the domain of the other values” (Moore and Siegel 2013, 85). This differs from an outlier which is “an individual
value that falls outside the overall pattern” (Moore and McCabe 200, 12).
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the question of Hungary, one issue this research highlights is whether longstanding findings
about policy-outcome relationships shift when we broaden the countries included in our research
beyond the traditional OECD countries.
Remember from Part 2 that the weeks of well-paid leave for fathers and equality in leave
for fathers are nearly perfectly correlated (r=.97). Both measures are included in the correlation
tables to compare the results of the correlations for these two policy dimensions and labor market
outcomes to the correlation results among out-of-pocket costs for single parents and couples and
the labor market outcomes. The correlations between out-of-pocket costs for single parents and
couples is r=.65. However, divergent relationships among the measures of out-of-pocket costs
for single parents and couples and the labor market outcomes differ in many cases, even though
the correlations between the two ECEC policy measures is strong. The goal is to visually show
another reason why policy-outcome relationships are complex.
Results are first reported for relationships among well-developed dimensions of leave and
ECEC and employment outcomes (see Table 8.6). As expected, well-developed leave and ECEC
dimensions are positively correlated with women’s employment and negatively correlated with
employment gaps between men and women with different levels of educational attainment.
Well-paid leave for mothers is positively and significantly correlated with employment rates for
all women and women with medium and high levels of educational attainment. Well-paid leave
for mothers is negatively correlated with employment gaps between men and women—i.e.,
longer weeks of well-paid leave is correlated with reduced employment gaps between men and
women. This relationship is negatively and statistically significant between highly educated men
and women (r=-.59 and P < 0.01).116 The signs of the correlations between well-paid weeks of
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Correlations are stronger with the inclusion of Hungary but are consistent with the exclusion of Hungary.
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leave for fathers and employment rates among women and employment gaps between men and
women with different levels of educational attainment are in the expected direction, though the
correlations are generally not statistically significant.
The correlations among the well-developed ECEC dimensions and the employment
outcomes show enrollment for 0–2-year-olds is positively correlated with women’s employment,
by educational attainment, and negatively correlated with employment gaps between men and
women. Six of the eight correlations are statistically significant. Correlations are in the expected
direction among enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling age in ECEC and
employment outcomes, but none of the relationships reach statistical significance.
Relationships among the coordination of care and the employment outcomes mirror the
relationships between well-paid leave and generous ECEC and the employment outcomes. The
coordination of care is positively correlated with women’s employment rates—across the
population and by three levels of educational attainment. The coordination of care is also
negatively correlated with employment gaps between men and women across the population and
by educational attainment. These relationships are all statistically significant with the exception
of employment gaps between men and women with low educational attainment (r=-.22).
Turning to class inequality in employment between low- and highly educated women,
relationships are less clear. First, as expected, generous ECEC, as measured by provision of care
for 0–2-year-olds, is negatively correlated with employment gaps between low- and highly
educated women. Well-paid leave for mothers is positively correlated with class inequality
between women with the inclusion of Hungary. This result is unexpected. However, excluding
Hungary, the relationship is no longer significant and slightly negative. The relationship between
well-paid leave for fathers and employment class inequality among women is the opposite of the
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relationships between well-paid leaves for mothers and employment class inequality among
women. With the inclusion of Iceland and Norway, the relationship is negative and statistically
significant (r=-36 and P < 0.10), indicating that well-paid leaves for fathers reduced class
inequality among women. However, the relationship is slightly positive and no longer
statistically significant when Iceland and Norway are removed from the measure of well-paid
leave for fathers (r=.12). For employment outcomes, the results suggest that relationships
between well-paid leave periods (allocated to either mothers or fathers) and class inequalities
among women are more sensitive to extreme values than relationships between well-paid leaves
and employment rates and gender employment gaps.
Moving to the correlations among the well-developed policy dimensions and part-time
work (see Table 8.7 and Table 8.8), the expectations are twofold. First, well-developed leave
and ECEC should be negatively correlated with women’s employment in part-time work, by
educational attainment. Second, well-developed leave and ECEC should also be negatively
correlated with class gaps in part-time work between low- and highly educated women. The
coordination of care should mirror these relationships. In general, the well-developed leave and
ECEC policy dimensions and the coordination of care are negatively correlated with part-time
employment rates and the part-time employment gap between low- and highly educated women.
However, not all relationships reach statistical significance.
Well-paid leave for mothers is negatively and significantly correlated with part-time
employment rates among women, both across the population and by educational attainment, and
with or without the inclusion of Hungary (the exception is the relationship between well-paid
leave for mothers and low-educated women. The correlation of r=-.35 nearly reaches statistical
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significance). These relationships are still in the expected direction with the exclusion of all
Eastern European countries (see Table 8.8).
Well-paid leave for fathers and the share of well-paid leave for fathers are also
significantly and negatively correlated with the share of women in part-time employment.
However, the relationship between well-paid leave for fathers and part-time employment rates
among women strengthens with the exclusion of Iceland and Norway from the measure of wellpaid leave for fathers. In Table 8.8, the relationships between well-paid leave for fathers and
part-time employment rates are still negative and moderately statistically significant. Overall, the
results suggest that periods of well-paid leaves for both mothers and fathers reduce the part-time
employment rate among women, but the magnitude of the effect changes with the inclusion or
exclusion of potentially problematic extreme well-paid leave values.
The correlations between the ECEC measures and part-time employment across the four
groups do not reach statistical significance, though the relationship is in the expected direction.
The expected relationships improve when Eastern European countries are excluded from the
analyses (see Table 8.8), but again, the relationships do not reach statistical significance. 117These
correlations suggest that well-developed leave dimensions may do more to reduce part-time
employment among women than well-developed ECEC dimensions.
Moving to part-time employment gaps between low- and highly educated women (final
column), there is either no relationship or a negative relationship between the well-developed
leave and ECEC policy dimensions and the part-time employment gap between low- and highly
educated women. For well-paid leave periods for mothers, the relationship strengthens without
the inclusion of Hungary (r=-.05 with Hungary and r=-.31 without Hungary, Table 8.7). There is
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However, the country N is greatly reduced in Table 8.8, with the exclusion of Eastern European countries, which
also factors into the significance of this relationship.
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no relationship between well-paid leave periods for fathers and part-time employment gaps
among women, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of Iceland and Norway. However,
relationships between weeks of well-paid leave periods for mothers and part-time employment
gaps among women improve with the exclusion of all Eastern European countries (r=-.35, Table
8.8) and the exclusion of all Eastern European countries and Iceland and Norway for weeks of
well-paid leave for fathers and part-time employment gaps among women (r=-.36, Table 8.8).
These results again suggest that the relationships between well-paid leave periods and class
inequality among women are sensitive to the country cases included and extreme values.
Divergent relationships are expected between well-developed leave and ECEC
dimensions and the earnings and occupational outcomes. The expectation is for well-developed
leave dimensions to be positively correlated with gender earnings gaps (worsen gender earnings
gaps) and negatively correlated with earnings gaps among employed women (reduce earnings
gaps between low- and highly educated women). The expectation is for well-developed leave
dimensions to be negatively correlated with occupational attainment (worsen the prospect for
women to be in managerial or lucrative managerial occupational positions) and positively
correlated with gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps (worsen gender
managerial and lucrative gender gaps). No relationships are expected between the welldeveloped ECEC dimensions and any of the earnings and occupational attainment outcomes.
First, looking at relationships between the well-developed leave dimensions and gender
earnings gaps (Table 8.9), the findings indicate that periods of well-paid leave for mothers is
negatively correlated with earnings gaps across the population and the class groups, but only the
correlation between well-paid leave for mothers and the population is negative and statistically
significant (r=-.34 and P < 0.10).
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Conversely, the results indicate the share of well-paid leave for fathers is positively
associated with earnings gaps.118 The correlation between well-paid leave and earnings gaps in
the high-socio-economic group is positive and statistically significant (r=.35, P < 0.10). For
earnings gaps between men and women with earnings both below and above the median, the
relationship is also positive and statistically significant (r=.43 and P < 0.05 and above the median
r=.39 and P < 0.10). These results suggest evidence of gendered tradeoffs—that well-paid leave
for fathers is associated with worsened earnings gaps between men and women across different
definitions of class. However, these findings are nearly reversed with the exclusion of Iceland
and Norway from the measure of well-paid leave for fathers. The pattern is more pronounced for
the correlation shifts for the definition of earnings above or below the median only.
Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 show how the relationships change between weeks of wellpaid leave for fathers and the earnings gap between men and women with earnings above the
median both with and without Iceland and Norway. Both figures show the gender earnings gap
on the y-axis and the weeks of well-paid leave for fathers’ use on the x-axis. Half of the
countries (12 total) do not provide any reserved weeks of leave at all to fathers. Therefore, the
weeks of well-paid leave in Norway and Iceland, coupled with large gender earnings gaps above
the median in these countries have a large effect on the relationship between the policy
dimension and gender earnings gaps, showing a positive correlation (Table 8.1, that longer
weeks of well-paid leave are positively correlated with gender earnings gaps, r=.39). Removing
Iceland and Norway, the relationship is now negative—longer weeks of well-paid leave for
fathers is negatively correlated with gender earnings gaps (Table 8.2, r=-.41). This issue of
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With the inclusion of Iceland and Norway.
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whether to include or exclude these countries with clearly well-developed leave policies along
this dimension is one of the main questions to arise from these analyses.
Moving to earnings gaps among employed women shows that gaps are sensitive to
extreme values for well-paid leave periods. The correlation between the weeks of well-paid leave
for mothers and earnings gaps between low- and highly educated women, is moderately positive
and statistically significant (r=.39 and P < 0.10), contrary to expectations. However, the
exclusion of Hungary means the relationship is slightly negative and no longer statistically
significant, implying that well-paid leave periods for mothers have no discernable relationships
with earnings gaps among low- and highly educated women. Well-paid leave periods for fathers
are negatively correlated with the earnings gap between women with different levels of
education. This relationship is significant with the inclusion of Iceland and Norway (r=-.34 and P
< 0.10) and weakly and negatively correlated with the exclusion of Iceland and Norway (r=-.14).
That the coordination of care is not significantly correlated with earnings gaps between
men and women and among women suggests that well-paid leaves and enrollment of children in
publicly provided care should have different relationships to these gaps, as explained in the
paragraphs above.
Finally, Table 8.10 reports the correlations between the policy measures and the share of
employed women in managerial and lucrative managerial positions and managerial and gender
managerial gaps. Well-paid leave for mothers is negatively correlated with the percentage of
female managers and lucrative managers (with or without the inclusion of Hungary). These
findings confirm the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis that generous leave periods that are well-paid
might lower the glass ceiling for women. However, well-paid leave is also negatively correlated
with gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps between men and women. This
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relationship is unexpected and implies that gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial
gaps are lower in countries with more generous well-paid leave periods for mothers.
Again, relationships between well-paid leave for fathers and the occupational outcomes
are dependent on the inclusion or exclusion of weeks of well-paid leaves for fathers in Iceland
and Norway. Without these countries included in weeks of well-paid leave, relationships among
the policy dimension and occupational outcomes are the same for the relationships among weeks
of well-paid leave for mothers and the occupational outcomes, though only the correlation
between the percentage of female managers and well-paid leave for fathers reaches statistical
significance (r=-.38 and P < 0.10). Overall, there is some evidence to support that generous
leaves lower the glass ceiling for women (because of the negative correlation between well-paid
leave periods and the percent of women managers and lucrative managers), but also improve
gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps. This is evidence both for and against
the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis.
As expected, enrollment in ECEC for either of the two groups is not significantly
correlated with earnings or occupational attainment. Enrollment of children 0–2 years of age in
public provision is negatively correlated with earnings gaps between women, but this
relationship does not reach statistical significance (r=-.26). This non-significant relationship
supports that generous ECEC is not bad for gender inequality between men and women or class
inequalities among women. These “non-relationships” between well-developed ECEC and labor
market attainment for women is consistent with the mounting evidence in the literature.
Note, however, that enrollment rates of children 3 years to compulsory schooling age and
coordination of care are negatively and, in some cases, moderately, correlated with the four
measures of occupational attainment in Table 8.10. None of the correlations are statistically
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significant. That generous ECEC and the coordination of care are negatively correlated with
gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps means that generous ECEC has similar
positive effects as well-paid leave for mothers. However, that generous ECEC and the
coordination of care is negatively correlated with the share of women in gender managerial and
lucrative gender managerial gaps suggests two possibilities. The first is that as a selection effect,
good ECEC increases women’s labor force participation by drawing in marginal workers with
less human capital. Their inclusion can lower aggregate outcomes. High enrollment rates ECEC
could also be associated with high levels of demand for female ECEC workers, and quite
possibly female ECEC workers below the managerial level. The negative effect could be driven
by the demand for ECEC workers, and not by employed women needing ECEC to care for their
children while working.119
Not-Well-Developed Leave and ECEC
And finally, for the not-well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions, the argument
is that any negative effects of these dimensions are not unintended. Negative consequences of
bad policy should be expected (and vice versa, good outcomes should be unexpected).
First, focusing on the three not-well-developed leave measures across Tables 8.6–
8.10120—for employment (Table 8.6), none of the not-well-developed leave policy dimensions
reach statistical significance. However, unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers is negatively
correlated with employment rates of women with a low and high education (r=-18, low

119

First, remember that the correlations between enrollment of children 3 years of age to compulsory schooling age
and women’s employment is positive but does not reach statistical significance (see Table 8.6). Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006) also argue this is what their ECEC policy variable is capturing—the demand-side effect for
female ECEC workers. One of the major limitations of ECEC utilization policy variables is what, specifically, is
being captured in the variable.
120
Unpaid + poorly paid leaves for mothers, unpaid + poorly paid leaves for fathers, and equality in leave (unpaid +
poorly paid leaves)
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education, and r=-.10, high education). Unpaid + low-paid leave periods for mothers are also
positively associated with employment gaps between highly educated men and women and
nearly reaches statistical significance (r=.31). Especially for the relationship between unpaid +
poorly paid leave for mothers and employment gaps between highly educated men and women,
the results suggest leave periods that are unpaid + poorly paid may worsen gender employment
gaps. This relationship is expected.
Moving to part-time employment rates (see Tables 8.7 and 8.8), like well-paid leave
periods for mothers, unpaid + poorly paid leaves for mothers are negatively correlated with parttime employment rates for women across class and the part-time employment gap between
women for all countries that data is available (Table 8.7). However, no correlation reaches
statistical significance. Excluding Eastern European countries, the relationship changes. The
results show that unpaid + poorly paid leaves are positively correlated with part-time
employment rates among women across all four groups (the population and by three levels of
educational attainment). The relationship between unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers and
the share of low-educated women in part-time employment is both positive and statistically
significant (r=.46 and P < 0.10). Further, unpaid + poorly paid leave for mothers is also
positively and significantly correlated with the part-time employment gap between women (r=.44
and P < 0.10). These results are in line with past research that suggests leaves that are long but
unpaid or poorly-paid are correlated with women’s reduced work intensity, especially for the
low-educated.
Moving to earnings gaps (Table 8.9) equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid) is
negatively correlated with earnings gaps across the class groups. The relationship between
equality in paid leave and the earnings gap between men and women with earnings above the
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median just reaches statistical significance (r=-.35 and P < 0.10). This relationship is unexpected
and suggests that any leave reserved for fathers—whether well-paid or not, may reduce earnings
gaps between highly paid men and women. Relationships vary among unpaid + poorly paid leave
periods for mothers and fathers and earnings gaps. The strongest correlation is between unpaid +
poorly paid leaves for mothers and gender earnings gaps between all men and women (Table 8.9,
column 1, r=.25). However, the correlation does not reach statistical significance.
None of the relationships between the three not-well-developed leave dimensions and the
four occupational outcomes reach statistical significance (Table 8.10). The expectation was for
not-well-developed leave policy dimensions to be associated with worsened gaps between men
and women and among women. Overall, the evidence from the correlations doe no support these
expectations.
Finally, moving to the out-of-pocket cost measures (for single parents and couples), there
are no correlations between out-of-pocket costs and the employment outcomes (Table 8.6).
These non-relationships are in line with expectations that “bad” dimensions of ECEC should
hinder job quality, not women’s employment.
The correlations between out-of-pocket costs for ECEC and part-time employment (Table
8.7 and 8.8) show the deleterious effects of high cost, “bad” ECEC for women’s work intensity.
With the inclusion of Eastern European countries (Table 8.7), there is a positive, statistically
significant relationship between out-of-pocket costs of care to couples and the share of women in
part-time employment for all employed women and for employed women with low and medium
levels of education. The correlation is in the expected direction but does not reach significance
for highly educated women. Out-of-pocket costs for couples are also positively correlated with
the part-time employment gap between low- and highly educated women (r=.43 and P < 0.10).
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These relationships are still strong and positive when Eastern European countries are excluded
(Table 8.8), but not statistically significant, with the exception of the part-time employment gaps
between women (r=.53 and P < 0.05).
These results support two arguments—the first is that high-cost childcare will adversely
affect women’s employment intensity—in this case, part-time work instead of full-time work.121
The second argument is that work intensity for women with more human capital (high
educational attainment) is not adversely affected by high childcare costs. This may be because
highly educated women can afford more costly childcare options that allow for full-time
employment.
Also unexpected are no significant relationships among out-of-pocket costs and earnings
gaps. Out-of-pocket costs for couples are moderately and positively correlated with earnings
gaps between men and women in the low-socioeconomic group, but this relationship does not
reach statistical significance (r=.30).
Finally, out-of-pocket costs for couples is positively and significantly correlated with the
percentage of women as managers and gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps
(see Table 8.10). The correlation between out-of-pocket costs for couples and the percentage of
employed women as lucrative managers is positive but does not reach statistical significance122
(r=.25). The fact that out-of-pocket costs for couples is positively associated with the percentage
of female managers is unintended but can be explained partly by the fact that countries with

This can result either from employer demand or women’s preferences for part-time employment (voluntary or
involuntary). High childcare costs may inhibit women’s full-time employment due to affordable childcare
constraints.
122
The correlation between out-of-pocket costs for single parents and the percentage of employed women as
managers and lucrative managers is also positive but does not reach statistical significance.
121
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“high total proportions of occupations classified as managerial” (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund
2013, 26) are also countries like the United States with high out-of-pocket costs for childcare. 123
The gender managerial gap and lucrative gender managerial gap are also positively
correlated with out-of-pocket costs for couples. Out-of-pocket costs for couples is correlated
with widened or worsening gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps between
men and women. This is because countries with high proportions of occupations classified as
managerial means that higher proportions of both men and women are classified as managers.
However, this proportion is always higher among employed men than employed women. These
large proportions of both employed men and women in managerial positions translate into larger
percentage point managerial and lucrative managerial gaps than countries with more restricted
classifications of occupations. Correlations among out-of-pocket costs for single parents and the
occupational outcomes are also positive, but not statistically significant.
Perhaps one surprise are no significant relationships between out-of-pocket costs for
single parents and the labor market outcomes. However, the relationships among out-of-pocket
costs for single parents and the labor market outcomes are generally in the same direction as the
relationships among the out-of-pocket costs for couples and the employment outcomes (this is
especially the case for the relationships with occupational attainment outcomes). I argue these
non-relationships show that even policy measures with strong relationships with one another
(r=.65 between measures of out-of-pocket costs for couples and single parents), can still have
somewhat different relationships with labor market outcomes. This also complicates the issue of
gender and class inequality in employment because we may expect that one policy measure can
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From Table 8.5 I showed that the share of employed women classified as managers is just over 13 percent. From
Table 5.3, the out-of-pocket childcare costs for couples as a percentage of family net income is at 22 percent (rank
of 21 out of 24 countries). The out-of-pocket childcare costs for single parents as a percentage of family net income
is 41 percent (rank of 24 out of 24 countries).
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act as a good proxy for another measure (out-of-pocket costs for couples should act as a good
proxy for additional measures of out-of-pocket costs for different family types because out-ofpocket costs for couples and single parents are highly correlated), but this may not necessarily be
the case.
Overall, while many of the relationships between the policy dimensions and the outcomes
are in the expected direction across Tables 8.6– 8.10, the vast majority are not statistically
significant. For the relationships between the well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions
and outcomes, only six relationships are unintended or unexpected. However, four of these
unexpected relationships between the policy measures and outcomes disappear when extreme
values are removed from the well-paid leave measures for both mothers and fathers. For
example, well-paid leave for mothers is positively correlated with employment gaps between
women with low and high education. However, the relationship is non-significant when Hungary
is removed from the correlation.
Three correlations between well-paid leave for fathers and three earnings gaps are
positive and significant (earnings gaps between men and women in the high-socio-economic
group, earnings above the median, and earnings below the median). However, the relationships
are completely reversed when Norway and Iceland are removed from the correlations. The
results show clearly that relationships between the weeks of well-paid leave for mothers and
fathers can change based on the inclusion or exclusion of policy data points and countries.
Because most countries do not provide well-paid leave for fathers, a question from this research
is whether more weeks of well-paid leave for fathers is a better indicator of worsened outcomes
for women in employment and why—because theories and past research suggest that allocating
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leave to fathers should reduce gender inequalities across measures of earnings and occupational
attainment because employers know that women’ will not be the sole leave takers.
Lastly, well-paid leave for mothers is negatively and significantly correlated with gender
managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps—this relationship is unexpected but refutes the
gendered tradeoffs hypothesis. In this case, well-paid leaves reduce gender gaps, which is a
“good” effect of a well-developed policy dimension on an outcome.
For the relationships between the not-well-developed leave and policy dimensions and
the employment outcomes, four relationships are unexpected. However, the four unexpected
relationships show that not-well-developed leave and ECEC are correlated with “good”
outcomes. First, unpaid + poorly paid leave periods for mothers and fathers are negatively
correlated with part-time employment rates for mothers, with the inclusion of Eastern European
countries (though the relationships are not significant, see Table 8.7). This suggests that long
leaves that are not well-paid are correlated with lower part-time employment rates among
women. These relationships are unexpected.
Equality in leave—unpaid + poorly paid leave is negative and statistically significant
with earnings gaps between men and women with earnings above the median, suggesting leave
periods that are not well-paid may still reduce employment gaps between men and women. Outof-pocket costs for couples are also positively correlated with the percentage of female
managers, though this can be explained by the fact that countries with higher out-of-pocket costs
for care are also those with more relaxed classification of managers.
As expected, there is no evidence that generous ECEC worsens gender inequalities in
employment across a range of employment outcomes. In fact, any relationships between public
provision of ECEC and women’s employment outcomes are either intended—e.g., generous
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public provision is correlated with an increased women’s employment across the socioeconomic
spectrum—or not significant.
However, bad ECEC—as measured by high out-of-pocket costs to couples—is correlated
with worsened outcomes for women in terms of job intensity and job quality. That bad ECEC is
positively correlated with worsened managerial and gender managerial gaps is expected. That
bad ECEC is positively correlated with higher rates of women in managerial positions can be
partially explained by the fact that countries with high out-of-pocket costs for childcare are also
those with more relaxed definitions of managerial occupations (such as the United States and
Ireland). There is also evidence to suggest that bad ECEC worsens gaps in part-time employment
between low- and highly educated women. All of these results are as expected based on past
literature. These results provide a more nuanced understanding of how different dimensions of
ECEC support or hinder women’s employment and the quality of women’s employment.
These results suggest that different dimensions of leave and ECEC policy have divergent
effects on women’s employment, employment intensity, and job quality, overall and by class.
Like the descriptive results from the prior section, there seems to be as much evidence for
the intended effects of well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions on women’s
employment as for unintended effects of these policy dimensions on women’s employment.
There is also some evidence that “bad” leave and ECEC policy dimensions may be correlated
with “good” employment outcomes for women.
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter addressed the issue of gendered tradeoffs across two analyses for samples of
working-aged men and women. The goal with the first analysis was to look at patterns of
women’s labor market outcomes organizing results using the newly constructed work-family
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reconciliation policy typology. This analysis was a comprehensive descriptive evaluation of five
labor market outcomes (employment, part-time employment, annual earnings, managerial status,
and lucrative managerial status) across the 24 individual high-income countries and across the
five policy groups in the typology. Across the analyses, the three predominant measures of class
from the literature were utilized—educational attainment, earnings, and occupational status. Past
analyses from gendered tradeoffs research were replicated in order to compare my results to the
literature that uses welfare state regimes (Mandel 2012) and policy constellations (Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund 2013) as rigorous units of analysis.
The goal with the second analysis was to reevaluate the relationships among leave and
ECEC policy and labor market outcomes utilizing the newly constructed multidimensional,
disaggregated, and precise policy measures from Part 2. The second analysis showed correlations
among the five labor market outcome statistics and 12 of the newly constructed policy measures.
Four sets of expectations were generated because it was hypothesized that different dimensions
of leave and ECEC (well-developed dimensions of leave and ECEC and not-well-developed
dimensions of leave and ECEC) would have different relationships with labor market outcomes.
The goal was to uncover relationships between a more complete set of leave and ECEC policy
dimensions and employment outcomes than past studies.
New to the literature, the relationship between the policy dimensions and class inequality
among employed women across three outcomes (employment, part-time employment, and
earnings) were introduced to the study. The goal was to provide a more nuanced picture of the
relationships among the leave and ECEC policy dimensions and class inequalities among lowand highly educated women.
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The analyses support the overall conclusion that the issue of gendered tradeoffs is more
complex than previous studies have shown. The patterns of labor market outcomes across the
five policy groups support that well-developed work-family reconciliation policies are just as
likely to support “good” labor market outcomes for women as “bad” labor market outcomes for
women. The correlations among individual measures of leave and ECEC that are
multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise (policy dimensions that are either well-developed
or not-well-developed) and the labor market outcomes show more expected relationships than
unexpected, or unintended relationships. Like Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019), I find there is
just as much evidence to support that “good” leave worsens outcomes for women as there is to
refute it. In fact, my comprehensive analysis shows overall there is more evidence that good
leave and ECEC improves gender equality in employment, or at the very least seem to have no
relationship with the labor market outcomes presented in the chapter.
The findings also provide evidence to support the argument that scholars need to be more
careful in drawing conclusions about the relationship between work-family reconciliation
policies and gender and class employment inequalities. My research shows that it is only certain
dimensions of these policies that may be associated with worsened outcomes (or not).
From the first descriptive analysis of labor market outcomes:
1) There is as much evidence to support that the well-developed work-family reconciliation
policy group is characterized by worse labor market outcomes and employment gaps for
highly educated women (compared to highly educated women in other work-family
reconciliation policy groups) as there is to refute it.
2) Any evidence to support that tradeoffs persist for high-status women compared to highstatus men in some individual countries or within any work-family reconciliation policy

185

group may also be sensitive to different definitions of class. These findings are evident
with the results for earnings gaps (Table 8.3). Earnings gaps between men and women in
the high-socio-economic group in the well-developed group are high, but no higher than
between highly educated men and women in the high-socio-economic group in the
bottom two policy groups. However, for the well-developed policy group, while earnings
gaps are worse between men and women in the high-socio-economic group compared to
the low-socio-economic group, this relationship is reversed when moving to a class
definition of earnings only.
3) Evidence of gendered tradeoffs is also sensitive to the individual countries included in
analyses. This was shown in the results for part-time employment, especially. Part-time
employment in Eastern European countries is much lower than across other high-income
countries. Removing Eastern European countries from the analyses show different
patterns of employment rates and gaps among women across the five work-family
reconciliation policy groups.
4) Class inequality among women was measured for employment, part-time employment,
and earnings. The results show that earnings gaps between women are lowest in the welldeveloped group. These results also do not seem to be at the expense of lower earnings
for women (compared to men) at the top of earnings ladder because average employment
gaps between high-status men and women in the well-developed policy grouping were no
higher or low than between high-status men and women in other policy groupings.
Employment gaps among women are also low in the well-developed group (Table 8.1,
fourth out of five work-family policy groups). Part-time employment gaps are highest in
the well-developed group when Eastern European countries are included and middling
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when Eastern European countries are excluded. Overall, the finding that earnings and
employment gaps between women are lowest in the well-developed group compared to
the others is intended. There is no evidence to support unintended consequences of welldeveloped policies for women in the well-developed policy group.
5) The analyses in this section were intended to be a comparison to past gendered tradeoffs
research that uses the welfare state regimes/family policy constellations as a rigorous unit
of analysis (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel 2012). Like Korpi, Ferrarini,
and Englund (2013), I find little evidence of negative work-family reconciliation policy
effects for high-status women in the well-developed regime.
From the second analysis (correlations between policy measures and labor market
outcomes):
1) Only certain dimensions of leave and ECEC policies are indicative of worsened
employment outcomes for women across a range of measures.
a. Contrasting relationships between policy measures and labor market outcomes
also indicate that one measure of these policies based on one or two dimensions
does not adequately capture the scope of these policies more generally. This study
suggests that scholars need to be more cautious in drawing conclusions about the
relationships between these policies and outcomes.
b. More to the point above, this study finds that only certain dimensions of leave are
correlated with worsened labor market outcomes. For example, well-paid leave
for fathers may worsen earnings gaps between men and women (in the highsocio-economic group, and the below-the-median and above-the-median group).
Well paid leave for mothers may worsen earnings gaps between low- and highly
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educated women. But remember these correlations are dependent on the countries
included. When weeks of well-paid leave in Hungary was removed from the
measure of the weeks of well-paid leave for mothers, the correlation between
well-paid leave for mothers and earnings gaps between women was slightly
negative and no longer statistically significant.
c. However, the correlations do, tentatively, support the “staying power” of leave
generosity (as well as the leave gender equality) and the unintended consequences
of leave policies. “Good” leave (well-paid leave periods for fathers, equality in
leave at 67 percent of usual earnings) may be correlated with worsened gender
earnings gaps between men and women across several of the socio-economic
groups. However, the included country cases matter for these analyses and any
evidence of gendered tradeoffs or worsened class inequalities among women.
d. Well-paid leave for mothers may lower the glass ceiling among women in terms
of becoming a manager or lucrative manager. However, this policy dimension is
also negatively correlated with gender managerial and lucrative managerial gaps.
This study adds a layer of complexity and suggests the importance of measuring
unpaid/low-paid leave periods separately from well-paid leave periods. “Good”
leave may worsen or improve labor market outcomes for women, depending on
what outcome is being measured (well-developed leaves for women may worsen
the rate of women in managerial or lucrative managerial positions, but may also
reduce gender managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps).
e. Long leaves that are poorly paid or unpaid are correlated with increased part-time
employment among low-educated women and worsen the part-time earnings gap
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between low- and highly educated women (for the results that exclude Eastern
European countries, Table 8.8).
f. The correlations also shed more light on the relationships between “good” and
“bad” ECEC and the labor market outcomes. Confirming past research (Mandel
2012; and Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019), “good” ECEC as measured by the
enrollment rates of children weighted by the provision of care is not associated
with unintended consequences across any of the labor market outcomes in any of
the tables. “Bad” ECEC—e.g., higher out-of-pocket costs to couples—worsens
job quality for women. Evidence for this is the positive correlations between outof-pocket costs for couples and part-time employment rates. Unintended, though
“bad” ECEC is positively correlated with the percentage of women managers, it is
also correlated with larger gender managerial and lucrative managerial gaps. The
latter correlations are intended consequences of “bad” ECEC.
g. Overall, there is more evidence of the “intended” relationships between welldeveloped leave and ECEC and the labor market outcomes presented in the tables
than unintended relationships.
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Chapter 9: Multilevel Models: Work-Family Reconciliation Policies and Women’s
Employment Outcomes by Class Across High-Income Countries
Introduction
In this final empirical chapter, a series of multilevel models are carried out to determine
relationships between the leave and ECEC policy dimensions, as measured in the indicators, and
two labor market outcomes—employment and annual earnings (hereafter, “earnings”).
This chapter is a replication and extension of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019). They use
a series of multilevel models to test the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis. Specifically, Model 3 in
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) is replicated and used as the main analytic strategy. Multilevel
models have been criticized mainly because of the number of countries included in any one study
and the use of cross-sectional data to make casual claims (Hook and Li 2020, 251). However,
this replication strategy was chosen so that my work does not have too many “moving parts.”
The main point is that results in this important literature are sensitive to how policy measures are
constructed. I am revisiting earlier findings (holding two outcomes and the model “constant”)
while changing the explanatory policy measures to see if these changes alter the conclusions.
This work is also extended in two ways. The first is introducing a class component to
multilevel models of pooled men and women. Models of employment and annual earnings for
men and women are broken down by three levels of educational attainment—low (below a high
school degree), medium (a high school degree or some college), and high (a four-year college
degree or higher). I do this to determine if the explanatory policy measures adversely affect
employment and annual earnings for women compared to men only within certain educational
groups.
The second extension is the introduction of multilevel models for class inequality among
women. Multilevel models of employment and individual annual earnings are carried out for a
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pooled sample of low- and highly educated women to determine if the explanatory policy
measures positively or adversely affect women with low educational attainment compared to
women with high educational attainment. This extension to the literature is to see if there are
relationships between gender inequalities in employment between men and women and class
inequalities among women. Do policies that worsen gender inequalities improve class
inequalities or vice versa? 124
Methods
Data
Country-level policy data (independent variables): Eight policy variables total will be
included in the multilevel models. Seven of the policy variables measure well-developed leave
and ECEC policy dimensions; the coordination of care, well-paid leave for mothers, well-paid
leave for mothers squared,125 well-paid leave for fathers, weighted enrollment of children 0–2
years of age in ECEC, weighted enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling in
ECEC, and the universality scale.
A measure of unpaid + poorly paid leave (unpaid/low-paid leave for the purposes of this
chapter) for mothers is also used in the models. Remember from Part 2 that unpaid/low-paid
leave for mothers is generous in terms of length but not the wage replacement rate. This policy
variable is included to better compare results to past research and determine if leave periods with
different payment levels (unpaid/low-paid leave periods and well-paid leave periods) are
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Brady also compares mothers with non-mothers. However, because one of my main interests is centered around
work-family reconciliation policies and class differences and because I utilize more policy measures than past
research, the decision was to utilize pooled samples with men and women and women with low- and high
educational attainments only.
125
The average weeks of well-paid leave right at 22 weeks or right around 5 months.
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differently associated with employment and earnings for women of different class groups. The
correlations from Chapter 9 suggest this may be the case.
Microdata and country cases: Same as Chapter 8.
Measurement
Sample: Individuals aged 25–54; this age group is standard in the literature on
employment outcomes because it excludes students and early retirees (same as Chapter 8).
Definition of class: Educational attainment. See an explanation of the LIS measure of
educational attainment in Chapter 8.
Dependent Variables
The two dependent variables are labor market outcomes that are standard in the literature.
Employment (labor market activity): Employment is a binary variable coded as 1 if a
respondent is employed and 0 if not.
Annual earnings: Individual annual earnings are converted to country-year specific
percentiles.126 This approach eliminates the need to adjust for national currencies, with or
without price adjustments. It is measured as the relative rank of earnings for employed men and
women ages 25–54 within each country’s earnings distribution (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019,
9). “This measure also avoids conflating welfare state policies with the effect of wage setting
institutions…Each respondent’s wage is measured by his or her or her position in the national
earnings distribution irrespective of cross-national differences in the length of the wage ladder”
(Mandel 2012, 246).127

From the LIS Database: The LIS variable is pilabour (a person level variable), defined as “Total income from
labour, including cash payments and the value of goods and services received from dependent employment, as well
as profits/losses and the value of goods received from self-employment.”
127
Per Mandel (2012, 245–246), who adds: “On the assumption that the effect is conditioned by class, what this
standardization prevents is the risk that the centralized wage determination in well-developed welfare states will
126
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Independent Variables: Level 2, Country-Level Controls
Unemployment rate: The overall unemployment rate across each country, measured
using the LIS data. “This variable captures differences in the business cycle and economic
performance” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019). In the LIS Database, this variable captures the
main activity status in the income reference period and ideally captures those who are employed
(but not out of the labor force).128
Union membership/collective bargaining: The average of the percentage of
individuals in a union and covered under collective bargaining agreements as defined as
measured by the ILO. Union membership is defined as the share of employees who are union
members (in percent of the employed); this percentage excludes union members who are not in
paid employment (self-employed, unemployed, retired, etc.). Collective bargaining is defined as
the share of employees covered by one or more collective agreements (in percent of the
employed).129 These are adjusted for the possibility that some workers do not have the right to
collectively bargain over wages.

cause an exaggerated effect of welfare state policies for less advantaged groups and obscure their unfavorable
implications for more advantaged groups.”
Further, the LIS Database reports three possible current incomes—gross, mixed, and net (see the gross net variable).
The LIS data for France 2010 and Poland 2013 report mixed income—total individual annual earnings do not
account for full taxes and contributions. The LIS data for Hungary 2012 and Slovenia 2012 reports net income—
total annual earnings do not capture taxes and contributions. The additional 20 datasets report gross income (taxes
and contributions are fully captured, collect, or imputed). The way these data are reported will also have an effect on
earnings gaps between men and women and among women. Earnings gaps will be higher across countries that report
gross annual earnings than across countries that report mixed or net annual earnings because taxes and contributions
are not captured in these datasets.
Finally, the top and bottom coding methods are taking from the LIS self-teaching. Note that less than .5 percent of
the sample across all datasets include observations with negative earnings for the sample.
128
The unemployment rates for CA10 and NO13 were derived from the OECD unemployment indicators since these
data were unavailable in the LIS.
129
Both union membership and collective bargaining data are available from the International Labor Organization
(ILO). I chose to use both in the study because data are available for all 24 countries. The correlation between union
membership and collective bargaining is moderately high at r=.51, suggesting countries with high shares of
employees in unions are also countries with high shares of persons covered under collective bargaining agreements.
Therefore, I take the average of these two variables that signals the share of employees covered under both union
memberships and collective bargaining that ranges from zero–100 percent.
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The set of models reported in this chapter are inclusive of the two country-level
controls—the unemployment rate and union membership/collective bargaining. 130 These two
country-level controls are included to determine the extent to which they drive the relationship
between the policy measures and the labor market outcomes. 131 Both are standard controls used
in the literature. Following Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) the unemployment rate and union
coverage/collective bargaining level two control variables are included because “it’s plausible
that work-family policies may be confounded with economic performance and labor market
institutions” (Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 11).132
A second set of models reported in the appendix exclude the two country-level controls. I
run two sets of models because of the fact that the coefficients and levels of significance change
across some of models for men’s outcomes (models with pooled men and women) and highly
educated women’s outcomes (models with pooled women with low and high educational
attainment) with the inclusion or exclusion of the country-level controls. This leads me to believe
there are some confounding effects of the country-level controls.
However, note that the use of country-level control variables across the gendered
tradeoffs literature varies greatly, due to issues with the country-level sample size and allowed
degrees of freedom. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019, 11) find results are consistent without the
use of the two country-level control variables (the unemployment rate and wage coordination in
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These models are compared to models without country-level controls.
See Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1920) for a similar argument.
132
In their study, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019, see page 27) use an ordinal wage coordination variable (from
Brady Blome, and Kmec 2014) that is scored from 1–5. A score of 1 is categorized as “fragmented wage bargaining,
confined to individual firms or plants.” A score of 5 is categorized as “centralized bargaining by confederations or
government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze with peace obligation, extremely high degree of union
concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive coordination of bargaining by
employer organizations with extensive pattern-setting.”
131
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their study) and choose to exclude these country-level controls from most analyses so as to not
exhaust degrees of freedom.133
Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1920) also utilize a series of controls in their models of
employment inequalities. The controls used were income inequality measured using the Gini
index, the unemployment rate, economic development measured by GDP per capita, and gender
egalitarianism measured by factor analysis using data from the International Social Survey
Program.134 Like Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019), Mandel and Semyonov (2006) find that the
control variables have no effect on the relationships between the policy variables and labor
market outcomes and show final results without control variables. 135
Mandel (2012) includes the rigidity of employment. The rigidity of employment captures
employment protections across countries. However, she includes this control in models
separately from other work-family reconciliation policy variables and, like the other studies, she
argues that the use (or not) of controls largely does not have an effect on the overall results.
Independent Variables: Level 1 Microlevel Control Variables
Weekly hours worked (for annual earnings multilevel models only): A continuous
variable that measures the hours worked in the first/main job. This variable can also include
overtime work. Following the definition of employment from the OECD, all persons employed
less than one hour per week in their main job are excluded from the analyses.136
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More specifically, these two country-level controls were included in select models that include women only and
omitted entirely from models that included both men and women for parsimony.
134
Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1920) justify the use of these controls because they have been used in previous
studies that address similar questions.
135
These controls were also input into the models one at a time due to a small country N sample size.
136
Weekly hours worked in the hours1 variable are also top-coded at 99 hours per week. A measure of the
percentage occupation female, a continuous measure of the percentage of those employed in one digit occupations
that are female, was also tested in multilevel models of annual earnings gaps between men and women. The results
were consistent with past research (including Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019) that higher shares of women in an
occupation are negatively associated with annual earnings. However, I chose to not include occupation percent
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Age and age squared: A continuous indicator for the population of interest that measures
a respondent’s age. The expectation is that employment rates and earnings will fall with age.
Marital status: A binary measure that is coded as 1 if a person is married or cohabitating
and 0 if in other relationships. The expectation is that marital status will increase the odds of
employment or be positively associated with higher earnings.
Presence of children 5 years or younger in the household: A binary measure that
indicates whether an employed man or woman lives in a household with young children, coded
as 1 if there is at least one child five years or younger in the household and 0 if no children five
years or younger is present in the household. The assumption is that young children are more
likely to influence the employment preferences of mothers.
Number of children: A continuous measure of the number of children 17 years of age or
younger in the household. Like the presence of children five years of age or younger in the
household, the assumption is that the presence of children below the age of 17 is likely to
influence the employment preferences of mothers.
Other employment: A binary measure that measures if any other adult in the household is
employed, coded as a 1 for yes and 0 for no.
Women: A binary measure is included in the models with pooled men and women.
Women is coded as 1 if the person is a female and 0 if the person is male. This measure is used

female in the annual earnings HLM models because the addition of this control further reduced the country N from
19–17 for all analyses and did not alter results overall. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) do not use weekly hours
worked “(a) because of systematic missingness within countries on usual hours worked and number of weeks
worked and; (b) because several countries simply do not have data on hours or weeks worked or even full- and parttime status”. I did not see evidence of systematic missingness in the data for the countries used in the study. I also
exclude countries without weekly hours worked from the analyses. While not ideal, I felt the inclusion of the control
was important. In a future study weekly hours worked could be excluded and more the countries without these data
can be added back in to determine if results change.
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to “assess whether the impact of policies on outcomes differs for ….women (versus men).”
(Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 10).
Educational attainment: A binary measure is included in the models with pooled women
with low and high educational attainment. Education is coded as 1 if the woman has a low
education and 0 if the woman has a high education. In these models, educational attainment is to
assess whether the impact of policies on outcomes differs for women with high education versus
low education.137
Country Cases Excluded from Select Multilevel Models
The intent with the earnings models is to include countries where weekly hours worked is
available and earnings are reported as gross earnings (with the inclusion of taxes and
contributions). Therefore, six countries are excluded from the earnings multilevel models—
Denmark, France, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia. These countries are removed
because no information is available in the LIS Database for weekly working hours in Denmark,
France, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia. 138 Based on multilevel modeling tests for this research,
weekly working hours is an important independent variable that explains cross-national
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Note that Mandel (2012) also includes an individual control of labor force probability in models of annual
earnings. Labor force probability is utilized to “ensure that the effects of policies (work-family reconciliation
policies in my case) is not merely a result of self-selection into the labor market” (Mandel 2012, 245). "Logistic
regressions are used to calculate the probabilities of employment in each country as a function of age, education,
marital status, the presence of preschool children, sex, and interaction terms of sex with the other independent
variables. These predicted probabilities are then plugged into the wage models. The labor force is defined as the
total number of individuals employed or unemployed as a percentage of the population aged 25–54. For the logic
behind this procedure, Mandel (2012, 255–256) cites Heckman, 1979; “employment supportive arrangements may
affect the selection of women into paid employment; in countries with ‘family-friendly’ working conditions, more
women participate in paid work, including those who would otherwise stay out of the labor force. Taking selectivity
into account eliminates cross-country variations in gender wage gaps which result from compositional differences in
labor force participation.” This control may be included in a future version of this study.
138
For the models of annual earnings, most of the countries excluded support well-developed policies. Brady,
Blome, and Kmec (2019, 7) note that Mandel and Semyonov (2005) use external sources on weekly work hours for
Denmark and Norway from outside sources: the Danish Leisure Study (1993) and the Norwegian Level of Living
Survey (1995). However, it is unknown how to impute microdata from outside microdata sets onto the LIS data.
There is a footnote about this in Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1918) but no method explanation.
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differences in earnings gaps. France, Poland, and Slovenia are also excluded because annual
earnings are not reported in gross income (see footnote 127).139 Hungary is excluded because
well-paid leave is an extreme value in Hungary (compared to the weeks of well-paid leave in
other countries) and because labor incomes are reported as net income (again, see footnote
127).140
Finally, for the employment multilevel models, Hungary is also excluded specifically
from models that include the well-paid leave measure for mothers as a level two explanatory
variable because, again, well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value compared to
weeks of leave across the other countries. This extreme value for the weeks of well-paid leave
for mothers in Hungary has too large an influence on the results.
Multilevel Modeling Analytic Strategy
All multilevel models of gender inequality pool together working-aged men and women.
Models of employment include all working-aged men and women, regardless of employment
status. Models of annual earnings include only employed men and women.
Models of class inequality include only working-aged women with low and high
educational attainment. Employment models include all women with low and high educational
attainment, regardless of employment status. Models of annual earnings include only employed
women with low and high educational attainment.

139

One major limitation of the annual earnings multilevel models in this chapter is that many of the countries with
well-developed leave and ECEC policies have no data available in the LIS for weekly hours worked. Again, weekly
hours worked is an important individual control level variable—more hours worked usually equates to higher
earnings. Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) do not include weekly hours worked in their earnings multilevel models
because they argue that measures of gender earnings gaps already take into account hours worked. However,
Mandel (2012) does include weekly hours worked as a control variable.
140
In much of the literature, individual countries are excluded where necessary data is not available. However,
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) do not exclude individual countries with missing data from their analyses.
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The modeling strategy is based on Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019). The models are
samples of individuals in a cross-section of 18 – 24 countries from around the years 2010 and
2013 (country N is dependent on the model). The models are linear for the continuous outcome
(earnings) and logit for the binary outcome (employment). All models include cross-sectional
data only. For the models of pooled men and women, results are shown by three levels of
educational attainment in three separate equations.
Random coefficient models are used for all analyses. For models of employment and
earnings with samples of men and women, random coefficient multilevel models of women and
men nested in countries are estimated. A random coefficient for female is included (female=1
and male =0). For these models, I examine whether the individual-level effect of gender
(employment and earnings gaps between men and women, across three educational groups),
covaries with country-level attributes (in this case, the work-family reconciliation policy
dimensions). In other words, the models assess if the work-family reconciliation policy
dimensions are associated with women’s attainment relative to men’s, net of any effect of workfamily reconciliation policy dimensions on men.
In addition, for the models of men and women, a random intercept is also included. This
is the variation of the intercept in the level 1 model across the level 2 units (countries). For the
employment models, the intercept is the country’s employment rate. For the earnings models, the
intercept is average country earnings. The intercept is interpreted as the employment/earnings
outcome when female = 0 (i.e. the outcome for men).
For the models with sample of low- and highly educated women, I examine whether the
individual effect of education (employment and earnings gaps between low and high educational
attainment), covaries with country level attributes (the same work-family reconciliation policy
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dimensions as for the models with samples of men and women). In these models a random
coefficient for educational status is included (low education = 1 and high education = 0). In other
words, the models assess if the work-family reconciliation policy dimensions are associated with
low-educated women’s attainment relative to highly educated women, net of any effect of workfamily reconciliation policy dimensions on highly educated women.
For these models with women only, a random intercept is also included. This is the
variation of the intercept in the level 1 model across the level 2 units (countries). For the
employment models, the intercept is the country’s employment rate. For the earnings models the
intercept is average country earnings. The intercept is interpreted as the employment/earnings
outcome when educational status= 0 (i.e., the outcome for highly educated women).
The equations for earnings gaps between men and women are below. The model can also
be adapted for employment gaps between men and women and employment/earnings gaps
among low- and highly educated women. The equations and write-up are adapted from Mandel
(2012, 247). First, the individual level model for earnings gaps between men and women is
expressed as followed:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽2𝑗 − 𝛽𝑘𝑗 (𝑋2𝑖𝑗 − 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗
Where (𝑌𝑖𝑗 ) is the earnings percentile of person i in country j, and (𝛽0𝑗 ) is the individual
level intercept. 𝛽1𝑗 is the regression coefficient associated with gender which represents the
average earnings difference between men and women in country j. 𝑋2𝑖𝑗 through 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 are
individual-level control variables (weekly hours worked141, marital status, age, age squared, the
number of household members 17 years of age or younger, the presence of children 5 years or

141

For models of annual earnings only. A control of weekly hours worked is not included in the employment
models.
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below in the household, if another person in the household is employed), and 𝛽2𝑗 − 𝛽𝑘𝑗 are their
associated regression coefficients. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is an error term, assumed to be normally
distributed with a mean of zero and variance σ².
The above equation allows the intercept 𝛽0𝑗 and the gender effect, 𝛽1𝑗 , to vary across
countries (i.e., to be random). At the second level, country-level characteristics explain these
random effects as followed:
Random Intercept Model:
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 − 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)+ 𝛾𝑍𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
Random Coefficient Models:
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 − 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢1𝑗
𝛽𝑘𝑗 = 𝛾𝑘
Where 𝛽0𝑗 denotes country’s average earnings, 142 𝛾00 is the intercept for the countrylevel earnings model, 𝛾01 is the effect of the work-family reconciliation policy dimensions on
𝛽0𝑗 , and 𝛾𝑍𝑗 are the country-level controls (the unemployment rate and collective
bargaining/union coverage). 𝛽1𝑗 is the cross country variation in the average earnings gap
between men and women – by work-family reconciliation policy dimensions (𝛾11 ).143 The
random coefficient for being a woman is female =1 and male = 0. Country-level random
effects 𝑢0𝑗 and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , are assumed to be uncorrelated and with a mean of zero. The effects of the
individual level control variables are constrained to be the same across countries; therefore, 𝛾𝑘
represents the fixed effects 𝛽𝑘𝑗 across all countries.

142
143

The level of men’s wages in this equation.
𝛾11 is the cross-level interaction effect.
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Theoretical Expectations
To recap, a set of eight policy indicators that measure different leave and ECEC policy
dimensions are included across the models. Five leave measures are included—the universality
of leave, well-paid leave for mothers, well-paid leave for mothers squared, well-paid leave for
fathers, and unpaid/low-paid leave for mothers.144 Three ECEC measures are included—the
weighted enrollment of children 0–2 years of age in care, the weighted enrollment of children 3
years to compulsory schooling in care, and the coordination of care.
From Part 2, I showed complex relationships among the explanatory policy measures. At
the most basic level, some policy measures were correlated while others are not. These results
indicated that one leave or ECEC policy dimension may not accurately represent the scope of
other policy dimensions. In the below expectations, I assume the directionality of the
relationship between the leave and ECEC measures of different policy dimensions and labor
market outcomes are the same until results prove otherwise. These expectations will allow me to
compare my results with past research that only include one measure of these policies in
multilevel models. Remember that unpaid/low-paid leave for mothers is generous in terms of
length but not payment. However, I still assume the same directionality as with the additional
leave policy dimensions.
Based on the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis, the following is expected for gender gaps
between men and women (where a negative coefficient on the gender binary variable indicates
less work and earnings for women relative to men). Well-developed leave and ECEC dimensions
should be positively associated with gender employment gaps (thereby reducing the negative

144

To recap again, unpaid/poorly paid leave for mothers is only generous in length, not in payment. But I include the
measure here because I am interested in the effect of how both unpaid + poorly paid leaves for mothers and wellpaid leave periods for mothers impact labor market outcomes.
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coefficient), across all three levels of educational attainment—i.e., dimensions of both policies
should reduce the employment gap between men and women across all three levels of
educational attainment.
The expectations are divergent relationships between the leave and ECEC dimensions
and earnings gaps between men and women across the three class groups. For leave, the
expectation is that the deleterious effects of well-developed leave on women’s labor market
attainment are not uniform across different class groups. For annual earnings, leave dimensions
should be negatively associated with earnings gaps between women and men with high levels of
educational attainment (i.e., leave should worsen the earnings gap) 145 and at an increasing rate
(well-paid leave squared). Conversely, there are two possible expectations for the relationship
between leave and earnings gaps between low- and medium-educated men and women—the
leave policy dimensions should either not be associated with earnings gaps or be positively
associated with earnings gaps between men and women with medium and low levels of
educational attainment (i.e., it should reduce earnings gaps).
Based on accumulated evidence across the literature, generous ECEC (measured by the
weighted enrollment of children in care) should not be associated with worsened earnings gaps
between men and women, regardless of educational status.
For the relationships between the policy dimensions and class inequalities among women,
the expectation is that well-developed leave and ECEC should be positively associated with
employment gaps and earnings gaps between low- and highly educated women (i.e., these
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The expectations for earnings gaps follow the expected direction of the coefficients. In these models, women are
coded as 1. Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates that gaps have widened and a positive one indicates that gaps
have been reduced. Note, then, that the use of positive or negative associations in this chapter differs from the
correlations in Chapter 8.
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policies should reduce both employment and earnings gaps between low- and highly educated
women).
The capacity for leave and ECEC to reduce class inequalities among women are intended.
The overarching question is whether leave is “bad” for gender inequality between men and
women and if both leave and ECEC are “good” for class inequality between low- and highly
educated women. This study is one of the first to better address the relationship between welldeveloped leave and ECEC policy dimensions, gender employment inequalities between men
and women, and class inequalities among women with different levels of educational attainment.
Results
Across all models in all tables, the coefficients and Z-scores (in parentheses) are
displayed.146 147 All tables and models in the chapter include the two country-level control
variables—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. 148 These tables and
models are compared to identical tables and models in the appendices that exclude the countrylevel control variables. Both sets of models are included (with and without controls) to evaluate
evidence of confounding effects between the level two control variables and the level two
explanatory variables.
Eighty models are shown in the chapter 10 models each for the employment and earnings
multilevel models that pool together men and women by the three educational groups and 10

146

See Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) and Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) for a different reporting style of just the
policy measures and relevant level 1 control variables.
147
See Mandel (2012) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017). One major reason for this is because, especially when
assessing gender gaps, gender has interacted with the policy variables. By reducing the sample to men and women
with high earnings, for example, we are better able to assess different relationships between policies and the
outcome in question across different class groups.
148
With the exception of Model 1 across all tables that show the level one controls only.
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models each for employment and earnings multilevel models of low- and highly educated
women.
Table 9.1 shows the intercorrelations between the level two control variables and the
explanatory policy variables. The thick black box around the first two columns shows the
correlations between the country-level control variables and the explanatory policy variables.
The majority of the correlations are moderate, that is a correlation of r=.50 or below, with the
exception of the correlations between union coverage/collective bargaining and well-paid leave
for fathers (r=.5633) and the weighted enrollment of children 0–2 years of age in ECEC and
union coverage/collective bargaining (r=.6089). However, since these correlations are still close
to the upper correlation limit they will be included together in the models.
Correlations among the explanatory variables were evaluated in Part 2. However, to
briefly explain the correlations again here, most explanatory variables are highly correlated with
the coordination of care. This is not surprising because well-paid leave periods and enrollment
rates of children across the two age groups are used to construct the coordination of care index.
Additional high correlations are shown between the variables—including the universality scale
and enrollment of children 3 years of age to compulsory schooling in care (r=.6287 and P <
0.01). Model nine for the earnings models include both measures of well-paid weeks of leave for
mothers and unpaid/poorly paid weeks of leave for mothers. Remember that these models
exclude six countries for a final country N of 18. The correlation between these two explanatory
variables is further reduced (r=-.1064).
Due to the high correlations across select explanatory variables, and because of the
difficulty of deciding which of the eight explanatory policy variables to include in models
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together,149 one policy indicator is generally input into each of the 10 models across all tables.
Model 9 across all tables includes both well-paid leave periods and unpaid/low-paid leave
periods for mothers. Model 10 includes a measure of both well-paid leave period for mothers and
its square. This method of including one policy measure per model (see also Mandel 2012) omits
any issues of multicollinearity without having to center the policy variables (centering of policy
variables is not common in this literature) and also allows for uniformity and comparison of
results across the different models of the two labor market outcomes.150 In future research, I may
include more policy variables in one model to determine if the coefficients change. Throughout
the explanation of the results, it is important to note that each policy indicator measures only one
dimension of leave or ECEC policy. I do not expect that one policy measure of one dimension is
indicative of relationships between labor market outcomes and measures of other dimensions of
either policy.
The results are explained by counting the policy coefficients across the models that
support or refute the tradeoffs expectations explained in the prior section. The coefficients that
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Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) include three explanatory policy variables in their models—paid leave, paid
leave squared, and the enrollment of children 0–3 years of age in publicly subsidized care. Remember from Chapter
3 there is virtually no correlation between the paid leave variable and the enrollment of children in their study.
Mandel (2012) also utilizes three explanatory policy level variables—FTE leave, publicly subsidized childcare for
children 0–6 years of age, and the share of public sector employment. In Model 6 in Tables 3 and 4, Mandel
combines all three policy variables together. However, since I include 8 explanatory policy variables, it is difficult to
determine which variables of which dimensions to combine. Therefore, I generally follow Models 1–5 from Mandel
(2012) and input one explanatory policy variable at a time in the models, with the exception of Models 9 and 10.
150
There is no one way to present the multilevel models—Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019), Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2017) present the full models only. Mandel (2012) presents several full models, by inputting one policy measure at
a time, along with a final model of the combination of the three policy measures from the WSII. In Chapter 3 it was
shown that the two policy measures in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019)—weeks of paid leave and enrollment in
childcare for children 0–6 years of age were not correlated with one another. In contrast, the three policy measures
utilized in Mandel (2012) are significantly correlated. Since most of the policy measures utilized in the multilevel
models in this chapter are correlated, even moderately, and sometimes negatively, the right method is to input the
policy measures across different models so they do not influence one another—this occurred in several tests of
multilevel models with the use of multiple policy measures. Across the literature, scholars generally do not
explicitly explain their coefficients—but rather if the variable coefficient is positively or negatively associated with
the dependent variable (labor market outcome).
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explain or refute the expectations in this study are the cross-level interactions of the policy
measure with gender (female=1) in the models with men and women and the policy measures
with educational attainment (low education = 1) in the models with low- and highly educated
women. Eleven cross-level interactions are displayed across each table for a total of 88
coefficients—33 coefficients each for the employment and earnings models of men and women
by three levels of educational attainment (66 total) and 11 coefficients each for the employment
and earnings models of low- and highly educated women (22 total). Across all models in all
tables, the coefficients or the significance of the coefficients of the cross-level interactions
(female*explanatory policy variable or low education*explanatory policy variable) do not
change whether the country-level controls are included in the models or not. 151 However, across
select models, coefficients and the significance of the explanatory variable changes for men’s
outcomes (when female = 0) and highly educated women’s outcomes (when educational
attainment = 0) across models with controls and those without controls.
As stated in Chapter 8, the main goal is to look at cumulative patterns and relationships
between the policy measures and labor market outcomes to draw conclusions about how policies
influence employment patterns for women across different educational groups.
Employment
The first set of 30 multilevel linear regression models (see Table 9.2, Table 9.3, and
Table 9.4) assess if the relationship between work-family reconciliation policy dimensions and
employment differs between men and women, by educational attainment. The expectation is that
well-developed work-family reconciliation policies (both leave and ECEC) will be positively
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Therefore, I do not compare the coefficients of the cross-level interactions in the models with controls to the
models without the controls in the appendices since the results do not change.

207

associated with gender employment gaps. All models control for the unemployment rate and
wage coordination/union coverage.
First, clear patterns of the effect of the individual-level characteristics, by educational
attainment, are in line with expectations, with a few exceptions (see Model 1 across all three
tables). As expected, being female, older (age squared), or having another person in the
household employed is negatively and significantly associated with the odds of employment
across the three educational groups. The presence of children five years of age or younger in the
household is negatively associated with the odds of employment across the three educational
groups, but the coefficients are not significant. Age is positively associated with the odds of
employment across all three educational groups. Being married is also positively associated with
the odds of employment across all three educational groups. The number of children 17 years of
age or younger in the household is positively and significantly associated with the odds of
employment only for the highly educated. The coefficients are negative for persons with medium
or low educational attainments. The coefficient is significant only for the low-educated,
suggesting that the odds of employment for low-educated persons diminishes as the number of
young household members increases.
For the level two control variables, the unemployment rate is significantly and negatively
associated with the odds of employment for all three educational groups, as expected. The effect
of unionization coverage/wage bargaining on the odds of employment is negative, and
significant only for the highly educated in four of the nine employment models in Table 9.2.
Across the models in the three tables, thirty-three coefficients (11 each for three levels of
educational attainment) are relevant to the tradeoffs hypothesis for employment gaps. Only three
of the 33 coefficients are statistically significant at P < 0.10. The three coefficients for the
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universality of leave interacted with female for all three educational groups are positive and
statistically significant (y=0.064, highly educated; y=0.046, medium-educated; y=0.037, loweducated).152 Overall, the results suggest the universality of leave has a different connection to
employment for women compared to men. The ease of accessing leave benefits improves
women’s relative odds of employment across all three educational groups. The top 5 ranked
countries on the universality scale are Finland, Italy, Poland, France, Germany, Iceland.
Referring back to Chapters 7 and 8, these countries place in the most well-developed,
moderately-high well-developed, and moderately well-developed groups in the work-family
reconciliation policy typology. Overall, these results suggest that countries with policies that are
well-developed along this particular policy dimension, regardless of the development of policies
across other policy dimensions, support the reduction of gender employment gaps between men
and women across the board.
However, it is only the universality of leave policy dimension that confirms the tradeoffs
hypothesis for gender employment gaps. No additional coefficients are statistically significant,
including the enrollment rates of both age groups of children enrolled in ECEC—which means
that other dimensions of these policies have similar connections to employment for women
compared to men across all three levels of educational attainment, and thus the gender gap in
employment is not affected by variation in these policies across countries.
For men’s outcomes, 17 of the 33 explanatory policy variable coefficients across the
models in the three tables are significant at P < 0.10.153 Of these, 13 coefficients are positive and
statistically significant at P < 0.10 and four coefficients are negative and statistically significant
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Note as well that the coefficient for the low-educated is just significant at P < 0.10 with a Z-score of 1.65.
For medium-educated men, the coefficient for the universality of leave is nearly significant at P < 0.10 (y=0.033
and Z-score =1.63).
153
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at P < 0.05. Eleven of the 13 coefficients are positive and statistically significant across the
models for highly and medium-educated men (see Tables 9.2 and 9.3), suggesting that welldeveloped work-family reconciliation policy dimensions are significantly associated with the
odds of employment for men with at least a high school education or higher. For men in all three
educational groups, the coefficients for well-paid leave squared are negative and statistically
significant at P < 0.01 (Model 10, Tables 9.2 and 9.4) and P < 0.001 (Model 10, Table 9.3).
However, the effects are very small in size (y=-0.00074, highly educated; y=-0.00071, mediumeducated; y=-0.00081, low-educated).
Comparing the significant coefficients for men’s outcomes in the models with controls to
the models without controls (see Appendix Tables 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4), 16 of the 17 coefficients for
men’s outcomes are no longer statistically significant. The exception is the policy measure for
the enrollment of children 0–2 years of age in ECEC for low-educated men in Appendix Table
9.4 (Model 6). The significance of these policy measures does not change in the models without
controls. The independent effect of 16 of the 17 explanatory work-family reconciliation policy
variables for high- and medium-educated men’s outcomes is obscured without the inclusion of
controls.154 Based on the moderate, positive correlations between several work-family
reconciliation policy dimension measures in the models and union coverage/wage bargaining
(see Table 9.1), I conclude that most dimensions of work-family policies are confounded with
labor market institutions. The effect is also dependent on the level of educational attainment.
However, the inclusion or exclusion of country-level controls in the models seems to have no
effect on the outcomes for low-educated men.
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Across the models, these are the coordination of care, the universality scale, well-paid leave for mothers,
enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling, unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers, and well-paid leave for
mothers squared.
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To explain the relationships in more detail, across the employment models for the three
education groups, union coverage/wage bargaining is negatively associated with the odds of
employment for men and women (again, this negative relationship between union coverage/wage
bargaining and the odds of employment are only statistically significant in four of the 10 models
for highly educated men and women). In general, the leave and ECEC policy dimensions are
positively and significantly associated with the odds of men’s employment across the models
with the country-level controls. To take the example of the coordination of care, this policy
dimension is positively and moderately correlated with the odds of employment among high- and
medium-educated men (Tables 9.2 and 9.3, Model 2), and is no longer significantly associated
with men’s employment in the models without controls (Appendix Tables 9.2 and 9.3, Model 2).
Union coverage/wage bargaining is positively and moderately correlated with the coordination of
care (r=.50). Therefore, union coverage/wage bargaining needs to be controlled for in order to
get the independent effect of the coordination of care on the odds of employment for highly
educated men.155
Annual Earnings
The 30 earnings models (see Table 9.5, Table 9.6, and Table 9.7) assess if the
relationship between work-family reconciliation policy dimensions and earnings differs between
men and women, by educational attainment. 156 Well-developed leave should be negatively
associated with earnings gaps between women and men with high levels of educational
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The correlations between the unemployment rate and the explanatory policy measures are very low (see Table
9.1), suggesting any relationship between the explanatory policy measures and outcomes is being driven by union
coverage/wage bargaining.
156
The number of hours worked is important and is included in all of the models. Since hours are not available for 5
of the 24 countries, the group N for these analyses is 19 instead of 24. In contrast to past studies, Brady, Blome, and
Kmec (2019) do not include an hours control variable in their analyses, whereas Mandel (2012) does include this
control across the models.
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attainment (i.e., well-developed leave should worsen the earnings gap) 157 and at an increasing
rate (well-paid leave squared). Well-developed leave should either not be associated with
earnings gaps or be positively associated with earnings gaps between men and women with
medium and low levels of educational attainment (i.e., well-developed leave should reduce
earnings gaps). Generous ECEC (measured by the weighted enrollment of children in care across
the two age groups) should not be associated with worsened earnings gaps between men and
women, regardless of educational status. Because women are coded as 1, a negative coefficient
indicates a widening of gender earnings gaps, a positive coefficient indicates a reduction in
gender earnings gaps.158
Of the 33 interactions between the policy measures and gender across the 30 models, 11
coefficients are statistically significant at P < 0.10 or greater. A more detailed explanation of
these coefficients and implications for this study are detailed below.
First, to begin with the individual-level controls, as expected, earnings are significantly
and negatively associated with being female, regardless of educational attainment. 159 Earnings
are also significantly and negatively associated with aging (age squared) and the number of
household members 17 years of age or younger (though the coefficient is negative, it is not
statistically significant for those with low educational attainments). All other individual-level
control variable coefficients are positive and statistically significant across the models. This
indicates that earnings are significantly and positively associated with marital status, the weekly
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The expectations for earnings gaps follow the expected direction of the coefficients. In these models, women are
coded as 1. Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates that gaps have widened and a positive one indicates that gaps
have been reduced. Note, then, that the use of positive or negative associations in this chapter differs from the
correlations in Chapter 8.
158
This is the method from Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019). The findings in these models will also be compared to
Mandel (2012). Mandel (2012) codes men as 1, therefore the coefficient signs in her study are the opposite of this
study.
159
Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) show that being female is the most robust coefficient in the models. Suggesting
that gender alone is a large factor as to why women’s earnings are penalized.
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number of hours worked, age, and having another person in the household employed. The
presence of children 5 years of age or younger in the household is positively associated with
earnings, but this association is significant only for the highly educated. 160
Moving to the country-level controls, collective bargaining/union coverage is positively
associated with annual earnings for low- and medium-educated men and women, though the
coefficients are not significant. Conversely, collective bargaining/union coverage is negatively
associated with annual earnings for highly educated men and women (also insignificant, Table
9.5). Whether significant or not, these relationships between earnings and collective
bargaining/union coverage for the different educational groups are in the expected direction and
consistent with past research, this is because strong labor market institutions are less likely to
support the earnings of high-status groups. The unemployment rate is positively associated with
annual earnings. For medium- and low-educated groups, the coefficients are positive and
statically significant. These results suggest that higher unemployment rates benefit the earnings
for the two groups without a college degree. 161
To move to the cross-level interactions—overall the results across the three tables show
that relationships between both unpaid/low-paid leaves and well-paid leaves allocated to mothers
differ for men and women across all three levels of educational attainment. For highly educated
men and women, the expectation is that well-developed leaves are negatively associated with the
annual earnings of highly educated women (thus worsening the gender earnings gap). The

However, social science research finds that young children can improve men’s earnings and negatively affect
women’s earnings since women are more likely to work fewer hours to take care of children or work in lowerpaying positions. In another set of models, I included a control for the share of women in one’s occupation.
However, I chose not to include this control in the final set of models because of no data availability in Australia and
Italy, which would have further reduced the country N from 19 countries to 17 countries. As expected across these
models, and in line with past studies (see Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019, 16), earnings were significantly and
negatively associated with percent occupation female.
161
The assumption for this relationship is a selection effect. Those in the labor market are the ones with better job
opportunities/characteristics or unmeasured skills.
160
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coefficient for female interacted with well-paid leave for mothers is negatively and statistically
significant in Models 4 and 9 of Table 9.5 for high-educated individuals (r=-0.0015 and P < 0.10,
Model 4; r=-0.0017 and P < 0.05, Model 9). These two coefficients confirm the gendered
tradeoffs hypothesis.
The next expectation is that well-developed leaves should have no effect on the earnings
gap (or a positive effect) between men and women with low and medium education levels. Both
well-paid leaves and unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers have a different connection to earnings
for low- and medium-educated men and women across several of the models in Tables 9.6 and
9.7, however, the coefficients are not in the expected direction. In the earnings models for
medium-educated men and women, gender interacted with well-paid leave for mothers is
unexpectedly negative and statistically significant in Models 4 and 9. Unpaid/low-paid leaves for
mothers interacted with gender is also negative and statistically significant in Models 8 and 9. In
the earnings models for low-educated men and women, gender interacted with well-paid leave
for mothers is negative and statistically significant in Models 4, 9, and 10. Unpaid/low-paid
leaves for mothers interacted with gender is also negative and statistically significant across
Models 8 and 9. Though the coefficients are unexpectedly negative, they are also small in size.
See the interaction coefficients in Models 4 and 9 for medium-educated men and women, for
example (y=-0.0011, Model 4 and y=-0.0013, Model 9), though the policy effect seems small in
size.162
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Mandel also finds a similar result for FTE leave and the low-educated in Table 4, Model 3L. This finding is
contrary to her expectations. However, though FTE leave also seems to worsen the gender wage gap between loweducated men and women, the effect is higher between highly educated men and Women. T-tests also showed that
the difference in the effects of FTE leave across the two groups are statistically significant. “Although the effect of
maternity leave is significant among the lower educated as well, it is much higher among the higher educated groups
[Models 3: y= 0.12, 0.29, respectively (t-test is statistically significant at P < 0.05), Models 6: y= 0.17, 0.24,
respectively (t-test is statistically significant at P < 0.10]” (Mandel, 2012, 257).
Further, if we look at the effect of well-paid leave on the levels of women’s employment in Model 4 for all three
educational groups in this study, the results show a non-linear effect. The most negative effect of well-paid leaves
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Overall, two of the 11 coefficients support the expectation about well-developed leave
while nine of the 11 coefficients refute it. That nine of the coefficients for well-paid leave and
unpaid/low-paid leave interacted with female are negative and statistically significant across
select models for low- and medium-educated men and women refutes the expectation of the
relationship between well-developed leaves and earnings gaps for the two groups with less than a
bachelor’s degree. The results suggest both well-paid and unpaid/low-paid leave periods worsen
gender earnings gaps between low- and medium-educated men and women. Overall, the results
for the two measures of leave policy generosity for mothers suggests that only unpaid/low-paid
leaves for mothers seem to have a deleterious effect on the relative earnings for low- and
medium-educated women (compared to low- and medium-educated men) and no effect for
highly educated women (compared to highly educated men). These results further suggest the
importance of the effect of different leave wage replacement cutoffs for women’s relative
outcomes across different class groups.
The results show that the development of leave policies along these two dimensions
matters for women’s relative earnings. The top five countries with the most weeks of
unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers are the Slovak Republic (164 weeks), Germany (148 weeks),
Estonia (146 weeks), the Czech Republic (134 weeks), and Austria (82.6 weeks). The countries
with the most weeks of well-paid leaves for mothers are Finland (44 weeks), the Czech Republic
(28 weeks), Iceland (28 weeks, Estonia (20 weeks), and Italy (20 weeks). The results suggest the
deleterious effects of both leave types on relative earnings for women across high-income
countries, regardless of the development across other policy dimensions.

are for medium- educated women (y=-0.0014 and p is not significant for the highly educated; y=-0.0029 and P <
0.01 for the medium- educated; and y=-0.0025 and P < 0.10 for the low-educated). The confidence intervals for the
highly and low-educated also overlap meaning the results are not statistically different from each other.
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Transitioning to additional results, overall, as expected, there is no evidence that welldeveloped ECEC (measured by enrollment rates of children 0–2 years and 3–5 years in public
care) worsens earnings gaps between men and women across the three educational groups.
For men’s outcomes, only 5 of the 33 explanatory policy variable coefficients across the
models are significant at P < 0.10. No explanatory variable coefficients are statistically
significant for low-educated men. Of these 5 coefficients, only 1 coefficient is positive and
statistically significant for highly educated men—unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers (see Model
9, Table 9.5; y=0.00022 and P < 0.10). These results suggest that unpaid/low-paid leaves for
mothers are associated with a slight improvement in the earnings of highly educated men, though
the effect is small in scale. Interestingly, the coefficient for well-paid leave for fathers is negative
and nearly statistically significant (y=-0.0051 and Z-score = -1.59). These results suggest that
well-paid leave for fathers nearly has deleterious effects on the earnings of highly educated men.
Four coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the outcomes of mediumeducated men—well-paid leave for mothers (Model 4, y=-0.0018 and P < 0.05; Model 9, y=0.0020 and P < 0.05), well-paid leave for fathers (Model 5, y=-0.0062 and P < 0.10), and wellpaid leave for mothers squared (Model 10, y=-0.000066 and P < 0.10). These results suggest that
two dimensions of leave policy are negatively associated with the earnings of medium-educated
men. However, these effects are very small in size.
Comparing the significant coefficients for men’s outcomes in the models with the
country-level controls to the models without country-level controls (see Appendix Tables 9.5,
9.6, and 9.7, only one coefficient in the models without controls is still statistically significant—
well-paid leave squared for mothers continues to be negatively and statistically significant for
medium-educated men’s outcomes (Appendix Table 9.6, Model 10, y=-0.000089 and P < 0.10).
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Well-paid leave for fathers is still negatively associated with the earnings for highly educated
men and is nearly statistically significant (Appendix Table 9.5, Model 5, y=-0.0041 and Z-score
= 1.62).
However, overall, the majority of the men’s outcomes are not statistically significant in
the models with or without the level controls. Only for four coefficients are men’s outcomes
obscured without the inclusion of the two country-level controls. Like the results for
employment, the inclusion or exclusion of controls do not change any of the outcomes for loweducated men. These results again suggest that any confounding effects of the unemployment
rate and collective bargaining/union coverage for men’s outcomes are also largely dependent on
educational attainment.
Class Inequality among Women: Employment and Annual Earnings
The final 20 multilevel models in Table 9.8 and Table 9.9 assess if the relationships
between work-family reconciliation policies and employment (Table 9.8) and earnings (Table
9.9) differ for women with low and high educational attainments.
Employment
Across the 10 models of employment in Table 9.8, as expected, low education among
women, aging (age squared), the number of household members 17 years of age or younger, the
presence of children 5 years of age or younger, or having another person in the household
employed are all negatively and significantly associated with the odds of women’s employment.
That low education is negatively and significantly associated with the odds of employment
shows that skills are an important factor to participation in the labor force.
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Of the 11 relevant coefficients (cross-level interactions between the policy measures and
low education) across the 10 models, no coefficients confirm the women’s class inequality
hypothesis.
However, three coefficients across the models are negatively and statistically significant
at P < 0.05 or greater; low education interacted with well-paid leave for mothers in Model 9 and
low education interacted with unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers in Models 8 and 9.
The results for the three coefficients in Models 8 and 9 suggest that well-paid leaves and
unpaid/low-paid leaves have different connections to employment of low- and highly educated
women. Contrary to expectations, women with a low education see their odds of employment fall
compared to highly educated women as a consequence of well-paid leave periods and
unpaid/low-paid leave periods. These cross-level interactions show that generous leaves—
whether well-paid or not—worsens employment gaps between low- and highly educated women.
These findings are unintended and show a new unintended consequence of leave policies—
worsened class inequalities among women in employment.
These results also show that the length of leave and the payment rate of leave are
particularly consequential for women’s employment and provide support for past findings that
show the deleterious effects of long leaves. Up to this point, the results for these models of
employment and the earnings models for men and women strongly suggest that the way leave
policies are measured matters for the study of the link between work-family reconciliation
policies and gender and class employment inequalities.
Also contrary to expectations, enrollment rates of children in ECEC across both age
groups are not linked to reduced employment gaps between low- and highly educated women.
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Moving to the effect of the policy variables for highly educated women’s outcomes
(educational attainment = 0), a few findings stand out. The effect of the coordination of care
(Model 2), the universality of leave (Model 3), enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory
schooling (Model 7), and unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers (Model 9) are positively and
significantly correlated with employment among highly educated women. These findings suggest
both well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions are positively associated with the odds
of employment for highly educated women.
In Model 10 of Table 9.8, well-paid leave for mothers is positively and significantly
associated with employment among highly educated women at P < 0.01 (y=0.060), meaning
well-paid leave for mothers improves the employment of highly educated women. However,
well-paid leave squared is negatively and significantly associated with employment among
highly educated women, suggesting the positive effect of well-paid leave for highly educated
women’s employment tapers off over time (at around 31 weeks). This effect is very small in size.
However, all five coefficients for women’s outcomes are insignificant in the models
without the country-level controls. Like the results for employment gaps between men and
women, when unemployment or collective bargaining are not controlled for, the independent
effect of these policy dimensions is obscured. The coordination of care, universality of leave, and
enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling in ECEC are all moderately correlated
with union coverage/collective bargaining. These moderate correlations suggest that countries
with better labor market supports also have well-developed policies that support the employment
of highly educated women. To get the effect of these policy dimensions on highly educated
women’s outcomes, union coverage/collective bargaining needs to be controlled for.163
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However, the weeks of well-paid leave for mothers and its square are weakly correlated with union
coverage/collective bargaining and also with the unemployment rate. I am unsure of what to make of these findings.
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Annual Earnings
The final 10 models in Table 9.9 assess if the relationship between work-family
reconciliation policy dimensions and annual earnings differs between women with low and high
educational attainment. The expectation is that leave, ECEC, and the coordination of care should
be positively associated with earnings gaps among women (e.g., these policies will reduce
earnings gaps between low- and highly educated women).
As expected, low education among women, aging (age squared), and the number of
household members 17 years of age or younger are all negatively and significantly associated
with earnings. The presence of children 5 years of age or younger and being married have no
effect on the earnings of low- or highly educated women. Working more hours or another person
in the household employment is positively associated with the earnings of low- and highly
educated women.
Across the models, none of the 11 interaction coefficients (low education interacted with
the policy variables) are statistically significant. The results suggest well-developed leave and
ECEC have a similar connection to earnings for highly educated women compared to loweducated women.
Moving to outcomes for highly educated women, well-paid leave for highly educated
women (low educational attainment = 0) in Models 4 and 9 are negative and statistically
significant at P < 0.05 (y=-0.0020 in both models). These results suggest that well-paid leave is
negatively associated with the earnings of highly educated women. 164
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The cross-level interaction between low education and the enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory
schooling is y=-.0012 with a Z-score of -1.55. I assume this negative relationship between low education and the
enrollment of children 3 years to compulsory schooling is due to the fact that countries with high-enrollment rates of
children in ECEC also have a large public sector. Public sector jobs pay less than those in the private sector and
attract those with less skill. So what this negative coefficient shows is the result of a large public care sector.
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However, in the models without controls (See Appendix Table 9.9), the coefficient for
well-paid leave for mothers in Models 4 and 9 are still negative (y=-0.0014, Model 4; y=-0.0015,
Model 9) but are no longer statistically significant. The correlation between weeks of well-paid
leave for mothers and the union coverage/collective bargaining control in this case is moderate
(r=.46 and P < 0.10). This moderate correlation suggests there is something confounding
between well-paid leave periods for highly educated women and union coverage/collective
bargaining. Countries with strong supports of unions and collective bargaining also tend to have
longer well-paid leaves. The literature expects that countries with strong supports for employees
are associated with negative effects on earnings of highly educated women because these
institutions do not support wage coordination for the highly educated. We see the effect of union
coverage/wage bargaining working through weeks of well-paid leave to depress the earnings of
highly educated women in Models 4 and 9.
Discussion and Conclusions
Motivated by the gendered tradeoffs literature, Chapter 9 provides a comprehensive new
analysis of the relationship between different dimensions of work-family reconciliation policies
and two labor market outcomes—employment and annual earnings.
This chapter is a replication and extension of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) that tests
the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis using multilevel models. Specifically for this study, Model 3
in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) is used as the main analytic strategy. Random coefficient
multilevel models of employment and annual earnings were carried out for pooled samples of
working-aged men and women by three levels of educational attainment and pooled samples of
working-aged low- and highly educated women. For both labor market outcomes and the two
sample groups, I estimated models of a cross-section of 18–24 high-income countries using
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country-level policy data and microdata from around the years 2010–2013. This study is one of
the most up-to-date in gendered tradeoffs research.
The goal of the analyses was to determine if there is evidence of gendered tradeoffs—if
well-developed leave and ECEC policies are associated with improved employment gaps but
worsened earnings gaps between men and women, across three educational groups. A secondary
goal was to determine relationships between gender inequalities in employment between men
and women and class inequalities among women. Do policies that worsen gender inequalities
improve class inequalities among women or vice versa? I revisited earlier findings, holding the
two labor market outcomes and the model constant while changing the explanatory (work-family
reconciliation) policy measures to see if these changes altered conclusions.
Of the 88 coefficients relevant to the gendered tradeoffs and women’s class inequality
hypotheses, only 5 coefficients across the models support the hypotheses. For the employment
models of men and women, the universality of leave is associated with a reduction in gender
employment gaps between men and women across all three educational groups (Model 3, Tables
9.2–9.4). In the earnings multilevel models of pooled men and women, well-paid leave for
mothers worsened gender earnings gaps between highly educated men and women (Models 4
and 9, Table 9.5).
However, another 12 coefficients for leave showed worsened gender and class gaps
across the two labor market outcomes. These findings were unintended but provide further
support that select leave policy dimensions worsen gender and class gaps. In the multilevel
models of earnings for low- and medium-educated men and women, both periods of well-paid
leaves and unpaid/low-paid leave periods worsened earnings gaps between men and women. In
the multilevel models of employment for low- and highly educated women, again, periods of
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well-paid and unpaid/low-paid leaves worsened employment gaps among women. Overall, a
total of 17 coefficients across the models support the persistence of both gendered tradeoffs and
also “class tradeoffs” among women.
The finding that leave policy generosity worsens employment gaps for the low-educated
men and women supports a similar finding from Mandel (2012). Mandel (2012) finds
(unexpectedly) that the measure of FTE leave used in her study worsens employment gaps
between low-educated men and women. While I argued in Parts 1 and 2 that measures of FTE
leave do not accurately measure leave policy generosity, my study refined Mandel’s (2012)
earlier conclusions to show that leaves of different payment levels have different consequences
for gender and class inequalities. The way policies are measured matters for this research.
Linking gender and class inequality, the findings suggest that two dimensions of leave
policy generosity—periods of well-paid leaves and unpaid/low-paid leaves for mothers, both
worsen gender earnings inequality across the three educational groups and employment gaps
between low- and highly educated women. The latter finding is unintended and sheds new light
on how leave policy generosity may advance employment opportunities for some groups of
women over others. Leave policy dimensions that worsen gender earnings inequality also
(unexpectedly) worsen class inequality among women in employment.
That generous ECEC seemed to have no effect at all on gender employment gaps and
class employment gaps is also surprising. The expectation is that both well-developed leave and
ECEC should promote women’s employment, regardless of educational status. Though this nonfinding is unexpected, the fact that there is no discernable relationship also means leave and
ECEC do not worsen these gaps. Overall, the results show that generous ECEC has no positive
or negative relationship to employment and earnings inequality both between men and women
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and among women. This non-finding for the relationships between ECEC and earnings is in line
with accumulated evidence in the literature (see Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019 and Mandel
2012, for example).
I also argue this study shows the importance of constructing policy indicators that take
into account more dimensions of leave and ECEC policy. First, assessing leave with different
wage replacement cutoffs shows that only well-paid leave periods worsen gender earnings gaps
between highly educated men and women. All leave, whether paid or not, worsens earnings gaps
between low- and medium-educated women. The study also suggests that different dimensions
of leave policy have different effects on employment and earnings inequality. The universality of
leave may do more to close employment gaps between men and women, while the generosity of
leave worsens gender earnings inequality and class employment inequalities among women. This
study also provides support for the persistence of the relationship between leave policy
generosity (i.e., the length of leave and the payment rate of leave) and gender employment
inequalities.
Overall, this study supports my overarching argument that different policy dimensions—
specifically leave policy dimensions—can have different effects on employment inequalities. My
study shows that one policy measure does not represent the scope of these policies more
generally as evidenced by the fact that only specific dimensions of leave policies had any
statistically significant relationship with gender and class gaps across the two labor market
outcomes in question. This study suggests further research should include different dimensions
of leave and ECEC policy to draw conclusions about the link between work-family
reconciliation policies and outcomes.
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Linking this study to the work-family reconciliation policy typology constructed in
Chapter 7, this study showed that countries can provide a policy that is well-developed across
one dimension, but not necessarily other dimensions. It is only particular dimensions of these
policies that reduce or worsen gender and class gaps. The results show that both leave policy
types worsen gender earnings gaps—especially between medium- and low-educated men and
women. Countries from different policy groupings support leave policies that are either long and
unpaid/low-paid and well-paid, suggesting that leave length and payment may be a hindrance to
women’s earnings, regardless of the development of other dimensions of these policies. For
example, Germany provides long, unpaid/low-paid leaves to mothers but also quite accessible
leaves to parents (rank of a 4 on the universality scale) in the policy typology (see Table 7.2).
The ranking of Germany on the universality scale suggests that Germany can both promote
women’s employment and reduce the gender employment gap, but long, unpaid/low-paid leaves
(that are not generous in terms of the wage replacement rate) worsen gender earnings gaps
between low- and medium-educated men and women.
Similar to the findings in Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013), this study also confirms
that leave differs in the extent to which it improves opportunities for women without a college
degree (for example, unpaid/low-paid leaves do not seem to worsen gender earnings gaps
between men and women with a college degree, but worsen gender earnings gaps between men
and women in the other two educational groups). Moreover, even “good” ECEC may not
improve the employment of women without a college degree. Though my findings back up many
of the main conclusions in both Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) and Brady, Blome, and
Kmec (2019), the consensus about the negative consequences of these policies is still
inconclusive, though again, the evidence suggests that it is only certain dimensions of these
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policies that may reduce or worsen gender and class gaps. More attention should be paid to the
relationships between leave and ECEC and the employment opportunities of women without a
college education.
There are several limitations to this study. First, this study was mainly interested in the
employment and earnings gaps between men and women and among women. There are many
possible comparisons with this type of research (for example, mothers and non-mothers, women
only, mothers and fathers). Secondarily, the study suggested that the level of employment and
earnings for men and highly educated women are also associated with leave and ECEC policy
dimensions (some positive and some negative). This study does not focus on the link between
these policies and the levels of women’s employment, per se, but does show that well-paid leave
periods may be deleterious to women’s outcomes. For example, well-paid leaves for mothers is
negatively associated with the earnings of highly educated women (see Table 9.9).
Second, microdata on the number of hours worked was missing from the many countries
with well-developed leave policies. These countries were ultimately removed from the earnings
multilevel models for the two sample groups. A clearer understanding of how to impute
microdata from different datasets165 means that more countries could be included in future
analyses.
Third are issues of the availability of policy at the country level and with comparable
country-level policy data. For several measures, it may be the case of “no available policy” to
make meaningful comparisons. For example, both the measure of well-paid leave for fathers and
the measure of equality in well-paid leave contained many 0s (12 out of 24 countries) because
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For example, Mandel (2012) states that she imputes working hours for Denmark and Norway from the Danish
Leisure Study (1993) and the (Norwegian) Level of Living Survey, but she does not provide any information on her
integration/imputation method (see footnote 3, page 255).
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nontransferable leave for fathers is still not available to fathers across many high-income
countries or does not replace wages at least 67 percent of usual earnings. The correlations
between well-paid leave for fathers and gender earnings gaps in Chapter 8 suggest that countries
with well-paid leave for fathers also have high gender earnings gaps (e.g., Norway and Iceland).
However, no relationships were found in the multilevel models which may be due to the number
of 0s included in the measure of well-paid leave for fathers. That well-paid leaves for fathers
could also be correlated with worsened gender earnings gaps would be an important finding
because it refutes the argument that well-paid leaves for fathers reduce gender employment
inequalities between men and women. However, more research is needed across this score. The
continued call for widely-available, detailed, and harmonized policy variables across countries
will also assist with more accurate comparisons.
The measure of ECEC in this chapter is also one of ECEC utilization, which is not ideal.
The idea behind using the measure of enrollment weighted by the dominant mechanism of
provision was to be able to compare this new measure—that rewards countries with widely
available public care arrangements—with comparable ECEC measures in past literature. While
my findings corroborated past research, there are still limitations to the measurement of ECEC
utilization versus the measurement of actual policy (see also Appendix 2.1 and Sirén et al.,
2020). It is also unclear what measures of ECEC utilization are actually capturing—it could be
the case that measures are capturing the demand for ECEC workers (i.e., higher enrollments
actually capture the demand for more women in feminized jobs) or it could be capturing the
supply of ECEC (i.e., more widely available ECEC allows more women to place their children in
care to enter employment). Mandel and Semyonov (2005) propose a similar argument in their
study. We may not see any discernable positive effect of ECEC for gender or class gaps because
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women are more likely to be employed in the public service sector jobs (in countries with high
enrollments in public care) that hinder earnings. In a future study, the newly constructed ECEC
universality scale should be utilized because it better captures ECEC policy—e.g., at what age
are children entitled to ECEC (if at all) and whether or not this entitlement is full-time or parttime.
Third, this study utilizes only one measure of class (educational attainment). However, as
shown in Chapter 8, relationships between policies and outcomes can change based on the
different measurements of class. This is surely the case when comparing the educational and
earnings multilevel models from Mandel (2012)—e.g., FTE maternity worsened gender earnings
gaps between low-educated men and women. However, for men and women with low earnings,
the results showed a slightly negative and not statistically significant relationship between FTE
maternity leave and earnings gaps between men and women with low earnings, suggesting
maternity leave does not worsen gender earnings gaps between low-earning men and women.166
Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) use different measures of class across different analyses
(similar to my Chapter 8, they utilize educational attainment, earnings (measured as quintiles ),
and occupational attainment). If the goal is to determine differences by class, then we need to
find better ways to clearly identify links and patterns between policies and outcomes using
different class measures.
Overall, at the policy level, the question should be centered around the goals of workfamily reconciliation policies. The results across this body of literature suggest some evidence of
tradeoffs. Different policy dimensions can have both positive and negative consequences for
women’s employment that may differ across levels of educational attainment. What balance
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Remember men are coded as 1 in her study so a negative relationship implies a reduction in gender earnings
gaps.
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should be struck across different policies? This study suggests that current policies fall short of
reducing gender and class gaps.
In future research, these policy measures can be used to evaluate relationships between
policies and outcomes for different sample groups—mothers and fathers or mothers and nonmothers. Different measures of class could also be explored. A more detailed look at
relationships between different dimensions of these policies and a small number of countries
through qualitative case studies could also be a fruitful approach. A more comprehensive set of
labor market outcomes could also be included.
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Chapter 10: Conclusions
Summary of Findings, Practical Contributions of Research
In this dissertation, I addressed two distinct issues from the work-family policy literature.
First, I addressed the call for better policy measurement and construction of work-family policy
measures for two of the most widely studied policies in this body of research—leave and ECEC.
Leave and ECEC are widely used policies in the study of the link between work-family policies
and women’s labor market outcomes because they help parents, mainly mothers, reconcile paid
with unpaid work. I addressed this call for better policy measurement and construction because
standard work-family reconciliation policy indicators in the literature are problematic and
oversimplified, and because country classifications used to categorize leave and ECEC policies
of high-income countries are outdated. The goal was to move toward a more complete set of
multidimensional, disaggregated, and precise leave and ECEC policy indicators that measure
different policy dimensions to determine which high-income countries provide leave and ECEC
policies that are well-developed across multiple policy dimensions.
I also constructed a comprehensive leave and ECEC policy database that allows for easy
comparison of leave and ECEC policies across high- and middle-income countries that could be
easily updated as policy information changes over time. Comparable, country-level policy data
from around the years 2010–2013 was compiled from a variety of international organizations,
publications, and country-specific sources (for a complete list of sources see the appendix and
the databases).
The comprehensive set of policy indicators, based on policy information compiled into
the new databases, were constructed to reevaluate a major debate in the work-family policy
literature—whether and to what extent well-developed work-family reconciliation policies
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support women’s employment but worsen labor market attainment for women across measures
such as annual earnings and occupational attainment. The argument is tradeoffs or consequences
of well-developed work-family reconciliation policies for women’s employment attainment are
unintended. Moreover, unintended consequences of these policies for women’s employment
attainment are not uniform for women across different class groups. I also extended the genre by
introducing an assessment of women’s class inequality. Do policies that worsen gender gaps
between men and women in employment, improve class inequalities among women in
employment? Is there a link between gendered tradeoffs and the relationship between leave,
ECEC, and class inequality among women?
The issue of gendered tradeoffs is widely debated. Previous research has shown some
evidence that leave policies worsen gender gaps in earnings and occupational attainment, while
growing empirical evidence shows that ECEC is not linked to negative consequences for women
in the labor market. Most recently, the literature showed the benefit of evaluating the link
between singular policy measures and women’s labor market outcomes versus the aggregation of
policies into indices that can mask the effects of singular policies. The literature also finds that
leave and ECEC policies may differentially influence women’s employment outcomes across
different class groups. For example, long leaves may worsen the gender earnings gap between
highly educated men and women but improve gender earnings gaps between men and women
without college degrees. Two main methods have been used—comparisons across welfare state
regimes and the combination of socio-economic data and work-family policy data in multilevel
models (Hook and Li 2020, 25).
My study is a hybrid in that I use both of the main methods from the literature to evaluate
the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and the women’s class inequality hypothesis. I first tackled
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whether leave and ECEC policy development supports Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “Three
Worlds” welfare state regime typology. I then constructed a new typology of work-family
reconciliation policies using the newly constructed multidimensional leave and ECEC policy
measures. I performed a descriptive assessment of five labor market outcomes for the two
sample groups, by three different measures of class, using the newly constructed policy typology
to organize and explain the results. Finally, I addressed the link between well-developed (and
not-well-developed) dimensions of leave and ECEC and gender and class inequalities through
the use of correlation analyses and multilevel modelling. This study is one of the most
comprehensive, and up-to-date studies in the gendered tradeoffs genre. My study incorporates a
broader set of high-income countries than used in many past studies (24 total countries), using
more recent country-level policy data and microlevel data from the LIS Database from around
the years 2010 and 2013.
In Part 2 of the dissertation, I addressed three interrelated arguments around the call for
new policy indicators in work-family policy research. First, is the argument that policy indicators
are narrow in scope. In the literature, most work-family policy indicators measure one or two
dimensions of leave and ECEC policy, such as the weeks of paid leave or the enrollment of
children in ECEC. In my research, I argued that work-family reconciliation policies are multidimensional and leave and ECEC policy indicators should measure different dimensions of these
policies. In Chapter 4, I identified 3 dimensions of leave to be measured: the generosity of leave
for both mothers and fathers (dimension 1)—how much is granted; gender equality (dimension
2)—fathers’ reserved share of total leave; and the universality of leave (dimension 3)—the
breadth of receipt. Two dimensions of ECEC to be measured were identified: generosity
(dimension 1) and universality (dimension 2). For ECEC generosity, newly constructed measures

232

included the enrollment of children under compulsory schooling weighted by the dominant
mechanism of provision and the out-of-pocket costs of care for single parents and couples. New
indicators of ECEC universality measure children’s right to leave at the national level and the
age and hours of entitlement. The scores across these two dimensions were then summed into a
simple ordinal scale.
Overall, 46 new measures of leave and ECEC policy (43 singular policy measures, one
index that measures the percentage of children under compulsory schooling age covered under
either well-paid leave and/or public care arrangements, and two scales for leave and ECEC
universality) were constructed using the leave and ECEC policy information from the newly
construct leave and ECEC policy databases. Six of these measures were replications of standard
indicators used in past research (four leave generosity measures and two ECEC generosity
measures of enrollment rates of children in care across two age groups prior to compulsory
schooling). The additional 40 measures were new to the literature or underutilized in past
research. The goal was to move toward a more complete set of multidimensional, disaggregated,
and precise leave and ECEC policy measures.
The newly constructed policy measures were first used to evaluate the claim that many of
the standard policy indicators used in the literature are problematic. In Chapter 5, I compared
replicated standard indicators of leave and ECEC policy generosity from the literature to newly
constructed, more precise measures of leave and ECEC policy dimensions to visually describe
the issues with the standard leave and ECEC indicators. I showed that two measures of leave
policy generosity, FTE leave and paid leave, equate well-paid leaves with poorly paid leaves.
Using the example of Germany, leave periods for both mothers and fathers rank highly
across standard measures of FTE leave (rank of a 3 for mothers’ leave and a rank of 6 for
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father’s leave) and weeks of all paid leave (rank of 2 for mothers’ leave and 6 for fathers’ leave).
However, the wage replacement rate over the total paid leave period shows the wage
replacement is quite low for leaves allocated to both mothers and fathers (57 percent for mothers
and 46 percent for fathers). Leave policies in Germany are equated with policies in other
countries that provide well-paid leave periods to both mothers and fathers. Moving to more
precise measures of leave length and payment, well-paid leave for mothers in Germany drops in
rank on the measure to 17 and 13 for fathers, which is the lowest possible rank (Germany,
provides no well-paid, nontransferable leave to fathers).
In Chapters 5 and 6, I also definitively showed that policy indicators are narrow in scope,
or at the very least are limited in the capacity to represent the scope of leave and ECEC policy
measures more broadly. The study identified six possible relationships among the leave and
ECEC policy generosity measures alone—3 possible statistically significant relationships among
the indicators and 3 possible non-statistically significant relationships among the measures.
Correlations among a set of the new, more precise, disaggregated measures of policies across the
three dimensions for leave and two dimensions of ECEC in Chapter 6 continued to show
complicated relationships among the indicators. The correlations questioned whether we should
see distinct patterns and relationships among the policy measures. Overall, I argue a broader set
of policy measures allows for a more thoughtful approach to choosing policy measures to
evaluate more specific expectations about the links between the policy dimensions and women’s
labor market outcomes. The way policies are measured matters for relationships not only among
different policy measures but suggests that the way policies are measured matters when studying
the link between policies and labor market outcomes. The ongoing debate as to what extent leave

234

and ECEC are potentially linked to worsened gender employment inequalities could result from
the myriad of ways these policies are measured in the first place.
Across Chapters 5 and 6, I also showed that, with the precise measurement of more
dimensions of leave and ECEC policies across high-income countries, standard regime
classifications for which countries promote well-developed leave and ECEC policies fall away.
Countries in the Social Democratic regime, but not only exclusively countries in the Social
Democratic regime, promote leave and ECEC policies that are well-developed. Countries in the
Liberal regime, but not only exclusively countries in the Liberal regime, promote leave and
ECEC policies that are the least developed. These findings support the feminist critiques of
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology and evidence from the literature on leave and ECEC
policy architecture. When more dimensions of leave and ECEC policy are measured, EspingAndersen’s (1990) welfare state regime classification does not adequately capture the variation
of leave and ECEC policies across countries within these defined groupings.
The new typology from Chapter 7 visually supports the limitations of the widely utilized
standard welfare state regime classification to categorize the development of leave and ECEC
policies. Using the rankings of 9 newly constructed leave and ECEC policy measures and points
either added or subtracted for incentives and disincentives for fathers’ leave, in Chapter 7 a new
work-family reconciliation policy typology was constructed that better categorized leave and
ECEC policies that are well-developed across multiple policy dimensions. I showed that
countries are categorized into five new policy groupings (from well-developed to least
developed) and these policy groupings were distinct based on the summed ranked score across
the nine policy measures and incentives and disincentives. The higher the ranking across each
measure signaled the more developed the leave or ECEC policy across a particular dimension.
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The scores ranged from 44 (lowest-ranked score = the most well-developed leave and ECEC
policies (Iceland)) to 175 (highest ranked score = the least well-developed leave and ECEC
policies (the Slovak Republic)).
From this new typology, I showed the robustness of the countries classified in the Social
Democratic regime—countries in this regime promote the most well-developed policies across
nearly all 11 dimensions utilized to construct the typology, as measured by the rankings (with the
exception of Finland). However, not only countries in the Social Democratic regime support
leave and ECEC policies that are the most well-developed, so do France (originally in the
Conservative-Corporatist regime) and Spain (originally in the Southern European regime). Select
countries classified in the Liberal regime provide the least well-developed policies in addition to
Switzerland (originally in the Conservative-Corporatist regime) and the Slovak Republic
(originally in the Eastern-European regime). The overall ranked scores and policy groupings
show the general development of leave and ECEC policies. Any one measure or policy
dimension can be compared across policy groupings to determine how well-developed policies
are across different policy dimensions. Returning to the example of Germany, the overall ranked
score shows that leave and ECEC policies place Germany in the moderately developed group
(third out of five groupings). Germany ranks low across measures of well-paid leave for mothers
and fathers but ranks highly on the universality scale. Therefore, this grouping schema identifies
policy variation both within and across the policy groupings and within the individual countries.
In Part 3 (Chapters 8 and 9), I utilized the newly constructed, disaggregated measures of
leave and ECEC policy dimensions and the work-family reconciliation policy regime typology to
reevaluate the link between leave and ECEC policies and women’s labor market outcomes. The
goal was to evaluate the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and women’s class inequality hypothesis,
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by adapting the two main methods used in the literature. Chapter 8 was largely descriptive and
exploratory. This chapter addressed the issue of gendered tradeoffs across a set of five labor
market outcomes (employment, part-time employment, earnings, managerial status, and lucrative
managerial status) for samples of working-aged men and women, utilizing three different class
definitions (educational attainment, earnings, and occupational attainment). The link between the
policies and class inequalities among low-and highly educated women were also evaluated for
measures of employment, part-time employment, and annual earnings. Two analyses were
carried out—a descriptive analysis of employment patterns across the five policy groups from
new typology constructed in chapter 7 and correlations among 12 of the new leave and ECEC
policy dimension measures and the employment outcomes.
The first descriptive analysis in Chapter 8 showed that patterns of labor market outcomes
for women, and gender and class employment inequalities, are less clear when categorizing
countries by levels of policy development (using the new typology from Chapter 7) compared to
studies that utilize standard welfare state regime categorizations. The overall conclusion from
this descriptive assessment largely parallels Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) who utilize
policy constellations as rigorous units of analysis. There is as much evidence to support that
well-developed work-family reconciliation policies support women’s employment as there is to
refute it (see also Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) for a similar argument).
New to the literature,167 I showed that the definition of class used in these descriptive
analyses also matters for the relationships between policies and outcomes. Earnings gaps
between high-status men and women in the well-developed policy grouping are high, but no
higher than between high-status men and women in the bottom two policy groups (across both
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See Mandel (2012) who also draws similar conclusions about different relationships between policies and
outcomes based on different class measures.
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class definitions). Overall and in the well-developed policy group, earnings gaps are larger
between men and women in the high-socio-economic group compared to the low-socioeconomic group. However, this relationship is reversed when moving to a class definition of
earnings only (splitting the sample into those with earnings above the median and those below
the median).
The correlations between the individual policy measures and employment outcomes
allowed me to assess more specific expectations of the relationships among individual policy
dimensions and employment outcomes. A set of four hypotheses were generated for four policy
dimension groups (well-developed leave and ECEC policy dimensions and not-well-developed
leave and ECEC policy dimensions, 12 policy dimensions total). The intent with this analysis
was to begin to uncover evidence of gendered tradeoffs and the links between the policy
dimensions and class inequalities among women using the more precise, disaggregated
measures.
Overall, the results suggest there is more evidence of the intended effects of both welldeveloped and not-well-developed policy dimensions and women’s employment outcomes. Only
specific dimensions of well-developed leave policies may be correlated with worsened gender
employment inequalities and, unexpectedly worsened class employment inequalities. The
correlation analyses further suggested the importance of measuring unpaid + poorly paid leave
periods separately from well-paid leave periods to uncover more specific relationships between
dimensions of leave policy generosity and gender and class employment inequalities.
More to these points above, “good leave” is correlated with some worsened gender
employment inequalities, and surprisingly, some worsened class inequalities among women. For
example, well-paid leave periods for fathers are positively and significantly correlated with
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earnings gaps between high-status men and women. Well-paid leave periods for mothers are also
positively and significantly correlated with both employment and earnings gaps among women
(leaves are correlated with larger gaps), and negatively and significantly correlated with the
percentage of employed women that are managers or lucrative managers. These correlations
support the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and unintended, suggest that “good leave” may also be
correlated with wider class gaps among women across measures of employment and earnings.
However, included country cases in the correlations also impact the relationships between the
policy dimensions and outcome in question, suggesting these results are tentative and require
more research. Further, though well-paid leave for mothers may lower the glass ceiling for
women in terms of becoming a manager or lucrative manager, well-paid leaves are also
negatively correlated with gender managerial and lucrative managerial gaps between men and
women, an intended or positive effect of well-paid leaves for mothers.
The results also show only intended correlations between “good ECEC,” and gender and
class inequalities in employment. Generous ECEC as measured by the enrollment rate of
children 0 to 2 years of age in care (weighted by the dominant mechanism of provision) is
positively correlated with women’s employment rates (by class), and negatively correlated with
gender employment gaps and class employment gaps among women. Supporting mounting
evidence in the literature, there are no unintended relationships between “good ECEC” and labor
market outcomes for women.
However, “bad” leave and ECEC policy dimensions, as expected, were also correlated
with worsened gender and class employment inequalities. Long leave periods that are poorly
paid or unpaid are correlated with higher rates of part-time employment among low-educated
women and worsened part-time earnings gaps between low- and highly educated women (for the
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results that exclude Eastern European countries, Table 8.8). High out-of-pocket costs for care are
positively correlated with part-time employment and negatively correlated with gender
managerial and lucrative gender managerial gaps.
Finally, in Chapter 9 I carried out two sets of hierarchical multilevel models. The first set
of models showed the link between eight well-developed work-family reconciliation policy
dimensions and employment and earnings gaps between men and women, by three levels of
educational attainment. The second set of multilevel models showed the link between welldeveloped work-family reconciliation policies and employment and earnings gaps among women
using the same eight newly constructed policy dimension measures. The goal was to determine if
there is support for the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and the women’s class inequality
hypothesis using the newly constructed policy measures, keeping the models and labor market
outcomes constant.
I identified that only certain design features of leave policy support the gendered
tradeoffs hypothesis. The universality of leave reduced gender employment gaps between men
and women across all three educational groups, as expected. Also expected, well-paid leaves
worsened gender earnings gaps between highly educated men and women. Unexpected is that
both well-paid leaves and unpaid + poorly paid leave periods for mothers worsened gender
earnings gaps between low- and medium-educated men and women.168
Also unexpectedly both types of leave were also associated with worsened employment
gaps between low- and highly educated women—refuting the women’s class inequality
hypothesis. Supporting the growing empirical evidence in the literature, the results provided
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Remember that the earnings models with measures of well-paid leave for mothers included 18 of the 24 countries
and the employment models with measures of well-paid leave for mothers included 23 of the 24 countries. Many of
the countries that provide well-paid leave periods for mothers are excluded from the earnings models due to the
absence of weekly hours worked or due to earnings data limitations in the microdata.
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further support that generous ECEC (as measured by enrollment rates) have no unintended
effects on gender employment inequalities as well as class inequalities among women.
The results confirm the relationship between the persistence of leave policy generosity
and worsening gender employment inequalities—supporting findings from past studies,
including Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Mandel (2012). The results add to the
literature a relationship between leave policy generosity and class inequalities among women in
employment, as well. This research therefore shows support for both “gendered tradeoffs,” and,
new to the literature, “class tradeoffs.” Also new to the literature, the multilevel model results
also confirm that additional dimensions of leave policy, such as well-paid leaves for fathers and
the universality of leave, may have no discernable relationship with worsened gender inequalities
across measures of employment and annual earnings.
However, results from the earnings multilevel models with men and women differ from
the correlation results in Chapter 8. The results from the correlation analyses showed that wellpaid leave for mothers was generally negatively associated with earnings gaps in the low- and
high-socio-economic groups (with or without the inclusion of Hungary in the analyses).
However, these correlations were weak and not statistically significant. The exception was the
correlation between weeks of well-paid leave for mothers and earnings gaps in the high-socioeconomic group that excluded Hungary from the analysis. The relationship was slightly positive
(r=.1851). The weeks of unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave for mothers had no relationship
with the low-socio economic group (r=-.0051) and a slightly positive, but still weak, relationship
with the earnings gaps in the high socio-economic group (r=.1090).169 The results from the
multilevel models showed a negative, or worsened, association between both well-paid and
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Remember that negative correlations in Chapter 8 signal a reduction in gender earnings gaps while a negative
association in the multilevel models signals a worsening of gender earnings gaps since women are coded as 1.
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unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave for mothers and gender earnings gaps across the three
educational groups.
The correlations also provided tentative evidence that well-paid leave periods for fathers
were significantly correlated with larger gender earnings gaps between men and women with
earnings above the median, for example. But this relationship was only true when Iceland and
Norway were included in the analyses. When these countries were dropped from the correlation
analyses, the relationship was still statistically significant, but negative, suggesting longer
periods of well-paid leaves for fathers were correlated with reduced gender earnings gaps
between men and women with earnings above the median. I argue these divergent results
between the correlations and the multilevel models are due to the differences of class definitions
and the countries included across the analyses. Any evidence of gendered tradeoffs is sensitive to
both the class measure used and the country cases included in any one analysis.170
Further, the results in Chapter 8 showed moderate to strong statistically significant
correlations between the coordination of care and women’s employment, and moderately
negative correlations between the coordination of care and gender employment gaps between
men and women across the educational groups. However, in Chapter 9 the coordination of care
had no discernable relationship with employment gaps between men and women across the three
educational groups. The coordination of care variable is intended to show the percentage of
children covered under either well-paid leaves or public childcare until compulsory schooling.
The argument is that the coordination of care across both policies may matter more for women’s

170

The correlations between weeks of unpaid + poorly leaves and well-paid leave for mothers and earnings gaps
include all 24 country cases (and one set of correlations that excludes Hungary from the correlation analyses of
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers and gender earnings gaps). Remember that the patterns of gender earnings
gaps are the same whether countries without gross income data are included or not. The multilevel models that
include measures of unpaid + poorly paid leave and well-paid weeks of leave include 18 or 19 countries only (any
country without gross income data are excluded, as are those countries with no weekly hours worked information in
the microdata).
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employment than either policy separately. This variable is most similar to indices that combine
different policies together. However, this non-relationship between coordination of care and
employment gaps in the multilevel models shows more evidence that it may be only specific
policy dimensions of leave that are associated with gender employment inequalities.
Returning to the example of Germany and the value added of the work-family
reconciliation policy typology, the results from the multilevel models support one of my main
arguments in this dissertation that it is only particular dimensions of leave policy that support the
gendered tradeoffs hypothesis. Germany provides long, unpaid + poorly paid leaves to mothers
but also provides leaves that is quite accessible to working parents (rank of a 4 on the
universality scale in the policy typology, see Table 7.2). The universality of leave policy in
Germany is well-developed. Therefore, we can say that because Germany’s leave policy is welldeveloped along the universality dimension that leave policy in Germany should be associated
with reduced gender employment gaps between men and women across the three educational
groups. However, leave policies for mothers in Germany are also not well-paid. Long and unpaid
+ poorly paid leave in Germany is associated with worsened gender earnings gaps between lowand medium-educated men and women, and unintended, increased employment gaps between
low- and highly educated women in employment. Therefore, different dimensions of the same
policy can have both positive or negative effects on women’s employment and attainment.
Also new to the literature, the study also shows that singular measures of policies cannot
act as a proxy for the scope of policies more generally because of the fact that other dimensions
of these policies are not linked to gender or class gaps. I argue scholars need to be more careful
when making broad claims about the relationship between leave and ECEC policy and women’s
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employment outcomes. Different dimensions of leave policy having different effects on both
gender and class gaps.
Theoretical Contributions
Do well-developed leave and ECEC policies support women’s employment but limit
women’s earnings and occupational attainment compared to men? Are gendered tradeoffs more
prevalent for high-status women compared to high-status men? Moreover, do well-developed
policies reduce gaps in employment and earnings among women? What are the relationships
between gender and class inequalities in employment?
To recap, the prevailing theories about gendered tradeoffs are supply-side theories that
link women’s skills and employment preferences to available work-family reconciliation policies
and demand-side-theories of employer statistical discrimination against women. The literature
argues that supply- and demand-side theories cannot be detangled from one another which makes
causal claims about the link between leave, ECEC, and gender and class employment
inequalities difficult to uncover. Overall, this study provides evidence to support the gendered
tradeoffs hypothesis and that well-developed leave policy dimensions may worsen employment
gaps between low- and highly educated women, but also posed new questions for gendered
tradeoffs research.
First, my study confirms that it is only certain dimensions of leave policy the support the
gendered hypothesis. This study supports the persistence of the negative effects of leave policy—
the length and payment—to worsening gender wage gaps, and also new to the literature and
unintended, worsened class employment inequalities among women. New to the literature, my
study finds that leaves—whether well-paid or not— may worsen class employment gaps among
low- and highly educated women. These findings suggests that human capital and skill are
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intertwined with the generosity of leave policy and the odds of employment for women of
different class groups. The study confirms also that the link between different dimensions of
leave and ECEC policy are not uniform for women across class groups. Further confirming past
research is that “good” ECEC has no discernable negative effect on gender and class inequalities.
I also showed the limitations of the welfare state regime classifications. To study issues
associated with the link between specific work-family policies and gender and class employment
inequalities, the welfare state regime categorizations are outdated. Instead, my study supports the
argument of feminist welfare state theorists that it is important to take gender into account when
categorizing the development of work-family reconciliation policies across high-income
countries. The findings in this study support the literature on leave and ECEC policy architecture
that the welfare state regime typology does not adequately explain variations of leave and ECEC
policies across countries in the same regime type.
My study also contributes to the growing necessity of using measures of underresearched work-family reconciliation policy dimensions to explore additional theories relevant
to the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a large body of literature
dedicated to the relationship between the length of leaves allocated to mothers and employment
outcomes for women. My study provides evidence that there is some truth to long and unpaid or
poorly paid leaves hindering women’s employment and attainment. Other theories suggest that
nontransferable leaves allocated to fathers that are moderate in length, well-paid, and accessible
may reduce gender employment inequalities because employers know that mothers won’t be the
only parent to take up available leave. My study tentatively challenges these assumptions and
suggests that well-paid leaves for fathers may also be linked to worsened gender earnings gaps
(Chapter 8), much in the same way that well-paid leaves for mothers worsen gender earnings

245

gaps. This analysis was sensitive to “extreme values,” included country cases, and the fact that
nearly half of the countries in the study provide no (well-paid) nontransferable leaves to fathers.
However, this study showed that beyond the length of leave and payment of that leave to
mothers, there is still much to uncover about relationships between understudied work-family
reconciliation policy dimensions and employment outcomes for women.
Policy Implications
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, and detailed across this dissertation, there is
great leave and ECEC policy variation at the individual country level. As shown in Part 2, the
United States has very poorly developed leave and ECEC at the federal level. The Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides parents with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a
new child or family member. Employees working in companies with 75 or more employees and
employed for at least 12 months with the same employer (consecutive or not) or who have
worked at least 1250 hours in the previous year are eligible to take up leave. The policy is not
generous in either length or payment. The policy is also very restrictive in terms of eligibility
requirements; that many low-skilled women are not eligible for these leaves is unsurprising.
There is also no entitlement to care for children under compulsory schooling age. Publicly
provided care is means-tested and not widely available. Out-of-pocket costs to parents are high—
nearly 40 percent of the average wage for coupled families with both adults working full-time for
2 young children in care—some of the highest out-of-pocket costs to parents in comparison to
other countries in the study.
Reforms to leave and ECEC policies have been pushed for decades by politicians, though
no substantial changes have been implemented. In the United States, the cultural assumption that
families, mainly mothers, should largely be responsible for the care of young children has not
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caught up with the reality that most parents work and need assistance caring for children. As
evidenced by this research, gender employment inequalities continue to persist—even in
countries with leave and ECEC policies that are vastly superior to those available in the United
States.
This study suggests that certain design features of well-developed leave policies may be
linked to tradeoffs for women in employment which can complicate reforms for policy makers.
These tradeoffs are not uniform for women across different class groups. My study shows that as
of now, no country, not even those with the most generous leave policies in terms of length and
payment of leave, provide equal shares of non-transferrable well-paid leaves to both mothers and
fathers. There is also the issue addressed in part 2 of this dissertation of what length of leave is
optimal to promote gender equality in employment. The two measures of well-paid leave at
different inflection points (one with an inflection point at 6 months and the other with an
inflection point of 12 months ) suggests that leaves may be too long for mothers in some
countries and too short for mothers in other countries, whereas leave policies are always “too
short” for fathers.
However, these complexities also suggests possible policy solutions. In the introductory
chapter I argue leave policies that at least treat men and women the same and promote equality in
the gender division of labor can begin to promote gender equality in employment. My study
suggests that the easier it is for both men and women to access leave promotes women’s
employment and reduce gender employment gaps. Additional recommendations to policy makers
are for equal, non-transferrable, highly-paid leaves for a duration of between 6 to 12 months,
along with other design features (see Kostecki, 2018).
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More broadly, I argue following an “ideal” policy roadmap should be central to the
writing and architecture of leave and also ECEC policies. Moreover, comparisons of leave
policies across countries can help policy makers make informed decisions about how the
architecture of well-developed policies across different dimensions can be adapted to the needs
of working parents in the United States. Having an understanding that gender or class
inequalities may occur and why they are occurring can help policy makers to continually
improve upon policies over time to adapt to the needs of working parents. Further, policies do
not work in a vacuum—identifying that well-developed leave policies and well-developed ECEC
policies should be accessible to working parents across different periods of a child’s life can
provide different care options to working parents.
Limitations of Research and Future Directions for Research
Two sets of limitations are apparent in this research. The first is about the measurement
of leave and ECEC and work-family policies more generally. At the end of Chapter 6, I argued
leave and ECEC policy measures that are disaggregated and precise may provide a better
understanding of relationships between different dimensions of leave and ECEC. These new
measures can be used to test more specific theories of these policies and their relationship with
gender and class inequalities in employment. A fruitful approach would be to pare down the
policy measures to “essential measures” and determine why only some dimensions of leave
policy specifically support the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis. The five measures of interest borne
out of this research are unpaid + poorly paid leaves and well-paid leaves for both mothers and
fathers as well as leave policy universality.
However, there are still many limitations to the operationalization of leave and ECEC
policies into policy measures for work-family policy research. The measurement of these two
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policies across multiple dimensions is complex and requires much knowledge about leave and
ECEC policies across high-income countries. It is clear throughout the literature that policy
indicators and measurement are not standardized, which suggests scholars have different
understandings and interpretations of these policies. The measures presented in the chapters are
also by no means exhaustive. Additional measures could also be added to what I have presented
in the chapter based on the use of different measurement techniques. And of course, the leave
and ECEC policy landscape across countries is ever-changing. Policy measures become quickly
outdated over time.
For ECEC there is still limited comparable data that presents challenges to the
operationalization of this policy into discrete policy measures. Most ECEC policy indicators
measure the utilization of ECEC (enrollment rates or cost of care to different family types) and
not the actual policy itself. There is simply not enough comparable data about opening hours or
fees charged by ECEC providers, for example. Lack of entitlement may also not indicate that
ECEC is not widely available. Rather, countries may allow different regions or municipalities to
supply ECEC based on the demand of local communities (see Appendix 2.1 for more on this
issue).
It is also unclear what measures of ECEC enrollment rates are actually capturing—it
could be the case that measures are capturing the demand for ECEC workers (i.e., higher
enrollments actually capture the demand for more women in feminized jobs) or it could be
capturing the supply of ECEC (i.e., more widely available ECEC allows more women to place
their children in care to enter employment). Mandel and Semyonov (2005) propose a similar
argument in their study. We may not see any discernable positive effects of ECEC for gender or
class gaps because women are more likely to be employed in feminized public care service
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sector jobs (in countries with high enrollments in public care) that bring women into employment
but do not improve their earnings or job prospects (compared to men, or compared to other
women).
Of course, research can also move beyond the link between these two policies and gender
and class inequalities. A growing number of studies have already looked at the relationship
between other adjacent policies and women’s employment outcomes (see Hook 2009; Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; and Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017, for example). I focused on leave
and ECEC policies because of their prominence in the literature and because of enough countrylevel policy data to measure multiple policy dimensions. However, future studies could focus
more on policies that promote women to stay home and care for children (such as home care
policies). More research could also be done looking at the link between part-time work policies,
the quality of these policies (if they are paid at the same rate as full-time work, or if they come
with other benefits, like social security benefits, for example), and women’s employment and
attainment.
Beyond policies and measurement, there are clear methodological limitations in this
literature. First, it is increasingly clear that the link between work-family policies and women’s
employment and attainment is not uniform across different class groups. However, if the goal is
to determine the links between work-family policies and women’s employment and attainment
across class groups then we need to find better ways to clearly identify links and patterns
between policies and outcomes using different class measures and where we expect to see
competing results. I argue a good start is at least addressing that different patterns of gender and
class inequalities can change based on different measures of class, which further complicates
gendered tradeoffs research. My study highlighted this issue, particularly with the earnings gaps
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analyses in Chapter 8—patterns of earnings gaps changed across the two measures of class.
Mandel (2012) draws a similar conclusion. Her study showed that FTE maternity leave worsened
gender earnings gaps between low-educated men and women. However, for men and women
with low earnings, the results showed a slightly negative and not statistically significant
relationship between FTE maternity leave and earnings gaps. The results suggest maternity leave
is not associated with worsened gender earnings gaps between low-earning men and women. 171
Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) use different measures of class across different analyses
and also find no clear patterns of gender employment inequalities using different class measures
(similar to my Chapter 8, they utilize educational attainment, earnings (measured in quintiles),
and occupational attainment).
Throughout this chapter, I also briefly laid out the limitations with the two most
prominent methodological approaches in the literature—welfare state regime studies and
multilevel modeling. In this study, I explored the gendered tradeoffs hypothesis and women’s
class inequality hypothesis using both approaches. I showed one limitation of the welfare state
regime studies is the development of welfare state institutions more broadly does not fully
explain the development of individual work-family policies. As stated in Chapter 9, Hook and Li
(2020, 251) argue that multilevel models “are sensitive to the selection and number of countries
included, which are typically less than thirty and often much less; data tend to be cross-sectional,
thus causal claims are questionable; and many key findings in the literature are based on data
from the 1990s, which are now dated.” Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019, 21) also address whether
“certain models provide the right evidence for the tradeoffs hypothesis” (based on different
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Remember men is coded as 1 in her study so a negative relationship implies a reduction in gender earnings gaps.
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sample groups and cross-sectional models versus models that incorporate multiple country
years).
Hook and Li (2020) offer up another suggestion for future research that combines these
two methods. Sticking with the importance of context and that the impact of policies may be
context-dependent, is the argument for institutional complimentaries (Thévenon 2016).
“Thévenon examines complementarities between policy pairs (paired interaction terms),
institutions (sum of the direct effects of all policies), as well as the effects of policies within
regimes (policies interacted with regime dummies)” (Hook and Li 2020, 251–252). He concludes
that “female labour force participation reacts differently to different policy measures, depending
on the institutional environment in which they play out” (Thévenon 2016, 494).
However, this singular study focuses only on the link between welfare state regimes and
individual policies and women’s employment (female labor force participation, full-time
employment, and part-time employment). The study does not address the link between these
institutions and female labor market attainment (and labor attainment for women across different
class groups). Thévenon (2016) utilizes several of the standard leave and ECEC policy measures
from the literature as well as other explanatory policy variables. My study showed how workfamily policies are measured matters for the link between these policies and women’s labor
market outcomes. For any future study of institutional complimentaries, it needs to be kept in
mind that links between institutional supports (welfare states + individual policies) and women’s
employment outcomes is also dependent on how work-family reconciliation policies are
measured in the first place and relationships between work-family policies—based on different
possible measurements—and welfare state regimes/contexts.
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My study also broadened gendered tradeoffs research incorporating high-income
countries from Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, not traditionally included in large-N
comparative studies. I showed that, especially with the case of Eastern Europe, part-time work
patterns are much lower than their high-income counterparts. Regional differences in the supply
or demand of part-time work may be apparent regardless of the development of family policies.
Another question is how do issues of gendered tradeoffs and women’s class inequality change
when bringing in countries from the middle-income world or adapting questions from gendered
tradeoffs research to regions outside Europe and the English-speaking countries? Increasingly,
countries in Latin America provide leave and ECEC policies that are similar to their European
counterparts. Do we see similar links between policies and outcomes in these regions as we do in
high-income countries—why or why not?
Other country-context-dependent studies such as like small N or country case studies may
better address other socio-economic variables (besides class) like race and ethnicity that may
impact the link between work-family reconciliation policies and women’s employment and
attainment. The country typology I constructed in Chapter 7 could be a good place to start in
terms of addressing variations of the development of these policies across different dimensions
within specific country contexts. The country typology is also a useful starting point to compare
leave and ECEC policy contexts in countries that place in new groups. For example, France
places in the well-developed grouping. The development of leave and ECEC in France is as welldeveloped as those in many of the Social Democratic countries. A case study using process
tracing could uncover why leave and ECEC policies in a Conservative-Corporatist country are
just as well-developed as those in several Social Democratic countries.
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Finally, in this study, I focused primarily on comparisons between men and women and
among women with different levels of educational attainment. In future research, the policy
measures I constructed in Part 2 can be used to evaluate relationships between policies and
outcomes for different sample groups—mothers and fathers or mothers and non-mothers, for
example.
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APPENDICES
Chapter 1 Appendix
Appendix 1: Full-Time Average Annual Earnings in Nineteen Countries
The table of full-time average annual earnings can be found in Appendix Table 1 in the
“All Tables” section.
Chapter 2 Appendix
Appendix 2.1: Leave and ECEC: Measures from Past Research and Descriptive Information
Leave Measures from Past Research and Descriptive Information
Central to the gendered tradeoffs literature is the measurement of leave policy to
construct policy indicators. In the literature, scholars have used a variety of indicators in the to
measure leave policy generosity. The measures generally include measures of length, payment,
wage replacement, or a combination of these dimensions. The standard indicators of leave policy
generosity from the literature are:
1) The total weeks of leave, whether paid or unpaid (Pettit and Hook 2009)
2) Weeks of fully-paid leave (the weeks of leave multiplied by the wage-replacement
rate of that leave—Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006, Mandel and Shalev 2009,
Mandel 2012, and Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013)
3) Weeks of paid leave at any wage-replacement rate (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017 and
Brady, Blome, and Kmec 2019)
4) The average wage-replacement rate over the total paid leave period (Olivetti and
Petrongolo 2017)172
172

Drawn from the literature that looks at gender inequalities among women, the weeks of well-paid leave (paid at
60 percent of usual earnings) is utilized in Keck and Saraceno (2013). This is one of the only studies that
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ECEC Measures from Past Research and Descriptive Information
Enrollment rates of children are primarily measured in three ways across the literature.
First enrollment rates are aggregated, taking into account average enrollment of all children in
ECEC under compulsory schooling age (Mandel 2012; Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006;
Mandel and Shalev 2009). Enrollment rates for only one age group may be measured —e.g.,
children between birth or up to two or three years of age or those in childcare services (Brady,
Blome, and Kmec 2019; Keck and Saraceno 2013; Mandel 2011; Pettit and Hook 2009). Finally,
enrollment rates for the two groups (those from birth up to the third birthday and from three
years to compulsory schooling age) is used in one study (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013).
Other measures of ECEC generosity used in the literature includes total expenditure for
ECEC as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (hereafter total public expenditure in
percent of GDP) and out-of-pocket childcare costs. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) include both
cash and non-cash benefits in their assessments. They define total public expenditure in percent
of GDP as the sum of benefits both in-kind (non-cash, such as childcare or preschool services)
and cash benefits (such as child allowances or subsidies that offset the cost of care for both
childcare and pre-primary education).173 174

incorporates a measure of well-paid leave; note in HLM models scholars construct indicators that signal “moderate”
amount of leave by squaring leave policy indicators. The justification is that weeks of leave have a positive effect on
gender equality in employment until a specific inflection point, upon which the effects of leave have negative effects
on gender equality in employment.
173
See OECD PF3_1_Public spending on childcare and early education (last updated in 2019) for more information
on public spending and conceptual differences across countries.
174
However, note that measures may not be completely comparable across the literature. Some studies include
expenditure on both institutions (non-cash) and cash benefits while others analyze expenditure on non-cash benefits
only.
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Concepts
Additional concepts are important to ECEC indicator construction. “Enrollment rates”
and “coverage rates” are often used interchangeably throughout the literature. Demand for
publicly subsidized ECEC services exceeds supply in nearly all countries. Therefore because
countries do not have unused public care services, scholars use enrollment rates as the coverage
rate, e.g., the percentage of children in an age group that are covered by public care services (see
Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014, 60).175
The financing and management of non-cash institutional supports for ECEC are
important dimensions to measurements of enrollment. Generally, most scholars utilize measures
of enrollment for children in publicly managed or publicly-funded or managed care (care
facilities managed by public entities) This is because scholars want to evaluate national
government’s attempt at subsidizing care through enrollment rates.176 However, different types
of care should be considered. Increasingly, enrollment rate information for formal care
arrangements are the data available through international organizations. The below definitions
are important to the chapter moving forward. The financing and management of care is centered
on the concepts of public financing, public care, private care, and formal care. The definitions
below have been adapted from the OECD (2010, 2016):

Gornick and Meyers (2009) utilize the term “enrollment rates.” Similarly, Mandel and Semeyonov (2005, 2006)
include the percentage of children aged 0–6 in publicly funded childcare facilities in the WSII. Korpi, Ferrarini, and
Englund (2013) defines childcare coverage as the percentage of children under three years old covered by publicly
subsidized childcare. Likewise, Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) use childcare coverage in their study defined as the
percentage of children under three years old in a country covered by publicly subsidized childcare (in facilities that
are either publicly or privately managed). Ciccia and Belijengberg (2014, 60) define childcare coverage as “the
number of children cared for in public or private facilities for at least 1 hour as proportion of all children of the same
age group.” Saraceno (2011, 81) utilizes childcare coverage in publicly provided or supported services.
176
See the Glossary for a full list of terms and concepts used throughout this chapter. Additional concept definitions
can be found in the notes section of Appendix A4.2.
175
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1) Public care—care that is both publicly funded and managed (more than 50 percent of
enrollments are in publicly operated facilities).
2) Private care—care that is largely managed by private stakeholders (both for-profit
and not-for-profit providers) and can be both publicly and privately funded.177 Private
childcare providers may also operate without public dollars and therefore be
completely privately financed.
3) Formal care arrangements—an umbrella term that encompasses both public and
private care provisions that adhere to the 2011 guidelines for ISCED-0. According to
the OECD and the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) this
generally includes children in ECEC services that take place in an institutionalized
setting and that contain an intentional education component; informal arrangements
such as informal learning by children through their parents or other relatives or
friends are not included (ISCED 2011, 26).178
The provision of care—whether care is publicly or privately managed directly relates to
the availability and cost of care. See more information regarding this issue in Chapter 3.
Finally, cash supports for childcare provision also provide parents across the
socioeconomic spectrum with different incentives to either stay at home and care for children or
enter the labor force. Examples of these include home care allowances that can be offered to help
parents care for their children at home in non-institutional settings and child allowances (these
allowances can be paid directly as a cash benefit or through or the tax system as a benefit or

177

The types of care under numbers 1 and 2 are largely included in the gendered tradeoffs literature. The main idea
is to assess public policy effects on women’s employment outcomes and employment gaps. Therefore, as long as
children are being cared for in a facility that is funded with public dollars, this child is considered to be in publicly
subsidized care.
178
In Mandel (2011) for example, data covers four types of childcare arrangements: group care, residential care,
child-minders, and paid care providers at home.
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rebate).179 Tax credits, tax rebates “in-work benefits” (see Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017, 19) that
are often means-tested and can incentivize low-income workers to enter the labor force.
“Although these tax credits are not primarily targeted to female labor force participation,
eligibility and take-up rates are higher among mothers than fathers” (Olivetti and Petrongolo
2017, 19). In the US, for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has increased the labor
supply of single mothers (Nichols and Rothstein 2016). However, since the US does not have
generous institutional childcare supports, parents still face the issue of how to provide care for
their children while they are at work. I do not include cash supports in this research but explain
them here to provide an understanding of the full care policy landscape.
Chapter 4 Appendices
Both Appendix Table 4.1 (leave policy information + notes) and Appendix Table 4.2
(ECEC policy information + notes) can be found in the “All Tables” section prior to the
bibliography.
Appendix 4.1: Supplemental Information for Appendix Table 4.2—Descriptive Evaluation of
Hours of Availability for ECEC Services
Measures of the availability/opening hours for childcare services is not completely
comparable. Therefore, no measures were used in analyses. However, compiled information is
still shown in Appendix Table 4.2 to provide more of a general understanding of the hours of
availability and compare it to the additional data. Where information is available that is relevant
to hours of availability/opening hours for childcare services, I display the following: 1) How
opening hours are regulated; 2) How many hours typical hours per week care is available; 3)
Typical opening hours per day; and 4) Some evidence of non-standard hours of operation. At
179

Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) includes some of these cash supports in their analyses.
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least one of the first three data points available for 28 of the 31 countries. I assume extended
childcare hours are rare or non-existent in countries with no information. No information for
extended hours is available in the US, Canada, and Ireland. For Switzerland and Estonia, typical
daily/weekly hours of availability are not available only information about how opening hours
are regulated. Therefore, typical daily/weekly hours of availability are available in 26 of the 31
countries.
Of the 20 countries for which data is available, in 13 countries providers are responsible
for setting hours of availability (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Australia, France, Iceland and the Slovak
Republic). Local governing bodies set hours of availability in four countries (Estonia, Finland,
Italy, and Switzerland). In three countries, hours of availability are set out in national legislation
(Greece, Denmark, and Hungary). Perhaps unsurprisingly, in five of the six countries for which
private care is the dominant mechanism of provision, individual providers regulate hours
(Austria, Australia, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovak Republic (a mixed system). In
Switzerland, the canton or commune is responsible for setting opening hours.
Overwhelmingly, day care centers are available during standard weekday work hours in
all countries. In 26 of the 31 countries for which data is available, day care centers are typically
open 30 hours per week or more, adhering to the international minimum standard. Some
countries offer a mix of part-time and full-time care options. Part-time creches in Italy are open
for 20 hours per week. Select public childcare centers are open for 25 hours per week in Latin
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American countries,180 Poland (kids clubs), Germany, and Spain. Hours of availability range
from 20 hours a week up to 60 hours in Luxembourg and Hungary.
Evidence of extended hours across some centers/municipalities also exists in Denmark,
Finland, Mexico, and Paraguay. The UK offers limiting evening, night, and weekend opening
hours. In Slovenia, some centers are open until 10 p.m. (see Yerkes and Javornik 2018 for the
evaluation of extended hours in the UK and Slovenia). Centers in Luxembourg are typically open
12 hours per day from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., while some centers in Hungary are open up to 12 hours
per day, which I classify as extended hours.
Therefore, though most childcare centers adhere to a 30 hour per week or more standard,
hours of availability differ greatly across countries. Most centers are open during standard
working hours with only a few countries offering extended hours in the evening, at night, or on
the weekend. Therefore, low-income parents or those with non-standard work hours can be
disproportionately affected by few care options for young children.
Appendix 4.2: Methods—Indicator Measurement and Ranking
All leave and ECEC policy indicators (hereafter, “indicators” or “measures”—both are
used interchangeably) are constructed based on different measurement considerations from the
literature or as discussed in the limitations section of Chapter 3. I utilize common best practices
from the literature to construct the indicators and to rank country estimates across each
individual indicator. Measures are constructed for all 24 countries in the study.
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In their analyses of 40 childcare programs across 22 Latin American countries, Diaz and Chamussy (2016, 123)
note that 80 percent of childcare programs offer full-time hours and 24 of the 40 programs or 60 percent of the
programs, offer services full-year-round (12 months).
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Leave Policy Generosity Indicators
Some generalized rules were followed for the construction of all indicators. First, in
select countries, mothers are required to take a portion of their leave prior to birth. The literature
is mixed about whether to include periods of mandatory pre-birth leave (Keck and Saraceno
(2013) and Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) do not include these weeks. However, Korpi,
Ferrarini, and Englund (2013) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) include these periods). In this
study, mandatory periods of per-birth and the total weeks of leave post-birth are both considered
in the construction of the indicators for mothers. A separate leave indicator that shows only
weeks of leave granted pre-birth (along with additional leave measures) can be found in
Appendix Table 5.1.
I justify that a wage-replacement rate of two-thirds of usual earnings or 67 percent of
usual earnings is the lowest cutoff point at which leave becomes inaccessible to low-wage
mothers and fathers and for which fathers, in general, will not take up leave. Therefore, leave
periods that replace wages at 67 percent of earnings, or more, is considered “well-paid” leave.
Leave periods that replace wages at less than 67 percent of usual earnings is considered “lowpaid” leave.
Additional rules: first where leave length is provided in months instead of weeks, I
assume 52 weeks out of the year divided by 12 months equals 4.33 weeks in a month. Second,
following the method of Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010)181, where more than one possible
arrangement of leave is available, I consider the least generous arrangement in terms of leave
length. In Norway, for example, parents may choose shorter leave periods paid at 100 percent of
earnings, or longer leave periods at 80 percent of earnings. In several cases, mothers who are not
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Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010) expands on the work in Gornick and Meyers (2003).
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insured, underinsured, or are currently unemployed are also eligible to receive leave benefits. For
example, in Slovenia, maternity leave is granted to women with less than 12 months of
contributions.182
Indicator 1 is simply the total weeks of leave, whether paid or unpaid. Indicator 2 is
constructed based on the full-time equivalent (FTE) leave method, the duration of leave
multiplied by the wage-replacement rate (e.g., Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Plantenga et
al. 2009; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010; Saraceno and Keck 2010; UNICEF 2008. Though
problematic (see Chapter 3), this indicator is one of the most widely utilized in this research. I
include it in my analyses in order to compare to the construction of other leave policy indicators
and to determine if conceptions of leave policy generosity differ when compared to other
indicators. Indicator 3 is the average wage-replacement rate over the total leave period. Indicator
4 is simply the weeks of leave that are paid (regardless of wage-replacement rate).
Returning to Indicator 3, this measure takes into account the average wage replacement
across the paid leave period (method adapted from Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). I assume the
following; first, where benefits are paid at a flat-rate (all leave takers receive the same benefit
amount as long as contribution or other eligibility requirements are met, regardless of earnings)
or an earnings-related benefit ceiling is available (leave takers are eligible to receive only up to a
specified amount over the leave period or a percentage of usual earnings up to a maximum), I use
the country’s average annual earnings to estimate the percentage of earnings represented by the
flat-rate benefit or benefit ceiling. Fourteen countries impose ceilings to wage replacements
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Note, however, that in countries with different wage replacement rules for mothers (and/or fathers) based on
length of employment, I use the standard wage replacement rules. In Slovenia, the wage replacement is dependent
on whether women have more or less than 12 months of contributions. In this case, I assume the standard wage
replacement rules for women with 12 months of employment/contributions. I argue that choice and flexibility may
be important to parents. Taking into account different leave lengths and payment rates may also change
understandings of generosity, but again, I take into account best practices from the literature. In most cases, any
flexibility is usually comparable in terms of generosity as the leave length and payment rates I analyze.
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during leave (Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg
(maternity leave, leave around the birth of a child), the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain,
and Switzerland). Two countries offer a flat-rate benefit (Luxembourg (parental leave) and the
United Kingdom).183 Data to calculate full-time average annual earnings come from the LIS
Database for around the years 2013 and 2010. Average annual earnings reflect full-time earnings
(35 weeks or more for individuals between the ages of 25–54).184
The additional indicators are all either new to the literature or under-utilized in the
literature. New to the literature, Indicator 5 is inclusive of all unpaid leave plus poorly paid leave
(a wage replacement of less than 67 percent of usual earnings). I construct this measure because
the literature suggests that periods of unpaid and poorly paid leave affect behavior to take up
leave differently than well-paid leave (paid at 67 percent of earnings).185 The question with this
indicator is whether the length of leave is more important to consider versus the payment (lowpaid leave is not generous).
Indicators 6 and 9 show the weeks of well-paid weeks of leave at either 67 percent of 85
percent of usual earnings for the duration of the paid leave period. 186 I include these paid leave
policy measures to show potential differences in country rankings between unpaid/low-paid and
well-paid leave periods.187 Indicators 7 and 8 are measured based on the results of Indicator 6.
With Indicators 7 and 8, an inflection point of well-paid leave that is not too long or too short are
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For detailed wage replacement calculation information for these countries, see country-specific notes in the
appendix.
184
Therefore, wage-replacement rates for workers with earnings below the average will be higher that what the
person with the earnings receives. This method is similar to the method utilized in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
185
Note, however, I do not make any assumptions about rates of take up for leave—this is out the scope of the
dissertation. Leave may be offered as a family entitlement, but mothers may or may not use it.
186
See footnotes in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for studies that utilize these leave policy measures.
187
My results will show that leave for fathers in most countries is paid at two-thirds of earnings or higher, with most
paid at 100 percent of usual earnings.
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considered using a one-year and six-month cutoff (two ends of ideal leave lengths assessed in the
literature).
Below is an explanation of indicator construction for the nine leave generosity indicators
that take into account the relevant rules discussed above. Each column represents one leave
policy indicator used across analyses.
Indicator 1 (Total weeks of leave): This is the total weeks of paid leave for both
mothers and fathers, whether paid or unpaid. Here I allocate all sharable weeks of leave to the
mother.
Indicator 2 (Weeks of fully-paid leave (FTE leave)): The weeks of paid leave
multiplied by the wage-replacement rate over the total leave period. For example, Norway offers
mothers 35 weeks of paid leave that replaces wages at 100 percent of usual earnings. 35 x 100 =
35 weeks of fully-paid leave.
Indicator 3 (Wage replacement over the total paid leave period): The wage
replacement, averaged over the total paid leave period. For example, the UK offers mothers 39
weeks of paid leave. The first 6 weeks are paid at 90 percent of usual earnings. The following 33
weeks are paid at GPB 135.45 or 90 percent of usual earnings, whichever is lower. Following the
rules above, I assume the average worker receives the flat-rate benefit of GPB 135.45 per week
since the average wage is GBP 473.29. Therefore, the calculation is as followed: 135.45/473.29
= .29 (wage replacement for 33 weeks of leave for the average worker. ((6*.90 + 33*.29)/39 = 38
percent wage replacement over the total period of paid leave.
Indicator 4 (Weeks of paid leave (at any wage-replacement rate)): All weeks of leave
that replace some portion of a parents’ usual earnings; regardless of the rate of payment.
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Indicator 5 (Weeks of unpaid or poorly paid leave (less than 67 percent of usual
earnings)): Total weeks of unpaid leave + total weeks of poorly paid leave (see Indicators 2 and
3 in Appendix 4.3).188
Indicator 6 (Weeks of well paid-leave at 67 percent or more of usual earnings): The
weeks of paid leave across each country that meet or exceed this cutoff, based on the rules
detailed above.
Indicators 7 and 8 (One-year cutoff and six-month cutoff (Weeks of paid leave with
a wage replacement at least 67 percent of earnings)): The total weeks of well-paid leave
(Indicator 6) minus 52 weeks (1 year) and 26 weeks (6 months). These indicators are included to
show different recommendations for moderate periods of well-paid leave at 67 percent of
earnings. The closer to zero the value, the closer the weeks of well-paid leave match the
recommendations of these two moderate well-paid leave periods. The farther away countries’
estimates are from the optimal moderate leave midpoint, either positive or negative, the lower the
country rank. The same value, either positive or negative, is given the same rank value. The rank
is granted in the same way calculated by the Excel rank function for those indicators given rank
in either ascending or descending order (see below).
Indicator 9 (Weeks of well-paid leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings): The
weeks of well-paid leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings, based on the rules detailed
above.
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Largely underutilized in past research but included for comparative purposes are weeks of unpaid and poorly paid
leave (Indicator 2). As evaluated earlier, weeks of unpaid and poorly paid leave can have consequences for gender
equality in employment, though specific measures of unpaid or poorly paid leave are largely absent from the
gendered tradeoffs literature.
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Leave Gender Equality Indicators
To build on the gendered tradeoffs literature and evaluate which countries support gender
equality through leave legislation, I assess five indicators that estimate the share of reserved
leave for fathers as well as which countries provide incentives and disincentives for fathers to
take up leave in the last two indicators. The literature suggests that fathers should be granted
equal shares of nontransferable leave (same as mothers). Incentives and disincentives for fathers
to take up leave are also important components to gender equality in leave legislation that can
further hinder or promote take-up. All indicators are calculated from the leave policy generosity
estimates. Positive or negative “points” are granted to a country’s ranking based on whether
legislation further incentivizes or disincentivizes fathers to take up leave. These positive or
negative “points” are taken into consideration when evaluating which countries provide policies
that are well-developed.
Indicator 1 (Total reserved leave for fathers as a percentage of total leave): total
weeks of reserved, nontransferable leave for fathers divided by [total weeks of leave for mothers
(reserved + shareable leave, including any pre-birth leave) + the total weeks of reserved,
nontransferable leave for fathers].
Indicator 2 (Total paid leave reserved for fathers): total weeks of reserved paid leave
for fathers (regardless of the wage-replacement rate) divided by [total weeks of paid leave for
mothers (reserved + sharable leave, including any pre-birth leave) + the total weeks of paid,
reserved, nontransferable leave for fathers].
Indicator 3 (Fathers’ share of unpaid + low-paid leave (less than 67 percent of usual
earnings): total weeks of reserved, nontransferable leave fathers receive that are either unpaid or
paid at less than two-thirds or 67 percent of usual earnings divided by [total weeks of leave for
mothers (reserved + sharable leave) unpaid or pad at less than two-thirds or 67 percent of usual
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earnings + the total weeks of paid, reserved, nontransferable leave for fathers unpaid or paid at
less than two thirds or 67 percent of usual earnings].
Indicator 4 (Total well-paid leave at 67 percent of usual earnings): total weeks of
reserved, nontransferable leave fathers that are paid at two-thirds or 67 percent of usual earnings
or higher divided by the [total weeks of leave for mothers (reserved + sharable leave) paid at
two-thirds or 67 percent of usual wages or higher + the total weeks of paid, reserved,
nontransferable leave for fathers paid at two-thirds or 67 percent of usual wages or higher].
Indicator 5 (Total well-paid leave at 85 percent of usual wages): total weeks of
reserved, nontransferable leave for fathers that are paid at two-thirds or 85 percent of usual
wages or higher divided by the [total weeks of leave for mothers (reserved + sharable leave) paid
at two-thirds or 67 percent of usual wages or higher + the total weeks of paid, reserved,
nontransferable leave for fathers paid at two-thirds or 67 percent of usual wages or higher].
Incentives: One point, up to a total of three points is granted if parents are able to take
off some time together, if mothers can transfer some of their leave to fathers, or if there is a
specific incentive for fathers’ to take up a period of shared leave (such as the receipt of “bonus
days” in the case of Finland’s leave policy, for example). In several countries, mothers are able
to transfer a portion of leave granted around the birth of a child to the father. Though we know
fathers are unlikely to use transferable leave from the mother or father, this dimension is
included as an incentive because the underlying idea is to promote fathers’ take-up of leave.189
Disincentives: countries’ policies are granted negative two points if only one parent can
take up periods of shared leave. Negative one point is granted if only one parent can take up a

Remember, that specific incentives for fathers to take a portion of shared leave (called “daddy days”) are already
included the appropriate measures.
189
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parental leave that is family entitlement, but the entitlement can be split if parents agree to it in
writing.
Leave Universality Indicators and Scale
The construction of the leave universality indicators and accompanying scale differs from
the construction of the leave generosity and gender equality indicators. This is because
measurements of leave policy universality are based on categorical information that is “ranked”
based on the features of leave policy legislation that is more or less restrictive. Each country is
given a score based on the legislative definition for that particular universality dimension. For
example, paid maternity leave for mothers through a social insurance or social insurance scheme
will receive the highest score for leave financing. From the main text, I highlighted that leave
that is financed through a social insurance scheme is the most universal because employers are
less likely to discriminate against leave takers when they do not have finance leave
themselves.190
The scoring of categorical policy information from most to least universal parallels the
ranking method used to rank the leave policy generosity and gender equality indicators (see next
section). These scores also automatically rank countries’ policies across each of the dimensions
from the least to most universal like the rankings for the leave generosity and gender equality
indicators. In this case, the rank is using a low score of 0 and a high score of 3 (3 for financing of
leave and maternity leave coverage rates) or 5 (eligibility requirements), depending on the
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See page ILO Maternity and Paternity at Work publication (2014, page 141) for a description of the categories.
Based on Article 6 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), countries are classified as financed by
“Social security” (social insurance or public funds, such as the state or government), the employer (“Employer
liability”) or a combination of these systems (“Mixed”). A mixed system might involve an initial payment by the
employer, followed by a partial reimbursement by social insurance or public funds. Mixed systems might also
provide that the employer pays the difference between the social insurance benefit and the worker’s previous
earnings. Some systems stipulate that the employer has to pay for workers who are not covered by social security.
For the purposes of this report, they are classified as funded by social security."
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indicator. Each individual indicator as well as the scale that includes the total score across the
five individual indicators are essentially ordinal scales. A higher score across any one of the five
individual indicators or the scale that aggregates the five scores across the individual indicators
indicates a dimension that is more universal than the other possible categories, but the exact
measurement between the scores is unknown.
For eligibility requirements and financing schemes I construct separate indicators for
mothers and fathers for a total of four separate indicators. The score across each indicator is
based only on periods of leave that is specifically reserved for either the mother or the father. In
the event that mothers or fathers are granted paid leave periods under two different schemes
(e.g., maternity leave and parental leave), the score is based on the least generous/most restrictive
scheme.
The scores across all five indicators are then tallied up to produce an overall leave
universality score for the universality scale. I add up the scores to determine the total variation
across the five individual ordinal indicators of leave due to low variation across the individual
indicators (though the scores across these individual ordinal indicators can certainly be compared
to other leave or ECEC indicators, if necessary). I rank the total scores in descending order to
obtain an overall numerical rank of leave policy universality across countries. By ranking all
generosity and gender equality indicators and the universality scale in the same way, I am better
able to compare the rankings across the individual indicators and universality scale.
The below is a justification of the scoring across each of the five individual universality
indicators based on the literature review/critique from Chapter 3.
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Coverage Rates
Coverage rates are categorized as broad percentages (see Appendix Table 4.1); 33–65
percent coverage, 66–89 percent coverage, and 90–100 percent coverage, indicating coverage in
the law for maternity leave. Because broader coverage indicates better accessibility, a score of 1
is granted for coverage between 33–65 percent, a score of 2 is granted for coverage between 66
and 89 percent and a score of 3 for coverage between 90 and 100 percent. A score of 0 would be
granted for coverage between 0 and up to 33 percent. However, no country receives a score of 0
since some maternity leave coverage is available across all countries in the study.
Leave Financing
Countries receive a score of 3 if available leave is financed by the state through taxation
or through a social insurance scheme financed by insured contributions. A 2 is granted to
countries that have leave financed as a hybrid between employers and social security (next
closest to the ideal based on my assessment). A score of 1 is given if leave is financed by
employers only or is financed through a mix of employers and an employee’s individual account
(this is the case in Switzerland). A score of 0 is granted if a leave scheme either does not exist or
exists but is not paid (therefore no financing scheme is available). 191
Eligibility of Leave
For this indicator, a score of 5 is granted for no conditions beyond membership in a
sickness fund, etc., employment with no minimum contribution requirements, and in some cases,
minimum established months of residency (Note: I use employment to mean either simply,

191

In Iceland and Norway there is no distinction between maternity/paternity leave and parental leave. However,
leave is often categorized into maternity/paternity and parental leave in leave research. Therefore, I assume all leave
is financed by the same entity (see ILO Maternity and Paternity at Work 2014 for further information). The
categories were based off of data and information from the ILO.
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employment or employment with contributions, but in nearly all cases eligibility for leave is
associated with employee contributions to fund that pays for leave benefits 192). A score of 4 is
granted for minimal conditions. By minimal conditions I mean the employee must request from
his/her employer or have less than 6 months of employment or contributions. A score of 3 is
granted for minimum employment requirements between 6 months to a year. A score of 2 is
granted for 12 months minimum employment. A score of 1 is granted for more than 1 year of
employment or evidence of a means test or minimum earnings requirement. I justify these
restrictions as the farthest away from the ideal because in many cases it is harder for low-wage
workers to establish a work history. Means tests or minimum earnings requirements also cutoff
groups of workers from access to benefits. Finally, a score of 0 indicates no available reserved
leave.
ECEC Policy Measurement
ECEC Policy Generosity
ECEC generosity measures are constructed using continuous data that is indicative of
ECEC utilization and availability (enrollment rates, total public expenditure on pre-primary
education in percent of GDP per capita, and parental fees (out-of-pocket costs for care)).

192

For countries that define eligibility by number of days or hours worked I assume the following: 21.74 full-time
workdays in a month = 260 workdays per year. Therefore, while I use a full-time equivalent; persons who work
part-time may have a more difficult time accessing available leave because of the need of a longer work history.
Hour minimums = 35 hours per week (full-time) x 52 weeks (assuming full-time full year employment = 1,820
hours per year). Specific country notes: Australia has an earnings threshold for receiving the parental benefit.
However, the threshold is very high; AUD 150,000 so I do not take this rule into account. For the composite index, I
grant countries the following scores for eligibility: I grant Finland a score of 5 for both mothers and fathers since the
employer has to be notified at least 2 months in advance of the duration of the leave. Slovenia: No minimum
qualifying period for employed persons. I use the requirements for the employed. Uruguay: There is some
discrepancy between the information provided by the ILO and the US Social Security Administration Social
Security Programs throughout the world information on eligibility for maternity leave. The Social Security
Administration categorizes maternity leave as a means-tested benefit while the ILO does not. In this case, I use the
rules from the ILO. I score eligibility for mothers and fathers as a 5 (fathers need to provide documentation to their
employers in order to take paternity leave which I classify as minimum conditions).
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Indicators 1 and 2 show the enrollment of children of formal care arrangements separated
by age (the enrollment of children from birth up to 2 years of age, Indicator 1, and enrollment of
children from 3 years of age to compulsory schooling age, Indicator 2). Indicators 4 and 5 utilize
the same enrollment information. However, enrollments are weighted by the dominant
mechanism of provision (public, mixed, or private). Public provision is shown to be more widely
available and indicative of care that is more affordable. In these cases, enrollment rates are
weighted by 1 (Yerkes and Javornik 2018). Enrollment rates under mixed provision systems are
weighted at .75, and enrollment rates in countries with the dominant mechanism as private
provision is weighted at .5 (see also Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997). Dominant mechanisms of
provision are drawn from the framework of Brennan et al.’s (2012) logics of care provisions:
market provision (both formal private or non-profit provisions) and state provision (public).
Indicator 3 is the total public expenditure on pre-primary education in percent of GDP per
capita and parental fees. For this indicator, I utilize data on GDP expenditure in pre-primary
education as a percent of GDP per capita to uncover government support for slightly older
children under compulsory schooling age.193 The final two Indicators (6 and 7) are net childcare
fees for children in single-parent and dual-parent families (these data assume two children ages 2
and 3 years of age in care, parents employed full-time. Fees are based on 100 percent of the
average wage).194 195
Some additional limitations to these data exist. For example, the cost of childcare based
on the percentage of net family income spent on care takes both child allowances and tax
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Data limitations for a measure of GDP expenditure are evaluated in the literature review of this chapter.
In Appendix Table 4.2 I also include fees to parents in specific programs in the seven Latin American countries.
Therefore, these data in middle-income and high-income countries are not completely comparable.
195
In Latin America, childcare fee estimates have been evaluated using household level surveys and that have
questions about the cost of specific childcare programs throughout Latin America, not across all childcare programs
(Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy 2016).
194
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allowances into consideration.196 However, tax allowances are dependent on whether a parent
works and their level of earnings. Therefore, these benefits are not available to all parents,
especially those that do not work (Yerkes and Javornik 2018, 6).197
ECEC Universality
In a second section, I evaluate legal entitlement to care at the national level (a measure of
the universality of leave) to determine the universality of ECEC across to measures. Two
separate indicators of ECEC entitlement and the child’s age of entitlement are scored, similar to
the leave universality indicators. The scores of both measures are added up in the ECEC
universality scale and ranked.
Countries are granted an overall score based on the following points system that takes
into account the age of legal entitlement for the child and whether the legal entitlement is fulltime (more than 20 hours per week) or part-time (20 hours per week or less). The assumption is
that the younger the legal entitlement to care and the more hours of care the child is legal entitled
to, the more universality in ECEC legislation. If legal entitlement is granted at 1 year or less =
score of 5; 2 years or less = 4; 3 years or less = 3; 4 years or less = 2; and 5 years or less score of
1. Full-time legal entitlement is granted a score of 2 and part-time legal entitlement is granted a
score of 1. Countries with no legal entitlement are granted a score of 0. This scoring system is
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In five countries, fees are based on sliding fee scales (Finland, Germany, Iceland, Slovenia and Switzerland). In
Greece, fees are set by the Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Welfare and municipalities with different fee
criteria based on family size and other economic criteria. In Norway, fees are set at no more than six percent of
income. I do not compare the criteria for parental fees to out-of-pocket costs since the data for out-of-pocket fees
provided in this analysis are for families that earn 100 percent of the average wage. These family types would
therefore not be exempt from childcare fees.
197
To uncover more information about fee structures, the OECD provides estimates of gross and net childcare fees
for different family types in select OECD countries (OECD 2014). Net childcare fees take into account allowances
and tax benefits a family may receive that can be used to cover the cost of care. No such comparable data exist for
Latin American countries.
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similar to that of the universality scale, with a 0 indicative of no legislation across that particular
measure. This is also the assumption with the continuous indicators—no legislation means
individual countries are granted a score of 0 on that particular indicator.
Possible scores on the ECEC universality scale range from 0 (no legal entitlement) to 7
(legal entitlement at 1 year of age or less and at 20 hours per week or more). Once ranked, the
scores range from 1–17.
Leave and ECEC Together
Method: Coordination of Care Index198
To measure the effective coverage rate, I construct a new index based on an adapted and
extended method from Plantenga and Remery (2015). The index combines dimensions of both
leave and ECEC generosity, similar to Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Korpi, Ferrarini,
and Englund (2013) to measure the percentage of children under compulsory schooling age
covered two childcare arrangements under either well-paid leave (care in the home) or ECEC
(care by the state). Weeks of well-paid leave for both mothers and fathers (at least 67 percent or
two-thirds of usual earnings), and enrollment rates in ECEC weighted dominant mechanism of
provision for care of children between 0–2 years of age and 3 years to compulsory schooling age
are used to calculate the coordination of care. Method adapted from Plantenga and Remery
(2015) and extended 199:
The effective ECEC coverage rate for children zero to two years of age: This rate
takes into account coordination between the number of well-paid weeks of post-natal leave for

198

I characterize this measure as an index because the possible values range from 0–100, much like Mandel and
Semyonov’s WSII.
199
Note I don’t assume the intent of well-paid leave and ECEC arrangements is to cover all children under
compulsory schooling age.
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both mothers and fathers at 67 percent of usual earnings (maternity, paternity, and parental leave
leave) weighted by the dominant mechanism of provision (see weights explained, above). 200
The effective coverage rate for children 0–2 years of age equation: (Number of weeks
of well-paid leave/156) + (the percentage of children 0–2 years of age in formal childcare
arrangements* the dominant mechanism of provision).201
Coordination of care index: (Effective coverage rate for children 0–2 years of age) +
(the percentage of children enrolled in pre-primary education*the dominant mechanism of
provision)/2.202
Appendix 4.4 Ranking Method for All Indicators and Indices
For all leave policy generosity indicators, gender equality indicators, the universality
scale, and ECEC generosity measures, I display two sets of results—the indicator estimates and
the rankings. The rankings are calculated directly from the indicator values. As stated in Chapter
4, the directionality of the rankings for each individual indicator is based on the literature. The
purpose of the rankings is to determine patterns of leave policy generosity, gender equality and
ECEC generosity across the regimes—e.g., do the Social Democratic countries rank highly
across all measures of leave policy generosity or is there some variation and why? What do the
rankings tell us about how well-developed leave and ECEC policies are? I utilize the Excel rank
function in order to rank the country estimates for each leave policy measure. This function
“returns the rank of a number in a list of numbers…. rank gives duplicate numbers the same

200

See Appendix Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the number of weeks of well-paid weeks of post-natal leave for both
mothers and fathers.
201
156 is the total number of weeks for children in this age category until the child’s third birthday.
202
By dividing the effective coverage rate for the two groups of children, I assume that theoretically 100 percent of
children in both age groups could be fully covered under well-paid leave or ECEC.
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rank. However, the presence of duplicate numbers affects the rank of subsequent numbers”
(Support Office online).
Each leave and ECEC policy indicator is ranked independently of other indicators. This is
because across nearly all studies, one or two dimensions of leave or ECEC policy are evaluated
without taking into consideration other dimensions or definitions of these policies. For example,
if a study includes a leave policy indicator for the weeks of paid leave at any replacement rate,
weeks of unpaid leave are not considered in the construction of this particular leave policy
indicator. Because more weeks of paid leave are indicative of better leave policy generosity, for
example, countries with more weeks of paid leave will receive a more favorable rank. Countries
with the same value for any one leave indicator receives the same rank. Duplicates ranks are
considered as one rank.
Country rankings are not based on established benchmarks but rather based on comparing
estimates across the sample countries with the exception of measuring well-paid leave with a
midpoint. Here I assume a benchmark or midpoint is optimal based on past literature and country
rankings decline the father away from the midpoint. Where a policy exists but there is no
estimate for that particular indicator, the country automatically ranks last. For example, the US
provides no paid leave to either mothers or fathers. Generosity Indicator number 4 measures the
number of paid weeks of leave. Because a leave policy exists but no leave is paid, the US
automatically ranks last across this indicator—indicative of the least generous paid leave policy
when compared to countries across this same measure.
Since each leave and ECEC indicator is evaluated independently of others the same
range, is not possible across each policy indicator. The range and rank values are dependent on
the estimate values across each leave and ECEC policy measure. More variation is shown across
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certain indicators than others. For example, the average wage-replacement rate over total leave
period for mothers (Indicator 3) shows the least variety in terms of country estimates and ranking
values. This is because 8 of the 24 countries included in the study offer paid leave periods that
replace 100 percent of usual earnings, on average.
For leave policy generosity, indicators for mothers, the possible range for ranking
purposes for any one indicator is from 1–24 (the total number of countries included in the study).
This is because some leave is available for mothers, whether paid or unpaid. For leave policy
generosity indicators for fathers, the possible range for ranking purposes for any one indicator is
from 1–20. This is because four of the 24 countries in the study offer no reserved leave at all for
fathers—Australia, Canada, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland.
The possible range for ranking purposes across the gender equality indicators are from 1–
20. This again is because no reserved leave is allocated to fathers in Australia, Canada, the
Slovak Republic, and Switzerland. The range declines as we move across the gender equality
policy measures from left to right as fewer countries meet the criteria for different measurable
leave periods. For example, total weeks of well-paid at 85 percent or more of usual earnings for
fathers as a percentage of total well-paid leave at 85 percent or more of usual earnings available
to both parents (Indicator 5, Table 6.1) shows less variety in terms of country estimates and
ranking values. This is because 11 of the 24 countries either do not offer well-paid leave at this
wage-replacement rate is reserved for either parent, or because no leave at this wage-replacement
rates is reserved for fathers.
The possible ranking across the universality scale is from 1–24 (the total number of
countries included in the study). This is because all countries receive a score across at least three
of the five individual universality indicators (no score is given for eligibility or financing scheme
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for fathers in the four countries for which nontransferable, reserved leave is not granted to
fathers). All countries provide maternity leave coverage to mothers (Indicator 1). All countries
also provide reserved leave for mothers that can be measured in terms of eligibility requirements
and leave financing (Indicators 2 and 4).
Ascending or Descending Rank
For all leave policy generosity indicators with the exception of Indicators 7 and 8, I
utilize descending rank. This is because the definition of generosity is based on how much is
granted—the number of weeks and the payment rate. For Indicator 5 (weeks of unpaid and
poorly paid leave) the length of the leave takes precedent over the payment rate. This is because I
assume that length is the indicative of generosity and some leave—whether or paid or not paid—
is more generous than no leave at all. For Indicators 7 and 8, I use a ranking that takes an “ideal”
midpoint into account—policies that are both well-paid and offer an ideal length—either 26
weeks (6 months) or 52 weeks (1 year) are considered the most generous and receive higher
ranks than those with leave lengths that are father away.
For all five leave gender equality indicators and the universality scale, I utilize
descending rank order. Across each gender equality indicator and the universality scale, country
ranks specifically refer to how well each country provides equal leave periods to fathers and how
accessible leave policies are.
For ECEC generosity Indicators 1–5 in Table 5.3, I utilize descending rank—more
children enrolled in ECEC (and weighted by the dominant mechanism of provision in Indicators
4 and 5) and higher GDP per capita expenditure on pre-primary education is indicative of more
generous ECEC policy. For the final two indicators across the tables (out-of-pocket costs for
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single and dual-parent families, Indicators 6 and 7), estimates are ranked in ascending order. This
is because lower out-of-pocket costs for children is indicative of more generous ECEC.
Limitations of Country-Level Policy Indicator Construction
In addition to the limitations addressed in Chapter 3, all indicators are constructed based
on available data, country selection, and my interpretation of past claims about how policies
support or hinder gender equality in employment. Like all scholars that assess leave and ECEC
policies, I draw from best practices in the literature about policy indicator construction. The goal
is to provide a more complete portrait of what policies and dimensions have been measured and
used in the gendered tradeoffs literature to date and to draw conclusions about what works and
what doesn’t to be able to move the literature forward in a meaningful way.
Chapter 5 Appendix
You can find two supplemental tables with additional leave policy generosity measures in
Appendix Table 5.1 and Appendix Table 5.2 in the “All Tables” section, prior to the
bibliography.
Chapter 9 Appendix
You can find eight supplemental tables with multilevel models excluding controls in
Appendix Tables 9.2–9.9 in the “All Tables” section, prior to the Glossary.
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Chapter Tables
Table 2.1 Mandel and Semyonov’s Welfare State Intervention Index (WSII)
Country

Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Finland
Israel
Belgium
France
Hungary
Spain
Italy
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Austria
Germany
Ireland
Canada
United States
Australia
Switzerland

Index of
welfare policy

Maternity
leave
(number of
fully paid
weeks)

% of children
ages 0-6 in
publicly
funded
childcare

Public
welfare
sector as
share of
total

100
93
72
57
56
50
50
50
43
41
34
30
30
27
27
23
20
18
10
4
2
0

41
28
42
32
12
12
16
24
16
17
25
19
16
8
16
16
14
10
8
0
0
8

56
65
30
35
57
63
61
48
45
52
44
47
35
28
39
22
35
18
29
30
23
16

25
25
20
16
18
13
11
12
14
11
5
5
11
16
8
6
7
11
7
8
10
7

Notes: Index is constructed using the first principal component of a factor analysis and is scaled to range between 0 and 100 (Mandel
and Semyonov 2006, 1919–1920)). All three indicators are highly and positively correlated, as reflected in their factor loadings: WSII
= .828 x maternity + .721 x child care + .845 x public services (variance explained 64 percent).
Source: Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1920).
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Table 3.1 Welfare State Generosity across Work-Family Policy Measures in Two Studies
Mandel and Semyonov's (2005 and 2006) WSII policy measures
Country
Weeks Country
% of
Country
of fullychildren
paid
ages 0-6
maternity
in publicly
a
funded
leave
childcare
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Slovak Republic
Hungary
Czech Republic
Italy
France
Spain
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Germany
Israel
Belgium
Ireland
United Kingdom
Canada
Switzerland
United States
Australia

42
41
32
28
25
24
19
17
16
16
16
16
16
14
12
12
10
8
8
8
0
0

Denmark
Belgium
France
Israel
Sweden
Italy
Hungary
Czech Republic
Spain
Slovak Republic
Netherlands
Finland
Luxembourg
Germany
Norway
United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
Austria
Ireland
Switzerland

65
63
61
57
56
52
48
47
45
44
39
35
35
35
30
30
29
28
23
22
18
16

Public
welfare
sector as
share of
total

Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Israel
Finland
United Kingdom
Spain
Belgium
Hungary
France
Italy
Luxembourg
Ireland
Australia
Netherlands
United States
Germany
Canada
Switzerland
Austria
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic

25
25
20
18
16
16
14
13
12
11
11
11
11
10
8
8
7
7
7
6
5
5

Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) policy measures
Country
Weeks of Country
Publicly
paid
subsidized
b
childcare
leave
coverage
(0-3 year
olds)
Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Hungary
Austria
Sweden
South Korea
Germany
Canada
Slovenia
Denmark
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
Ireland
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Israel
Greece
United States

156
156
156
156
156
104
61
59
52
50
48
46
34
26
24
21
10
10
6
0
0

Denmark
France
South Korea
Sweden
Belgium
Slovenia
Canada
United Kingdom
Finland
Ireland
Estonia
Israel
Germany
Spain
Netherlands
Austria
Czech Republic
Greece
Hungary
United States
Luxembourg

57.1
42
37.7
37
36
27
26.9
26
25
24
22
20.5
15.3
15.1
14.5
9.2
8
7
6
6
2.8

Notes: Social Democratic countries highlighted in yellow. Country-level policy data across the two studies from the early to mid2000s. Measurements of leave and ECEC differ across the two studies. High-income country cases also vary between the two studies.
Sources: Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006); Brady, Blome and Kmec (2019).
a
Mandel and Semyonov's (2005, 2006) measure of leave is the weeks fully paid (FTE) maternity leave (weeks of leave multiplied by
the wage replacement rate).
b
Brady, Blome, and Kmec's (2019) measure of leave is the weeks of paid leave regardless of the wage replacement rate (and includes
both maternity + parental leave).
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Table 3.2 Correlations among Policy Indicators from Table 3.1

Mandel and 1) Weeks of
Semyonov fully paid
(2005, 2006) maternity
leave
2) ECEC
enrollment
(0-6 years)

1
1

2

0.3699*

1

3

4

5

3) Public
0.5817** 0.4486** 1
welfare
sector
employment
as share of
total
Brady,
Blome, and
Kmec
(2019)

4) Paid leave 0.4687** 0.1318
(at any wage
replacement
rate)
5) ECEC
0.3504
enrollment
(0-3 years of
age)

-0.1506

1

0.5589** 0.6670*** 0.0372

1

Notes: Non-significant correlations highlighted in yellow.
Correlations between measures across the studies only include country cases that are the same between both studies. Family policy
information used to construct the leave, ECEC, and public sector measures in Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) were extracted
from secondary sources. Family policy information to construct the leave and ECEC policy measures in Brady, Blome, and Kmec
(2019) was extracted from national sources as well as several publications (Gornick et al. 1997; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Gauthier
2010; Keck and Saraceno 2011; Boeckmann et al. 2012). I assume the policy information in both studies is close to the years of the
LIS data used (from the mid- to late 1990s in Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and from 2000–2007 in Brady, Blome, and Kmec
(2019).
N for correlations among measures in Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) = 22.
N for correlations among measures in Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) = 21.
N for correlations among measures across the studies = 18.
Source: Author's own calculations.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 4.1 Welfare State Regime Classificationsa

Social Democratic
ConservativeCorporatist
Liberal

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway
Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Switzerland

Southern European

Greece, Italy, Spain
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia

d

Eastern European

Australia, Canada, Ireland,b the United
Kingdom, the United States
c

a

For countries included in this study; adapted from Esping-Andersen (1990) and select gendered tradeoffs literature.
Mandel (2012) argues that Ireland can be considered in the Conservative group because of its Irish Catholic heritage. However, I
include it with the Liberal regime.
c
Some scholars have found that Southern European countries form a distinct policy cluster, though Esping-Andersen (1990) places
Italy in the Conservative-Corporatist welfare state regime due to its Catholic history and heritage. I chose to place Italy in the Southern
European cluster since other institutional and political characteristics more appropriately match its Southern European counterparts.
d
Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Mandel (2012) include select countries from Eastern Europe in their analyses, with an
indication these countries provide leave and ECEC policy generosity similar to the Conservative-Corporatist regime.
b
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Table 4.2 Dimensions of Leave Policy Generosity Emphasized across Each Leave Generosity Measure
Standard indicators replicated:
1. Total weeks of leave
Length
(paid + unpaid)
2. Weeks of FTE leave
Length and payment
(wage replacement rate x
the weeks of paid leave)
3. Average wage
Payment
replacement (usual
earnings) over total paid
leave period
4. Weeks of paid leave
Length
(at any wage replacement
rate)
New indicators: specific wage replacement
rates taken into account
5. Total weeks of unpaid
+ poorly paid leave (less
than 67 percent of usual
earnings)

Length and payment

6. Weeks of well-paid
Length and payment
leave at two-thirds usual
earnings (67 percent
earnings)
7. Weeks of well-paid
Length and payment
leave at two-thirds of
usual earnings with a
moderate leave cutoff
period of one year
8. Weeks of well-paid
Length and payment
leave at two-thirds usual
earnings with a moderate
leave cutoff period of six
months
9. Weeks of well-paid
leave at 85 percent or
more of usual earnings

Length and payment

Notes: Length refers to the total length of leave for each specific measure, payment refers to whether consideration of payment or
payment cutoffs are taken into account.
Source: Author's own conceptualization of policy measures.

285

Table 5.1 Leave Policy Generosity Indicators for Mothers, 24 Countries (all calculations inclusive of any
mandatory pre-birth leave)
Country

Leave policy generosity indicators from past research
Total weeks of Total weeks of
Weeks of
Weeks of Average wage Average wage Total weeks Total weeks
leave (paid +
leave (paid +
fully paid
fully paid
replacement
replacement of paid leaveb of paid leave
unpaid)
unpaid)
leave (FTE leave (FTE over total paid over total paid Indicator 4 Descending
a
Indicator 1
Descending
leave)
leave period
leave period
Rank
leave)
Rank
(percent)
Descending
Indicator 2 Descending
Rank
Indicator 3
Rank

0

50
44
26
35
16
16
66
42
16
14
0
15
26
39

23

4
6
12
9
17
17
2
7
17
22
23
21
12
8
0

67
75
80
100
100
100
57
68
100
68
0
55
57
38

16
11
10
1
1
1
17
14
1
14
23
19
18
22

5
6
10
4
14
14
3
7
14
21
23
22
19
20

23

23

0

50
44
26
35
99
162
162
42
42
14
52
50
56
65
34
33
21
35
16
16
38
29
16
10
0
8
15
15

12

14
17
22
20
8
4
4
18
18
23
11
14
10
9

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom

16
5
17
10
15
1
14
10
3

1
21
1
12
1
12
1
19
9

17
46
16
28
20
105
24
28
52

100
49
100
70
100
70
100
55
93

24

United States
21
16
11
4
2
7
1
3
11

13
9
14
12
11
1
8
18
2

34
46
52
162
166
105
180
164
52

17
23
16
20
20
74
24
15
48

Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Table 5.1 continued
Country

18
18
18
18
7
4
3
13
13
18
10
11
9
8
0

50
44
26
35
16
16
14
16
16
14
0
0
0
6
11
9
12
6
9
1
8
20
2

20

3
4
7
5
12
12
17
12
12
17
20
20
20
19
-35
-32
-36
-24
-32
53
-28
-52
0

-52

-2
-9
-26
-17
-36
-36
-38
-36
-36
-38
-52
-52
-52
-46
10
8
11
5
8
19
7
20
1

20

2
3
6
4
11
11
16
11
11
16
20
20
20
18

-9
-6
-10
2
-6
79
-2
-26
26

-26

24
18
0
9
-10
-10
-12
-10
-10
-12
-26
-26
-26
-20

6
4
8
2
4
19
2
20
18

20

17
15
1
6
8
8
13
8
8
13
20
20
20
16

17
0
16
0
20
0
24
0
52

0

0
9
0
35
16
16
14
16
16
0
0
0
0
6

5
14
6
14
4
14
3
14
1

14

14
12
14
2
6
6
11
6
6
14
14
14
14
13

Moderate
Moderate
Total weeks Total weeks
well-paid
well-paid
of well-paid of well-paid
leave:
leave: six
leave at 85% leave at 85%
sixmonth month cutoff or more of
or more of
cutoff
Midpoint rank
usual
usual
Indicator 8
earnings
earnings
Indicator 9 Descending
Rank

0
0
0
0
83
146
148
26
26
0
52
50
56
59
17

17
20
16
28
20
105
24
0
52

New leave policy generosity indicators
Total weeks Total weeks Total weeks Total weeks Moderate Moderate
of unpaid + of unpaid + of well-paid of well-paid well-paid well-paid
poorly paid poorly paid leave at 67% leave at 67% leave: one leave: one
c
leave
or more of
or more of year cutoff year cutoff
leave
usual
usual
Indicator 7 Midpoint
Indicator 5 Descending
Rank
earnings
earnings
rank
Indicator 6 Descending
Rank

Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
12
16
13
12
6
4
18
2
1
18

d

United States
17
26
36
134
146
0
156
164
0

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway

Greeced
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Notes: All indicator estimates rounded up to the nearest whole number. Countries for which policy data from around the year 2009: Australia, Canada, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Slovak Republic. All other countries policy data from around the year 2012. Indicators used in past research: Indicator 1—Total weeks of leave (paid +
unpaid) = Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017); Pettit and Hook (2009). Note Pettit and Hook (2009) differentiate between total weeks of parental leave and total weeks of
maternity leave; Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) include an indicator of the total weeks of leave (inclusive of maternity, parental, and childcare) and indicator of weeks
of maternity leave only. Indicator 2—Weeks of fully-paid leave = Mandel (2012); Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013); Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), Mandel
and Shalev (2009). Indicator 3—Wage replacement (average over paid leave period)) = Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017). Indicator 4—Weeks of paid leave (regardless of
the wage replacement rate) = Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019); Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013); Mandel (2011), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017). Indicators 6–9—
Weeks of well-paid leave paid at 67 percent replacement of usual earnings, cutoff points, and weeks of well-paid leave at 85 percent replacement of usual earnings =
adapted from Keck and Saraceno (2013) and others. Keck and Saraceno (2013) utilize nine months as the adequate amount of paid leave with a 60 percent cutoff for
wage replacement.
Specific indicator notes: Moderate well-paid leave with a one year cutoff (mothers, Indicator 7): Hungary ranks before Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United States,
and the Slovak Republic because they offer well-paid leave at 67 percent of earnings while the other countries do not. Moderate well-paid leave with a 6 month cutoff
(mothers, Indicator 8): Slovenia and Hungary rank before Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United States, and the Slovak Republic because these two countries offer wellpaid leave while the others do not.
Table formatting notes: Horizontal black box outlines refer to country groupings either using Esping-Andersen's welfare state groupings (1990) or regional groupings;
consistent with past literature. The indicator estimate is followed immediately by the indicator rank estimate. Green highlighting = Top 5 ranked countries. Red
highlighting = bottom 5 ranked countries. Note that in some cases, not enough variation is available to highlight the top-ranked in green and the bottom -ranked in red.
In this instance I began with green highlighting the top five ranked across each indicator and worked downwards.
Source: Author's own calculations using country-level policy data from a variety of primary and secondary sources (see Appendix 4.1).
a
multiplied by weeks of paid leave.
replacement
Wage
b
any wage replacement rate.
at
Paid
c
paid less than 2/3 of usual earnings.
Leave
For Austria and Greece, the total weeks of unpaid + poorly paid leave (Indicator 5) are 82.6 and 17.3 weeks respectively.
d

’
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Table 5.2 Leave Policy Generosity Indicators for Fathers, 24 Countries

2
3
13
14
4.7
156
8.7
26
0.4
0
0
0
14
15
12
17.7
17.5
3
2
16
19
16
21
10

16
15
10
8
14
1
13
4
20
21
21
21
8
7
12
5
6
2.1
0.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
0
4.4

1.3
2.1
10.4
12.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
9.9
0.4
0
0
0
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.4
5.4
7
16
16
12
9
21
5

11
8
2
1
16
9
6
3
14
21
21
21
16
13
16
14
4
100
0
0
100
100
0
34

67
70
80
100
0
100
46
38
100
0
0
0
0
34
0
100
31

1
16
16
1
1
21
13

10
9
8
1
16
1
11
12
1
21
21
21
16
13
16
1
15

2.1
0
0
1
2
0
13

2
3
13
12
0
2
8.7
26
0.4
0
0
0
0
2
0
0.4
17.5

8
16
16
13
9
21
3

9
7
3
5
16
9
6
1
14
21
21
21
16
9
16
14
2

Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
52.1
134
2
1
2
0
13

Leave policy generosity indicators from past research adapted for fathers' leave
Total
Total
Weeks of Weeks of
Average
Average wage Total weeks Total weeks
weeks of
weeks of fully paid fully paid
wage
replacement
of paid
of paid leave
b
leave (paid leave (paid
FTE
leave (FTE replacement over total paid
Descending
leave
a
+ unpaid)
+ unpaid)
leave)
over total
leave period
Rank
leave
Indicator 4
Indicator Descending Indicator 2 Descending paid leave
Descending
1
rank
Rank
period
Rank
(percent)
Indicator 3

Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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2
3
13
12
0
2
0
0
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4
0.2
4
13
13
9
6
21
4

6
3
1
2
13
6
13
13
10
21
21
21
13
13
13
10
12

-49.9
-52
-52
-51
-50
-52
-49.9

-50
-49
-39
-40
-52
-50
-52
-52
-51.6
-52
-52
-52
-52
-52
-52
-51.6
-52

4
13
13
9
6
21
4

6
3
1
2
13
6
13
13
10
21
21
21
13
13
13
10
12

-23.9
-26
-26
-25
-24
-26
-23.9

-24
-23
-13
-14
-26
-24
-26
-26
-25.6
-26
-26
-26
-26
-26
-26
-25.6
-26

4
13
13
9
6
21
4

6
3
1
2
13
6
13
13
10
21
21
21
13
13
13
10
12

Moderate
well-paid
leave - six
month
cutoff
Midpoint
rank

2.1
0
0
1
2
0
2.1

0
0
0
12
0
2
0
0
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4
0.2

Total
weeks of
well-paid
leave at
85% or
more of
earnings
Indicator 9

2
10
10
6
4
21
2

10
10
10
1
10
4
10
10
7
21
21
21
10
10
10
7
9

Total weeks
of well-paid
leave at 85%
or more of
earnings
Descending
Rank

Moderate
well-paid
leave - six
month
cutoff
Indicator 8

15
15
15
13
12
1
11
4
15
21
21
21
8
7
9
6
5
2.1
0
0
1
2
0
2.1

Moderate
well-paid
leave - one
year cutoff
Midpoint
rank

0
0
0
2
4.7
154
8.7
26
0
0
0
0
14
15
12
17.3
17.3
3
2
13
15
15
21
10

Total weeks Moderate
of well-paid well-paid
leave at 67% leave - one
or more of year cutoff
usual
Indicator 7
earnings
Descending
rank

50
134
2
0
0
0
10.9

New leave policy generosity indicators
Total weeks Total weeks Total weeks
of unpaid + of unpaid + of well-paid
poorly paid poorly paid
leave at
c
leave
67% or
leave
more of
Indicator 5 Descending
rank
usual
earnings
Indicator 6

Table 5.2 continued
Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
d
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Notes: One decimal place is allocated to estimates across several countries. This is because several countries offer less than 1 week of leave to fathers across multiple
measures. Because weeks of leave allocated to fathers is much shorter than for mothers, decimal places matter for the indicator rankings. An example of this is Greece and
Italy in Indicator 1. According to the author's calculations, Greece provides fathers with 17.7 weeks of leave while Italy provides 17.5 weeks. For all leave policy
generosity indicators for fathers, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the Slovak Republic offer no reserved leave periods for fathers. These countries are automatically
ranked last (rank of 21) across all indicators.
Specific indicator notes: Moderate well-paid leave with a one-year cutoff (fathers, Indicator 7): Italy ranks prior to Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, the United States, the Czech Republic, and Estonia because they offer 1 day of paid leave paid below 67 percent of usual earnings (the other countries all offer
reserved, unpaid leave).
Source: Author's own calculations using country-level policy data from a variety of primary and secondary sources (see Appendix 4.1).
a
Wage replacement multiplied by weeks of paid leave.
b
Paid at any wage replacement rate.
c
paid less than 2/3 of usual earnings.
Leave
Italy technically provides 17.32 weeks of unpaid + poorly paid weeks of leave to fathers (Indicator 5), which is why Italy is ranked 5th and Greece is ranked 6th.
d
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Table 5.3 ECEC Policy Generosity Indicators, 24 Countries

1
16
2
3
19
6
14
5
93
78
51
47.9
49
79
64
95
94
98
81
88
95

94
80
96
98
83
100
95
90

19
20
11

10
18
22
24
23
17
21
5
8
2
15
13
5

8
16
4
2
14
1
5
12

0.59
0.39
0.6

0.38
0.18
0.06
…
0.09
0.3
0.32
…
0.45
0.48
0.54
0.35
0.65

1.18
0.77
0.69
0.73
0.47
0.66
0.44
0.58

8
15
7

16
20
22
…
21
19
18
…
13
11
10
17
6

1
2
4
3
12
5
14
9

Country

67
27
56
54
19
48
29
53
3
9
12
17
14
11
8
20
18
9
23
13
21
75
73
91

Standard ECEC policy generosity indicators
Enrollment in Enrollment in Enrollment in
formal care
formal care
formal care
arrangements arrangements arrangements
(0-2 yrs. of
(0-2 yrs. of
(3 yrs. age)
age)
compulsory
Indicator 1
Descending
schooling)
Rank
Indicator 2

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
54
38
33
24
29
35
43.2
17
23
38
4
32
16
22
24
7

Total public
Total public
expenditure expenditure on
on prepre-primary
primary
education in
education in
percent of
percent of
GDP
GDP
Descending
Indicator 3
Rank

Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
9
3
45

Enrollment in
formal care
arrangements
(3 yrs. compulsory
schooling)
Descending
Rank

Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Table 5.3 continued

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
27
19
16.5
12
14.5
17.5
21.6
17
23
38
2
32
16

67
27
56
54
9.5
48
29
53

22
23
6

10
14
17
20
19
15
13
16
12
7
24
8
18

1
10
2
3
21
5
9
4

75
73
91

69.75
78
51
47.9
36.75
79
64
95
94
98
81
88
95

94
80
96
98
83
100
95
90

18
19
10

20
17
22
23
24
16
21
5
8
2
14
12
5

8
15
4
2
13
1
5
11

9
27
14

18
15
15
19
39
13
41
6
0
9
18
8
6

8
22
5
17
4
7
15
11

9
22
13

18
14
14
20
23
12
24
4
1
9
18
7
4

7
21
3
17
2
6
14
11

Country

Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
4.5
2.25
45

New ECEC policy generosity indicators
Enrollment in Enrollment in Enrollment in
Enrollment in
Out-of-pocket
Out-of pocket
formal care
formal care
formal care
formal care
childcare costs as a childcare costs as a
arrangements arrangements arrangements arrangements (3- percentage of net
percentage of net
(0-2 yrs. of
(0-2 yrs. of
(3- compulsory
compulsory
family income
family income
age)
age)
schooling)
schooling)
(single parent (single parent a
a
a
a
100%
the
average
100%
the average
(Weighted)
(Weighted)
(Weighted)
(Weighted)
wage, parent
wage, parent
Indicator 4
Descending
Indicator 5
Descending Rank
employed full-time) employed full-time)
Rank
Indicator 6
Ascending Rank

Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Table 5.3 continued

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
21
28
18
18
22
29
22
3
0
5
10
4
3

9
14
4
10
2
10
8
16

7
16
11

20
23
18
18
21
24
21
3
1
7
11
5
3

10
15
5
11
2
11
9
16

48
38
84

52
53
34
30
26
50
43
59
64
74
49
66
90

96
68
89
90
49
79
65
74

19
21
5

15
14
22
23
24
16
20
13
12
8
18
10
2

1
9
4
3
17
6
11
7

Country

Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
5
16
10

Out-of-pocket
Out-of-pocket
Coordination Coordination
childcare costs as a childcare costs as a
of care
of care
percentage of family
percentage of
index: all
index: all
net income (dualfamily net income
children
children
earner, both parents (dual-earner, both
prior to
prior to
employed full-time, parents employed compulsory compulsory
100% the average full-time, 100% the
schooling
schooling
wage)
average wage)
Index 1
Descending
Indicator 7
Ascending Rank
Rank

Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Notes: Additional detailed notes for all ECEC policy generosity indicators can be found in Appendix 4.2.
Sources: Enrollment rates in formal care arrangements, children 0-2 years of age: Koslowski, Blum, Moss (2016); ISCED (2011); Moss (2015). Enrollment rates in preprimary education, children 3-5 years of age: Koslowski, Blum, Moss (2016); ISCED (2011); Moss (2015); UNESCO/UIS (2019). Total public expenditure on pre-primary
education in percent of gross domestic product: UIS/UNESCO (2019). Out-of-pocket costs of center-based childcare and as a percentage of net family income (for single
and dual parent - 100 percent the average wage, parents employed full-time): CESinfo DICE (2014). CESinfo DICE (2014) retrieves its information from the OECD
database so the information is comparable across countries. Percentages for Italy were derived from the OECD database. Net childcare costs for parents using childcare:
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NCC.
a
Indicators 4 and 5 (Enrollment rates for the two groups of children) are weighted by the dominant mechanism of provision. Because enrollment rates are for formal care
only (see above), I weight the enrollment rates by their dominant mechanism of provision. Because private care has been found to be less accessible or affordable, I am
penalizing countries with a dominant mechanism of care that is either privatized or mixed for both sets of enrollments. Weights are as follows: Public care = 1 (enrollment
rate percentage stays the same), mixed provision =.75, private care =.50.
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0.557***

1
2
1
0.1625
1
0.2451
0.3406*
0.1648
0.9302***
0.3677*
-0.1027
-0.2544
0.3253
-0.0330
0.4427**
-0.2425
0.3238
-0.5337*** 0.0102
0.0946
0.5252***
0.0345

3

1
-0.1371
0.2521
0.2941
0.3311
-0.0647
0.4198**

4

1
-0.0094
0.1345
-0.0288
-0.0365
0.2522

5

0.3984*

1
0.3674*
0.8619***
0.4758**
0.4691**

6

0.5868*** 0.2692

1
0.1456
1
0.2802
0.3747*
0.6609*** 0.4036*

7

0.3289

1
0.3180

9

0.6511*** 1

1

10

11

1
0.0968
0.1998
0.2143
0.5631***
0.0663
0.0556
0.6213***
0.4460** 0.1400

8

0.4328**

Table 5.4 Correlations, Standard Leave and ECEC Indicators
Leave 1) Mom all leave (paid + unpaid)
2) Mom FTE leave
3) Mom average wage
4) Mom all paid weeks
5) Dad all leave (paid + unpaid)
6) Dad FTE leave
7) Dad average wage
8) Dad all paid weeks
ECEC 9) Enroll. 0 - 2 yrs.
10) Enroll. 3 yrs. to comp.
schooling
11) Expenditure - pre-primary
education

Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients. Non-statistically significant correlations highlighted in yellow. Red highlighting indicative of
correlations discussed in-text. N= 24. For Expenditure – pre-primary education N=22. No expenditure data available for Canada or
Greece.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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-0.3491* 1

4

-0.0978

1

5

3

0.1961
1
-0.1199

2

2) Mom 67 percent of usual
earnings
0.0064

0.2046
0.0163

0.6312*** 1

1

7

0.2377
0.553*** 0.2524

6

-0.3233
0.2052

1

3) Mom 85 percent of usual
earnings

0.2393

0.9043*** 0.3367
-0.0649
-0.0064

-0.1572

8
9

-0.6903*** 1

0.5418*** 1

12

0.4877**

-0.2782

11

0.3022

-0.2646

10

0.3704*

-0.035

0.7528*** 0.5598*** 1
0.5591*** 0.3471* 0.6583*** 1

0.5247*** 0.2359

-0.1649

-0.0744
0.0364

-0.0892

-0.6169*** 0.6518*** 1

0.3253
0.2755

0.5036*** 0.3828*
-0.3229

-0.1720

0.3588*
0.3322

-0.2057

-0.2694

-0.3084 0.1800
-0.4096** 0.2591
-0.0663
-0.3737*

-0.1496

6) Dad 67 percent of usual
earnings
7) Dad 85 percent of usual
earnings
8) Dad weeks of FTE leave
9) Weighted enroll. 0-2 yrs.
of age

4) Mom weeks of FTE leave -0.1982
5) Dad unpaid + poorly paid 0.3884*

1
1) Mom unpaid + poorly paid 1

Table 5.5 Correlations, New Leave, and ECEC Indicators + Measure of FTE Leave
Leave

ECEC
10) Weighted enroll. 3 yrs.
to compuls. school
0.0047

-0.2618

13

0.5983*** 0.7945*** 0.8531*** -0.5485*** -0.5013** 1

-0.4404** -0.1003

0.3930*

-0.2654

0.555***

-0.4437**

0.6845*** 0.0756

-0.1408

-0.3581* 0.7104*** 0.3789*

11) Out-of-pocket costs single parents
12) Out-of-pocket costs couples
Leave + 13) Coordination of care
ECEC index

Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients. Non-statistically significant correlations highlighted in yellow. Identical correlations for measures of well-paid leave for
fathers at 67 percent of usual earnings or higher across measures 8–10 is due to the fact that no country provides fathers with more than 6 months of leave. Therefore,
weeks of well-paid leave is measured the same way across these measures and correlations with other indicators identical. There is also a perfect relationship between
measures 8 and 9. Red highlighting indicative of correlations discussed in-text.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 6.1 Gender Equality in Leave Legislation, 24 Countries
Country

Share of nonShare of nonShare of nonShare of nonShare of nonShare of nontransferrable
transferrable leave transferrable paid
transferrable
transferrable
transferrable
leave allocated to allocated to fathers leave allocated to
paid leave
leave allocated to leave allocated
fathers (paid +
(paid + unpaid)
fathers
allocated to
fathers (unpaid +
to fathers
c
unpaid)
Descending Rank
fathers
poorly
paid)
(unpaid
+
Indicator 2
b
Descending Rank
Indicator 3
poorly paid)
Indicator 1
Descending
rank

Denmark

4

16

4

12

0

15

Finland

6

13

6

10

0

15

Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands

33
29
5
49
5
38
1
0

7
8
15
3
14
5
19
21

33
26
0
11
12
38
2
0

2
4
16
8
6
1
13
21

0
100
5
51
6
50
0
0

15
1
13
4
12
5
15
21

Australia
a
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom

0
0
20
19

21
21
10
12

0
0
0
5

21
21
16
11

0
0
20
20

21
21
11
10

United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republica
Slovenia

50
34
28
50
45
1
1
1
0

2
6
9
1
4
17
20
18
21

0
2
28
12
0
0
1
8
0

16
14
3
7
16
16
15
9
21

50
50
40
58
50
1
0
0
0

5
5
9
3
5
14
15
15
21

20

10

20

5

100

1

Switzerland

a

a
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Table 6.1 continued
Country

Share of nonShare of nonShare of nonShare of nontransferrable
transferrable
transferrable
transferrable
well-paid leave well-paid leave well-paid leave well-paid leave
allocated to
allocated to
allocated to
allocated to
fathers (67 % or fathers (67 % or fathers (85 % or fathers (85 % or
more of usual
more of usual
more of usual
more of usual
earnings)
earnings)
earnings)
earnings)
Indicator 4
Descending Rank
Indicator 5
Descending
Rank

Incentives Disincentives

Total Incentives +
Disincentives

Denmark

4

7

0

10

0

0

0

Finland

6

6

0

10

1

0

1

Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands

33
26
0
11
0
0
2
0

1
2
13
4
13
13
9
21

0
26
0
11
0
0
2
0

10
3
10
5
10
10
8
21

0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0

Australia
a
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom

0
0
0
0

21
21
13
13

0
0
0
0

21
21
10
10

0
0
0
1

-2
-1
0
0

-2
-1
0
1

United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republica
Slovenia

0
2
1
12
0
0
1
8
0

13
10
11
3
13
13
12
5
21

0
2
100
12
0
0
100
8
0

10
9
1
4
10
10
1
6
21

0
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2

0
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
-1

4

8

4

7

0

-1

-2

Switzerland

a

a

Notes: Value are percent values, percent of total leave available to fathers at different wage cutoffs. All shares are calculated from the
generosity indicators in the previous chapter. A 0 value or 0 percent is granted to countries that do not reach the earnings threshold for
a particular indicator. The United States provides no paid leave to mothers or fathers. Ireland provides no well-paid leave to mothers
or fathers. Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, the United States, and the Czech Republic provide no leave to either parent at 85 percent or
more of usual earnings.
Source: Author's own calculations from information provided in Appendix Table 4.1.
a
Australia, Canada, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland do not provide reserved, non-transferrable weeks of leave to fathers.
Therefore, a value of a 0 and the lowest rank of 21 are granted across all measures for these countries.
b
For Indicator 1: Different ranks for the Netherlands, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland are due to rounding (all provide just around 1
percent of the share of total reserved, non-transferrable leave to fathers). This is similarly the case for the United States and Spain
(both provide 50 percent of the share of total reserved, non-transferrable leave to fathers).
c
Past studies that incorporate a percentage share of total paid leave for fathers: Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) (similar to Indicator 2).
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Table 6.2 Universality of Leave Legislation, 24 Countries
Countries

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia

Coverage in
law of
maternity
leave
Indicator 1

Financing of
mothers'
reserved
leave
Indicator 2

Financing of
fathers'
reserved
leave
Indicator 3

3
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3

2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
0
3
3
2
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

2
3
3
3
0
3
3
3
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
3
3
0
0
3
3
0
3

Eligibility
Eligibility
requirements requirements
(mothers)
(fathers)
Indicator 4
Indicator 5

3
5
3
3
4
3
4
3
2
3
2
2
3
3
2
3
4
3
3
4
1
4
1
2

3
5
3
3
4
3
4
2
2
0
0
0
3
3
2
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
0
2

Total score
across 5
indicators
(Leave
universality
scale)

Leave
universality
scale
Descending
rank

13
18
15
14
14
15
15
14
10
7
4
7
12
12
5
13
16
14
12
14
13
16
6
13

12
1
4
7
7
4
4
7
19
20
24
20
16
16
23
12
2
7
16
7
12
2
22
12

Notes: For coverage in the law of maternity leave, no country ranks 0 because all countries cover some share of the population under a
maternity leave scheme, whether paid or unpaid.
Source: Author's own calculations from information provided in Appendix Table 4.1.
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Table 6.3 ECEC Universality Indicators and Scale, 24 Countries
Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia

Age of legal
Legal
entitlement entitlement
to care
to care
5
5
0
5
1
3
5
3
2
2
0
0
3
3
0
1
0
3
0
3
3
0
0
5

2
2
0
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
0
2
2
0
0
2

Total score
(ECEC
universality
scale)
7
7
0
7
2
5
6
4
3
3
0
0
4
4
0
2
0
5
0
5
5
0
0
7

Descending
rank

Binary
a
entitlement

1
1
17
1
15
6
5
10
13
13
17
17
10
10
17
15
17
6
17
6
6
17
17
1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1

Notes: The most universal arrangements are those with entitlement around 1 year of age or less for full-time care (more than 20 hours
per week); full-time care equals a score of 2. Seven is the highest score that can be achieved; 0 is the lowest score. A shortage of
ECEC in Estonia means that a child's entitlement to leave isn't realized until 3 years of age. In Switzerland I assume most nursery
schools have part-time hours (20 hours per week or less).
Source: Author's own calculations from information provided in Appendix Table 4.2.
a
Entitlement or not at national level: 0= no entitlement, 1 = entitlement.
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0.4156**

1
1

1

2
3

0.5673*** 0.2557

0.7020*** 0.4555** 1
0.3280
0.2160

0.278

0.0837
0.1612
0.2636
0.073
0.0882
0.1632

0.0890

0.0029
0.2084
0.2346
0.9187***
0.2870
0.1870
0.6965***
0.3606*

0.1027
0.1755
0.3623
0.2071
0.2505
0.3414*
0.1235

4
5

1

1
-0.0047
-0.1473
0.4277**
0.6043***
-0.0682
0.2245
0.3607*
0.2024

0.1281
0.3747*
0.7133***
0.1409
0.2293
0.569***
0.3328

12

0.3457* 1

11

8

0.2310

10

7

0.2011

9

6

0.4677**

1
0.2633
1
0.3469*
0.7133*** 1
0.7535*** 0.7670*** 0.7087*** 1
0.0306

1
0.2749
0.1219
0.3189
0.4331**
0.3329

1
0.3213
0.1113
0.2155
0.0510
0.3127

Table 6.4 Correlations, Gender Equality and Universality of Leave Legislation and ECEC Universality

1) Gender equality all leave (paid +
unpaid)
2) Gender equality all paid leave
3) Gender equality unpaid + poorly paid
4) Gender equality 67 percent
5) Gender equality 85 percent
6) Coverage
7) Financing (mom)
8) Financing (dad)
9) Eligibility (mom)
10) Eligibility (dad)
11) Leave universality
scale
12) ECEC universality
scale

Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients between the gender equality indicators (1-5); Spearman rank coefficients between all other
indicators. Non-correlations highlighted in yellow. N = 24.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.

302

1) Mom unpaid + poorly paid leave
2) Mom well-paid leave - 67 percent
3) Dad unpaid + poorly paid leave
4) Dad well-paid leave - 67 percent
5) Equality unpaid + poorly paid leave
6) Equality 67 percent of earnings
7) Leave universality scale
8) Weighted enroll. 0-2 yrs.
9) Weighted enroll. 3 years to comp.
schooling
10) Out-of-pocket costs - single parents
11) Out-of-pocket costs - couples
12) ECEC universality scale
13) Coordination of care index

10

11

12

13

-0.6903*** 1
-0.6169*** 0.6518*** 1
0.4827** -0.0473
-0.0590 1
0.8531*** -0.5485*** -0.5013** 0.6844*** 1

9

5

-0.5387*** -0.2782
-0.6459*** -0.1720
0.3457*
0.6061***
0.5347*** 0.7945***

8

4

1
0.2557 1
0.1632 0.5690*** 1
0.3523* 0.5652*** 0.4049** 1
0.3524* 0.4093** 0.6272*** 0.5418*** 1
-0.2260
-0.3040
0.3328
0.5455***

7

1
0.2572
0.9671***
0.5516***
0.5591***
0.3704*
0.0355
-0.123
0.278
0.3319

6

1
2
3
1
-0.3491* 1
0.3884* -0.0649 1
-0.3233 0.2377
-0.098
-0.2211 0.0712
0.3796*
-0.2379 0.1623
0.0383
0.0111
0.5498*** 0.1892
-0.4096** 0.2591
0.0364
0.5036** 0.2359
-0.1649
-0.2618
0.4139**
0.5550***

-0.0663
0.0047
-0.1408
-0.3242
-0.3581*
-0.3737* -0.089
-0.4437** -0.1
0.4571** 0.0740
0.7104*** 0.0756

Table 6.5 Correlations Between Leave and ECEC Measures, All Dimensions
Leave

ECEC

Leave + ECEC

Notes: Spearman correlations between the leave universality scale and ECEC universality scale and other measures; Pearson correlations
between all other variables. Non-correlations highlighted in yellow. Red highlighting indicative of correlations discussed in-text.
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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Table 7.1 Leave and ECEC Policy Dimensions and Rank of Each Measure Used to Calculate the Total Ranked
Score
Leave:
1) Total weeks of well-paid leave at 67
percent or more of usual earnings (mothers)

Rank used to calculate
ranked score
Descending

2) Total weeks of well-paid leave at 67
percent or more of usual earnings (fathers)

Descending

3) Share of well-paid leave for fathers at 67
percent or more of usual earnings

Descending

4) Leave universality scale

Descending (the leave
universality scale is
already a scale based on
descending rank)

5) Incentives for fathers to take-up leave

Subtracted from overall
ranked score

6) Disincentives for fathers to take-up leave

Added to overall ranked
score

ECEC
7) Enrollment in formal care arrangements:
0 -2 years of age (weighted)

Descending rank

8) Enrollment in formal care arrangements: 3 Descending rank
years to compulsory schooling (weighted)
9) Out-of-pocket childcare costs for single
parents

Ascending rank

10) Out-of-pocket childcare costs for couples Ascending rank
11) ECEC universality scale
Descending rank
a. Legal entitlement to ECEC in national level
legislation
b. Hours of entitlement to ECEC in national
level legislation

Notes: Incentives are subtracted because again, the lower the ranked score, the more policies can be characterized as well-developed.
Disincentives are added because they add to the overall score for each country.
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Table 7.2 New Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Typology Based on the Rankings of 9 Dimensions of Leave
and ECEC Policy + Incentives and Disincentives
Country

Iceland
Norway
Denmark
France
Spain
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Greece
Germany
Poland
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic

Total weeks of
well-paid leave at
67% or more of
usual earnings
Descending rank
(mothers)

Total weeks of
well-paid leave at
67% or more of
usual earnings
Descending rank
(fathers)

Fathers' share of
well-paid leave
at 67% of
earnings or more
Descending rank

Leave
universality
scale
Descending
rank

7
5
3
12
12
2
9
1
4
9
11
17
8
12
12
12
6
19
20
20
17
20
20
20

1
2
6
6
4
4
12
9
3
13
10
13
6
13
13
10
13
13
13
13
21
21
21
21

1
2
7
4
3
8
11
12
6
13
10
13
5
13
13
9
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13

4
7
12
4
7
12
2
12
1
7
12
4
2
7
7
19
16
16
16
23
20
24
20
22
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Enrollment in
Enrollment in
formal care
formal care
arrangements (0-2 arrangements (3
years of age)
yrs. to comp.
(Weighted)
schooling)
Descending rank
(Weighted)
Descending rank

2
3
1
5
7
6
12
18
10
8
16
9
22
4
21
10
24
15
19
13
14
17
20
23

4
2
8
1
2
10
8
5
15
12
5
5
18
11
13
20
14
16
24
21
17
22
23
19

Table 7.2 continued
Country

Iceland
Norway
Denmark
France
Spain
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Greece
Germany
Poland
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic

Out-of pocket
childcare costs as a
percentage of net
family income
(single parent 100% the average
wage, parent
employed full-time)
Ascending rank

Out-of-pocket
childcare costs as
a percentage of net
family income
(dual-earner, both
parents employed
full-time, 100%
the average wage)
Ascending rank

ECEC
universality
scale
Descending
rank

Leave
Incentives

Leave
Disincentives

Total ranked
score (with
gender equality
in leave
legislation)

Total ranked score
(without gender
equality in leave
legislation)

3
17
7
6
9
13
1
4
21
7
4
14
9
11
2
18
18
12
23
24
14
14
20
22

5
11
10
11
7
11
1
3
15
5
3
9
7
16
2
20
11
24
21
21
23
18
18
16

17
1
1
6
6
1
17
9
1
6
15
5
17
9
15
13
17
9
9
17
13
17
17
17

0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
-2
0
-2
0
-2
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
2

44
50
55
55
57
68
73
73
76
80
86
89
94
96
98
131
132
137
158
165
152
168
173
175

43
48
48
51
53
60
62
61
69
67
76
76
87
83
83
122
117
123
145
152
139
155
160
162

Source: Author's own calculations from policy measure rankings in Chapters 5 and 6.
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67.2
65.9
54.0
56.8
42.8
57.3
59.5
41.9
41.7
53.7
60.9
51.5
36.0
59.5
67.5
46.3
51.0
52.0
55.0
40.6
41.3
35.3
43.6
43.2
62.9
60.7
52.9
37.7
53.6
47.8
51.4
66.5
85.7
84.0
76.6
57.2
74.0
77.7
67.5
79.0
70.7
78.7
74.7
46.3
80.7
77.2
67.4
76.2
69.5
71.8
76.2
75.4
54.0
66.2
68.7
74.2
71.5
64.3
76.5
71.6
75.9
71.7
81.0
89.4
91.6
86.9
75.2
84.8
89.9
83.3
95.4
81.6
85.7
87.2
67.9
84.2
85.5
84.9
77.7
80.0
86.1
76.0
83.8
75.6
78.9
80.1
83.8
80.0
76.1
82.1
80.5
85.7
82.6

Employment Employment Employment Employment
rate (all
rate (women, rate (women, rate (women,
women)
low education)
medium
high
education)
education)

72.7
83.9
82.3
75.6
59.8
74.9
79.8
61.6
77.8
75.4
80.3
75.0
51.5
79.4
76.8
71.7
72.3
70.3
74.6
73.8
75.6
60.3
70.3
70.9
75.8
72.3
71.3
76.1
73.9
76.6
73.0
9.6
6.0
3.6
10.4
11.9
8.3
7.3
25.0
8.0
3.9
3.2
9.5
22.5
9.9
12.5
16.6
14.9
15.3
11.6
14.7
10.8
7.9
13.4
11.7
15.8
18.1
10.6
7.4
13.0
9.6
11.5

Employment
gap between
men and
women (all)

7.9
11.3
13.0
18.8
18.6
13.9
13.2
38.2
10.4
6.9
9.5
15.6
33.4
14.3
15.4
25.7
20.0
21.8
23.1
3.9
20.6
15.7
28.4
18.3
18.1
21.1
14.6
4.5
14.6
11.2
16.9

Employment
gap between
men and
women (low
education)
15.6
7.4
5.4
11.4
17.2
11.4
9.6
22.8
11.4
6.4
3.7
10.8
26.0
7.7
14.0
21.2
12.3
16.2
14.3
13.8
11.6
13.2
14.0
13.4
17.0
20.6
15.5
8.3
15.3
11.3
13.4

Employment
gap between
men and
women
(medium
education)

7.8
3.3
1.4
3.7
7.1
4.7
3.3
10.0
-2.3
7.3
8.1
5.3
12.0
11.8
7.2
8.3
13.2
10.5
3.7
17.2
9.4
3.4
11.8
9.1
11.3
13.9
9.2
7.6
10.5
7.1
7.9

Employment
gap between
men and
women (high
education)

13.8
23.5
37.5
30.1
32.3
27.5
30.4
41.4
53.8
27.9
24.7
35.6
32.0
24.7
18.0
38.6
26.7
28.0
31.1
35.4
42.4
40.3
35.3
36.9
20.9
19.3
23.3
44.4
27.0
37.9
31.2

Employment
gap among
women (low
and high
education)

Table 8.1 Women's Employment Rates and Gaps by Educational Attainment and Work-family Reconciliation Policy Groups
(ages 25-54)
Country

Iceland
Norway
Denmark
France
Spain
Well-developed avg.
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Mod. well-developed avg.
Greece
Germany
Luxembourg
Poland
Austria
Mod. developed avg.
Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Mod. Low developed avg.
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic
Least developed
Eastern
Europeanavg.
Avg.
Overall average

Notes: All estimates are weighted.
Source: Author's own calculations using the LIS data.
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Table 8.2 Share of Employed Women in Part-Time Work by Educational Status and the Part-Time Employment
Gap by Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Groups (ages 25–54)
Country

Part-time
employment
share (all
women)

Part-time
employment
(low
education)

Part-time
employment
(medium
education)

Part-time
employment
(high
education)

Part-time
employment gap
among women
(low and high
education)

Iceland

21.5

27.2

29.4

13.3

13.9

29.5
24.7
22.5
27.4
25.1

…
…
…
36.5
31.8

…
…
…
32.4
30.9

…
…
…
21.3
17.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
15.2
14.5

7.1
39.9
11.7
15.8
10.0
16.9
27.9
24.9
40.3
41.0
9.7
45.4
28.8
37.9
56.3
7.2
40.4
45.1
22.5
34.3
41.1
43.4
45.9
23.1
4.0
29.1
37.4
27.5
33.9

12.6
44.1
24.9
20.8
10.6
22.6
32.5
29.0
59.6
51.1
23.3
48.6
42.3
47.1
64.5
4.8
61.4
69.3
30.6
46.1
56.5
54.2
55.5
26.6
3.8
35.0
45.4
36.1
45.3

7.9
36.7
13.4
17.3
9.3
16.9
27.0
21.8
43.3
40.7
11.3
46.2
32.6
38.0
66.3
6.9
47.0
58.5
25.0
40.8
49.2
47.3
48.9
26.9
4.8
32.0
41.1
30.5
39.2

5.0
41.9
4.6
14.4
10.6
15.3
28.1
26.3
30.2
33.4
5.9
41.5
27.4
32.8
45.4
8.4
32.1
34.0
20.0
28.0
32.9
35.0
39.5
21.6
2.3
24.6
32.0
23.2
30.0

7.6
2.2
20.3
6.5
0.0
7.3
4.3
2.7
29.4
17.7
17.4
7.1
14.9
14.2
19.2
-3.6
29.3
35.3
10.7
18.2
23.6
19.2
16.0
5.0
1.5
10.4
13.4
13.0
12.7

a

Norway
a
Denmark
a
France
Spain
Well-developed avg.
b

Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Mod well-developed avg.
Mod well-developed avg.*
Greece
Germany
Luxembourg
b
Poland
Austria
Mod. developed avg.
Mod. developed avg.*
Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Mod. low developed avg.
Mod. low developed avg.*
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic
Least devleoped avg.
Least developed avg.*
Overall average
Overall average*

Notes: *Excludes Eastern European countries. The well-developed group does not include any Eastern European countries so only one
set of statistics is calculated.
Part-time work in the LIS are individuals employed 30 hours per week or less at their main job. Shares are calculated from the hours1
variable. The definition of part-time in the LIS differs from the OECD, which defines part-time work as less than 30 hours employed
in a main job. All rates are weighted.
Source: Author's own calculations using the LIS data.
a
For Denmark, Norway, and France, information on part-time work is not available in the LIS Database. Percentages of part-time
work for the entire population are derived from the OECD (2020) part-time employment rate indicator (again, note that part-time work
is defined as less than 30 hours per week). Data are for those 15 years or older employed in a job.
b
Poland and Slovenia—no data available in the hours1 variable in the LIS Database. Shares are calculated from the LIS ptime1
variable.
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Table 8.3 Gender Earnings Gaps by Two Different Class Definitions and the Class Earnings Gap among
Women, in Percentiles by Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Groups (ages 25–54)
Country

Iceland
Norway
Denmark
France
Spain
Well-developed avg.
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Mod. well-developed avg.
Greece
Germany
Luxembourg
Poland
Austria
Mod. developed avg.
Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Mod. low developed avg.
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic
Least developed avg.
Overall average

Population

Low-socioeconomic
group

High-socioeconomic
group

24.8
25.4
19.6
17.2
14.8
20.4
10.0
20.9
7.4
20.6
20.9
16.0
10.4
27.6
14.2
19.4
29.3
20.2
27.1
26.8
22.0
11.9
15.2
20.6
28.1
25.2
17.6
20.8
22.9
19.9

11.9
7.7
4.0
7.4
3.7
7.0
1.4
12.3
7.8
7.7
3.3
6.5
7.9
15.1
14.3
5.2
11.1
10.7
12.2
17.4
14.1
12.7
6.1
12.5
16.2
9.8
6.3
3.9
9.1
9.2

15.3
12.8
12.6
7.6
5.3
10.7
7.2
10.8
4.2
9.9
12.5
8.9
8.8
10.7
6.6
9.6
11.8
9.5
15.6
12.7
8.1
8.4
9.4
10.8
11.3
9.9
7.5
12.5
10.3
10.0

Below median Above median
Among
only
only
women (low
and high
education)
25.1
11.6
29.3
6.1
9.1
25.6
2.0
8.4
29.2
7.0
4.8
31.7
3.7
1.5
30.3
8.8
7.1
29.2
0.1
0.0
43.6
9.5
5.6
33.6
3.9
1.9
60.9
1.6
5.9
25.2
-2.0
7.3
37.3
2.6
4.1
40.1
3.4
6.5
37.8
10.7
6.3
39.9
11.4
3.7
52.2
6.5
5.2
48.2
10.4
6.0
35.5
8.5
5.6
42.7
4.9
9.0
32.2
9.9
7.8
45.6
8.9
4.3
40.4
6.2
7.9
40.8
5.5
6.4
40.3
7.1
7.1
39.9
10.8
6.3
31.1
8.0
6.4
28.4
2.7
5.8
24.4
4.3
8.8
37.9
6.5
6.8
30.5
6.7
6.1
36.7

Notes: Gender wage gaps are unadjusted. Low-socio-economic group = less than a secondary education and less than median
earnings. High-socio-economic group = a tertiary degree or higher and above median earnings. Both class definitions exclude a
portion of the sample population from the calculations.
The LIS database reports three possible current incomes: gross, mixed, and net (see the grossnet variable). The LIS data for France
2010 and Poland 2013 report mixed income—total individual annual earnings does not account for full taxes and contributions. The
LIS data for Hungary 2012 and Slovenia 2012 reports net income—total annual earnings does not capture taxes and contributions. The
additional 20 datasets report gross income (taxes and contributions are fully captured, collect, or imputed). The way these data are
reported will also have an effect on earnings gaps between men and women and among women. Earnings gaps will be higher across
countries that report gross annual earnings than across countries that report mixed or net annual earnings because taxes and
contributions are not captured in these datasets. Note that excluding these countries from the overall and policy grouping averages
does not change the overall patterns.
Source: Author's own calculations using the LIS data.
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1
1
0.4824**
0.7524***
0.4346**
0.5681***
-0.4587**
1
0.2169
0.6525***
0.2558
0.118

2

1
0.3231
0.8559***
-0.4261**

3

1
0.3827*
-0.0181

4

1
-0.4357**

5

1

6

Table 8.4 Correlations among Earnings Gap Measures

1) Population
2) Low-socio-economic group
3) High-socio-economic group
4) Below median only
5) Above median only
6) Between women
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 8.5 Percent of Women Managers and Lucrative Managers, and Gender Managerial and Lucrative
Gender Managerial Gaps by Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Groups (ages 25–54)
Country

Female
managers
among
employed
women (%)

Female
lucrative
managers
among
employed
women (%)

Gender
managerial
a
gap

Lucrative
gender
a
managerial gap

Iceland
Norway
Denmark
France
Spain
Well-developed avg.
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Finland
Estonia
Mod well-developed avg.
Greece
Germany
Luxembourg
Poland
Austria
Mod well-developed avg.

10.3
…
2.4
8.2
2.6
5.9
3.0
…
1.4
2.3
9.9
4.2
1.3
2.9
4.0
4.5
3.6
3.3

4.3
…
1.8
5.3
1.3
3.2
1.6
…
0.9
1.7
5.3
2.4
0.9
1.5
2.5
2.6
1.3
1.8

2.0
…
3.5
3.6
1.6
2.6
3.2
…
0.1
2.9
6.7
3.2
0.7
3.1
2.5
2.0
3.6
2.4

3.8
…
2.5
4.3
1.2
3.0
1.7
…
0.5
2.1
5.0
2.3
0.6
2.5
2.0
2.2
2.6
2.0

Netherlands
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Ireland
United States
Mod. Low developed avg.
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Slovak Republic
Least developed avg.

4.6
3.3
7.6
6.9
13.4
7.1
8.0
…
8.0
4.2
6.7
5.4

2.0
1.8
3.3
2.3
5.2
2.9
2.7
…
3.9
2.4
3.0
2.6

4.8
2.7
6.0
4.7
3.6
4.4
4.9
…
3.2
2.5
3.5
3.2

3.0
2.2
3.8
3.7
4.8
3.5
4.1
…
3.0
2.5
3.2
2.8

Overall average

Notes: Lucrative managers are men and women managers with earnings at the 70th percentile or higher. All results are weighted and
unadjusted.
Source: Author's own calculations using the LIS data.
a
Percentage point differences.
b
No occupational data in the LIS Database for Australia, Italy, and Norway.
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0.0562
0.3304
0.451**
0.0768
0.4072**
0.6324***
0.3374

0.3669*
0.3777*
0.1356
0.0365
0.0268
0.3173

0.6058***
-0.1052
-0.1429
-0.003
-0.2342
-0.0500

0.3683*

0.6285***
0.4963**
0.1991
0.3069
0.1218
0.4485**

-0.3533*
-0.0112
0.1216
0.0756
-0.2661
-0.1195

-0.0495

-0.3211
-0.3430
-0.2846
-0.3398
-0.2169
-0.4132**

-0.2227
-0.1671
-0.0845
0.129
-0.1697
-0.0486

-0.0436

-0.2985
-0.2756
-0.2911
-0.1362
-0.2171
-0.1548

-0.3397*
-0.1468
0.0395
0.0421
-0.2073
-0.0800

-0.1621

-0.2812
-0.3467
-0.1370
-0.1832
-0.0422
-0.3505*

-0.5488***
0.3122
0.1585
-0.0839
0.0458
0.0758

-0.2008

-0.5884***
-0.3865*
-0.2790
-0.4897**
-0.2626
-0.4915**

-0.0746
0.1287
0.0615
-0.0392
0.1244
-0.0587

-0.0298

0.3415*
-0.0779
-0.3622*
0.1287
-0.3642*
-0.3994*

Employment gaps between men and women
All
Low
Medium
Highly
educated
educated
educated

0.3464*
0.3814*
0.2245
0.1102
0.1106
0.3543*
0.2447

0.4226**
0.1535
0.0230
-0.0028
-0.1708
0.0111

Highly
educated

0.2043
0.4261**
-0.1806
-0.1409
0.0343
-0.2527
0.0246

Employment
gap among
women (low
and high
education)

0.3876*
0.1038
-0.0857
-0.0773
-0.0263
0.1421

Women's employment rates
Employment
Low
Medium
rate (all)
educated
educated

Table 8.6 Correlations among Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Dimensions and Employment Outcomes (ages 25–54)
Policy indicator

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
a
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
b
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
Equality in leave (67% of usual earnings)
Enrollment 0-2 years of age weighted by provision
Enrollment 3 years to comp. schooling weighted
by provision
Coordination of care
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (mothers)
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (fathers)
Equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid leave)
Out-of-pocket costs - single parents
Out-of-pocket costs - couples

Notes: N= 24. Pearson correlation coefficients. There are no significant correlations between the universality scale and the employment rates and gaps shown in
the table.
a
Excludes
Hungary—weeks of well-paid leave an extreme value. N=23.
b
Excludes Iceland and Norway—weeks of paid-leave an extreme value. N=22.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 8.7 Correlations among Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Dimensions and Part-Time Employment
Outcomes (ages 25–54)
Policy indicator

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
a
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))b
Equality in leave (67% of usual earnings)
Enrollment 0-2 years of age (weighted)
Enrollment 3 years to comp. schooling (weighted)
Coordination of care
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (mothers)
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (fathers)
Equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid leave)
Out-of-pocket cost - single parents
Out-of-pocket costs - couples

All women

Low educated

Medium
educated

High educated

Part-time
employment gap
among women
(low and high
education)

-0.4016*
-0.3679*
-0.1540
-0.4104*
-0.1508
0.0535
-0.2455
-0.2624
-0.2663
-0.1892
-0.14
0.0039
0.3707*

-0.3456
-0.4217*
-0.2041
-0.3402
-0.1739
0.1005
-0.2750
-0.2426
-0.2497
-0.2512
-0.1845
0.0641
0.4234*

-0.4196*
-0.4313*
-0.1355
-0.3808*
-0.1024
0.1177
-0.3299
-0.2744
-0.2837
-0.2188
-0.2199
0.0858
0.4432**

-0.4643**
-0.3927*
-0.2935
-0.4452*
-0.2588
0.0455
-0.2243
-0.2589
-0.2577
-0.1504
-0.1115
-0.0690
0.2913

-0.0493
-0.3148
-0.0034
-0.0686
0.0090
0.1340
-0.2334
-0.1241
-0.1396
-0.2860
-0.2086
0.2165
0.4315*

Notes: N = 24 (all women). N = 21 (all other outcomes). Pearson correlation coefficients.
a
Excludes Hungary—weeks of well-paid leave an extreme value. N=23 (all women). N = 20 (all other outcomes).
b
Excludes Iceland and Norway—weeks of paid-leave are extreme values. N=22 (all women). N = 19 (all other outcomes).
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.

Table 8.8 Correlations among Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Dimensions and Part-Time Employment
Outcomes, Excluding Eastern European Countries (ages 25–54)
Policy indicator

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
a

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
Equality in leave (67% of usual earnings)
Enrollment 0-2 years of age (weighted)
Enrollment 3 years to comp. schooling (weighted)
Coordination of care
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (mothers)
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (fathers)
Equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid leave)
Out-of-pocket costs - single parents
Out-of-pocket costs - couples

All women

Low educated

Medium
educated

High educated

Part-time
employment gap
among women
(low and high
education)

-0.3971
-0.4076*
-0.3574
-0.4479*
-0.3689
-0.3059
-0.4267*
0.1959
-0.2415
-0.2359
0.0015
0.3054

-0.4243
-0.4390*
-0.3657
-0.4411*
-0.197
-0.2696
-0.3514
0.4838*
-0.0155
-0.1791
0.1216
0.4139

-0.3841
-0.3124
-0.3486
-0.3076
-0.1761
-0.3383
-0.3631
0.3443
-0.1359
-0.3136
0.0924
0.3908

-0.3038
-0.5746**
-0.2009
-0.574**
-0.3705
-0.1549
-0.3569
0.3092
-0.092
-0.1093
-0.2011
0.1105

-0.3554
-0.107
-0.3601
-0.111
0.0648
-0.2641
-0.1888
0.4424*
0.068
-0.169
0.3905
0.5328**

Notes: No Eastern European countries included in correlations. N = 18 (all women). N = 15 (all other correlations). Pearson
correlation coefficients.
a
Excluding Iceland and Norway from well-paid leave periods for fathers N = 16 (all women). N = 13 (all other correlations).
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Policy indicator
-0.3413*
-0.0323
0.1615
-0.3191
0.1322
-0.0918
-0.0220
-0.1762
0.2532
-0.0283
-0.3269
-0.0989
0.1327

Population
Low-socioHigh-socioBelow median
economic group economic group
only
-0.2183
-0.2178
-0.1882
-0.2637
0.1851
-0.1619
-0.0989
0.3493*
0.4309**
-0.5413***
-0.2698
-0.4658**
-0.1286
0.2898
0.4542**
-0.2030
0.0792
0.1084
-0.1039
0.0043
0.1198
-0.2356
-0.0342
0.0498
-0.0018
0.1134
-0.0514
0.1880
-0.1609
0.0822
-0.1629
-0.2681
-0.1367
0.0025
0.0134
-0.1930
0.3076
-0.0083
-0.0123

Above
median only
-0.3294
-0.1052
0.3939*
-0.4103**
0.3391
0.0361
-0.1965
-0.1681
0.1044
-0.1381
-0.3473*
0.2109
0.0882

Among
women
0.3955*
-0.0794
-0.3401*
-0.1428
-0.3662*
-0.2635
0.1048
0.0503
0.1884
0.0817
0.0646
-0.0214
-0.1273

Table 8.9 Correlations among Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Dimensions and Earnings Gap Outcomes (ages 25–54)

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))a
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
b
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
Equality in leave (67% of usual earnings)
Enrollment 0-2 years of age (weighted)
Enrollment 3 years to comp. schooling (weighted)
Coordination of care
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (mothers)
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (fathers)
Equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid leave)
Out-of-pocket costs - single parents
Out-of-pocket costs - couples

Notes: N = 24. Pearson correlation coefficients. Wage gaps are measured between men and women in the 50th percentile in both socio-economic
groups and between women with a low and high education in the 50th percentile.
a
Excludes Hungary—weeks of well-paid leave an extreme value. N=23.
b
Excludes Iceland and Norway—weeks of paid-leave an extreme value. N=22.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Figure 8.1 Weeks of Well-Paid Leave (Fathers) and Gender Earnings Gaps (earnings above the median)
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Figure 8.2 Weeks of Well-Paid leave for Fathers and Gender Earnings Gaps (earnings above the median,
excluding Iceland and Norway)
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Table 8.10 Correlations among Work-Family Reconciliation Policy Dimensions and Occupational Attainment
Outcomes (ages 25–54)
Policy indicator

Female
managers
among
employed
women (%)

Female
lucrative
managers
among
employed
women (%)

Gender
managerial
gap
(percentage
point)

Lucrative
gender
managerial
gap
(percentage
point)

Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
a
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (mothers))
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
b
Well-paid leave (67% of usual earnings (fathers))
Equality in leave (67% of usual earnings)
Enrollment 0-2 years of age (weighted)
Enrollment 3 years to comp. schooling (weighted)
Coordination of care
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (mothers)
Unpaid + poorly paid leave (fathers)
Equality in leave (unpaid + poorly paid leave)
Out-of-pocket costs - single parents
Out-of-pocket costs - couples

-0.4915**
-0.4652***
0.1964
-0.3843*
0.2026
0.0537
-0.3531
-0.2794
0.0501
0.0089

-0.4168*
-0.3283
0.1933
-0.1861
0.2365
0.1822
-0.1742
-0.1203
0.2298
0.1934

-0.4454**
-0.1719
-0.2781
-0.3254
-0.2959
0.0247
-0.3479
-0.3143
0.1744
-0.0654

-0.5259**
-0.3631
0.0594
-0.3406
0.0665
0.0879
-0.3371
-0.2842
0.2095
0.0661

-0.0853

-0.0419

-0.1715

-0.207

0.3568
0.4067*

0.1824
0.2428

0.2498
0.555***

0.3337
0.4674**

Notes: N = 21 (no occupational data in the LIS for Australia, Italy, and Norway). Pearson correlation coefficients.
a
Excludes Hungary—weeks of well-paid leave an extreme value. N=20.
b
Excludes Iceland and Norway—weeks of paid leave an extreme value. N=19.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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1

1
0.5418***
-0.4096**

0.2838

1
-0.0663

-0.3171

1

Well-paid
leave (fathers)

1
0.5591***
0.3704
-0.3233

0.0529

Universality
scale

1
0.2377
0.2591
0.5036**
-0.3491*

0.0712

Coordination
of care

1
0.4249**
0.3286
0.3649*
0.6287***
0.0111

0.9224***

Weighted Unpaid/lowenroll 3 yrs. paid leave
to compuls.
(mothers)
school

1
0.5866***
0.7104***
0.555***
0.7945***
0.8531***
-0.3581*
0.1767

Weighted
enroll 0-2
yrs.

0.4973**

Well-paid
leave
(mothers)

Table 9.1 Intercorrelations Between Level Two Explanatory Variables and Level Two Control Variables

1
-0.0755
0.4999**
0.4654**
0.1706
0.5633***
0.6089***
0.3553*

Unemployment
rate

Unemployment rate
Union coverage/collective bargaining
0.065
0.3211
0.0822
-0.1456
-0.1149
0.2347
-0.4095**
-0.0647

Union
coverage/collective
bargaining

Coordination of care
Universality scale
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
school
Unpaid/low-paid
leaves (mothers)
0.0024
0.1028

Well-paid leave sq. (mothers)

Well-paid
leave sq.
(mothers)

1

Notes: Pearson correlations between the level two explanatory variables (policy variables) and the country-level controls are to ensure correlations are moderate (at .5 or
below). Correlations between all explanatory variables were shown in part 2. The thick black box signals that the first two columns show the correlations between the
level two explanatory variables and the level two controls. Spearman correlations were also performed between the universality scale and the unemployment rate and
union coverage and collective bargaining and are nearly identical (r=.34, unemployment rate and r=.48, union coverage/collective bargaining). N = 24. Note that some
of the models contain less than the full 24 country cases.
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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Table 9.2 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Highly Educated Men and Women:
Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.21*
-0.53*
-0.97***
-0.33*
-0.23*
(-2.46)
(-2.04)
(-4.32)
(-2.49)
(-2.40)
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
-0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
(8.98)
(8.97)
(8.97)
(8.98)
(8.98)
-0.0079
-0.008
-0.0081
-0.0081
-0.0079
(-0.33)
(-0.33)
(-0.33)
(-0.33)
(-0.33)
-0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82***
(-33.8)
(-33.8)
(-33.8)
(-33.8)
(-33.8)
-0.082*** -0.092*** -0.081*** -0.081***
(-7.21)
(-7.46)
(-6.96)
(-6.37)
-0.013** -0.012** -0.0095
-0.0037
(-2.69)
(-2.69)
(-1.89)
(-0.72)
0.012*
(2.51)
0.0056
(1.36)
0.063*
(2.44)
0.064***
(3.57)
0.011
(1.66)
0.0065
(1.20)
-0.028
(-0.91)
0.023
(0.89)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

201866
24

201866
24

201866
24
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201555
23

201866
24

Table 9.2 continued
M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.33*
-0.56
-0.14
-0.32
-0.44**
(-2.15)
(-1.41)
(-1.16)
(-1.81)
(-2.82)
Marital status
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
Age
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
Age squared
-0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
Number of hh members 17 or younger
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
(8.97)
(8.98)
(8.98)
(8.99)
(8.99)
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
-0.008
-0.0079
-0.0073
-0.0075
-0.0082
(-0.33)
(-0.32)
(-0.30)
(-0.31)
(-0.34)
Other person in the household employed -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.82***
(-33.8)
(-33.8)
(-33.9)
(-33.9)
(-33.8)
Unemployment rate
-0.079*** -0.091*** -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.086***
(-6.11)
(-8.80)
(-6.73)
(-8.22)
(-8.36)
Collective bargaining/union coverage
-0.0069 -0.012** -0.0026
-0.0044
-0.010*
(-1.23)
(-3.19)
(-0.57)
(-0.95)
(-2.37)
Coordination of care
Gender (female = 1)

Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.012*
(2.06)
0.0066
(1.16)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.047**
(3.24)
0.023
(1.49)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.0011
(0.18)
0.005
(1.07)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.018***
(3.92)
0.0046
(0.95)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.0029
(1.82)
-0.00092
(-0.61)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.0040**
(2.97)
-0.00014
(-0.091)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

201866
24

201866
24

201866
24

201555
23

-0.00074**
(-2.69)
-0.00034
(-1.12)
201555
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with high educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Table 9.3 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Medium-Educated Men and Women:
Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.32***
-0.3
-0.88**
-0.30*
-0.31**
(-3.65)
(-1.07)
(-3.25)
(-2.08)
(-3.15)
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
(37.10)
(37.10)
(37.10)
(36.90)
(37.10)
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
(14.10)
(14.10)
(14.10)
(14.20)
(14.10)
-0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014***
(-11.6)
(-11.6)
(-11.6)
(-11.7)
(-11.6)
-0.0023
-0.0026
-0.0025
-0.0019
-0.0025
(-0.25)
-0.026
(-1.19)
-0.39***
(-21.3)

Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care

(-0.28)
-0.026
(-1.21)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.081***
(-10.2)
-0.004
(-1.27)
0.011***
(3.38)
-0.0003
(-0.069)

Universality of leave

(-0.28)
-0.026
(-1.21)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.085***
(-8.55)
-0.0016
(-0.45)

(-0.20)
-0.024
(-1.12)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.079***
(-9.03)
-0.0016
(-0.43)

(-0.27)
-0.026
(-1.21)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.077***
(-8.01)
0.00067
-0.18

0.033
(1.63)
0.046*
(2.15)

Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0096*
(1.98)
-0.00081
(-0.13)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)

0.0098
(0.42)
-0.0088
(-0.33)

Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

216874
24

216874
24

216874
24
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215789
23

216874
24

Table 9.3 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
-0.35*
(-2.24)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)
-0.0025

M7
-0.19
(-0.45)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)
-0.0027

(-0.28)
-0.026
(-1.21)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.077***
(-8.07)
-0.00017
(-0.043)

(-0.29)
-0.026
(-1.20)
-0.39***
(-21.3)
-0.089***
(-14.9)
-0.0038
(-1.79)

M8
-0.30*
(-2.50)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)

M9
-0.27
(-1.35)
0.66***
(37.00)
0.13***
(14.20)
-0.0014***
(-11.7)

-0.0025
(-0.27)
-0.026
(-1.20)
-0.39***
(-21.4)
-0.078***
(-8.09)
0.0017
-0.49

-0.0019
(-0.20)
-0.024
(-1.11)
-0.39***
(-21.4)
-0.079***
(-9.20)
-0.00033
(-0.085)

M10
-0.38*
(-2.12)
0.66***
(36.90)
0.13***
(14.20)
-0.0014***
(-11.7)
-0.002
(-0.22)
-0.025
(-1.13)
-0.39***
(-21.2)
-0.084***
(-12.4)
-0.0023
(-0.83)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0098*
(2.06)
-0.0013
(-0.21)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.044***
(4.73)
0.0098
(0.57)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.0031
(0.68)
0.0012
(0.24)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.017***
(6.42)
-0.0015

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.

(-0.28)
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00019
(0.15)

0.00098
(0.86)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00029
(-0.19)

-0.00045
(-0.27)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

216874
24

216874
24

216874
24

215789
23

-0.00071***
(-4.04)
-0.00022
(-0.65)
215789
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with medium educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Table 9.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Low-Educated Men and Women:
Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.29**
-0.3
-0.75**
-0.28
-0.28**
(-3.26)
(-1.05)
(-2.62)
(-1.90)
(-2.88)
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
(29.10)
(29.20)
(29.20)
(29.10)
(29.20)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.100***
0.10***
(9.35)
(9.36)
(9.36)
(9.27)
(9.37)
-0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00082*** -0.00083***
(-6.13)
(-6.14)
(-6.14)
(-6.04)
(-6.14)
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.048***
-0.049***
(-4.98)
(-4.99)
(-5.00)
(-4.83)
(-5.00)
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.43)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
(-2.09)
(-2.11)
(-2.10)
(-2.10)
(-2.11)
-0.068***
-0.072***
-0.064***
-0.064***
(-5.02)
(-4.81)
(-4.79)
(-4.77)
0.00066
0.0012
-0.00045
-0.00034
(0.12)
(0.23)
(-0.080)
(-0.063)
0.0055
(1.03)
0.000047
(0.01)
0.023
(0.75)
0.037^
(1.65)
0.0051
(0.68)
-0.00096
(-0.16)
0.042
(1.31)
-0.0048
(-0.18)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

79863
24

79863
24

79863
24
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79655
23

79863
24

Table 9.4 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.32*
-0.25
-0.30*
-0.26
-0.34
(-1.97)
(-0.58)
(-2.41)
(-1.35)
(-1.89)
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
(29.20)
(29.20)
(29.20)
(29.00)
(29.10)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.099***
0.100***
(9.36)
(9.36)
(9.35)
(9.26)
(9.28)
-0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00082*** -0.00082***
(-6.13)
(-6.14)
(-6.13)
(-6.03)
(-6.04)
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.047***
-0.048***
(-5.00)
(-5.00)
(-4.98)
(-4.80)
(-4.83)
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.43)
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
(-2.11)
(-2.11)
(-2.12)
(-2.11)
(-2.09)
-0.064***
-0.072***
-0.067***
-0.063***
-0.070***
(-4.99)
(-5.24)
(-5.11)
(-5.37)
(-5.93)
-0.0035
0.00078
0.00025
-0.0058
-0.0017
(-0.64)
(0.16)
(0.05)
(-1.08)
(-0.35)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0045
(0.67)
-0.0012
(-0.19)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.044**
(2.71)
0.0078
(0.45)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.013*
(2.07)
0.001
(0.21)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.0084
(1.42)
-0.00055
(-0.11)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0027
(-1.60)
0.000023
(0.02)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0040*
(-2.49)
-0.0001
(-0.063)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
79863
24

79863
24

79863
24

79655
23

-0.00081**
(-2.61)
-0.00018
(-0.52)
79655
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with low educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Table 9.5 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Highly Educated Employed Men and
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.091***
-0.088**
-0.097**
-0.071***
-0.088***
(-8.99)
(-2.65)
(-3.13)
(-4.87)
(-8.36)
0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083***
(95.20)
(95.20)
(95.20)
(95.10)
(95.20)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
-0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031***
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
-0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0039*** -0.0038***
(-3.92)
(-3.91)
(-3.91)
(-3.99)
(-3.90)
0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0083*** 0.0082***
(3.43)
(3.44)
(3.44)
(3.46)
(3.44)
0.0038
0.0039
0.0039
0.004
0.0039
(1.69)

Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care

(1.71)
0.0013
(1.18)
-0.00044
(-1.07)
0.00048
(1.01)
-0.000055
(-0.096)

Universality of leave

(1.71)
0.0014
(1.17)
-0.00034
(-0.70)

(1.76)
0.0011
(1.16)
-0.000042
(-0.096)

(1.72)
0.0013
(1.36)
0.00024
(0.51)

0.00052
(0.20)
0.00051
(0.20)

Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.000091
(0.12)
-0.0015^
(-1.88)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)

-0.0051
(-1.59)
-0.0027
(-0.78)

Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

70274
19

70274
19

70274
19
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70028
18

70274
19

Table 9.5 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
-0.098***
(-5.15)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.91)
0.0082***
(3.44)

M7
-0.079
(-1.73)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.91)
0.0082***
(3.44)

M8
-0.078***
(-5.61)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.91)
0.0082***
(3.44)

M9
-0.054**
(-2.96)
0.0083***
(95.10)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0039***
(-4.00)
0.0083***
(3.46)

M10
-0.076***
(-4.55)
0.0083***
(95.10)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0039***
(-3.99)
0.0083***
(3.46)

0.0039
(1.71)
0.0014
(1.37)
-0.000083
(-0.20)

0.0039
(1.71)
0.0012
(1.05)
-0.00038
(-0.96)

0.0039
(1.70)
0.0015
(1.44)
-0.00021
(-0.52)

0.0039
(1.74)
0.0012
(1.40)
0.00025
(0.56)

0.004
(1.76)
0.00082
(0.92)
0.00002
(0.05)

-0.00007
(-0.10)
-0.0017*
(-2.21)

0.0015
(1.05)
-0.00054
(-0.28)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.0006
(-1.03)
0.00033
(0.46)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.00044
(0.95)
-0.00015
(-0.26)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.000075
(0.50)
-0.00023
(-1.28)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00022^
(1.72)
-0.00027
(-1.56)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

70274
19

70274
19

70274
19

70028
18

-0.000041
(-1.16)
-0.000029
(-0.56)
70028
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with high educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Table 9.6 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Medium-Educated Employed Men
and Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.12***
-0.12***
-0.12***
-0.11***
-0.12***
(-14.1)
(-4.45)
(-4.62)
(-8.77)
(-13.4)
0.0072***
0.0072***
0.0072***
0.0071***
0.0072***
(88.00)
(88.00)
(88.00)
(87.50)
(88.00)
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.10)
(11.20)
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.20)
(14.40)
-0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015***
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.1)
(-11.3)
-0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0036***
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
(-3.77)
(-3.89)
0.0038
0.0038
0.0038
0.0037
0.0038
(1.57)
(1.58)
(1.58)
(1.53)
(1.58)
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
(6.21)
(6.24)
(6.23)
(6.50)
(6.24)
0.0041***
0.0045***
0.0039***
0.0037***
(3.60)
(3.69)
(3.69)
(3.50)
0.00021
0.0004
0.00072
0.00064
(0.49)
(0.83)
(1.44)
(1.29)
-0.00052
(-1.06)
0.000094
(0.20)
-0.0032
(-1.23)
0.000032
(0.02)
-0.0018*
(-2.09)
-0.0011^
(-1.69)
-0.0062^
(-1.81)
-0.0023
(-0.79)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

68484
19

68484
19

68484
19
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67704
18

68484
19

Table 9.6 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.12***
-0.11**
-0.10***
-0.087***
-0.10***
(-7.79)
(-2.87)
(-9.48)
(-6.25)
(-7.56)
0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0071*** 0.0071***
(88.00)
(88.00)
(88.00)
(87.50)
(87.50)
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.10)
(11.10)
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.20)
(14.20)
-0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015***
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.1)
(-11.1)
-0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0035***
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
0.0038
0.0038
0.0038
0.0037
0.0037
(1.58)
(1.58)
(1.58)
(1.53)
(1.53)
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
(6.23)
(6.23)
(6.23)
(6.49)
(6.50)
0.0038*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0036***
(3.37)
(3.43)
(3.60)
(4.15)
(3.50)
0.00018
0.00012
0.0002
0.0011*
0.00081
(0.40)
(0.29)
(0.47)
(2.09)
(1.72)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
-0.0020*
(-2.48)
-0.0013*
(-2.20)

Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.00044
(0.28)
-0.0013
(-0.79)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.00043
(-0.68)
0.00017
(0.29)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

-0.00033
(-0.66)
-0.00009
(-0.19)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00018
(1.14)
-0.00027^
(-1.89)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00025^
(1.71)
-0.00028*
(-2.15)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

68484
19

68484
19

68484
19

67704
18

-0.000066^
(-1.66)
0.0000041
(0.10)
67704
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with medium educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models - the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Table 9.7 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Low-Educated Employed Men and
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.13***
-0.11***
-0.11***
-0.10***
-0.12***
(-13.2)
(-3.38)
(-3.86)
(-7.87)
(-12.8)
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.20)
(48.40)
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
(5.65)
(5.62)
(5.63)
(5.58)
(5.64)
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0096***
0.0095***
(5.31)
(5.30)
(5.30)
(5.36)
(5.30)
-0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000085*** -0.000084***
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.82)
(-3.76)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.0021
-0.002
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.37)
(-1.36)
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0049
0.0049
(1.18)
(1.19)
(1.18)
(1.20)
(1.19)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(8.91)
(8.96)
(8.95)
(8.95)
(8.95)
0.0043**
0.0042*
0.0043**
0.0040*
(2.77)
(2.42)
(2.71)
(2.52)
0.0007
0.00057
0.00062
0.00066
(1.16)
(0.80)
(0.81)
(0.87)
-0.0007
(-1.02)
-0.00038
(-0.72)
-0.00093
(-0.24)
-0.0015
(-0.65)
-0.00069
(-0.52)
-0.0018*
(-2.44)
-0.0018
(-0.35)
-0.0031
(-1.01)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

20164
19

20164
19

20164
19
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20083
18

20164
19

Table 9.7 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.13***
-0.076
-0.11***
-0.080***
-0.095***
(-7.02)
(-1.87)
(-8.61)
(-5.37)
(-6.49)
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.30)
(48.20)
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
(5.63)
(5.63)
(5.63)
(5.56)
(5.57)
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0096***
0.0097***
0.0096***
(5.30)
(5.30)
(5.32)
(5.39)
(5.37)
-0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000086*** -0.000085***
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.78)
(-3.84)
(-3.82)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.0021
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.35)
(-1.36)
(-1.37)
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0049
(1.19)
(1.18)
(1.17)
(1.18)
(1.20)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(8.95)
(8.96)
(8.95)
(8.96)
(8.96)
0.0040*
0.0046**
0.0043**
0.0045**
0.0042*
(2.53)
(2.82)
(2.87)
(3.00)
(2.57)
0.00052
0.00062
0.00075
0.001
0.00065
(0.80)
(1.08)
(1.30)
(1.27)
(0.85)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00092
(-0.73)
-0.0020**
(-3.04)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.00016
(0.06)
-0.0036*
(-2.15)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.00018
(-0.20)
0.00018
(0.26)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

-0.00069
(-1.01)
-0.00065
(-1.28)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00034
(1.55)
-0.00035*
(-1.97)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00032
(1.35)
-0.00039**
(-2.59)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

20164
19

20164
19

20164
19

20083
18

-0.000025
(-0.39)
0.000053
(1.20)
20083
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with low educational attainments only. Two controls are also
included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a
continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that
weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.

330

Table 9.8 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Low- and Highly Educated Women:
Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Educational attainment (low ed. = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-1.67***
-1.40***
-1.33**
-1.48***
-1.75***
(-13.1)
(-3.47)
(-3.14)
(-8.20)
(-12.9)
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
(16.00)
(16.00)
(15.90)
(16.00)
(16.00)
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
(23.00)
(23.00)
(23.00)
(22.90)
(23.00)
-0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
-0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068***
(-7.17)
(-7.18)
(-7.18)
(-7.15)
(-7.18)
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.31)
(-6.27)
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.36***
-0.35***
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
-0.073*** -0.094*** -0.071*** -0.070***
(-4.64)
(-6.74)
(-4.38)
(-4.13)
-0.0069
-0.011*
-0.0037
0.0012
(-1.10)
(-2.20)
(-0.54)
-0.18
0.013*
(2.10)
-0.0044
(-0.69)
0.13***
(4.34)
-0.028
(-0.83)
0.012
(1.35)
-0.0066
(-0.88)
-0.014
(-0.35)
0.049
(1.37)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.

N
No. of countries

147661
24

147661
24

147661
24
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147362
23

147661
24

Table 9.8 continued
Educational attainment (low ed. = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-1.87***
-1.12
-1.49***
-1.35***
-0.87***
(-8.30)
(-1.85)
(-9.43)
(-5.66)
(-6.56)
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.31***
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
(23.00)
(23.00)
(23.00)
(22.90)
(22.90)
-0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.6)
(-18.6)
-0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(-7.18)
(-7.18)
(-7.16)
(-7.12)
(-7.14)
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.25)
(-6.29)
(-6.31)
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.36***
-0.36***
-0.36***
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.9)
(-16.9)
(-16.8)
-0.069*** -0.081*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.078***
(-4.06)
(-5.06)
(-4.31)
(-4.68)
(-5.30)
-0.0033
-0.0053
-0.0051
0.0036
0.00054
(-0.46)
(-0.94)
(0.61)
(0.08)
(-0.82)

Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.014
(1.62)
-0.016**
(-3.24)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.060**
(2.92)
-0.0059
(-0.26)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.0061
(0.76)
0.0073
(1.07)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.017*
(2.44)
-0.0067
(-0.92)

Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.0029
(1.40)

Low ed*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.004^
(1.95)

-0.0055** -0.0079***
(-3.10)
(-5.99)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.

-0.00097*
(-2.52)
-0.000016
(-0.036)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.

N
No. of countries

147661
24

147661
24

147661
24

147362
23

147362
23

Notes: Models are an extension of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3. Sample is reduced to women with low and high
educational attainments only. Two controls are also included in these models—the unemployment rate and collective bargaining/union
coverage. The universality scale is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10
exclude Hungary because it was determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001.
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Table 9.9 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Low- and Highly Educated
Employed Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Educational status (low ed. = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage
Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
-0.25***
-0.20***
-0.25***
-0.23***
(-17.8)
(-4.41)
(-5.77)
(-11.1)
0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096***
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.50)
0.0053*
0.0054*
0.0053*
0.0053*
(2.02)
(2.02)
(2.02)
(2.01)
0.027***
0.027***
0.027***
0.028***
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
-0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029***
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.82)
-0.00024
-0.00021
-0.00021
-0.00011
(-0.082)
(-0.072)
(-0.072)
(-0.039)
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
(4.71)
(4.71)
(4.70)
(4.76)
0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0052***
(4.01)
(3.95)
(4.55)
-0.00058
-0.0004
0.00042
(-1.11)
(-0.67)
(0.77)
0.0001
(0.17)
-0.00086
(-1.09)
-0.0013
(-0.42)
0.00015
(0.04)
-0.0020*
(-2.17)
-0.00077
(-0.65)

Well-paid leave (fathers)

M5
-0.25***
(-17.3)
0.0096***
(99.70)
0.0054*
(2.02)
0.027***
(20.40)
-0.00029***
(-17.2)
-0.010***
(-8.72)
-0.00021
(-0.071)
0.014***
(4.71)
0.0054***
(4.27)
0.000071
(0.12)

-0.0063
(-1.57)
0.0036
(0.76)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

45877
19

45877
19

45877
19
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45685
18

45877
19

Table 9.9 continued
Educational status (low ed. = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Unemployment rate
Collective bargaining/union coverage

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.26***
-0.16**
-0.25***
-0.22***
-0.22***
(-9.83)
(-2.59)
(-12.3)
(-8.19)
(-9.41)
0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096***
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.50)
(99.50)
0.0054*
0.0054*
0.0053*
0.0053*
0.0054*
(2.02)
(2.03)
(2.02)
(2.00)
(2.02)
0.027***
0.027***
0.027***
0.028***
0.028***
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
-0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029***
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.82)
(-8.82)
-0.00021
-0.00021
-0.00021
-0.00011
-0.00013
(-0.072)
(-0.074)
(-0.073)
(-0.038)
(-0.044)
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
(4.70)
(4.70)
(4.71)
(4.76)
(4.76)
0.0055*** 0.0057***
0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.0050***
(4.17)
(4.14)
(4.04)
(4.52)
(4.35)
-0.00066 -0.00047
-0.00071
0.00037
0.00048
(-1.23) (-0.95)
(-1.43)
(0.61)
(0.90)

Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0020*
(-2.12)
-0.00092
(-0.78)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00057
(-0.32)
-0.0033
(-1.20)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.00034
(0.45)
0.00061
(0.61)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

-0.00032
(-0.54)
-0.0012
(-1.55)

Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00018
(-0.98)
-0.000062
(-0.23)

Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.000033
(-0.19)
-0.0002
(-0.78)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

45877
19

45877
19

45877
19

45685
18

-0.000043
(-0.95)
0.000072
(1.01)
45685
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. Sample is reduced to
women with low and high educational attainments only. Two controls are also included in these models—the unemployment rate and
collective bargaining/union coverage. The universality scale is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams
2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an
extreme value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001.
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Appendix Tables and Databases
Appendix Table 1 Full-Time Average Annual Earnings in 19 Countries
Country

Canada 2010
Czech Republic 2013
Denmark 2013
Finland 2013
France 2010
Germany 2013
Hungary 2012
Iceland 2010
Ireland 2010
Italy 2014
Luxembourg 2013
Netherlands 2013
Norway 2013
Russia 2013
Slovak Republic 2010
Slovenia 2012
Spain 2013
Switzerland 2013
United Kingdom 2013

Full-time
Monthly
annual earnings wage
43002.60
244859.63
307661.21
31372.75
19119.86
31155.56
1035312.65
4077928.58
25418.86
11954.47
44765.97
33376.48
400640.87
216452.32
6994.76
9819.83
14469.59
75339.80
24649.07

3583.55
20404.97
25638.43
2614.40
1593.32
2596.30
86276.05
339827.38
2118.24
996.21
3730.50
2781.37
33386.74
18037.69
582.90
818.32
1205.80
6278.32
2054.09

Daily wage
(monthly
wage/21.7)
165.14
940.32
1181.49
120.48
73.42
119.65
3975.86
15660.25
97.61
45.91
171.91
128.17
1538.56
831.23
26.86
37.71
55.57
289.32
94.66

Weekly wage
(daily
wage*5)
825.70
4701.61
5907.47
602.40
367.12
598.23
19879.28
78301.24
488.07
229.54
859.56
640.87
7692.80
4156.15
134.31
188.55
277.83
1446.62
473.29

Notes: Data calculated as average annual earnings from paid employment for men and women between the ages of 25–54 who work
full-time (more than 35 hours per week) from the LIS data. All wages are calculated in national currencies. Hourly working time not
available in Norway or Slovenia.
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Appendix Table 4.1 Leave Policy Database (with country-specific notes)
Country (A)

Australia

a

Leave reserved for mothers (B)

Leave reserved for fathers (C)

Shared leave (D)

Parental leave flexibility/stretchability (E)

Parental leave entitlement and job
protection information (F)

Financing of leave (G)

Eligiblity requirements (H)

Additional leave (inclusive of
childcare leave, leave to take time
off to care for dependents, inclusive
of care for a sick child) (I)

Total weeks of leave (J)

Coverage in the law of maternity leave (percentage of employed
women), 2010 (K)

Incentives for fathers to take-up
leave (L)

6 weeks of leave following the birth of a child are mandatory for
the mother, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 6
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 6
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 0%

N/A

46 weeks of leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 46
Total paid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 1 year.
No flexibility in use (see notes).

Family entitlement; only one parent
is entilted to the 46 weeks of shared
leave.

Leave taken around the birth of a child
(Parental leave): N/A, unpaid.

Parental leave: Must have 12 continuous months of employment
(full- or part-time) with the same employer.

10 days of paid personal/carer's
Total unpaid weeks: 52
leave; paid. 2 days of unpaid leave
Total paid weeks: 0
may also be granted during the same Total leave time: 52 weeks
timeframe.
Disincentive: Only one parent is
eligible to take-up shared leave.

66–89

Austria

b

Maternity leave of 16 weeks (8 weeks to be taken prior to
childbirth, compulsory) paid at 100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 16
Total paid weeks: 16
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

4.7 weeks of parental leave, unpaid
(4 weeks overlap with the mother,
for a total of 8.7 weeks).
Total weeks of leave: 4.7
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 4.7
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Maximum age for which leave can be used: 7 years.
Draw down full or part-time or reduced hours: Reduced hours; each
parent also has the possibility to postpone 3 months of parental
leave to use up to the child's 7th birthday. Leave may be taken by
one parent only (mother or father) or by both parents on an
alternating basis (the whole period can be divided into a maximum
of three parts alternating between parents, with each part at least
two months).
Eligibility requirements for draw down: Must have worked for
employer 3 years or more.
Leave is job protected until the child is 4 years of age; until 7 years
of age protection against dismissal without grounds is provided.

Family entitlement; only 8.7 weeks Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
of parental for fathers is
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
employment- protected and reserved Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.
for the father.

Maternity leave: All employed women are eligible; short-term and
freelance workers are eligible if they have health insurance;
unemployed women are eligible if they have completed three
months continuous employment or have been compulsorily healthinsured for 12 months within the last three years.
Paternity leave: N/A.
Parental leave: No requirements but to request from employer.

2 weeks for children (per employee), Total unpaid weeks of leave: 87.3
one week for other dependents, fully Total paid weeks: 20.7
paid.
Total leave time: 103.3 weeks

90-100

Incentive: Parents can take a period
of months off together.
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82.6 weeks of parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 82.6
Total paid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Brazil

c

Canada

d

Colombia

17 weeks (4 months) for private sector employees; 26 weeks (6
months) for public sector employees.
Total weeks of leave: 17
Total paid weeks: 17
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

1 week for private sector employees; N/A
paid at 100% of earnings (2 weeks
for public sector employees); no
parental leave.
Total weeks of leave: 1
Total paid weeks: 1
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

N/A

N/A

Maternity leave: Paid by the employer
who is reimbursed by the Social
Security Institute.
Paternity Leave: Employers.
Parental Leave: N/A, does not exist.

Maternity leave: The right of all women who work and contribute
to Social Security; housewives or students who pay into social
security voluntarily; self-employed must pay into the scheme for at
least 10 months.
Paternity leave: All public and private sector employees who pay
into social security.

No law for private sector.
Public sector up to 30 days (or
more), unpaid for all employees.
(International Review of Leave
Research, 2012).

Total unpaid weeks of leave: 0
Total paid weeks: 18
Total leave time: 18 weeks

N/A

35 weeks of parental leave, paid at
55% of average earnings up to a
ceiling of CAN 435 per week.
Total weeks of leave: 35
Total paid weeks: 35
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 55%

66–89
15 weeks of maternity leave (up to 18 in some jurisdictions,
optional to take leave up to 17 weeks prior) paid at 55% of average
earnings up to a ceiling of CAN 435 per week.
Total weeks of leave: 15
Total paid weeks: 15
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 55%
Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 1 year.
No flexibility in use.

Family entitlement - only one parent Maternity and parental leave: Social
can take leave. To share leave,
Insurance.
parents have to agree to the division Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
of leave in writing at least 30 days
prior to the end of maternity leave.

Maternity leave: The insured must have at least 600 hours of
covered employment in the previous 52 weeks.
Parental leave: Six months of continuous employment with the
same employer.

N/A - no provisions at the national
level.

66–89

Disincentive: Only one parent is
eligible to take-up shared leave
unless an agreement to split it with
the other parent in writing.

14 weeks of maternity leave paid at 100% of earnings (at least 1
week before birth is compulsory).
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 14
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

1.2 weeks of paternity leave paid at N/A
100% of earnings; no parental leave.
Total leave time: 1.2
Total paid weeks: 1.2
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

N/A

N/A

Maternity and paternity leave: Social
Insurance.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.

Maternity leave: At least 9 months of contributions.
Paternity leave: At least 100 weeks of contributions.

N/A

Total unpaid weeks: 0
Total paid weeks: 15.2
Total leave time: 15.2 weeks

33-65
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Total unpaid weeks: 0
Total paid weeks: 50
Total leave time: 50 weeks

Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Czech
e
Republic

f

Denmark

28 weeks of maternity leave (at least 6-8 weeks prior to childbirth,
compulsory) paid at 70% of earnings up to CZK 31,837; from the
seventh week after childbirth, mothers may transfer some or all of
the maternity leave to the father of the child;
134 weeks of job-protected parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 162
Total paid weeks: 28
Unpaid weeks: 134
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 70%

134 weeks of job protected parental
leave; unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 134
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 134
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

N/A

Maximum age of child for which leave can be used: 3 years.
Parents can switch on and off or take leave at the same time.

Individual entitlement;
both parents can take leave at the
same time; both parents have
employment protection.

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

For new mothers: The insured must have at least 270 days of
coverage in the two years before childbirth; self-employed persons
must have at least 180 days of coverage in the year before
childbirth.
Parental leave: Each parent has to ask for approval from their
employer.

Parents can take 9 days in a block of Total unpaid weeks 276.4
time (no limit on frequency), until
Total paid weeks: 28
the child is 10 years of age.
Total leave time: 296 weeks

66-89

Incentives: Parents can take a period
of time off together + a portion of
maternity leave can be transferred to
the father.

18 weeks of maternity leave (4 weeks before birth, compulsory),
paid at earnings up to a ceiling of DKK 788 per day (about 67% of
average earnings).
Total weeks of leave: 18
Total paid weeks: 18
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 67%

2 weeks of paternity leave paid at
earnings up to a ceiling of DKK 788
per day (about 67% of average
earnings).
Total weeks of leave: 2
Total paid weeks: 2
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 67%

Maximum age of child for which leave can be used: 64 weeks old
(however, parents can save 8-13 weeks for a period later than 64
weeks old).
Parents can extend the leave from 32 weeks until the child is 46
weeks. Parents can also return to work on a part-time basis with a
reduced benefit payment during this time and extend the leave from
32-64 weeks which must be approved by the employer.

Individual entitlement, each parent
All 3 forms of leave: Both the state
is entitled to receive benefit for 32
and employers.
weeks though total leave period
cannot exceed 32 weeks; no "use it
lose it" incentive for fathers; leave is
employment-protected for both
parents.

Maternity and parental leave: At least 120 hours of work in the 13 N/A
weeks before benefits can be taken; the self-employed must have at
least 6 months of coverage in the last 12 months.
Paternity leave: Male must be in a partnership.
90-100
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32 weeks of parental leave paid at
100% of earnings up to a ceiling of
DKK 788 per day (about 67% of
average earnings).
Total weeks of leave: 32
Total paid weeks: 32
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 67%

Unpaid weeks: 0
Paid weeks: 52
Total leave time: 52 weeks

Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Estonia

g

Finland

20 weeks of maternity leave (up to 10 weeks can be taken prior to
childbirth) paid at 100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 20
Total paid weeks: 20
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

2 weeks of paternity leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 2 weeks.
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 2
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

146 weeks of parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 146
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 146
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Maximum age for which leave can be used: 3 years.
Parents can draw down benefits part-time to take care of a child
with a disability; for children without a disability, parents can use
all leave at one time or use in several parts until the child is three
years of age.

Family entitlement, job protection
for both parents.

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity Leave: N/A, unpaid.
Parental Leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity leave: Must be a member of the Health Insurance Fund;
no minimum length of service.
Parental leave: No qualifying conditions except for employment.

Either parent up to 14 calendar days, Unpaid weeks: 148
paid at 80% of earnings for sick
Paid weeks: 22
child under 12 years.
Total leave time: 168 weeks
Parents with child under 14 years of
age can take 10 days per calendar
year, unpaid.
Supplementary holiday period per
parent, 3 or 6 days dependent on age
of the child, flat rate payment of
EUR 4.25 per day.

90-100
17.5 weeks of maternity leave (2 weeks must be taken prior to
childbirth, compulsory); during the first 9.3 weeks the benefit is
paid at 90% of earnings up to a celling, after which the remaining
weeks are paid at 70% of earnings (the average wage replacement
across all weeks is about 81% of earnings).
Total weeks of leave: 17.5
Total paid weeks: 17.5
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 81%

3 weeks of paternity leave paid at
70% of earnings up to a ceiling of
EUR 34,495.
Total weeks of leave: 3
Total paid weeks: 3 (rounded)
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 70%

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: Less than 1 Family entitlement.
year of age.
Each parent is entitled to take leave in two parts for at least 12 days
in duration; leave can be taken part-time at 40-60 percent of fulltime hours, but only if both parents take part-time leave; in this
case the benefit payment is cut in half.

26 weeks (rounded) of parental leave;
the first 5 weeks of parental leave is
paid at 75% of earnings up to EUR
53,072; the additional weeks of
parental leave are paid at 70% of
earnings up to EUR 34.49 (this
averages to around 71% of earnings).
Total weeks of leave: 26
Total paid weeks: 26 weeks (rounded)
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 71%
All 3 forms of leave: Social Insurance.

Maternity + paternity leave: Based on residency only.
Parental leave: Any arrangement is subject to an employer
agreement.

Parents can take 3 or 4 days when
Unpaid weeks: 0
child is ill. Payment based on
Paid weeks: 46.5
collective agreements - but usually Total leave time: 46.5 weeks
full earnings.
Childcare leave (shared entitlement):
117.2 weeks, unpaid, to be taken
until the child is 3 years of age.

66-89

Incentive: Finland offers an
incentive for fathers to take
additional bonus days if they take-up
the last two weeks of parental leave.
Collectively, these 6 weeks are
called the "fathers month." These six
weeks are the only weeks of parental
leave that are employment-protected
for fathers.
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
France

h

16 weeks (at least 3 weeks to be taken before birth, compulsory)
paid at 100% of earnings up to a ceiling of EUR 2,859 per month;
146 weeks of parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 162
Total paid weeks: 16
Unpaid weeks: 146
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 10%

2 weeks paid at 100% of earnings up N/A
to a ceiling of EUR 2,859 per month;
154 weeks of parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 156
Total paid weeks: 2
Unpaid weeks: 154
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 1.3%

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 3
Parents can combine parental leave with part-time work (between
16-32 hours per week).

Individual entitlement.

Maternity and paternity leave: Insured must have at least 10
months of coverage and 200 hours of employment in the 3 months
before leave.
Parental leave: Employees must have at least 1 year of continuous
employment with the same employer before the child's birth.

Germanyi

90-100
14 weeks (6 weeks prior to birth compulsory) paid at 100% of
earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 14
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity leave: Social Security
(health insurance fund).
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.
In general all employees are eligible Unpaid weeks: 300
to take off 3 days to care for a sick
Paid weeks: 18
child under the age of 16, unpaid.
Total leave time: 318 weeks
In the case of serious illness for a
child under 20, employees are
granted 3 years of total leave
dependent on work history and
family structure.

8.7 weeks of parental leave is
reserved specifically for fathers paid
at 67% of earnings up to a ceiling of
EUR 1,800 per month.
Total weeks of leave: 8.7
Total paid weeks: 8.7
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 46%

Parental leave is shared (up to 148
weeks for women and up to 156 weeks
for men); paid at 67% of wages up to
a ceiling of EUR 1,800 per month;
however, only one year of leave is
paid (43.3 weeks for men including
reserved leave and 52 weeks, women).
Total weeks of leave: 148 (until
child's 3rd birthday)
Total weeks of paid leave: 43.3 (men)
or 52 (women)
Unpaid weeks: 104
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 46%

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: 8 years.
The final year of leave may be taken up to a child’s eighth birthday;
both parents are entitled to take leave at the same time and both can
take up leave across two periods of time.

Family entitlement; 8.7 weeks
reserved for fathers; both parents
have employment protection for the
entirety of the leave.

Maternity leave: Mixed (employer
liability; flat-rate benefits paid out
through social insurance).
Paternity leave: N/A, program does
not exist.
Parental leave (Elterngeld): Social
Security/Social Insurance.

Maternity leave: Must be a member of a sickness fund; no
minimum qualifying period.
Parental leave: Workers must request parental leave in writing at
the latest 7 weeks before the leave takes effect and acknowledge the
length and periods of leave over the next two years; parent cannot
work more than 30 hours while on parental leave.

Parents can take up to 10 days of
leave per year receiving 80% of
earnings in case of children's
sickness.

Unpaid weeks 104
Paid weeks: 74.7
Total leave time: 170.7 weeks

66-89
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Greece

j

17 weeks of maternity leave in the private sector (8 weeks prior to
childbirth compulsory) paid at 100% of earnings; 17.3 weeks of
parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 34.3
Total paid weeks: 17
Unpaid weeks: 17.3
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

2 days (.4 week) of paternity leave
paid at 100% of earnings; 17.3
weeks of parental leave unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 17.7
Total paid weeks: .4
Unpaid weeks: 17.3
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

Maximum age: up to 6 years of age.
Leave may be taken in one or several blocks of time.

Individual entitlement, per parent,
per child; both parents have
employment protection for the
entirety of the leave.
Maternity leave: At least 200 working days during the previous two Different schemes exist, including:
years.
Leave for children’s sickness, school
Paternity leave: Must be employed.
visits and additional leaves to care
Parental leave: Subject to an employer agreement.
for sick children. See Moss (2012).

Hungary

k

66-89
24 weeks of maternity leave (up to 4 weeks before birth,
compulsory) paid at 70% of average daily earnings (no ceiling on
payments).
Total weeks of leave: 24
Total paid weeks: 24
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 70%

N/A

Maternity leave: Social Security
(social insurance and public funds).
Paternity leave: Employer liability.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.
Unpaid weeks: 34.6
Paid weeks: 17.4
Total leave time: 52 weeks

1 week paid at 100% of the average
daily wage.
Total weeks of leave: 1
Total paid weeks: 1
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

80 weeks of parental leave (until
child's second birthday, following
maternity leave). The first 52 weeks
(year) are to be taken by the mother.
The additional 28 weeks of parental
leave can be shared by mothers and
fathers; paid at 70% of average daily
earnings up to a ceiling of 2x the
national minimum daily wage (HUF
130,200 per month).
Total weeks of leave: 80
Total paid weeks: 80
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 70%

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: 2 years.
No flexibility in leave; leave must be taken all at once.

Family entitlement; leave is the
individual right of the mother until
the child's 1st birthday; no leave is
specifically reserved for the father,
but is job-protected.

All three forms of leave: Social
security/social insurance.

Maternity leave: Insured must have at least 365 days of coverage in
the last two years.
Paternity leave: Must be insured and request leave; no minimum
qualifying period.
Parental leave: No qualifying conditions except employment for the
GYED.

Two major programs exist:
Unpaid weeks: 0
Childcare leave - 1 year; paid at
Paid weeks: 105
HUF 28,500 per month (the monthly Total leave time: 105 weeks
minimum pension) can be taken by
either parent between the child's 2nd
- 8th birthday.
Leave to care for dependents Family entitlement for benefit;
length dependent on child's age;
under one year – unlimited; 12-35
months – up to 84 days per child per
year; 36-71 months – 42 days; six to
12 years – 14 days; paid at 70
percent of earnings (Moss, 2012,
147).

66-89
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
l

Iceland

13 weeks (at least 4 weeks may be taken prior to birth, optional)
paid at 80 percent of earnings up to a ceiling of ISK 400,000 per
month.
Total weeks of leave: 13
Total paid weeks: 13
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 80%

13 weeks of parental leave paid at
80% of earnings up to a ceiling of
ISK 400,000 per month.
Total weeks of leave: 13
Total paid weeks: 13
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 80%

13 weeks of parental leave paid at
80% of earnings up to a ceiling of
ISK 400,000 per month.
Total weeks of leave: 13
Total paid weeks: 13
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 80%

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 1.5 years.
Family entitlement; leave is reserved All forms of leave: Social Insurance.
Leave can be taken in one continuous period or as several blocks of and job-protected for both parents.
time.

All forms of leave: Parents must have been working in Iceland for
at least 6 consecutive months before leave.

Ireland

m

90-100
42 weeks of maternity leave (2 weeks before birth compulsory); 26
weeks are paid at 70% of earnings up to a maximum of EUR 280
per week, the additional 16 weeks are unpaid; 14 weeks of parental
leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 56
Total paid weeks: 26
Unpaid weeks: 30
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 40%

Childcare leave: 13 weeks, per
Unpaid weeks: 0
parent (individual, nonPaid weeks: 39
transferrable), unpaid until the child Total leave time: 39 weeks
is 8 years of age.
No paternity leave; 14 weeks of
parental leave, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 14
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

N/A

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 8 years.
Leave may be taken all at once or in separate blocks of a minimum
of six continuous weeks or more favorable terms subject to
employer’s agreement.

Individual entitlement;
leave is reserved and job protected
for both parents.

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity leave: insured must have at least 39 weeks of paid
contributions in the year immediately before maternity leave or the
relevant tax year.
Parental leave: all employees who have completed one year’s
continuous employment with their present employer.

Three days leave in a 12 month
Unpaid weeks: 44
period; paid. Three days paid leave Paid weeks: 26
in any 12 consecutive months, up to Total leave time: 70 weeks
5 days in a 26 month period.
65 weeks of leave to care for a sick
child or child with disability; unpaid.

90-100
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Italy

n

o

Luxembourg

20 weeks of maternity leave (4 weeks prior to childbirth,
compulsory) paid at 80% of earnings; 26 weeks of parental leave
(total leave cannot be longer than 10 months combined or 11
months if the father takes at least 3 months of leave) paid at 30
percent of earnings until the child is 3 years of age, unpaid after 3
years).
Total weeks of leave: 46
Total paid weeks: 46
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 49%

1 day of paternity leave (.2 week)
paid at 100% of earnings; 17.32
weeks of parental leave (total leave
cannot be longer than 10 months
combined) paid at 30 percent of
earnings until the child is 3 years of
age, unpaid after 3 years.
Total weeks of leave: 17.52
Total paid weeks: 17.52
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 32%

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: 8 years.
Leave can be taken at any time until a child is 8 years old. Parents
can take a single leave period up to a maximum of 6 months; or
shorter leave periods amounting to a maximum of 6 months.

Individual entitlement. Each parent All three forms of leave: Social
is entitled to job-protected, reserved Insurance.
leave.

Maternity and paternity leave: Must be currently covered.
Parental leave: Employee has to inform the employer about his/her
leave with minimum 15 days notice.

Leave to care for dependents - no
limit to length for child 3 years of
age or younger, 5 days per year per
parent for child 3-8 years of age;
leave is unpaid.

Unpaid weeks: 0
Paid weeks: 63.52
Total leave time: 63.52 weeks

Paternity leave: N/A.
Parental leave of 26 weeks paid at a
flat-rate payment of EUR 1,778 per
month.
Total weeks of leave: 26
Total paid weeks: 26
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 38%

N/A

66-89
16 weeks of maternity leave (8 prior to childbirth, compulsory),
paid at 100% of earnings up to a ceiling equal to five times the
minimum social wage (EUR 9,007.43 per month); parental leave of
26 weeks paid at a flat-rate payment of EUR 1,778 per month.
Total weeks of leave: 42
Total paid weeks: 42
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 68%

N/A

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: 5 years
Individual entitlement. Each parent Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Parents may take 12 months leave on a part-time basis (benefit
is entitled to job-protected, reserved Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
payment cut in half); parents must take parental leave immediately leave.
Parental leave: State funds.
following the end of maternity leave but a second period can be
taken by the other parent until the child is 5 years year of age.
Maternity leave: belong to a fund for at least six months in the year Parents with children less than 15
before the year of the expected date of leave.
years of age, 2 days per year per
Parental leave: must have worked for at least one year with the
child; paid.
same employer (for at least 20 hours per week).
p

Mexico

90-100
12 weeks of maternity leave paid at 100% of earnings (6 weeks
prior to birth, compulsory).
Total weeks of leave: 12
Total paid weeks: 12
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

Unpaid weeks: 0
Paid weeks: 68
Total leave time: 68 weeks

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Maternity leave: Must have at least 30 weeks of contributions in
the 12 months before the benefit is first paid.

N/A

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
Parental leave: NA, does not exist.
Unpaid weeks: 0
Paid weeks: 12
Total leave time: 12 weeks

90-100
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Netherlands

Norway

Panama

r

s

q

16 weeks of maternity leave (6 prior to childbirth, compulsory),
paid at 100% of daily earnings up to the maximum daily value of
the sickness benefit EUR 192.55; parental leave of 26 weeks per
parent, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 42
Total paid weeks: 16
Unpaid weeks: 26
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

2 days of paternity leave (.4 week)
N/A
paid at 100% of earnings; parental
leave of 26 weeks per parent, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 26.4
Total paid weeks: .4
Unpaid weeks: 26
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

Maximum age of child for which benefits can be used: 8 years.
Leave must be taken part time; full-time is only possible when the
employer agrees; leave can also be stretched out over a 52 week
period; leave can also be taken in 2 or 3 blocks of time.

Individual entitlement. Each parent Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
is entitled to job-protected, reserved Paternity leave: Employer liability.
leave, per child.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity leave: Insured must be employed or receiving
unemployment benefits, no minimum qualifying period.
Paternity leave: No minimum qualifying period.
Parental leave: Employed with same employer for at least one year;
leave periods must be agreed upon between the employee and
employer.

Short-term leave up to 10 days to
Unpaid weeks: 52
care for a relative or sick child, paid Paid weeks: 16.4
at 70% of employees earnings.
Total leave time: 68.4 weeks
Unpaid long term leave for persons
with seriously ill children.

66-89
9 weeks of maternity leave (3 prior to birth, compulsory) paid at
100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 9
Total paid weeks: 9
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

2 weeks of paternity leave, unpaid;
12 weeks of parental leave paid at
100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 12
Unpaid weeks: 2
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

26 weeks of parental leave (not
inclusive of the 12 weeks reserved for
fathers) paid at 100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 26
Total paid weeks: 26
Total unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

Maximum age for which benefits can be used: 3 years.
One or both parents may combine all or part of the leave pay period
with part-time work; the father's quota cannot be taken during the
first 6 weeks of the parental leave period in most cases; fathers can
use the leave all at once or split it into two periods.

Family entitlement; 12 weeks
specifically reserved for the father;
leave is job-protected for both
parents.

Maternity and parental leave: Social
Insurance.
Paternity leave: N/A, unpaid.

For all benefits: Mother or father must have been employed and
earning a pensionable income for at least 6 of the 10 months
immediately prior to receipt of benefits; parental leave is subject to
employer's approval.

10 days to care for a sick child under Unpaid weeks: 2
12, per year, per parent; 15 days per Paid weeks: 49
year for more than two children;
Total leave time: 49 weeks
benefit is paid by the employer at the
same rate as the sickness benefit.
Childcare leave - reserved for each
parent for 1 year until the child's 3rd
birthday; unpaid.

66-89
14 weeks (6 weeks prior to birth, compulsory) paid at 100% of
average weekly earnings in the last 9 months.
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 14
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.

Must have at least nine months of contributions in the year before
the seventh month of pregnancy.

Can take leave for medical checks
for sons under 2 years of age.
(updated 2011, ILO Working
Conditions Laws Database).

Unpaid weeks: 0
Paid weeks: 14
Total leave time: 14 weeks

66-89
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Paraguay

12 weeks (6 weeks prior to birth) paid at 50% of the insured's
average earnings in the past four months for 9 weeks.
Total weeks of leave: 12
Total paid weeks: 9
Unpaid weeks: 3
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 50%

3 days paid at 100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: .6
Total paid weeks: .6
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

N/A

N/A

N/A

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity leave: Employer Liability.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.

Maternity leave: At least six weeks of contributions in the last four N/A
months.
Paternity leave: Must be employed and request leave from
employer.
Peru

33-65
13 weeks (6.5 weeks prior to birth, compulsory) paid at 100% of
the average daily wage in the 12 months prior to birth.
Total weeks of leave: 13
Total paid weeks: 13
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

t

Poland

u

Unpaid weeks: 3
Paid weeks: 9.6
Total leave time: 12.6

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Maternity leave: At least three months of consecutive contributions
or at least four months of contributions in the six months prior to
becoming pregnant.
33-65
24 weeks of maternity leave (at least 2 weeks to be taken prior to
giving childbirth, optional) paid at 100% of average earnings over
the past 12 months; 14 weeks obligatory, the additional 10 weeks of
maternity leave can be transferred to the father.
Total weeks of leave: 24
Total paid weeks: 24
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

N/A

Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.
Unpaid leave: 0
Paid leave: 13
Total leave time: 13 weeks

Maximum age for which leave can be used: 4 years.
Parents can take leave in one continuous period or in up to four
separate blocks.

Family entitlement; leave for the
Maternity and paternity leave: Social
father is not reserved but parents can Insurance.
take leave up to 3 months together. Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity and paternity leave: Must be insured with at least 30
days of continuous employment; 90 days for those voluntarily
insured.
Parental leave: At least 6 months of employment

All employees are granted up to 14
days per year to care for a family
member, paid at 80% of earnings (I
assume continuous and inclusive of
weekends).
An employee can also take leave
until child is 8 years of age in case
of school closing, emergency, etc.,
also paid at 80% of earnings.

66-89

Incentives: Parents can take a period
of time off together + mothers can
transfer a portion of their leave to
the father.
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2 weeks of paternity leave paid at
100% of average earnings in the past
12 months.
Total weeks of leave: 2
Total paid weeks: 2
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

Parental leave of 156 weeks, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 156
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 156
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Unpaid weeks: 156
Paid weeks: 24
Total leave time: 180 weeks

Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Slovak
v
Republic

Slovenia

w

28 weeks of maternity leave (at least 8 weeks prior to childbirth,
compulsory) paid at 55% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 28
Total paid weeks: 28
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 55%

N/A

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 3 years.
No flexibility in taking leave.

Family entitlement, only one person Maternity leave: Social Insurance.
may use the leave; no leave
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
specifically reserved for fathers.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity leave: Insured must have at least 270 days of coverage in
the 2 years before the expected date of childbirth.
Parental leave: A request of the employee, no other qualifying
conditions.

Employees can take 10 days per year
to take care of a sick relative
(including a sick child). An earningsrelated benefit is paid (ošetrovné).

66-89

Disincentive: Only one parent is
eligible to take-up shared leave.
Around 13 weeks of paternity leave
paid at 100% of average earnings for
the first 2.2 weeks (15 days); the
remaining 75 days (10.8 weeks) the
father is paid social security
contributions based on the minimum
wage (approximately EUR 169 per
month), these days can be taken up
to the child's 3rd birthday.
Total weeks of leave: 13
Total paid weeks: 13
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 34%

15 weeks (4 weeks prior to childbirth, mandatory) paid at 100% of
average earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 15
Total paid weeks: 15
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

136 weeks of parental leave (mothers)
or 156 weeks (fathers, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 136 (mothers),
156 (fathers)
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 136 (mothers), 156
(fathers)
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

Unpaid weeks: 136
Paid weeks: 28
Total leave time: 164 (use of weeks of
leave for the mother under shared
weeks).

Around 37 weeks of parental leave
paid at 90% of average earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 37
Total paid weeks: 37
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 90%

Maximum age for which benefits can be used: up to 8 years.
Family entitlement - only one parent All types of leave: Social Insurance.
Leave may be taken full-time or combined with part-time work; up can take leave, however both parents
to 75 days may be taken at any time up to the child’s 8th birthday, enjoy employment protection.
full-time or part-time leave or as individual days.

All types of leave: There is no minimum qualifying period,
however, in order to receive the full benefit payment the insured
must have worked at least 12 months prior to childbirth; women no
longer insured must have been insured at least 12 months out of the
last 3 years.

In general, 7 working days may be
Unpaid weeks: 0
taken by either parent to take care of Paid weeks: 65
a sick child/family member, per
Total leave time: 65 weeks
illness episode, longer in other cases,
paid at 80% of average earnings, and
cannot be lower than the guaranteed
wage.

90-100

Disincentive: Only one parent is
eligible to take-up shared leave
unless an agreement to split it with
the other parent in writing.
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
Spain

x

Switzerland

y

16 weeks paid at 100% of earnings up to a ceiling of EUR 3,230 per
month (10 weeks prior to birth optional); 46 months of parental
leave, unpaid; an additional 104 weeks of parental leave is
available until the child's 3rd birthday, but is not job-protected.
Employed mothers can transfer up to 10 of their 16 paid weeks of
maternity leave to the father if they take at least 6 weeks following
childbirth.
Total weeks of leave: 166
Total paid weeks: 16
Unpaid weeks: 150
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

2.1 weeks of leave paid at 100% of
N/A
earnings; 50 weeks of parental leave,
unpaid; an additional 104 weeks of
parental leave is available until the
child's 3rd birthday, but is not jobprotected.
Total weeks of leave: 156.1
Total paid weeks: 2.1
Unpaid weeks: 154
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

Maximum age for which benefits can be used: 3 years (only up to 1
year is the leave job protected).
There are no limits to the number of periods of leave that can be
taken, with no minimum period of leave.

Individual entitlement; both parents
have employment protection for the
first year, the additional 104 weeks
of parental leave is available until
the child's 3rd birthday, is not job
protected for either parent.

Maternity and paternity leave: Dependent on age, at least 180 days
of contributions in the seven years before childbirth if older than 26
or 360 days of lifetime contributions.
Parental leave: No qualifying conditions; employers can restrict
both parents from taking leave if parents work for the same
company.

Two days per worker, per event for
Unpaid weeks: 304
illness of a child or other family
Paid weeks: 18.1
reasons, paid by the employer (no
Total leave time: 322.1 weeks
mention of payment amount).
Full or part-time leave to take care
of a seriously ill child paid at 100%
by sickness insurance.
Workers may take up to 2 years off
to take care of a dependent relative
with a serious illness or disability,
paid between EUR 300 and EUR
520.69 per month
Workers may also take off 2 years as
an unpaid career break.

66-89

Incentive: Mothers can transfer
some of their leave to fathers.
N/A

14 weeks paid at eighty percent of earnings, up to a ceiling of CHF
196 per day.
Total weeks of leave: 14
Total paid weeks: 14
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 68%
N/A

N/A

Maternity and paternity leave: Social
Insurance.
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

N/A

Maternity leave: Social security and
employer.
Paternity leave: N/A, does not exist.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.
Working parents are entitled to 3
Unpaid weeks: 0
days, per episode to care for a sick
Paid weeks: 14
child. Only one parent can benefit at Total leave time: 14 weeks
a time. Payment for this leave is not
mandatory.

Maternity leave: At least 9 months of contributions and work
history of at least 5 months of the 9 months prior to childbirth.

66-89
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Appendix Table 4.1 continued
United
z
Kingdom

United
aa
States

52 weeks of maternity leave that can begin at least 11 weeks prior
to birth (optional). 90% of woman’s average earnings for six weeks
with no ceiling + a flat-rate payment of either GBP 135.45 or 90%
of average gross weekly earnings (whichever is lower) for 33
weeks. The remaining 13 weeks are unpaid; after 20 weeks of
maternity leave, the mother can transfer leave to the father - which
can be taken for a minimum of 2 weeks or a maximum of 26 weeks
(called Additional Paternity Leave - APL); APL is paid for a
maximum of 19 weeks at the flat rate of GBP 135.45 or 90% of
average earnings, whichever is lower. 13 weeks of parental leave,
unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 65
Total paid weeks: 39
Unpaid weeks: 26
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 38%

2 weeks of paternity leave paid EUR N/A
159 per week, or 90 per cent of
average weekly earnings, whichever
is less; 13 weeks of parental leave,
unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 15
Total paid weeks: 2
Unpaid weeks: 13
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 34%

Maximum age of child for which benefit can be used: 5 years.
Leave may be taken in blocks or in multiples of one week, up to
and for no more than four weeks per year.

Individual entitlement; leave is
reserved and job-protected for each
parent.

Maternity and paternity leave: Mixed
(the state and the employer - who is
later reimbursed by the state).
Parental leave: N/A, unpaid.

Maternity and paternity leave:
Parent must be employed continuously for at least 26 weeks by the
same employer up to and including the 15th week before the
expected week of childbirth.
Parental leave: At least one year of continuous employment at the
same employer.

Employees may take an unspecified
amount of time off to care for
dependents; time off is unpaid.

Unpaid weeks: 39
Paid weeks: 41
Total leave time: 80 weeks

66-89

Incentive: Mothers can transfer
some of their leave to fathers.
12 weeks, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 12
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 12
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 0%

12 weeks, unpaid.
Total weeks of leave: 12
Total paid weeks: 0
Unpaid weeks: 12
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 0%
Maximum age for which benefit can be used: up to any age (see
notes).
Leave can be taken up to 12 weeks in any 12 month period in one
continuous period or divided into several blocks of time.

Individual entitlement; leave is
reserved and job-protected for each
parent.

Parental leave: An employee must meet the following three
N/A
requirements: work for an employer who employs 50 or more
employees at the site or within 75 miles of the site, have worked for
at least 12 months (consecutive or not) with the same employer,
have worked at least 1250 hours over the previous 12 months.

Uruguay

33-65
12 weeks (6 prior to birth) paid at 100% of earnings.
Total weeks of leave: 12
Total paid weeks: 12
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid leave period: 100%

3 days in the private sector; 10 for
civil servants both paid at 100% of
earnings.
Total weeks of leave: .6
Total paid weeks: .6
Unpaid weeks: 0
Average wage replacement of paid
leave period: 100%

N/A

N/A

N/A

Parental leave: N/A unpaid.

Unpaid weeks: 24
Paid weeks: 0
Total leave time: 24 weeks

N/A

Maternity leave: Social insurance.
Paternity leave: Employer liability.
Parental leave: N/A, does not exist.
N/A (ILO Working Conditions Laws Unpaid weeks: 0
Database). No leave for family
Paid weeks: 12.6
reasons confirmed by Moss, 2016.
Total leave time: 12.6 weeks

Maternity and paternity leave: No minimum qualifying period.

66-89
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Notes: Countries for which policy data comes from around the year 2009/2010: Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, Ireland, the Slovak
Republic. All other countries’ policy data is from around the year 2012/2013. General note regarding payment of leave in Australia,
France, and several additional countries (see below notes): Parental leave is not paid. These countries provide a supplement or other
policy that parents may be eligible for. However, I categorize the leave as unpaid if parents can receive the benefit payment regardless
of whether or not they take-up leave. General note regarding childcare leave (not included in analyses): Also available in five
countries: Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Spain. Note that for Spain, childcare leave on the same job is job-protected until
the child is 1 year of age. From age 1 until the child is 3 years of age (the duration of the childcare leave), job protection is restricted to
a job in the same category for both mothers and fathers. Moreover, for Spain, Moss (2012) defines all leave until a child is 3 years of
age parental leave while the OECD defines leave from 1-3 years as childcare leave. In this case, I use the OECD definition and count
the 2 years between 1 year to 3 years of age as childcare leave.
a
Australia: There is no differentiation between maternity, paternity, and parental leave. One week of leave following the birth of a
child can be taken by both the mother and father, but since they overlap, I do not include this leave time in my analyses. I assume that
mothers take leave in the majority of instances. Note that in some states, a mother may be able to request leave until the child reaches
school age, through flexible work arrangements. From Ray et al. (2010): "Australia grants each set of new parents a ‘baby bonus’ of
AUD 5,000 per child. This benefit may allow parents who could not otherwise afford to take leave to do so. However, because parents
receive this benefit regardless of whether they take parental leave, we treated Australian parental leave as unpaid." Since parental
leave is not employment-protected for the father, I assume mothers take the entirety of available leave.
b
Austria: Parents may take one month of parental leave simultaneously. Therefore, I accounted solely for the one month fathers can
take individually in the generosity index for couples and also in the generosity index for fathers. (4.7 weeks of leave in the generosity
scale). A separate childcare benefit to accompany parental leave is available to those eligible. However, the benefit is not accounted
for in my analyses because parents can receive the benefit whether or not they take parental leave.
c
Brazil: Private sector employees may be able to earn an additional two months of leave if the company participates in the Company
Citizen programme. For these additional two months, employers pay the cost of the leave and can deduct the cost through taxes.
d
Canada: Leave varies by province. For the purposes of the generosity and gender equality indicators, I utilized the number of jobprotected weeks from the OECD PF2_5 Trends in Leave entitlements around childbirth from the OECD Family Database. Maternity
and parental leave is paid at 55 percent of average insured earnings up to a ceiling of CAN 435. I calculate weekly earnings at CAN
825.70. Therefore, the person with average wage receives wage replacement benefits of about 51 percent of total leave (825.70 x .55 =
454.14).
f
Denmark: Both mothers and fathers are allocated 32 weeks of shared parental leave. Since the leave is shared, it is granted to mothers
in couples for the generosity index for mothers and in the gender equality indices. For eligibility requirements, I use the requirements
for employed workers. About 75 percent of the workforce is covered by collective agreements, mandating employers to top-up state
benefits. All leave is paid at full earnings up to DKK 788 per day. Average daily earnings were calculated at DKK 1,181.50. The
average earner therefore receives 67 percent of usual earnings.
g
Finland: There exists an incentive for fathers to take leave in Finland. For the generosity scale I do not report the additional incentive
weeks, but I do report them in the gender equality indices. Access to leave is based on residency. Mothers and fathers NOT employed
receive a flat-rate benefit of EUR 22.96 per working day (2012). Note that while taking childcare leave, parents are entitled to a
homecare allowance. However, since the allowance is universal, I did not include it in my analyses. From Moss 2012, 110. During the
first 56 days, benefit is paid at 90 percent up to a ceiling of EUR 53,072. After this, benefit is paid at 70 percent again up to a ceiling
of EUR 34,495. Average annual earnings were calculated at EUR 31,372.75. An employee with average earnings therefore receives
the maximum payment. Over the course of total leave, wages are replaced at around 81 percent of usual earnings.
h
France: Maternity and paternity leave wage replacement is paid at 100 percent of earnings up to a ceiling of EUR 2,859 a month in
2009. Average monthly earnings are calculated at EUR 1,593.32. Therefore, I assume 100 percent wage replacement for the average
worker.
i
Germany: Offers an income-related parental benefit (Elterngeld) paid at a 67 percent replacement rate for a parent who works less
than 30 hours per week; only one year of parental leave is paid. According to the author's calculations, the monthly wage in Germany
is EUR 2,596.30, which means that the average earner receives the full amount (EUR 2,596.30 x .67 = EUR 1,739.52.). The incomerelated payment may be extended to up to 108 weeks, however, in this case the benefit amount is cut in half (Moss 2012, 130).
j
Greece: Total weeks of leave for mothers according to my calculations totals 34.3 weeks. Parents can work flexible hours to care for a
child. However, since this leave technically falls under employment law, I do not account for it in my scale. The leave is granted to
both parents for 3.77 months with no ceiling on payments; paid for by the employer (see Moss 2012, 139).
k
Hungary: Has a two-tiered scheme for leave benefits. The information used in analysis and calculations is for insured parents,
Gyermekgondozasi dij (GYED). There is a separate scheme gyermekgondozasi segely (GYES), for non-insured parents.
l
Iceland: Has a tiered system for all forms of leave. Those who work part-time receive a benefit paid at a lower amount; certain
groups, such as students, may be eligible for a flat-rate amount. From Moss (2009, 213): "Note on terminology: In Icelandic the term
faedingarorlof (literally ‘birth leave’) is used in law to refer to paid Maternity, Paternity, and Parental leave. But in common parlance,
the term is mostly used to refer to women’s absence from the labor market due to birth and childcare. When the father takes his leave,
it is usually referred to as fedraorlof (Paternity leave). So even if the law makes no distinction between different types of leave taken
by mothers and fathers, a distinction is made in everyday usage." Eighty percent of earnings is paid up to a ceiling of ISK 400,000 per
month. The average monthly wage is calculated at ISD 339,827.38 leave takers receive the full benefit.
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Ireland: Benefit ceiling is EUR 280 per week. Usual weekly earnings were calculated at EUR 488.07 per month. Therefore, the
average earner receives around 57 percent wage replacement. Because 16 weeks are unpaid, the wage replacement for the total leave
period is around 36 percent of usual earnings.
n
Italy: Parental leave is an individual entitlement for each parent up to a maximum of 6 months each. However, total leave cannot
exceed 10 months. Moreover, leave is paid at 30 percent of earnings for up to 6 months. Therefore, allocating the least generous
arrangement across all indices, I assume mothers take-up 6 months of parental leave and the payment. I therefore allocate 4 months of
unpaid leave to fathers (and one paid paternity leave day at 100 percent of usual earnings). In June 2012, a law passed in Italy that
allowed fathers one day of paternity leave paid at 100 percent of usual earnings. Mothers can also transfer two days of maternity leave
to the father. Note as well that if fathers take at least 3 months of parental leave they are also eligible to receive 1 additional month of
leave. I do not count this month in incentives since parental leave is already an individual entitlement.
o
Luxembourg: The average monthly wage in Luxembourg is EUR 3,730.50 (author's calculation). This means that maternity leave
(leave around the birth of a child) is paid at 100 percent of earnings. However, parental leave is paid at a flat rate of EUR. 1,778 per
month. Therefore, the wage replacement is about 48 percent of usual earnings.
p
Mexico: If a woman is not currently covered by social insurance but has already qualified for maternity leave, her employer is
responsible for the full payment of benefits.
q
Netherlands: For "additional leave," I account for the leave up to 10 days to take care of a sick family member. The longer unpaid
leave to care of a seriously ill child, I assume is less commonly utilized. Leave takers receive 100 percent of earnings up to a ceiling of
EUR 192.55 (the maximum daily payment for the sickness benefit). The average daily wage in the Netherlands was calculated at EUR
128.17 so persons with the average wage receive the maximum benefit payment amount.
r
Norway: There is no actual distinction between the three benefit types (maternity, paternity, and parental benefits). For the table I
include the least generous arrangement. However, note that mothers can choose a "long option" for leave that will increase the total
leave weeks from 26 to 36 weeks. In this scenario, the 9 weeks of leave categorized as maternity leave is paid at 80 percent of usual
earnings. Likewise, shared parental leave that is extended from 26 to 36 weeks is paid at 80 percent of usual earnings. The portion of
parental leave reserved specifically for fathers is also paid at 80 percent of earnings. For maternity and parental leave, the insured
(mother or father) must also earn at least 50 percent of the base amount (NOK 82,122). Parents with a child between 1 and 3 years of
age are eligible to receive a monthly cash benefit per child if the child is not enrolled in a publicly subsidized ECEC service (Moss
2012, 209). All parents are entitled to this benefit regardless of whether the mother or father is taking childcare leave. Therefore, this
benefit is not included in my analyses. For the shorter option, leave takers receive up to 100 percent of usual earnings up to a ceiling
of NOK 437,286 a year. The average earnings in Norway is NOK 400,640.87. Therefore, the I assume the average earner receives the
maximum payment for the duration of the leave.
s
Panama: if a woman is not currently covered by social insurance but has already qualified for maternity leave, her employer is
responsible for the full payment of benefits.
t
Peru: One hundred percent of the average daily wage in the 12 months prior to the start of the benefit is paid. However, in the absence
of average daily wage information for Peru, I assume the benefit is paid at 100 percent of usual earnings.
u
Poland: Parental leave is a family entitlement. However, parents can take up to 3 months off together. I account for the entirety of the
leave (156 weeks) since no leave is specifically reserved for the father, and include an additional incentive point for fathers.
v
Slovak Republic: Maternity leave benefits can also be paid to the child's father, the husband of the child’s mother, and other persons
subject to conditions. A separate parental allowance (rodičovský príspevok) of EUR 199.60 per month is available to families whether
or not they take parental leave, therefore I classify parental leave as unpaid. In the Slovak Republic, maternity leave (leave around the
birth of a child) is paid at 55 percent of the daily assessment basis, which is usual earnings in the 12 months prior to childbirth. I
therefore assume that leave benefits are paid at 55 percent of usual earnings.
w
Slovenia: Slovenia has a two-tier system. Mothers and fathers not insured (but that had been insured for 12 months in the prior 3
years before childbirth) also receive a benefit paid at a lower rate. Employment protection is extended to both mothers and fathers
according to Thompson Reuters Practical Law, “Employment and Employee Benefits in Slovenia: Overview."
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/If9009e90854211e498db8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&tr
ansitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1. I assume the following regarding wage replacement for leave duration: maternity
leave is paid at 100 percent of average earnings. Paternity leave is paid at around 47 percent of usual earnings based on calculations.
Parental leave is paid at 90 percent of usual earnings up to a ceiling of EUR 2,863, per month. The average monthly wage was
calculated at EUR 818.32, so I assume the average leave taker receives the full payment amount.
x
Spain: For paternity and maternity leave takers, 100 percent of earnings is paid up to a ceiling of EUR 3,230 per month. The average
monthly wage was calculated at EUR 2,258.08 per month. Persons with enough contributions receive the total benefit payment.
y
Switzerland: For maternity leave, eighty percent of earnings, up to a ceiling of CHF 7,350 per month, is paid. Average monthly
earnings were calculated at CHF 6,278 per month; I therefore assume leave takers receive the full benefit amount.
z
United Kingdom: Over the entire maternity leave period, leave takers receive a payment of around 28.6 percent of usual earnings.
The first 6 weeks are paid at 90 percent of usual earnings with no caps to benefits. Thirty-three weeks are paid at a flat-rate benefit of
£135.45. This flat-rate benefit divided by the usual weekly earnings of £473.29 means the 33 weeks are paid at around 28.6 percent.
aa
United States: The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) covers a broad range of needs for leave. I categorize this type of leave as
parental leave. Note several states including California and, most recently, New York, offer paid parental leave at the state level. I do
not account for these benefits since I am interested in federal-level programs only.
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Sources:
Columns B– F: Across all columns, information is derived from the International Review of Leave Policy Research, various years; the
ILO working conditions law database; and the Social Security Systems throughout the World (SSA) publications.
Column G (Financing of leave): UN Women (2015).
Column H (Eligibility requirements): Social Security Systems throughout the World (SSA) and International Review of Leave Policy
Research, various years.
Column I (Additional leave): Information from the International Review of Leave Policy Research and ILO working conditions laws
database.
Column K (Coverage in the law of maternity leave): ILO Maternity and Paternity at Work, Law and Practices Across the World, 2014.
Definition (ILO, 2014, 148): This indicator measures the share of employed women (regardless of their status in employment,
category of work, or the level of formality) who are legally covered by statutory maternity leave. The numerator is the result of the
number of women employed whose sector, occupation, or other personal characteristics are explicitly included in the scope of the
labor code (legally covered) minus the number of women workers legally covered who do not meet the qualifying conditions to access
the right to maternity leave (legally unqualified). The denominator is the number of women in employment, without discrimination as
to age, nationality, marital status, or residence. This indicator reflects the entitlement to maternity leave, regardless of its length or
payment.
Column L (Incentives and disincentives) for fathers to take-up leave: International Review of Leave Policy Research, various years.
Note leave reserved specifically for the father with a "use it or lose it incentive,” such as the father’s quota in Norway and Iceland, is
already allocated to fathers in the indicators.
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Appendix Table 4.2 ECEC Policy Database (with country-specific notes)
Countries (A)

Generosity of ECEC
Total public Out-of-pocket
expenditure childcare costs
on preas a percentage
primary
of net family
education in income (single
percent of
parent, 100%
GDP (B)
the average
wage, parent
employed fulltime) (C)

Out-of-pocket
childcare costs as
a percentage of
family net
income (dualearner, both
parents employed
full-time) 100%
the average
wage) (D)

Dominant mechanism
of provision for young
children 0-2 years of
age
(E)

Dominant mechanism
of provision for
children 3-5
years/comp. school
age (F)

Dominant
mechanism
of provision
for young
children 0-2
years of age
(Weight) (G)

Dominant
mechanism of
provision for
children 3-5
years/comp.
school age
(Weight) )(H)

Enrollment in
Enrollment in formal
formal care
care arrangements (3arrangements 0-2 comp. schooling) (J)
years of age (I)

Enrollment in formal
care arrangements 0-2
years of age
(Weighted estimate)
(K)

Australia

0.06

15

18

Private care: Centers
and family day care
centers.

Public care: Reception
class/pre-school with
primary school.

0.5
0.47

1
4

33
2

51
Private care: Family
day care centers
(Tagesmutter) and
center based day cares
(Krippen).

16.5
Public care:
Kindergartens;
obligatory for 5 year
olds.

51

Austria

0.5
0.51

1
N/A

19
N/A

83
Public care: Guarderia
0-3 years of age
Public care childcare
programs:
Programs: Espaço de
Desenvolvimento
Infantil, Rio de Janeiro,
Centros de Educação
Infantil, Fortaleza
(For children 6 months 4 years of age).

9.5
Public care:
Preescholar
(obligatory from age
4).

83

Brazil

1
N/A

1
19

13
18

76
Private care: Center
based and family day
care (0-3 years of age).

13
Public care: Junior
Kindergarten and
Kindergarten (4 & 5
years of age).

76

Canada

0.5

1

24

47.9

12

47.9

352

Enrollment in
formal care
arrangements
(3- comp.
schooling)
(Weighted
estimate) (L)

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Colombia

0.28

N/A

Average monthly
out-of-pocket
expenditure per
child
13% of houshold
per capita income
(2011). Note only
1/3 of users pay
this amount; 2/3
pay nothing for
services; private
care costs are
more expensive
(26% in 2011).

Public care childcare
programs (no formal
schooling component).
Programs: Hogares
Comunitarios (Instituto
Colombiano de
Bienestar Familiar
[ICBF]), Modalidad
Institucional (ICBF)
(For children 0 to 4
years of age).

Public care:
Preescholar
(obligatory from age
5).

Czech Republic

1
0.54

1
18

17
10

Denmark

0.5
1.18

1
8

4
9

50
Private care: Center
based day care
(creches).
81
Public care: Family day
care centers, (Dagpleje)
creche, age integrated
facility (Adlersintegrer
for 0-5 years of age).

17
50
Public care:
Kindergarten
(Materska skola).
2
81
Public care: Family
day care centers,
(Dagpleje) creche, age
integrated facilitiy
(Adlersintegrer for 0-5
years of age),
kindergarten for 3-5
years of age (Bornehaver; compulsory for
6 year olds).

Estonia

1
0.35

1
8

67
4

94
Public care: Centerbased care (creches, 0-6
years of age).

67
94
Public care: Centerbased care (creches, 06 years of age) and preschool and nursery
schools from ages 3 5 years; Pre-school
(Borne-haver) at 6
years of age.

1

1

32

88

32

353

88

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Finland

0.77

22

14

Public care: Family day
care centers
(Perhepaivahoito) and
Municipal early
development centers
(Paivakoti).

Public care: Family
day care centers
(Perhepaivahoito) and
Municipal early
development centers
(Paivakoti);
pre-school (Esiopetus)
at 6 years of age.

1
0.66

1
7

27
10

80
Public care: Center
based care (creches:
and family day care
centers (assistant
maternelles).

27
Public care: Preschool (ecole
maternelle).

80

France

1
0.44

1
15

48
8

100
Public care: Center
based creches (Krippen)
By 2016 more of a mix most children enrolled
in non-profit and for
profit government
dependent private
settings.

48
Public care:
Kindergartens (preschool).

100

Germany

1
N/A

1
6

29
3

95
Public care: Creches
(until child is 2.5 years
of age).

29
Public care: Nursery
school for children
older than 2.5 years;
kindergarten from 2
years of age.

95

Greece

Hungary

1
0.65

1
6

17
3

17
95
Public care:
Kindergarten (Ovoda).

Iceland

1
0.69

1
5

16
4

Ireland

1
0.09

1
39

56
22

95
Public care: Creches
(Bolscode) for children
0-2 years
95
Public care: Day-care
centers and family day
care centers (day
mothers).
96
Private care: Regulated
family day care centers
and center-based
nurseries (0-3 years of
age).

0.5

0.75

29

49

14.5

354

16
Public care: Preschool.

95

56
96
Mixed provision
Private care: Preschool play groups (35 years of age)
Public care: EECE and
pre-school (infant
school) (4-5 years of
age).
36.75

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Italy

0.45

N/A

N/A

Luxembourg

1
0.58

1
11

23
16

Mexico

1
0.53

1
N/A

Netherlands

0.75
0.38

Norway

Public care: Creches
(Asili nidi).

Public care: Preschool (Scuola
dell'infazia).

94
Public care: Centerbased care (Creches)
and family day care
centers (Tagsmutter).
53
90
Average monthly Educacion initial (0-3
out-of-pocket
years of age);
expenditure per
Mixed provision
child
childcare/pre-primary
23% of houshold programs for children 0per capita income 5 years of age.
(2009)
Note only 1/3 of
users pay this
amount; 2/3 pay
nothing for
services; private
care costs are
more expensive
(35% in 2009).

23
94
Public care: Preschool (Enseignement
pre-scolarire) from 35 years of age.
53
90
Public care: Preescolar
Mixed provision
childcare/pre-primary
programs:
3-5 years of age
Jardín de niños
2 - 5 years of age:
Centros de Educacion
Inicial (CEI SEP)
Centros de Asistencia
Infantil Comunitarios
(CAIC) (childcare and
educational services
for disadvantaged
children).

0.75
18

5
21

69
Private care: Family
day care centers
(Gastouderopvang) and
child care centers
(Kinderopvang) and
playgroups (0- 3.5
years of age).

3.75
Mixed provision
private care: Family
day care centers
(Gastouderopvang)
and child care centers
(Kinderopvang) and
playgroups (0- 3.5
years of age)
Public care: Group 1
with primary school
(3.5-5 years of age).

0.5
0.73

0.75
17

54
10

93
Public care:
Kindergarten
(Barnehage), family
day care centers
(including rural
familiebarnhager), and
open kindergarten
(barnehage) (0-5 years
of age).

27
69.75
Public care:
Kindergarten
(Barnehage), family
day care centers
(including rural
familiebarnhager), and
open kindergarten
(barnehage) (0-5 years
of age).

1

1

54

98

54

355

51.75

98

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Panama

0.1

N/A

N/A

Public care: Educacion
inicial (0-4 years of
age).
Public childcare
program:
Centro de Orientación
Infantil y Familiar
(COIF)
(For children 0-3 years
of age).

Public care:
Preescolar/Educacion
inicial (4-5 years of
age, obligatory).
Pre-primary Programs:
Centros de Educación
Inicial Comunitarios
(CEIC) (all children)
and Centros Familiares
y Comunitarios de
Educación Inicial
(CEFACEI)
(disadvantaged
children/children in
rural areas).

Paraguay

1
0.3

1
N/A

12
N/A

44
Public care: Educacion
inicial divided into 2
cycles 0-3 and 4 years
of age.
Public care: Preescolar
at 5 years of age
(considered the
beginning of
compulsory, basic
education)
Public childcare
programs for children 05 years: Programa
Nacional Abrazo,
Centros de Protección.

12
44
1-7 years: Programa
Nacional Abrazo,
Centros Comunitarios
These are mainly
centers for poor
children designed to
help keep them off the
streets and in care and
education.

Peru

1
0.49

1
N/A

5
N/A

35
Mixed provision:
Educación inicial (no
formal schooling
cirriculum).
Mixed provision
childcare program:
Cuna Más
(for children from 6
months to 2 years of
age, targeted to poor
children).

5
35
Public care: Educación
Initial (2-5 years of
age, mandatory from 3
years of age).

0.75
0.59

1
9

13
5

84
Private care: Nurseries
(By 2016 Creches,
Childminders, and
nannies are available
full-time; kids clubs
available part-time).

9.75
Public care: Preschools and nursery
schools.

84

Poland

0.5

1

9

75

4.5

75

356

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Slovak Republic

0.39

27

16

Slovenia

0.75
0.6

1
14

3
10

Spain

1
0.48

1
9

45
5

Switzerland

1
0.18

1
15

38
28

United Kingdom

0.5
0.3

1
13

38
29

United States

0.5
0.32

1
41

Uruguay

0.5
0.44

1

Mixed provision:
Public care:
Public and private care: Kindergartens.
Nursery schools.
73
2.25
Public care:
11 months - 6 years of
age
Vrtci (center based
setting)
Varstvo predšolskih
otrok (home-based care)

73

91
Public care: Centerbased care (Educacion
Preescolar).
98
Private care: Centerbased care (Creches and
Krippen).
78
Private care: Nurseries,
childminders, and play
groups.

45
Public care: Preschool (Educacion
Infantil).
38
Public care: Preschool.

91

19
Public care: Play
groups, early year
education (3-4 years
of age); at 4 years
reception class with
primary school.

78

35
22

79
Private care: Child care
centers and family day
care centers.

17.5
79
Public care: Preschool, kindergartens
and Head Start.
(Note that some
kindergartens are in
private care facilities).

1
N/A

43.2
N/A

64
Public care: Educación
en la Primera Infancia
Main program: Plan
Centros de Atención a
la Infancia y a la
Familia (CAIF)
(For children 0-3 years
of age).

21.6
64
Public care: Educación
inicial
(3-5 years of age
mandatory from 4
years of age).

1

28

88

28

357

98

88

Table 4.2 continued
Universality of ECEC
Countries (A) Legal
Legal
entitlement to entitlement to
care in national care in age of
legislation
child (C)
(ECEC or
compulsory preprimary
education) (B)

Legal
entitlement to
care in months
(age of child)
(D)

Legal
entitlement to
care in weeks
(age of child)
(E)

Legal
entitlement parttime = 20 hrs. a
week or less/
full-time = more
than 20 hours
per week (F)

N/A
60

N/A
260

No entitlement
Part-time

Australia
Austria

No entitlement
Compulsory
pre-primary
education
begins at 5
years of age.

Brazil

From birth
4
(though issues
in practice);
compulsory preschool
education from
4 years of age.

48

208

Part-time

Canada
Colombia

No entitlement N/A
Compulsory
5
pre-primary
education from
5 years of age).
No entitlement N/A

N/A
60

N/A
260

No entitlement
N/A

N/A

N/A

No entitlement

6 months
3 years
(shortage of
ECEC means
entitlement is
not guaranteed
until 3 years of
age)

0.6
3

6
36

26
156

Full-time
Full-time

Around 1 year
3 years
1 year
5 years

1
3
1
5

12
36
12
60

52
156
52
260

Full-time
Full-time
Part-time
Part-time

Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia

Finland
France
Germany
Greece

N/A
5

358

Appendix Table 4.2 continued
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Mexico

3 years
No entitlement
3.25 years
No entitlement
3 years
Compulsory
pre-school
education from
3 years of age
(see notes).

3
N/A
3.25
N/A
3
3

36
N/A
39
N/A
36
36

156
N/A
169
N/A
156
156

Full-time
No entitlement
Part-time
No entitlement
Part-time
Mixed

Netherlands
Norway
Panama

4 years
1 year
Compulsory
pre-school
education
begins at 4
years of age.

4
1
4

48
12
48

208
52
208

Part-time
Full-time
Part-time

Paraguay

No entitlement; 5
pre-school at
age 5 is
considered the
first grade for
Educación
Escolar Básica).

N/A

N/A

No entitlement

Peru

Obligatory pre- 3
primary
education from
3 years of age.
No entitlement N/A
No entitlement N/A

36

156

Full-time

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

No entitlement
No entitlement

Around 1 year
3 years
Obligatory preprimary
education from
4 years of age.
3 years

12
36
48

52
156
208

Full-time
Full-time
N/A

36

156

Part-time

N/A
48

N/A
208

No entitlement
Part-time

Poland
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Switzerland

1
3
4

United
3
Kingdom
United States No entitlement N/A
Uruguay
Obligatory pre- 4
primary
education from
4 years of age.

Notes: All notes and sources are divided into two groups, the first for ECEC policy generosity and the second for ECEC policy
universality.
Generosity of ECEC:
(B) For total public expenditure on pre-primary education data unavailable for Greece and Canada. All estimates are from the year
2013 with the exception of Brazil (2011), Mexico (2011), Panama (2011), Paraguay (2012), and Uruguay (2011); estimates for the
following countries are from 2010 (to match the year of microdata used in a later chapter): Australia, France, Iceland, Ireland, and the
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Slovak Republic. Definition: “Total general (local, regional and central) government expenditure in educational institutions (current
and capital), expressed as a percentage of GDP. It excludes transfers to private entities such as subsidies to households and students
but includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to government (http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary).”
(C and D) Out-of-pocket costs of center-based childcare and as a percentage of net family income for (single and dual parents – 100
percent the average wage, parents employed full-time); no information for Latin American countries with the exception of Colombia
and Mexico (classified in the dual-parent household column). For Colombia and Mexico, data is not completely comparable to highincome countries. This estimate is across all household types. Employment status of parents is unavailable, estimate is also for one
child in care. I classify these data in the dual parent household column since these household types are more prevalent across
countries. The percentage of average monthly out-of-pocket expenditure per child is expressed as percentage of household per capita
income (Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy 2016, 97).
(E and F) Definitions for mechanism of provision; data are derived from the OECD (2010, 2016): Public provision is largely publicly
funded and managed (more than 50 percent of enrollments are in public care facilities); private provision is largely managed by
private stakeholders (both for-profit and not-for-profit providers) and is publicly and privately managed. By mixed provision for Latin
American countries, I mean that about half of the centers are run by the government and half private entities. Note that in Latin
American countries, eligibility for care for young children (0-3 years of age) is means tested in all countries with the exception of
Brazil, in which care is universal in legislation but not in practice (no information for Paraguay) (see Blofield and Martinez Franzoni
(2015) Table 3-1 pages 18-19).
Regarding the mechanism of provision for children 0-2 years of age, there are specific notes for Latin American countries for
childcare services (mainly for children 0-2 years of age, and possibly including older children prior to compulsory schooling). I utilize
the information from Mateo Díaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016) on pages 137–139, including Figure 5.6 Model of childcare
provision in countries with nationally administered programs in selected countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Six out of the
seven countries in my study are included in this figure. Brazil is not included because programs are administered at the local level.
There are five provision models from Mateo Díaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016, 137); Unsubsidized private childcare = entirely
run by a private operator; public only has a regulatory role; subsidized private = provided by a private operator but receives financial
support from the government; subsidized community managed = centers are run by the community and provide formal childcare
services (receive public funding), I assume this is public care facilities; outsourced public childcare = financed entirely by the public
sector but the government pays private operators to run the centers; public = financed and managed directly by the government.
Author’s estimates for mechanism of provision (childcare services) from Mateo Díaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016, 139, Figure
5.6), percentage of all children in childcare: Paraguay = 65 percent public care/ 35 percent combination of public outsourced public =
public care (OECD), Mexico = 30 percent subsidized private/15 percent subsidized comm managed/20 percent outsourced public/ 35
percent public = mixed provision - this differs from the OECD typology. In Mexico the types of care for children 0-5 years of age are
as followed: Guarderías (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social [IMSS]); Estancias Infantiles (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social
[SEDESOL]) (1-4 years of age only); Estancias Infantiles (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado
[ISSSTE]), Centros de Desarrollo Infantil (CENDI SEP) and Centros Asistenciales de Desarrollo Infantil Comunitario (CADI) (DIF);
Panama = 85 percent community managed/15 percent public care = public care; Peru = 100 percent combination of public and
outsourced public = mixed provision; Uruguay = 100 percent outsourced public = private care; Colombia = 60 percent community
managed/40 percent outsourced public = public care; and Brazil = childcare programs are under the local administration of
municipalities = public care.
Regarding the dominant mechanism of provision for children in pre-primary education (3-5 years of age/compulsory schooling): This
was determined using the UNESCO/UIS Education data. I divided the number of children in pre-primary private institutions by the
total number of persons in pre-primary care. The percentage in private institutions is 38 percent or less in every Latin American
country: 25 percent Brazil (2013); 28 percent Colombia (2011); 14 percent Mexico (2013); 28 percent Panama (2012); 22 percent
Paraguay (2012); 31 percent Peru (2013); 38 percent Uruguay (2013). Country-specific notes for additional countries: In Ireland,
public care facilities were phased out between 2010 and 2016. According to the UNESCO UIS, by 2013 98 percent of all children in
pre-primary education were enrolled in private care facilities. For Slovenia, dominant mechanism of provision derived from Yerkes
and Javornik (2018) and UNESCO/UIS data. In 2013, only 3 percent of children were enrolled in private institutions.
(G and H) Weights for Dominant of Provision: Because enrollment rates are for formal care only (see above), I weight the enrollment
rates by their dominant mechanism of provision. Since private care has been found to be less accessible or affordable I am penalizing
countries with a dominant mechanism of care that is either privatized or mixed for both sets of enrollments. For public care = 1
(enrollment rate stays the same); Mixed provision = .75; Private care = .50.
(I and J) Enrollment rates in formal care arrangements for children 0-2 years of age in high-income countries adhere to the
International Standardization Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 guidelines for ISCED-0 (Early Childhood Education).
According to the OECD, “This generally includes children in ECEC services recognised under ISCED 2011 level 0 (ECEC services
that take place in an institutionalized setting and that contain an intentional education component, among other criteria)…” Note the
data used in these analyses are prior to the inclusion of children in other registered ECEC services outside the scope of ISCED 2011
level 0 (i.e. registered services that do not meet the criteria for classification under ISCED 2011 level 0, such as having an intentional
educational component)” (PF3.2: Enrolment in childcare and pre-school, 2018, 1). Estimates of enrollment rates in Latin American
countries do not adhere to the ISCED 2011 guidelines for ISCEC-0. However, I ensured that at a minimum, sources from Latin
America defined formal care as care in public and private arrangements outside of familial care arrangements (not informal) or
informal care arrangements. Mateo Díaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016, technical note page 3) defines childcare programs as all
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educational and care arrangements for children not yet of schooling age provided by others than the parents (separated into formal and
informal care arrangements).
Enrollment rates in formal care arrangements are derived from several different sources and years: Estimates for four Latin American
countries and year of data: Brazil (2012), Colombia (2012), Mexico (2009), and Uruguay (2013) are derived from Figure 4.4 in
Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016). Note estimates are based on findings presented in graph format and include children 0–
3 years of age (surveys differ on whether 3-year-olds are included in the 0–3 age group or the 3–5 age group and therefore there may
be some overlap). True estimates in numerical format are not available in the publication. The percentage of children attending formal
care is inclusive of nursery schools, daycare, pre-school, and any non-parental form of childcare outside of the home. The estimates
are based on the number of children attending childcare as a percentage of children in that specific age group (see Diaz and Chamussy
2015, 10). Estimates for the additional three Latin American countries and years of data: Panama (2010), Paraguay (2010), and Peru
(2010) are derived from Blofield and Franzoni (2015). Coverage in this case is for children from 0–3 years of age. I assume coverage
is the enrollment rate, since demand is always larger than the supply of available formal childcare across countries. They note the
following, which is also taken into consideration for pre-primary education values: “..the treatment of age groups may vary across
sources, whether drawn from government agencies in charge of services or household surveys. This is particularly the case for
children 3 years of age who may be counted under categories 0–3 or 3–6 depending on how each country defines the age bracket for
pre-school education and on the type of service reported in household surveys (Blofield and Franzoni 2015, 22).” Estimates for the six
high-income countries for around the year 2010 (to match the year of microdata used in another chapter) were derived from Moss
(2015, The International Review of Leave Research). The values from Moss (2015) were derived from the OECD Family Database.
For additional detailed information regarding estimates, sources, and definitions, see the below. Estimates for all additional highincome countries were derived from Koslowski et al. (2016), and come from the year 2013. The values from Moss (2016) were
derived from the OECD Family Database, Table PF3.2.A. The OECD definition of formal care for high-income countries is as
follows: “enrolment rates in early childhood education and care services for 0- to 2-year-olds, that is, the percentage of children aged
0-2 enrolled in or using early childhood education and care services (out of all children in that age group). This generally includes
children in ECEC services recognised under ISCED 2011 level 0 (ECEC services that take place in an institutionalised setting and that
contain an intentional education component, among other criteria)…” Note again these data are prior to the inclusion of children in
other registered ECEC services outside the scope of ISCED 2011 level 0 (i.e. registered services that do not meet the criteria for
classification under ISCED 2011 level 0, such as having an intentional educational component) (PF3.2: Enrollment in childcare and
pre-school, 2018, 1). Please see PF3.2 to learn more about differences to data collection and processes within countries. Net
enrollment rates for all countries derived from the UNESCO/UIS database from either 2010 or 2013 (to match the year of microdata).
Net enrollment rates are the total number of students in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled in that level,
expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group (http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary). Exceptions for enrollment rates
from UNESCO/UIS from years other than 2013: for Estonia the rate is from 2012, Colombia from 2011, and Germany, 2012
(Koslowski et al. 2016). For Canada and Iceland, the 2010 rates are derived from Moss (2015). Note that the rate for Panama differs
by 20 percentage points between 2012 (64 percent) and 2013 (44 percent). All enrollment rates for high-income country rates
available in the UNESCO/UIS were also cross referenced with rates from Moss (2015) and the OECD. For Switzerland and the United
Kingdom, there are sizeable discrepancies between estimates from Moss (2016) and the UIS data, though both sources utilize the
ISCED 2011 level 0 definition for ECEC services: Switzerland: Moss/OECD = 48 percent, UNESCO/UIS = 78 percent; United
Kingdom: Moss/OECD = 96 percent, UNESCO/UIS = 79 percent. Because utilizing data from fewer sources is optimal, I use the
UNESCO/UIS data in the final analyses.
Sources: Total public expenditure on pre-primary education in percent of gross domestic product (B):
UIS/UNESCO (2019). Out-of-pocket costs of center-based childcare and as a percentage of net family income (for single and dual
parent—100 percent the average wage, parents employed full-time) (C & D): CESinfo DICE (2014), Database for International
Comparison and Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2016). Dominant mechanism of provision for 0–2-year-olds (E): Mateo Díaz
and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2015, 2016); OECD (2010, 2016); SITEAL (2017); Yerkes and Javornik (2018). Dominant mechanism of
provision for 3–5-year-olds/up to compulsory schooling age (F): OECD (2010, 2016); SITEAL (2017); UNESCO UIS (2019).
Enrollment rates in formal care arrangements, children 0–2 years of age (I): Blofield and Franzoni (2015); Koslowski, Blum, and
Moss (2016); ISCED (2011); Mateo-Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy (2015, 2016); Moss (2015). Enrollment rates in pre-primary
education, children 3–5 years of age (J): Koslowski, Blum, and Moss (2016); Moss (2015); ISCED (2011); UNESCO/UIS (2019). For
columns G and H and K and L: Author's own calculations based on information from cols. E and F. See the above notes exceptions for
some source exceptions for specific countries.
ECEC universality notes:
(B-E) Legal entitlement to care: For high-income countriesm information is derived from Moss (2009– 2015); Koslowski, Blum, and
Moss (2016). Legal entitlement to care at the national level as defined in country-level education information. I categorize obligatory
pre-primary education as a legal entitlement to care as long as it is not part of the basic/compulsory school system. According to
SITEAL (2015) mandatory pre-school education is considered the first grade of basic education in Paraguay. Both Luxembourg and
Hungary offer legal entitlement to ECEC from 3 years of age and compulsory pre-primary education from 5 years of age. Latin
America Legislation for ages of compulsory education from Arrabal (2019): Brazil: Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação N.
9.394/96, 1996. Modified in 2006 and again in 2009: 4–5 years of age; Colombia Ley General de Educación, 1994: established
compulsory pre-school education from 5 years of age; Mexico: Ley General de Educación, 1993: 3–5 years of age; Panama: Ley
Orgánica de Educación, 1995: 4–5 years of age; Paraguay: Ley General de Educación, 1998: 5 years of age; Peru: Ley General de
Educación, 2003: 3–5 years of age; and Uruguay: Ley General de Educación, 2008: 4–5 years of age.
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(F) Legal access part-time or full-time: For high-income countries, information is derived from Koslowski, Blum, and Moss (2016);
Moss (2010–2015). For Latin American countries, information on hours for mandatory pre-primary education was mainly derived
from country-level and other sources. These hours don't refer to entitlement hours per se, but the hours of availability for program
types that are mandatory for enrollment laid out in the law. Brazil: 800 hours of schooling annually are required, spread over at least
200 school days, including at least 4 hours a day for part-time students and 7 hours a day for full-time students Library of Congress.
Global Legal Monitor. Brazil: Mandatory Pre-School Enrollment for Four Year Old Children. April 18, 2013.
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazil-mandatory-pre-school-enrollment-for-four-year-old-children/. Mexico: Some preschools are available for 3 hours per day, some up to 5 hours per day, and some up to 8 hours per day (see Gobierno de Mexico.
Educación Preescolar 2019, https://www2.aefcm.gob.mx/que_hacemos/preescolar.html). For example, CEI SEP is available full-time
up to 8 hours per day and CAIC is available part-time up to 5 hours per day. Panama: Entitlement part-time 4 hours per day, 20 hours
per week: Up to 4 hours per day/20 hours per week—See Ministerio de educacion republica de panama. Proyectos institutcionales o
programas desarrollados 2017. Direccion nacional de educacion inicia, 2017, http://www.meduca.gob.pa/sites/default/files/201710/Programas%20Desarrollados_Direcci%C3%B3n%20Nac.%20de%20Educaci%C3%B3n%20Inicial._Sept%202017.pdf. Peru:
Minimum school day is 5 hours per day x 5 days per week = 25 hours per week. Ministerio de Educación Peru, Lineaminetos para el
seguimiento y control de la labor efectiva de trabajo docente en las instituciones educatives publicas, Artículo 4°.– Mínimo de horas
efectivas de trabajo pedagógico (de acuerdo al Plan de Estudios), 2001–2019,
http://www.minedu.gob.pe/normatividad/reglamentos/Lineam-SegContTrabDocente.php. Uruguay: Most schools are 4 hours per day
(multiplied by 5 days per week = 20 hours) or part-time based on the definition. Some schools, however, offer full-time hours. See
Sistema Nacional de Educación Pública (SNEP), Del jardín a la escuela, 2019, http://snep.edu.uy/del-jardin-a-la-escuela/.
Sources: (B-E) Legal Entitlement to care: Arrabal (2019); Koslowski, Blum, and Moss (2016); SITEAL (2017). Legal entitlement to
care part-time or full-time (F): Gobierno de Mexico (2019); Koslowski, Blum, and Moss (2016); Library of Congress (2013); Moss
(2009–2015); Ministerio de Educación de Panama (2017); Ministerio de Educación Peru (2019); Sistema Nacional de Educación
Pública (SNEP) Uruguay (2019).
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Appendix Table 5.1 Additional Leave Policy Indicators, Mothers, 31 Countries
Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

Total
weeks of
pre-birth
maternity
a
leave
Indicator 1

Total weeks
of unpaid
leave
Indicator 2

4
2
0
3
8
3
6
8
6
0
0
0
2
0
0
8
4
0
6
0
0
0
8
4
0
1
6
6
6
7
6

0
0
0
0
83
146
96
0
26
0
52
35
30
26
12
17
0
36
134
146
0
156
136
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0

Total weeks Total weeks
Total
Total weeks
of unpaid
of poorly
weeks of
of paid
b
c
leave
leave
paid leave paid leave
Ascending
Indicator 3 Indicator 4 Descending
Rank
Rank
1
1
1
1
25
29
26
1
19
1
24
22
21
19
17
18
1
23
27
29
1
31
28
1
1
1
1
1
16
1
1
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0
0
0
0
0
0
82
26
0
0
0
15
26
33
0
17
26
0
0
0
0
0
28
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0

50
44
26
35
16
16
66
42
16
14
0
15
26
39
0
17
46
16
28
20
108
24
28
52
17
14
12
14
9
13
12

4
6
12
9
18
18
2
7
18
23
30
22
12
8
30
16
5
18
10
15
1
14
10
3
16
23
27
23
29
26
27

Appendix Table 5.1 continued

Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

Moderate
paid leave one year
cutoff
Indicator 5

Moderate
paid leave one year
cutoff
Midpoint
Rank

Moderate
paid leave six month
cutoff
Indicator 6

-2
-9
-26
-17
-36
-36
14
-10
-36
-38
-52
-37
-26
-13
-52
-35
-6
-36
-24
-32
56
-28
-24
0
-35
-38
-40
-38
-43
-39
-40

2
4
11
8
17
17
7
5
17
22
30
21
11
6
30
15
3
17
9
14
29
13
9
1
15
22
26
22
28
25
26

24
18
0
9
-10
-10
40
16
-10
-12
-26
-11
0
13
-26
-9
20
-10
2
-6
82
-2
2
26
-9
-12
-14
-12
-17
-13
-14

Moderate Share of paid Share of paid
paid leave - weeks out of weeks out of
six month total weeks of total weeks
cutoff
leave
of leave
Midpoint
Indicator 7 Descending
Rank
Rank
26
24
1
7
10
10
28
22
10
15
30
14
1
18
30
7
25
10
3
6
29
3
3
27
7
15
20
15
23
18
20

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.16
0.10
0.41
1.00
0.38
1.00
0.00
0.30
0.46
0.60
0.00
0.50
1.00
0.31
0.17
0.12
1.00
0.13
0.17
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.75
1.00
1.00

1
1
1
1
26
29
20
1
21
1
30
23
19
17
30
18
1
22
24
28
1
27
25
1
1
1
1
1
16
1
1

Notes: Line divides refer to welfare state groups. The policy measure is followed by the rank in all instances. Latin American
countries are still included in all tables.
Source: Author's own calculations based on information from Appendix Table 4.1.
a
All pre-birth leave is paid.
b
Less than 67 percent of usual earnings.
c
Refers to leave paid at any wage replacement rate. Note this indicator is the same one used in the analyses but is also provided here to
compare to the indicators utilizing the one-year and six-month cutoff points.
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Appendix Table 5.2 Additional Leave Policy Indicators, Fathers, 31 Countries
Country

Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Austria
France
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Australia
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom
United States
Greece
Italy
Spain
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Brazil
Colombia
Paraguay
Uruguay
Mexico
Panama
Peru

Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
weeks of
weeks of weeks of weeks of
weeks of paid leave - paid leave - paid leave - paid leave unpaid
unpaid
poorly
paid
paid leave
one year
one year
six month
six month
leave
leave
paid
leave*** Descending
cutoff
cutoff
cutoff
cutoff
Indicator 2 Ascending leave** Indicator 4
Rank
Indicator 5 Midpoint
Indicator 6 Midpoint
Rank
Indicator 3
Rank
Rank
0
0
0
0
4.7
154
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
13
12
17.3
0
50
134
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
17
24
1
1
1
25
25
25
20
19
18
21
1
22
23
16
1
1
25
1
1
1
1
1
25
25
25

0
0
0
2
0
0
8.7
26
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
17.32
0
0
0
0
0
0
10.9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
3
13
12
0
2
8.7
26
0.4
0
0
0
0
2
0
0.4
17.52
2.1
0
0
1
2
0
13
1
1.2
0.6
0.6
0
0
0

9
7
3
5
20
9
6
1
18
25
25
25
20
9
20
18
2
8
20
20
14
9
25
3
14
13
16
16
25
25
25

-50
-49
-39
-40
-52
50
-43.3
-26
-51.6
-52
-52
-52
-52
-50
-52
-51.6
-34.48
-49.9
-52
-52
-51
-50
-52
-39
-51
-50.8
-51.4
-51.4
-52
-52
-52

9
7
3
5
20
9
6
1
18
25
25
25
20
9
20
18
2
8
20
20
14
9
25
3
14
13
16
16
25
25
25

-24
-23
-13
-14
-26
-24
-17.3
0
-25.6
-26
-26
-26
-26
-24
-26
-25.6
-8.48
-23.9
-26
-26
-25
-24
-26
-13
-25
-24.8
-25.4
-25.4
-26
-26
-26

9
7
3
5
20
9
6
1
18
25
25
25
20
9
20
18
2
8
20
20
14
9
25
3
14
13
16
16
25
25
25

Notes: Australia, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland do not allocate non-transferrable leave to
fathers. These seven countries rank last (rank of a 25 across each measure).
Source: Author's own calculations based on information from Appendix Table 4.1
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Appendix Table 9.2 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Highly Educated Men and
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.21*
-0.55*
-0.99*** -0.34**
-0.25**
(-2.46)
(-2.10)
(-4.36)
(-2.61)
(-2.62)
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.00)
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
-0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
(8.98)
(8.98)
(8.98)
(8.99)
(8.98)
-0.0079
-0.008
-0.0078
-0.0081
-0.0079
(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)
0.0039
(0.54)
0.0055
(1.35)

Universality of leave

(-0.32)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

-0.023
(-0.59)
0.064***
(3.55)

Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0054
(0.56)
0.0064
(1.19)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)

-0.017
(-0.40)
0.022
(0.87)

Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

201866
24

201866
24

201866
24
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201555
23

201866
24

Appendix Table 9.2 continued
M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.36*
-0.55
-0.45**
-0.17
-0.33
(-2.36)
(-1.41)
(-1.43)
(-1.89)
(-2.86)
Marital status
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
0.49***
(24.00)
(24.00)
(24.10)
(24.10)
(24.00)
Age
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
0.28***
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.40)
(25.30)
(25.40)
Age squared
-0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.9)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
Number of hh members 17 or younger
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
(8.98)
(8.98)
(8.99)
(9.00)
(8.99)
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
-0.008
-0.0079
-0.0072
-0.0074
-0.008
Gender (female = 1)

Other person in the household employed

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

(-0.30)
-0.82***
(-33.9)

(-0.30)
-0.82***
(-33.9)

(-0.33)
-0.82***
(-33.8)

0.011
(1.11)
0.0063
(1.11)

0.02
(0.71)
0.023
(1.50)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.0008
(-0.099)
0.0053
(1.15)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.0046
(0.54)
0.0042
(0.89)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.0029
0.0043
(1.22)
(1.73)
-0.00076 -0.000089
(-0.51)
(-0.058)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
201866
24

201866
24

201866
24

201555
23

-0.0003
(-0.54)
-0.00036
(-1.15)
201555
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with high educational attainments only. The universality scale is
treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.3 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Medium-Educated Men and
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.32***
-0.31
-0.89**
-0.30*
-0.31**
(-3.65)
(-1.07)
(-3.21)
(-2.07)
(-3.16)
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
0.66***
(37.10)
(37.10)
(37.10)
(37.00)
(37.10)
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
0.13***
(14.10)
(14.10)
(14.10)
(14.20)
(14.10)
-0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014***
(-11.6)
(-11.6)
(-11.6)
(-11.7)
(-11.6)
-0.0023
-0.0023
-0.0022
-0.0016
-0.0023
(-0.25)
(-0.25)
(-0.24)
(-0.18)
(-0.25)
-0.026
-0.026
-0.026
-0.024
-0.026
(-1.19)
(-1.20)
(-1.19)
(-1.11)
(-1.20)
-0.39***
-0.39***
-0.39***
-0.39***
-0.39***
(-21.3)
(-21.3)
(-21.3)
(-21.3)
(-21.3)
0.0069
(1.11)
-0.00031
(-0.070)
-0.021
(-0.62)
0.047*
(2.13)
0.01
(1.17)
-0.0009
(-0.15)
0.033
(0.90)
-0.0076
(-0.29)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

216874
24

216874
24

216874
24
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215789
23

216874
24

Appendix Table 9.3 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
-0.36*
(-2.24)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)
-0.0023
(-0.25)
-0.026
(-1.20)
-0.39***
(-21.3)

M7
-0.22
(-0.50)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)
-0.0023
(-0.25)
-0.026
(-1.19)
-0.39***
(-21.3)

M8
-0.31*
(-2.51)
0.66***
(37.10)
0.13***
(14.10)
-0.0014***
(-11.6)
-0.0022
(-0.24)
-0.026
(-1.19)
-0.39***
(-21.4)

M9
-0.27
(-1.35)
0.66***
(37.00)
0.13***
(14.20)
-0.0014***
(-11.7)
-0.0016
(-0.18)
-0.024
(-1.10)
-0.39***
(-21.3)

M10
-0.37*
(-2.05)
0.66***
(37.00)
0.13***
(14.20)
-0.0014***
(-11.7)
-0.0016
(-0.18)
-0.024
(-1.11)
-0.39***
(-21.3)

0.011
(1.22)
-0.0014
(-0.22)

0.026
(1.06)
0.0095
(0.54)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.0062
(0.90)
0.0012
(0.25)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.0067
(0.91)
-0.0013
(-0.25)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00012
(-0.054)
-0.00025
(-0.16)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00081
(0.35)
-0.00043
(-0.26)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

216874
24

216874
24

216874
24

215789
23

-0.00034
(-0.70)
-0.00022
(-0.62)
215789
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with medium educational attainments only. The universality scale
is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.

369

Appendix Table 9.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Low-Educated Men and
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.29**
-0.28
-0.74**
-0.27
-0.28**
(-3.26)
(-1.00)
(-2.60)
(-1.85)
(-2.81)
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
(29.10)
(29.10)
(29.10)
(29.00)
(29.20)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.099***
0.10***
(9.35)
(9.35)
(9.35)
(9.26)
(9.35)
-0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00082*** -0.00083***
(-6.13)
(-6.13)
(-6.13)
(-6.02)
(-6.13)
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.047***
-0.049***
(-4.98)
(-4.98)
(-4.98)
(-4.81)
(-4.98)
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
(-2.09)
(-2.09)
(-2.09)
(-2.09)
(-2.10)
0.0045
(0.68)
-0.000099
(-0.023)
-0.016
(-0.43)
0.037^
(1.64)
0.0062
(0.71)
-0.0012
(-0.19)
0.061
(1.62)
-0.0059
(-0.23)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

79863
24

79863
24
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79863
24

79655
23

79863
24

Appendix Table 9.4 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.3
-0.25
-0.29*
-0.27
-0.34
(-1.86)
(-0.58)
(-2.40)
(-1.37)
(-1.86)
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
0.61***
(29.20)
(29.10)
(29.10)
(29.00)
(29.00)
0.10***
0.10***
0.10***
0.099***
0.099***
(9.34)
(9.35)
(9.34)
(9.25)
(9.26)
-0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00083*** -0.00082*** -0.00082***
(-6.12)
(-6.13)
(-6.12)
(-6.02)
(-6.02)
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.049***
-0.047***
-0.047***
(-4.98)
(-4.98)
(-4.97)
(-4.80)
(-4.82)
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
-0.012
(-0.45)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
(-0.44)
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
-0.041*
(-2.10)
(-2.09)
(-2.10)
(-2.10)
(-2.08)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0019
(0.21)
-0.0012
(-0.18)

Well-paid leave (fathers)

0.029
(1.15)
0.0088
(0.50)

Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.014*
(1.97)
0.0005
(0.10)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.0019
(0.24)
-0.0005
(-0.097)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0028
(-1.27)
0.000098
(0.06)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0036
(-1.61)
0.000024
(0.02)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
79863
24

79863
24

79863
24

79655
23

-0.00047
(-0.96)
-0.00021
(-0.60)
79655
23

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with low educational attainments only. The universality scale is
treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.5 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Highly Educated
Employed Men and Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.091***
-0.089**
-0.097**
-0.071***
-0.088***
(-8.99)
(-2.64)
(-3.10)
(-4.82)
(-8.31)
0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0083***
(95.20)
(95.20)
(95.20)
(95.10)
(95.20)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
(12.60)
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
0.030***
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
(26.10)
-0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00031***
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
(-21.8)
-0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0039*** -0.0038***
(-3.92)
(-3.93)
(-3.93)
(-4.00)
(-3.91)
0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0083*** 0.0082***
(3.43)
(3.43)
(3.43)
(3.46)
(3.44)
0.0038
0.0038
0.0038
0.004
0.0039
(1.69)
(1.68)
(1.69)
(1.74)
(1.71)
0.00038
-0.85
-0.000042
(-0.073)
0.00044
(0.22)
0.00051
(0.20)
0.000081
(0.14)
-0.0015^
(-1.87)
-0.0041
(-1.62)
-0.0027
(-0.79)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

70274
19

70274
19

70274
19
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70028
18

70274
19

Appendix Table 9.5 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

-0.098***
(-5.09)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.92)
0.0082***
(3.44)
0.0038
(1.70)

-0.079
(-1.71)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.92)
0.0082***
(3.43)
0.0038
(1.69)

-0.078***
(-5.55)
0.0083***
(95.20)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0038***
(-3.93)
0.0082***
(3.43)
0.0038
(1.69)

-0.053**
(-2.91)
0.0083***
(95.10)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0039***
(-4.00)
0.0083***
(3.46)
0.0039
(1.73)

-0.076***
(-4.51)
0.0083***
(95.10)
0.029***
(12.60)
0.030***
(26.10)
-0.00031***
(-21.8)
-0.0039***
(-4.00)
0.0082***
(3.45)
0.004
(1.75)

0.00021
(0.38)
-0.0017*
(-2.20)

0.0017
(1.30)
-0.00055
(-0.28)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.00068
(-1.24)
0.00032
-0.45

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.00047
(1.05)
-0.00015
(-0.26)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.000073
(0.50)
-0.00023
(-1.27)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00018
(1.43)
-0.00027
(-1.56)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

70274
19

70274
19

70274
19

70028
18

-0.000047
(-1.36)
-0.000028
(-0.56)
70028
18

Notes: Model is based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with high educational attainments only. The universality scale is
treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.6 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Medium-Educated
Employed Men and Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.12***
-0.12***
-0.12***
-0.11***
-0.12***
(-14.1)
(-4.36)
(-4.57)
(-8.58)
(-13.2)
0.0072***
0.0072***
0.0072***
0.0071***
0.0072***
(88.00)
(88.00)
(88.00)
(87.50)
(88.00)
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
0.023***
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.20)
(11.10)
(11.20)
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.40)
(14.20)
(14.40)
-0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00015***
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
(-11.1)
(-11.3)
-0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0036***
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
(-3.90)
(-3.77)
(-3.89)
0.0038
0.0038
0.0038
0.0037
0.0038
(1.57)
(1.57)
(1.57)
(1.52)
(1.57)
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
0.013***
(6.21)
(6.21)
(6.21)
(6.48)
(6.21)
-0.00012
(-0.21)
0.000076
(0.16)
0.00076
(0.29)
0.000044
(0.02)
-0.00088
(-0.96)
-0.0011^
(-1.68)
-0.0037
(-1.08)
-0.0023
(-0.80)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

68484
19

68484
19

68484
19
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67704
18

68484
19

Appendix Table 9.6 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
M7
-0.12***
-0.11**
(-7.68)
(-2.77)
0.0072*** 0.0072***
(88.00)
(88.00)
0.023***
0.023***
(11.20)
(11.20)
0.015***
0.015***
(14.40)
(14.40)
-0.00015*** -0.00015***
(-11.3)
(-11.3)
-0.0036*** -0.0036***
(-3.89)
(-3.89)
0.0038
0.0038
(1.57)
(1.57)
0.013***
0.013***
(6.21)
(6.21)

M8
-0.091***
(-3.68)
0.0017*
(2.03)
0.021
(0.88)
0.022
(1.71)
-0.00026
(-1.63)
0.0054
-0.51
0.028
(0.95)
0.12**
(2.98)

M9
M10
-0.086***
-0.10***
(-6.10)
(-7.38)
0.0071*** 0.0071***
(87.50)
(87.50)
0.023***
0.023***
(11.10)
(11.10)
0.015***
0.015***
(14.20)
(14.20)
-0.00015*** -0.00015***
(-11.1)
(-11.1)
-0.0035*** -0.0035***
(-3.77)
(-3.76)
0.0037
0.0037
(1.52)
(1.52)
0.013***
0.013***
(6.48)
(6.48)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00083
(-0.90)
-0.0013*
(-2.20)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0023
(1.10)
-0.0013
(-0.80)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.00038
(-0.53)
0.00016
(0.27)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.00021
(0.36)
-0.00011
(-0.23)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00015
(-0.43)
0.0005
(1.03)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.000066
(0.33)
-0.00028*
(-2.13)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

68484
19

68484
19

68484
19

67704
18

-0.000089^
(-1.68)
0.0000047
(0.11)
67704
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with medium educational attainments only. The universality scale
is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.7 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Low-Educated Employed
Men and Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female* coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Female*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.13***
-0.11**
-0.11***
-0.10***
-0.12***
(-13.2)
(-3.29)
(-3.76)
(-7.63)
(-12.5)
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.20)
(48.40)
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
(5.65)
(5.65)
(5.66)
(5.61)
(5.66)
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0097***
0.0095***
(5.31)
(5.31)
(5.31)
(5.37)
(5.31)
-0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000085*** -0.000084***
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.83)
(-3.77)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.0021
-0.002
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.37)
(-1.38)
(-1.37)
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0049
0.0048
(1.18)
(1.18)
(1.17)
(1.19)
(1.18)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.90)
-0.000091
(-0.12)
-0.00041
(-0.74)
0.0035
(1.05)
-0.0016
(-0.66)
0.00017
(0.14)
-0.0018*
(-2.44)
0.00071
(0.16)
-0.0031
(-1.00)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

20164
19

20164
19

20164
19
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20083
18

20164
19

Appendix Table 9.7 continued
Gender (female = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.13***
-0.075
-0.11***
-0.079***
-0.094***
(-6.89)
(-1.79)
(-8.54)
(-5.21)
(-6.26)
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
0.0059***
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.40)
(48.30)
(48.20)
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
0.019***
(5.65)
(5.66)
(5.64)
(5.59)
(5.61)
0.0095***
0.0095***
0.0096***
0.0097***
0.0097***
(5.31)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.39)
(5.38)
-0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000084*** -0.000086*** -0.000085***
(-3.77)
(-3.77)
(-3.78)
(-3.85)
(-3.83)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.0021
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.36)
(-1.37)
(-1.38)
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0048
0.0049
(1.18)
(1.18)
(1.17)
(1.17)
(1.19)
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
0.029***
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.91)
(8.91)

Coordination of care
Female* coordination of care
Universality of leave
Female*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.00023
(0.19)
-0.0021**
(-3.06)

Female*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0021
(0.74)
-0.0038*
(-2.15)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Female*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Female*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.000085
(0.09)
0.00017
(0.24)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.00005
(0.07)
-0.00067
(-1.29)

Female*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00016
(0.63)
-0.00034^
(-1.91)

Female*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.00012
(0.46)
-0.00039*
(-2.50)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Female*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
20164
19

20164
19

20164
19

20083
18

-0.000056
(-0.75)
0.000055
(1.21)
20083
18

Notes: Models are based off of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3, with a few exceptions. In this study, an education
control variable is omitted because the sample is reduced to persons with low educational attainments only. The universality scale is
treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019). Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was
determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme value.
^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.8 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Employment among Low- and Highly Educated
Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Educational attainment (low ed. = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-1.67***
-1.41***
-1.33**
-1.49***
-1.75***
(-13.1)
(-3.45)
(-3.10)
(-8.22)
(-12.7)
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
(23.00)
(23.00)
(23.00)
(22.90)
(23.00)
-0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.6)
(-18.7)
-0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068***
(-7.17)
(-7.17)
(-7.17)
(-7.14)
(-7.17)
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.31)
(-6.27)
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.36***
-0.35***
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
0.0082
(1.12)
-0.0044
(-0.69)
0.042
(1.05)
-0.028
(-0.83)
0.011
(1.08)
-0.0066
(-0.88)
0.011
(0.24)
0.048
(1.32)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low education*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

147661
24

147661
24

147661
24

378

147362
23

147661
24

Appendix Table 9.8 continued
Educational attainment (low ed. = 1)
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-1.88***
-1.13
-1.50***
-1.36***
-0.87***
(-8.20)
(-1.84)
(-9.24)
(-5.75)
(-6.60)
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.30***
0.31***
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
(16.00)
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
0.24***
(23.00)
(23.00)
(23.00)
(22.90)
(22.90)
-0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.7)
(-18.6)
(-18.6)
-0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(-7.17)
(-7.17)
(-7.15)
(-7.11)
(-7.14)
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.14***
(-6.27)
(-6.27)
(-6.25)
(-6.29)
(-6.31)
-0.35***
-0.35***
-0.36***
-0.36***
-0.36***
(-16.8)
(-16.8)
(-16.9)
(-16.9)
(-16.8)

Coordination of care
Female*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low ed.*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

0.015
(1.50)
-0.016**
(-3.26)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.039
(1.37)
-0.0054
(-0.24)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.

0.0066
(0.80)
0.0075
(1.07)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.0069
(0.78)
-0.0067
(-0.90)

Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

0.0023
0.0037
(0.91)
(1.42)
-0.0055** -0.0078***
(-2.97)
(-6.02)

Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

147661
24

147661
24

147661
24

147362
23

-0.00059
(-1.06)
-0.000025
(-0.058)
147362
23

Notes: Model is an extension of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 3, Model 3. Sample is reduced to women with low and high
educational attainments only. The universality scale is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019).
Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme
value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Appendix Table 9.9 Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Annual Earnings among Low- and Highly
Educated Employed Women: Coefficients and (Z-scores) (ages 25–54)
Educational status (low ed. = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed
Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low education*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)

MI
M2
M3
M4
M5
-0.25***
-0.20***
-0.25***
-0.23***
-0.25***
(-17.8)
(-4.38)
(-5.74)
(-11.0)
(-17.2)
0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096***
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.50)
(99.70)
0.0053*
0.0053*
0.0053*
0.0053*
0.0053*
(2.02)
(2.02)
(2.02)
(1.99)
(2.01)
0.027***
0.027***
0.027***
0.028***
0.027***
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
-0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029***
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.81)
(-8.71)
-0.00024
-0.00024
-0.00024
-0.00014
-0.00023
(-0.082)
(-0.082)
(-0.082)
(-0.050)
(-0.080)
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
(4.71)
(4.70)
(4.70)
(4.77)
(4.71)
0.00029
(0.39)
-0.00087
(-1.11)
0.0013
(0.38)
0.00013
(0.04)
-0.0014
(-1.31)
-0.00077
(-0.65)
-0.0066
(-1.54)
0.0036
(0.75)

Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.
Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.
Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)
Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

45877
19

45877
19

45877
19

380

45685
18

45877
19

Appendix Table 9.9 continued
Educational status (low ed. = 1)
Weekly hours worked
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Number of hh members 17 or younger
Presence of child 5 years or below in hh
Other person in the household employed

M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
-0.26***
-0.16*
-0.25***
-0.22***
-0.22***
(-9.78)
(-2.55)
(-12.2)
(-8.13)
(-9.32)
0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096***
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.70)
(99.50)
(99.50)
0.0053*
0.0054*
0.0053*
0.0053*
0.0053*
(2.02)
(2.02)
(2.01)
(1.99)
(2.01)
0.027***
0.027***
0.027***
0.028***
0.028***
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
(20.40)
-0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029*** -0.00029***
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
(-17.2)
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.73)
(-8.81)
(-8.81)
-0.00023
-0.00023
-0.00024
-0.00015
-0.00016
(-0.080)
(-0.081)
(-0.083)
(-0.050)
(-0.054)
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
0.014***
(4.70)
(4.70)
(4.70)
(4.77)
(4.77)

Coordination of care
Low ed.*coordination of care
Universality of leave
Low education*universality of leave
Well-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0015
(-1.42)
-0.00092
(-0.78)

Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers)

0.0014
(0.57)
-0.0033
(-1.20)

Well-paid leave (fathers)
Low ed.*well-paid leave (fathers)
Weighted enrollment 0-2 yrs.
Low ed.*enroll 0-2 yrs.

-0.00018
(-0.19)
0.0006
(0.60)

Weighted enrollment 3 yrs. to comp.

0.00024
(0.32)
-0.0012
(-1.55)

Low ed.*enroll 3 yrs. to comp.
Unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.0002
(-0.80)
-0.000061
(-0.23)

Low ed.*unpaid/low-paid leave (mothers)

-0.00015
(-0.67)
-0.0002
(-0.78)

Well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
Low ed.*well-paid leave (mothers) sq.
N
No. of countries

45877
19

45877
19

45877
19

45685
18

-0.00008
(-1.25)
0.000073
(1.01)
45685
18

Notes: Models are an extension of Brady, Blome, and Kmec (2019) Table 2, Model 3. Sample is reduced to women with low and high
educational attainments only. The universality scale is treated as a continuous variable for the interaction term (see Williams 2019).
Models 4, 9, and 10 exclude Hungary because it was determined that weeks of well-paid leave for mothers in Hungary is an extreme
value. ^P < 0.10, *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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GLOSSARY
Annual earnings (socio-economic classification): Denotes differences in job
characteristics among the employed; in this study high-earnings are those with earnings above
the median. Low earnings are those with earnings below the median. Annual earnings are
converted country specific percentiles for the analyses in this study.
Childcare services: Available to very young children, typically 0 and up through 2 years
of age. In this study, I define children in childcare as those aged 0 and up through 2 years of age
(prior to a child's 3rd birthday).
Dimension (policy): Refers to one dimension of a leave or ECEC policy: generosity,
gender equality, or universality.
Dominant mechanism of provision (public or private): Indicates whether ECEC or
pre-primary education is predominantly provided by public or private childcare providers.
Early childhood education and care (ECEC): Common name for care of children
between 0 and up to the age of compulsory schooling (typically 5 or 6 years of age); it is also an
umbrella term that encompasses two different types of care: child care services and pre-primary
education (see below). ECEC, ECEC services, and ECEC arrangements are all utilized
interchangeably to describe these services.
Educational status: Socio-economic classification by education level. In the LIS, three
different class divisions are used: below a high-school degree (low educational attainment),
completion of a secondary degree (high school education in the US and some college, medium
educational attainment), and completion of a university education (4-year university degree—
US equivalent, high educational attainment).
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Family policies: Those policies that assist mothers (or fathers) to stay home and care for
children.
Female-typed occupations: Low status roles, often low-paid with little opportunity for
occupational advancement. In this literature, often refers to occupations in the public care sector.
Formal care arrangements: An umbrella term that encompasses both public and private
care provisions that are at least in part publicly funded (in Mandel 2011, for example, data covers
four types of childcare arrangements: group care, residential care, child-minders, and paid care
providers at home).
Gender egalitarian leave: Leave policies that are equally accessible by working mothers
and fathers and are most likely to lead to symmetrical use by both parents.
Gender equality in leave legislation: Fathers' reserved share of all leave provided to
both mothers and fathers. The share should ideally be 50 percent (half for the mother and half for
the father).
Gender employment inequalities: Refers to gender gaps between men and women
across different labor market outcomes, including earnings and occupational attainment
(managerial or lucrative managerial status, for example).
Gendered tradeoffs (see also unintended consequences): Refers to a specific
relationship between work-family policies/work-family reconciliation policies and labor market
outcomes. Policies such as leave and ECEC can promote equality in employment, but worsened
gaps across measures of labor market attainment—mainly earnings and occupational attainment.
Unintended consequences may vary for some groups of women compared to others across the
class spectrum.
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Generosity of ECEC: Normally defined and measured by enrollment rates of children in
care that is publicly provided or subsidized by private dollars. In this study, the generosity of
ECEC is defined as enrollment of children in two age groups prior to compulsory schooling (0–2
years) and (3 years to compulsory schooling) in care.
Generosity of leave: How much leave is granted to each recipient, for example, the
weeks of leave allocated to mothers. These leaves can be paid or unpaid.
Generosity of welfare state provisions: Refers to the generosity of welfare states as a
whole across different measures. Generosity is measured in different ways across the literature,
but the general idea is that “more” welfare state spending, longer leaves, or higher enrollments of
children in care are indicative of “generosity,” for example.
High-status (socio-economic status): Generalized socio-economic classification—those
with high levels of education (a university degree or higher) and/or high earnings, or high levels
of occupational attainment (e.g., having a managerial status).
Home care policies: Those policies that assist mothers (or fathers) to stay home and care
for children.
Indicator (policy): The tool that is used to measure dimensions of work-family
reconciliation policies; in the context of my dissertation, used to test relationships between workfamily reconciliation policies and employment outcomes. (See also, measure.)
Leave incentives/disincentives: A situation where fathers are incentivized or
disincentivized to take a portion of leave, when leave is not specifically reserved for the father.
Leave policies: Inclusive of three different types of leave: maternity leave (leave that can
be taken by the mother around the birth of a child), paternity leave (leave that can be taken by the
father around the birth of a child), and parental leave (longer leaves that can be taken by either
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the mother or father once maternity leave ends). Rules surrounding leave and take-up varies by
countries.
Low-status (socio-economic status): Generalized socio-economic classification—those
with low levels of education (less than a university degree) and/or low earnings (such as earnings
below the median (Mandel 2012) or lower earnings quintiles), and those in unskilled positions.
Measure (policy): The tool that is used to measure dimensions of work-family
reconciliation policies; in the context of my dissertation, a measure is used to test relationships
between work-family reconciliation policies and employment outcomes. (See also, indicator.)
Occupational status: Socio-economic classification by occupation, defined by Shalev
(2008) and Mandel and Shalev (2009). In these studies, two occupational groups are compared:
managers at the top and menial services workers at the bottom, described as “the post-industrial
working class, encompassing unskilled and semiskilled work in sales, care work, cleanup, food,
and entertainment. The choice of the two is to represent different patterns of women’s labor
market integration as well as different poles of the contemporary class structure. The first is
home ground for the glass ceiling, while the second encompasses the lower reaches of the
feminized service sector” (Shalev 2008, 433).
Policy dimension: Work-family policies are multidimensional and made up of different
parts. A policy dimension refers to a specific dimension of either leave or ECEC policy that can
ideally be measured—generosity, gender equality, and universality. Specific dimensions include
the length of leave, payment rate of leave (leave policy generosity) or the number of children
aged 0 to 2 enrolled in childcare services (ECEC policy generosity), for example.
Pre-primary education: Early education arrangements that are available to children
typically between 3 years and the age of compulsory schooling.

385

Pre-school and pre-kindergarten: Two specific types of schooling that fall under the
umbrella of pre-primary educational arrangements.
Private care: (See Dominant mechanism of provision) Care that is largely managed by
private stakeholders but can be both publicly and privately funded. Private childcare providers
may also operate without public dollars and therefore be completely privately financed.
Public care: (See Dominant mechanism of provision) Care that is both publicly
managed and financed.
Reserved leave/individual non-transferrable leave/non-sharable leave: Leave that is
specifically reserved for the mother or father and cannot be shared or transferred to the other
parent.
Take up (verb) and take-up (noun): Take up (verb) refers to the actual use of the leave
policy benefit. Take-up (noun) refers to ratio of leave recipients to eligible leave recipients.
Tradeoff or paradox: Relationship between work-family policies and adverse labor
market outcomes for women. A stretching of the original concepts to include more adverse
outcomes such as employment or earnings gaps among women.
Unintended consequences: Refers to a specific relationship between work-family
policies/work-family reconciliation policies and labor market outcomes. Policies such as leave
and ECEC can promote equality in employment, but worsened gaps across measures of labor
market attainment—mainly earnings and occupational attainment. Unintended consequences
may vary for some groups of women compared to others across the class spectrum.
Universality of ECEC: Refers to the child’s entitlement to leave and whether that
entitlement is part-time (less than 20 hours per week) or full-time (20 hours per week or more).
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Universality of ECEC: Who is eligible to receive the benefit/the breadth of the
population covered.
Use it or lose it incentive: Leave that the father must use that if not used, cannot be
transferred to the other parent. Leave that is reserved and non-transferrable to the mother.
Welfare state policies: National level set of social policies across different areas, such as
old-age security, employment benefits, social assistance, poverty reduction, and work-family
policies, that comprise the welfare states of individual countries.
Welfare state regimes: In this study, I am specifically referring to Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) typology—the relationship between the state, markets, and households; high-income
countries mainly from Europe and North America are classified into three regime types based on
similarities of political and economic institutions, including social and labor market policies:
Social Democratic, Conservative-Corporatist, and Liberal. Note Esping-Andersen’s work is just
one example of a regime typology, but it has been influential and widely used in gendered
tradeoffs research.
Welfare state paradox: That generous or well-developed welfare states with large
public service sectors—mainly the Social Democratic welfare states (Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden)—promote women’s employment but hinder women’s chances for high
earnings and desirable positions (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).
Well-developed work-family reconciliation policies: Those policies that best support
women’s employment across multiple policy dimensions, based on evidence from the literature.
It is a technical term that is distinctly related to the measurement of leave and ECEC policies.
Leave and ECEC policies are considered well-developed if they rank highly across indicators
that measure multiple policy dimensions.
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Women’s class inequality: The link between work-family reconciliation policies and
gaps among women in employment. In this study, women’s class inequality refers to suggested
improved gaps among women across measures of employment and wages measured by low and
high educational attainment.
Work-family policies: A subset of welfare state policies; inclusive of both work-family
reconciliation policies and home care policies.
Work-family reconciliation policies: Those policies that help parents combine work and
employment. The two policies of interest for this dissertation are leave policies taken around
childbirth and publicly subsidized childcare or ECEC policies, traditionally targeting mothers’
work-life balance.
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